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Abstract 
In attempting to account for a weaker Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto 
independence in the face of a more powerful China’s irredentist claim, much of the 
literature is predicated on counter-factuals, misconceptions and wishful thinking. 
That is, it sees Taiwan facing an inhibited binary choice between independence from 
(taidu) and unification with (tongyi) Beijing. In doing so, the literature ignores the 
fact that Taiwan has been an independent, sovereign state under the name of the 
Republic of China since 1949 and that this status quo constitutes that reality through 
an intermediate state identity and discourse of “ROC Independence”, or huadu.  
Huadu, therefore, is worth analysing in its own right as the phemomenon that 
accounts for Taipei’s maintenance of its de facto independence. Huadu developed 
from rational responses by the authoritarian ROC state to three crises of legitimacy 
on Taiwan; first, in 1947 when it responded with violence and entrenchment, second, 
after 1971 when it responded with liberalisation and, third, after 1987 when a 
democratising ROC pivoted to the PRC. The fortuitous result of that encounter for 
Taipei was that huadu became encoded as the 1992 Consensus of One-China-
Respective-Interpretations (OCRI) - a tacit agreement with Beijing that permitted de 
facto peaceful international relations while shelving Taiwan’s de jure status as long 
as neither side violated the status quo. This study argues that huadu nucleated in 
post-1987 democratisation and crystalised in post-2008 Rapprochement with Beijing, 
legitimating and securing the ROC ontologically as a sovereign Taiwan. In so doing, 
huadu delegitimates taidu and tongyi and effectively stalemates Beijing’s power by 
compelling its sanction. A realist-constructivist account that uses a linguistics-
informed discourse analysis is an innovative approach that best elucidates huadu. It 
is realist and constructivist because, first, it provides firm textual warrant for huadu’s 
viii 
intersubjective co-constitution in power politics and, second, it treats cross-Strait 
relations as they are, not as interested parties would like them to be. 
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1 
Chapter 1: Constructing the cross-Strait Status Quo 
Everyone should just think: Is there another relationship in the world like the cross-strait 
relationship? There is none. It is extremely complex and involves internal issues, foreign relations, 
military matters, and economics.1 
In 1999 the DPP also adopted a resolution that recognized the status quo that Taiwan is already 
independent with the national title the Republic of China, and I'm sure the Chinese know that. 2 
There is only one China in the world and Taiwan has been a part of China's territory since 
antiquity. This is a reality widely recognized by the international community.3 
1.1. Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC), seated in Beijing, retains overwhelming 
material power preponderance over Taiwan, or the Republic of China (ROC), seated 
in Taipei. The military website, Global Firepower, ranks the PRC 3rd and Taiwan 
18th in terms of warfighting capability in 2017.4 The Composite Index of National 
Capability (CINC) places the PRC as the world’s most powerful country and Taiwan 
24th in 2007.5  At the same time, by deploying its daguo, or “Great Power” state 
1 Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2015. Opening remarks by President Ma at 
an international press conference following meeting with mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping in 
Singapore (November 7 2015): [Online] Available at: 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=FE07F9DA122E29D4&sms=3A4E63FA5107487
D&s=09053FE4D429BE95 [Accessed 1 May 2017]. 
2 Wu, Jiaushieh. 2016. Quoted in The Brookings Institution, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Assessing the Outcomes and Implications of Taiwan's January 2016 Elections, 18 January 
2016. Available at: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/event/160119_csis_brookings_taiwan_transcript.pdf [Accessed 25 January 2016].  
3 Permanent Mission by the People’s Republic of China to the UN. 2007.  Statement by Ambassador 
Wang Guangya at the General Committee of the 62nd GA Session. Wednesday, 19 September 2007. 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/ldhy/ld62/t364457.htm [Accessed 28 
December 2011]. 
4 Global Firepower. 2017. 2017 Military Strength Ranking. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp [Accessed 5 July 2018]. 
5 The Correlates of War Project Version 5.0. 2007. [Online] Available at: www.correlatesofwar.org 
[Accessed 5 July 2018]. See also: Singer, J. David. 1987. Reconstructing the Correlates of War 
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identity, the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan and aims at unification, by force if 
necessary. Furthermore, the UN, the US, most states and Taiwan’s own ROC 
constitution formally recognise Taiwan as part of China. Although Taiwan does 
possess impressive national power resources that allow it to punch above its weight, 
the PRC is superior in every measure.6 
Despite progressive economic convergence between 2008 and 2016 under an 
ostensibly China-identifying and Chinese-Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) 
administration, Taipei continued to face an acute security threat from the PRC.7 Yet, 
Taipei resisted Beijing’s pressure to deepen political convergence while continuing 
to buck-pass to the US and hedging by engaging in détente with Beijing. Rather than 
explicitly acceding to or rejecting Beijing’s demands through unification (tongyi) or 
de jure Taiwan Independence (taidu), Taipei continued to diverge politically by 
maintaining the status quo of de facto independence as the ROC. Taiwan’s de facto 
sovereign status is “ROC Independence”, or huadu. 
Traditional rationalist approaches would claim that Taipei’s sovereignty under the 
cross-Strait status quo is permitted by the US-China relationship. 8  First, Taipei 
Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985. International Interactions, 14: 115-32. 
[Accessed 5 July 2018]. 
6 Gitter, David and Sutter, Robert. 2016. Taiwan's Strong but Stifled Foundations of National Power. 
The National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report 54.  [online] Available at: 
http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=857 [Accessed 5 July 2018]; Gitter, David and 
Sutter, Robert. 2016. Evaluating Taiwan’s National Power. The Diplomat, 6 January  2016.  [Online] 
Available at: 
 https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/evaluating-taiwans-national-power/ [Accessed 6 July 2018]. 
7 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China, 2013. Quadrennial Defense Review. [online] 
Available at: http://qdr.mnd.gov.tw/encontent.html [Accessed 5 July 2018]. 
8 For summaries, see: Bush, Richard. 2016. Security Policy. In: Gunter Schubert, ed. 2016. Routledge 
Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. Abingdon: Routledge. 529-43; Huang,  Kewi-bo. 2016. 
Taiwan’s foreign policy and international space. In, Gunter Schubert, ed. 2016. Routledge Handbook 
of Contemporary Taiwan. Abingdon: Routledge.465-81; Lin, Cheng-yi. 2016. Taiwan-US security 
relations. In, Gunter Schubert, ed. 2016. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. Abingdon: 
Routledge: 482-499; Mearsheimer, John, J. 2010. The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US 
power in Asia.  
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became a US Cold War proxy from 1950. Second, the 1972 US-PRC Shanghai 
Communique created an ambivalent US One-China policy that “acknowledged” 
China’s (ROC and PRC) One-China Principle. Third, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act 
provided Taipei with a US security umbrella, even as the US de-recognised the ROC 
and formally recognised the PRC. Both permitted Beijing and Taipei to agree the 
1992 Consensus, which consolidated the status quo in One-China Respective 
Interpretations (OCRI). However, while such an approach explains the permissive 
environment, it effaces Taiwan’s development of a state identity, separate to that of 
China, between 1950 and 1992. This study argues that “respective interpretations” in 
OCRI legitimated Taipei’s separate state identity and permitted its political 
divergence from China. Hence, this study abstracts out US material power to focus 
on how and why Taipei’s state identity accounts for its sovereignty. 
Taiwan is worthy of attention because it provides an outstanding example of how a 
contested state can achieve provisional endorsement, even from its veto state. Taiwan 
is not a secessionist entity; rather, its contested statehood in the ROC derives from 
the 1949 Communist Revolution in mainland China, which reduced the ROC to an 
ancien regime holdout. Its legitimacy ameliorates its legal isolation and cross-Strait 
relations have, in fact, developed Taipei’s statehood through state identity change.9 
This study argues that the 1992 Consensus provides Taipei with legitimacy in huadu.  
That legitimacy bestows on Taipei a form of discursive power that stalemates 
Beijing’s material power, resists Beijing’s daguo identity and delegitimates both 
tongyi, which Beijing supports, and taidu, which Beijing resolutely opposes. 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(4): 381-396; Masden, Robert A. 2001. The struggle 
for sovereignty between China and Taiwan. In, Krasner, Steven, D. 2001. Problematic Sovereignty: 
Contested Rules and Political Possibilities. DC: Columbia University Press:141-93. 
9 Geldenhuys, Deon. 2009. Contested States in World Politics, London: Palgrave: 208. 
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Traditional rationalist approaches cannot fully account for this puzzle, but a realist-
constructivist (RC) examination of power and identity can. 
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of this study’s argument. Section 
1.2 presents the study’s research puzzles and questions. Section 1.3 outlines the 
research design by briefly summarising the theoretical framework, which explores 
power and identity through a realist-constructivist lens, and outlining an abductive 
linguistics-informed discourse-analytic methodology. Section 1.4 presents the 
study’s findings and originality and explores its expected limitations. Section 1.5 
makes the realist and constructivist nature of huadu explicit by locating it in 
disciplinary terms, identifying taidu, tongyi and huadu forces in Taiwan and defining 
the nature of the status quo that huadu maintains. Section 1.6 presents a historical 
overview of huadu’s cross-Strait and domestic political contexts. Finally, section 1.7 
provides an outline of the chapters. 
1.2. Puzzles and Research Questions  
The prevalence of huadu in the outline above raises a number of interrelated puzzles, 
all derived from the first one below:  
1. China surpasses Taiwan in material power, yet lacks the capability to
enforce unification (tongyi). Conversely, Taiwan surpasses China in
discursive power (q.v. 3.5.1). Yet it does not have the power to declare
Taiwan Independence (taidu).
2. Between 1992 and 2016, Taiwan’s state identity shifted from Chinese to
Taiwanese, despite rapprochement and deteriorating chances of a ROT.
3. Increasing economic convergence has been paralleled by an increasing
security dilemma and further political divergence.
5 
4. In Taiwan between 1994 and 2016, regardless of administration, Chinese
national identity declined while Taiwanese national identity increased.
Furthermore, although there is little appetite for taidu, there is very little
desire for tongyi, even though rational choice suggests that the latter
might remove the island’s security dilemma and increase economic
benefits.
5. The 2008-2016 KMT administration’s Chinese turn did not lead to
political convergence. Rather, Taiwanese national identity and huadu
state identity consolidated.
6. Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008-16 cross-Strait policy was perceived as a threat to
Taiwan, yet this study’s data suggest he maintained Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Research Question: Given China’s material power and the reality of Taiwan’s status, 
what accounts for China’s inability to compel unification and Taiwan’s maintenance 
of its de facto independence and how did this phenomenon develop? 
Hypothesis: The discursive power of huadu trumps Beijing’s material power and 
secures Taiwan’s de facto independence because it legitimates Taiwan’s ROC state 
identity and trumps Beijing’s irredentist claim. Huadu as discursive power and state 
identity developed out of Free China in state identity politics from the earliest days 
of ROC rule on Taiwan. 
As far as puzzle two, above, is concerned, from 1949 Beijing and Taipei competed 
over who had the right to be called China and by 1980 Beijing had won. Despite this, 
the ROC prevails internationally in other ways. For instance, the ROC passport is 
more powerful than the PRC one. It is recognised for visa-free entry to 127 countries 
and territories, while the PRC passport entitles bearers to visa-free entry to only nine 
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countries and territories.10 Yet, while Taipei can no longer credibly use the name 
China internationally, it cannot declare a ROT (taidu) since, regardless of Beijing’s 
threat, such a move would entail ROC state death. 
Regarding puzzle three, above, despite intensive economic convergence with China 
and post-2008 Rapprochement, Taiwan has continued to diverge from China 
politically. Figure three below indicates that, since 1989, the PRC has gone from 
having no commercial links with Taiwan to being its main FDI focus and trading 
partner. Official Taiwanese trade with China rose from zero in 1990 to around 
US$130 billion in 2014. 11  FDI and trade with China, however, benefits Taiwan 
unevenly, favouring large conglomerates over SMEs, farmers and labour, and while 
Beijing engaged with the KMT administration after 2008, the military balance of 
power continued to shift in the PRC’s favour and Chinese threats to Taiwan 
continued.12 So, there has been little material evidence of a peace dividend from 
cross-Strait economic interdependence in general and from Rapprochement in 
particular. Indeed, apart from rhetorical declarations of Chinese identity between 
2008 and 2016, the KMT made no moves towards tongyi.  
In terms of puzzle four above, longitudinal data from NCCU indicates a complete 
reversal from Chinese to Taiwanese national identity between 1992 and 2017 and a 
decline in joint Chinese-Taiwanese identification. This corresponds with a marked 
overall preference for the status quo, a fall in a preference for tongyi and a rise in a 
preference for taidu. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that this became more pronounced 
10 China Business Network. 2018. List of visa free countries (regions) for ordinary Chinese passport 
holders (updated: 2018-1-3). World Travel Online. [online] Available at: 
http://news.travel168.net/focus_on/20180111/46224.html [Accessed 20 March 2018].  
11 National Bureau of Statistics of China. National Data. [Online] Available at: 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/ [Accessed 7 August 2018].  
12 US Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense.  2011. Annual Report to Congress. 
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. [online] Available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf [Accessed 1 December 2011]. 
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during the 2008-16 KMT administration. Such polling data is significant in that it 
shows that, despite economic convergence and Taiwan’s status, democratic norms 
constitute an essential common value across Taiwan’s political spectrum. It also 
shows that perceived moves toward tongyi or taidu are not supported, that the 
electorate overwhelmingly prefers the status quo and that maintaining it represents a 
societal consensus. Shelley Rigger points out that a range of hypothetical outcomes 
that depend on Chinese threat can be shown to be favoured by the electorate 
in Taiwan. Indeed, Emerson Niou’s research stands out in this regard.13 The 
NCCU polls, however, are seen as robust and representative and since the 
present study seeks not to deal in counterfactuals and wishful thinking, it uses the 
NCCU polls as its benchmark. It is this dilemma that Taiwan has resolved through 
huadu.  
Puzzles five and six, above, are particularly pertinent to this study’s discourse 
analytic methodology. First, an overarching huadu discourse determined the KMT’s 
2008-16 cross-Strait policy. As such, what was perceived as a pro-China KMT 
discourse was in fact simply strategic and instrumental rhetoric; the genuine 
huadu discourse can be located in this study’s data. Second, Taiwan-leaning (pan-
Green) domestic interest groups (DIGs) that coalesced around the Sunflower 
movement articulated a crystalisation of Taiwanese national identity that was 
itself constituted by the same huadu discourse.  
This study argues that ROC state identity change means taidu is a straw man. Taidu 
represents Taiwan’s independence from the ROC and, as such, it is fallacious and 
13  See: Rigger, Shelley. 2011. Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse. Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. However, the NCCU data is considered the benchmark by most 
scholars. Niou, Emerson. 2005. Measuring Taiwanese public opinion on Taiwanese independence. 
The China Quarterly, 18(1); 158-68; Niou, Emerson. 2011. The China Factor in Taiwanese Politics. 
Proceedings of the Conference of Democracy and Diplomacy in East Asia. University of Tokyo. 16 
September 2011. [Online.] Available at: https://jww.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/jss/pdf/jss630304_055071.pdf 
[Accessed 14 June 2019].  
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misconceived in the context of the PRC’s irredentist claim. What had been a 
domestic ROC-Taiwan dimension in which Taiwan sought independence became an 
international dimension in which Taiwan as the ROC sought sovereignty and inter-
state relations with China (q.v. 3.4. Fig.5). If the ROC could not be China, it had to 
become Taiwan and if Taiwan could not free itself from the ROC, it had to make the 
ROC Taiwanese. Pan-Green domestic groups may have perceived the content of the 
KMT’s and the DPP’s cross-Strait policy as a threat to Taiwan’s security at different 
times. However, Taipei’s policy vis-a-vis the status quo has remained constant. 
Therefore, huadu, as a provisional political status and a state identity accounts for 
Taipei’s maintenance of its de facto independence, is deployed in Taipei’s cross-
Strait policy and has been constructed domestically and in cross-Strait relations. 
Taiwan’s power is derived from huadu. What power does huadu give Taiwan? The 
theoretical frameworks in chapters three and four argue that Taiwan’s power is 
discursive; it is a form of legitimacy that enables de facto, but not de jure, 
independence. Huadu is a true discourse because the term itself is so rarely uttered 
by policymakers.  
9 
Figure 1 Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese Identity 1992-2017 
Source: National Chengchi University.14  
Figure 2 Changes in Unification-Independence Stances of Taiwanese 1994-2017 
Source: National Chengchi University.15 
14 Election Study Center. National Chengchi University. 2017. Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese 
Identity. [online]  
Available at: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/pic.php?img=166_8cefc9c5.jpg&dir=news&title=Image 
[Accessed 30 March 2018]. 
15 Election Study Center. National Chengchi University. 2017. Changes in Unification/Independence 
Stances of Taiwanese. [online] Available at: 
http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/pic.php?img=167_8bb1a751.jpg&dir=news&title=Image  [Accessed 31 March 
2018]
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Figure 3 Taiwan’s Balance of Trade with China 
Source: MOEA16 
1.3. Research Design 
1.3.1. Theoretical Framework 
This study draws on Samuel Barkin’s Realist Constructivism (RC), Alexander 
Wendt’s systemic Constructivism, Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat, Yücel 
Bozdağlıoğlu’s constructivist approach to state identity formation and Maxym 
16 Ministry of Economic Affairs. 2014. Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly. [online] Available 
at:https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News.aspx?n=CDC6641393E172AE&sms=F3C4CDB291314363 
[Accessed 30 March 2018]. 
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Alexandrov’s model of state identity and foreign policy.17 This synthetic approach 
combines complementary classical realist and constructivist concepts, principles and 
axioms rather than neorealist and neo-classical realist positivist variables. That is, 
core concepts of power politics, a logic of the social and contingency are augmented 
with a classical realist interest in morality, prudence, diplomacy, statecraft and an 
approach to power that is social, relational and contextual. Wendt’s interest in 
anarchy, discursive power, state identity and norms are combined with a broader 
constructivist interest in legitimacy and Walt’s interest in threat perception. This 
framework employs these concepts to posit that huadu, as discursive power and state 
identity, operates to legitimate the ROC, thus trumping the PRC’s material power 
advantage and securing Taiwan’s de facto independence. 
This study’s RC framework takes a reflexive approach. Reflexivity is a point of 
agreement between Classical Realism and Constructivism. 18   It is also directly 
relevant to RC as an approach that offers a social understanding of power and a 
prescriptive theory of foreign policy. 19  Therefore, in the interests of analytical 
prudence, this section purposely explores the limits, ambiguities and biases inherent 
in a RC framework. The key argument above is expanded on more explicitly in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
17 Barkin, J Samuel. 2010. Realist Constructivism. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press; Wendt, 
Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. 
International Organization, 46(2): 391-42; Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel.  2007. Constructivism and Identity 
Formation: An Interactive Approach. Uluslararas Hukuk ve Politika, 3(11): 121-144; Alexandrov, 
Maxym. 2003. The Concept of State Identity in International Relations: A Theoretical Analysis.  
Journal of International Development and Cooperation, 10(1): 33–46. 
18 Guzzini, Stefano. 2000.  A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. European 
Journal of International Relations, 6: 151; Steele, Brent. 2007. Liberal-Idealism: A Constructivist 
Critique. International Studies Review, 9, fn 10. 
19 Barkin. 2010: 88 
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Traditional rationalist IR approaches offer explanations for Taiwan’s maintenance of 
its de facto independence. However, they do not fully account for the puzzles 
highlighted above. Approaches that identify power as a factor invariably treat it as 
material and coercive. Much deals with Taiwan’s reliance on US power or the China-
US context.20 In locating national identity as a factor, much research either conflates 
it with or focuses on it to the exclusion of state identity.21 To resolve this, this study 
abstracts out the US-China relationship and deploys a realist-constructivist (RC) 
synthesis to create a two-level, three-stage, domestic-systemic framework that better 
accounts for the power of  huadu  to secure Taiwan’s sovereignty (q.v. 3.4.).  
To do this, this study does three things. First, in line with Barkin’s (2010) Realist 
Constructivism, it seeks to escape the positivist trap by eschewing strict variables. 
Instead it uses core realist and constructivist principles, axioms and concepts to see 
what can be explained by them jointly that cannot be explained either by materialist 
and rationalist approaches alone or by realism and constructivism separately. The 
core realist concept is power politics; the core constructivist one is intersubjectivity. 
Added to these are contingency, anarchy, identities and interests. It is not so much 
the distinction between the material and the ideational as that between what is given 
and what is contingent that creates an opening for RC.22 Second, it adopts the main 
thrust of Wendt’s systemic Constructivism, expressed as “identities are the basis of 
interests” and “anarchy is what states make of it” to account for cross-Strait power 
20 For summaries of this literature, see: Bush, Richard. 2016. Security Policy. In: Gunter Schubert, ed. 
2016. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. Abingdon: Routledge. 529-43; Huang Kwei-bo. 
2016. Taiwan’s foreign policy and international space. In, Gunter Schubert, ed. 2016. Routledge 
Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. Abingdon: Routledge.465-81; Lin, Cheng-yin. 2016. Taiwan-US 
security relations. In, Gunter Schubert, ed. 2016. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 482-499. Bush  
21 Dawley, Evan.N. 2009, The question of identity in recent scholarship on the history of Taiwan,  
China Quarterly, 198: 442-52.  
22 Barkin, Samuel. 2010. Realist Constructivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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politics. 23 It then extends this to the domestic level to explore domestic political 
struggle and the effect of this on the national interest and foreign policy. In order to 
do this, it resolves realist and constructivist understandings of power. 24  Walt’s 
Balance of Threat links domestic politics to cross-Strait politics.25 Third, the study 
presents an IR conception of how Taiwan’s state identity is legitimated in cross-
Strait policy. Power and identity are dealt with theoretically in separate chapters (q.v. 
Ch 3 and Ch 4) but there are areas of cross-over and synthesis.  
This study’s Realist Constructivism acknowledges that Taipei’s cross-Strait policy 
reflects unitary state preferences, but prevalent domestic preferences also reflect state 
preferences. That is, domestic political competition and threat perception are 
constituted by huadu. This means that, while specific cross-Strait policies oscillate 
within the status quo, the preferences of powerful domestic groups are in fact 
constrained by a coherent state identity and Taipei presents a consistent state identity 
to China that limits Beijing’s policy options. The theoretical framework outlined here 
closes the gap between the material and the ideational on the one hand and Realism 
and Constructivism on the other. In doing so, it constitutes a synthetic approach that 
strengthens realist and constructivist arguments. Waltz claims:   
[International relations] theory indicates that some factors are more important than 
others and specifies relations among them. In reality, everything is related to everything 
23 Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics International Organization 46(2) p.398. See also: Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of 
International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Onuf, N.G. 1989. World of Our 
Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press; Onuf, Nicholas. 1997. Constructivism: A User's Manual" in Kubálková, et al. eds., 
International Relations in a Constructed World. M.E. Sharpe. 
24 Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond. eds. 2005. Power in Global Governance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 8-22. Berenskoetter, Felix and Williams, M.J. eds. 2007. Power in 
World Politics. Abingdon: Routledge: 2. 
25 Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 17. 
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else, and one domain cannot be separated from others. But theory isolates one realm 
from all others in order to deal with it intellectually.26 
Walt also suggests that “[n]o single approach can capture all the complexity of 
contemporary world politics.”27 Given the multidimensional nature of cross-Strait 
relations, a single-level or single-theory approach carries insufficient explanatory 
power. 28  For this reason, Wendt notes, a synthetic research framework provides 
“more compelling answers and a better picture of reality.” 29 A study of Taipei’s 
cross-Strait policy is no exception. Cross-Strait policy is foreign policy and its study 
must synthesise what is salient about Taiwan and its relations with China. This 
requires problem-driven research rather than approach-driven analysis. RC as a 
synthetic approach offers a more satisfying account than a single theory. It builds on 
Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism in three ways: first,  it seeks pragmatic 
“middle-range theoretical arguments” to address “concrete issues of policy and 
practice”; second, rather than testing theory or building on research traditions, it 
addresses broad problems that integrate real-world complexity; third, by developing 
comprehensive responses to real-world puzzles, a synthetic approach sacrifices 
parsimony for complex explication that locates points of tension among core 
concepts and causal/constitutive mechanisms normally analysed in isolation within 
separate traditions.30  
26 Waltz, Kenneth. 1988. The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory. Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 18(4): 615. 
27 Walt, Stephen. 1998. International Relations: One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy, 100: 30 
28 See Sil, Rudra and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2010. Analytical Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: 
Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions. Perspectives on Politics 
8(2):411 - 431; Checkel, Jeffrey. 2010. Theoretical Synthesis in IR: Possibilities and Limits. Simons 
Papers in Security and Development 6: 1–34. 
29 Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt. 2002. Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons. 2002.  Handbook of International Relations.  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications: 68. 
30 Siland Katzenstein. 2010:412.  
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To achieve explanatory power, while adhering to theoretical requirements, such an 
approach ought not to be constrained by paradigmatic horizons; diverse socio-
political concepts constantly reinforce paradigms; thus, reflexivity operates through 
reasoned assessment to judge among competing normative and theoretical claims 
across paradigms. IR depends on innovation, including meta-theoretical reflection.31 
This is not an argument for an unrestrained default to description and interpretation 
and a return to a pre-theoretical stage in IR. Nor is it a sideways step into area studies. 
Rather, it presents an alternative to the strictly positivist claim that only through the 
falsifiable testing of hypotheses derived from paradigmatic positions can plausible 
explanation be derived.  
While RC as synthesis is not eclecticism, the approaches may be combined at the 
macro-level.32 This can be done by locating “common understandings” or “creative 
confrontations” of core concepts among opposing traditions that permit the exposure 
of new knowledge.33 At the micro-level, however, Sil and Katzenstein see theoretical 
eclecticism also drawing relevant concepts and factors from different theories and 
interpreting a specific case using a well-matched concept. For example, in IR the 
broad realist paradigm provides an approach to the state and power politics. Similarly, 
IR Constructivism and national identity theory provide a framework for discourse 
and state identity. Shared theoretical vocabularies permit new knowledge claims 
concerning new cases. When combined with a linguistics-informed methodology, a 
new framework for “discursive power” (q.v.3.5.1) as legitimacy helps extend 
31 Makinda, Samuel. 2000. International Society and Eclecticism in International Relations Theory. 
Cooperation and Conflict, 30(5):212. 
32 Friedrichs, Jörg and Friedrich Kratochwil. 2009. On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can 
Advance International Relations Research and Methodology. International Organization 63(4): 708 – 
709. 
33 Sil and Katzenstein: 113. 
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arguments and knowledge in each field. 34  Conversely, as a novel explanatory 
framework that blends meaningful factors from other theories, a RC synthetic 
approach is more ambitious. It entails a shift in “epistemic commitments” to settle on 
a new set of research assumptions and principles. 35 Despite Sil and Katzenstein’s 
preference, however, theoretical eclecticism has meta-theoretical and methodological 
flaws.  
First, an eclectic approach cannot account for a single phenomenon on multiple or 
heterogeneous theoretical grounds at the same time. To separately weigh each 
concept is unreasonable since it requires a meta-theoretical mastery of a number of 
approaches.36 This in turn makes the application of theory to practical puzzles and 
cases problematic. Friedrichs and Kratochwil observe that only Sil and Katzenstein 
claim to be analytically eclectic in IR.37  
Conversely, even though a synthetic approach draws on a plurality of theories, it 
weighs each one differently on the grounds that “if one theory provides some value-
added to the other,” it is beneficial.38 At the same time, a synthetic approach does not 
need to take everything from each theory. While coherence is essential, a synthesis 
does not need all the ontological assumptions of each theory. 39  There must be 
theoretical guidance, but while an eclectic approach explains a phenomenon by 
selecting and treating equally elements from two or three theories, a synthetic 
approach maintains one theory as pivotal while utilising other concepts as subsidiary 
to the main theory. For this reason, RC defaults to Classical Realism and what that 
34 Sil and Katzenstein: 113. 
35 Sil and Katzenstein: 419. 
36 Friedrichs and Kratochwil. 2009: 709. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Checkel, Jeffrey. 2010: 12. 
39 Moravcsik, Andrew. 2003. Theory Synthesis in International Relations: Real Not Metaphysical. 
International Studies Reviews 5(1): 132. 
17 
cannot explain is accounted for by Constructivism. What this study does in this 
regard is to synthetically refine a RC framework that recognises the material and 
proceeds from theoretical bases that reject positivist assumptions about the nature 
and purpose of theory. 
1.3.2. Methodology 
A qualitative methodological approach that draws on post-positivist linguistics 
methods for support permits exploration of the constitutive inferences suggested by 
the data and to understand how ideational phenomena produce material outcomes.40
This project uses two overlapping methods – first, historical, theoretical and 
contextual analysis based on literature review and, second, primary documentary 
research using discourse analysis. Literature review permits the mapping of the 
dynamics of haudu in relation to Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy. These include the 
relevant academic literature as well as historical documents such as government 
statements, political speeches and official reports. Sources published in Chinese and 
less noticed in the West can provide new perspectives on the thinking behind huadu 
and Taiwanese political speech.41 This study’s methodology holds that there are facts 
that can be located, analysed and interpreted logically and it seeks to unearth core 
realist and constructivist principles, axioms and concepts and draws on an abductive, 
pluralist approach to the philosophy of science to explore how they interact.42 
1.3.2.1. Discourse Analysis 
The main purpose of this study’s discourse analysis is to reveal how huadu as a 
discourse of state identity is grammatically rather than rhetorically encoded and 
40 Ibid: 7. 
41 Li, Rex. 2009.  A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
42 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of 
Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics. Abingdon: Routledge 
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enacted in Taiwanese political speech and, therefore, more subtle and effective. For 
this reason, the methods employed are linguistics ones. Discourse is the 
communicative effect of text; conversely, text is discourse encoded in words and 
grammar and text is its product.43 All discourses are expressions of power relations 
and, as such, they are contested and resisted.44 Discursive power is a form of social 
practice that exploits power dynamics to legitimate one actor’s preferences over 
another’s. Language enacts discursive power to maintain or change a status quo to 
benefit a knowledgeable actor.45  
Discourse therefore is not text. Rather, text is a discourse encoded lexico-
gramatically and discourses can only be located and analysed through the texts that 
encode them and the contexts that inform those texts.46  Nor is rhetoric discourse; 
political rhetoric is simply the instrumental packaging of language that more often 
than not provides “not an explanation but an expectation” of policy responses to 
perceived threats.47 Rather than rhetoric, it is the overarching discourse that better 
evidences foreign policy and enacts power.   
Discursive power is a meta-textual phenomenon whose meaning is understood 
pragmatically rather than semantically in power politics. That is, it is conveyed 
beyond the surface meaning of the text. Discourse is what happens beyond the text 
when meaning needs to be inferred.48 But empirical evidence for a discourse can only 
43 Widdowson, Henry. 2008. Text, Context, Pretext. London: Blackwell: 8. 
44 Foucault, Michel. 1972. Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books. 
45 Fairclough, Norman [1989] 2013. Language and Power. London: Routledge: 5. 
46 Widdowson, Henry. 2008. Text, Context, Pretext. London: Blackwell.  
47 Brooks, Stephen and William Wholforth. 2008. World out of Balance: International Relations and 
the Challenge of American Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 71. 
48 See: Widdowson, Henry G. 1998: 136-151. The basic ideas of Systemic Functional Grammar were 
developed by Michael Halliday in the 1960s as a response to Chomskyan notions and are outlined in 
Halliday, Michael. 1994. An Introduction to Functional Grammar. London: Edward Arnold. 
Sociolinguistic textual approaches to discourse analysis are outlined in Brown, Gillian and Yule, 
George. 1983. Discourse Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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be located in text itself, using analytical techniques to locate firm textual warrant for 
interpretive claims. Therefore, this study argues that the discourse that accounts for 
Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence – that is, huadu - can be 
identified in the formal linguistic properties of Taiwanese political speech. Taiwan’s 
effective exercise of discursive power in huadu can be observed through linguistic 
analysis of the text that encodes such discourse. Methodologically, this requires 
locating text that exhibits Taiwan’s legitimation of huadu over tongyi or taidu and 
China’s recognising it. The linguistics-driven discourse analysis described in this 
study best locates this discusrsive power. This methodology combines micro-
interactional and macro-structural IR discourse approaches, 49  corpus linguistics, 50 
pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the form of the Discourse 
Historical Approach (DHA).51  
In line with the DHA’s focus on genres, the study uses a variety of scripted and 
unscripted text produced by policy elites.52 This is an under-utilised resource that is 
the by-product of strategic political activity.53 The data consists of a 5 million word 
master corpus of Taiwanese political speech with salient discourses triangulated to 
historical narrative. A number of sub-corpora provide evidence for salient and valent 
DIG discourses that may be analysed against the master corpus. Corpus linguistics 
provides an initial way into the text and exposes recurring themes and textual 
patterns that evidence a discourse. This is the first step in locating valent text and 
avoids selective interpretation and confirmation bias. The DHA then permits two 
49 Holzscheiter, Anna. 2013. Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: 
Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations. International Studies Perspectives: 1-21. 
50 Baker, Paul. ed. 2012. Contemporary Corpus Linguistics.London: Continuum. 
51 Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer, 2009. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage. 
52 Wodak, Ruth. and Michael Meyer. 2009. 
53 Procksch, Sven-Oliver and Slapin, Jonathan. 2008. A scaling model for estimating time-series party 
positions from texts. American Journal of Political Science, 52(3):705-722. 
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forms of textual analysis that facilitate this study’s claim that huadu is grammatically 
rather than rhetorically encoded in political speech. First, analysis of actors’ 
argumentation strategies exposes superficial rhetoric and, second, linguistic analysis 
unearths a discourse of huadu. This does two things: first, it locates firm textual 
warrant for plausible interpretations of a speaker’s meaning, thus actually doing 
discourse “analysis”; second, it provides empirical linguistic evidence from which 
pragmatic meaning can be derived, thus linking text and discourse.  
Crucially, in focusing on the DHA’s “linguistic means of realisation”, this study 
creates space to repair certain flaws in CDA by pursuing an innovative path in IR 
discourse analysis. That is, CDA has been accused of peddling a crude emancipatory 
agenda that misrepresents basic linguistic concepts and eschews analytical rigour in a 
hasty leap from textual description to interpretation. In particular, CDA has been 
accused of epistemological and methodological incoherence, selection and 
confirmation bias, a lack of reflexivity, of conflating text with discourse, of failing to 
employ recognised linguistics terminology to support interpretive claims around the 
meaning of political statements, of misapplying  underlying linguistic concepts and 
of failing to appreciate the role of context in determining how meaning is interpreted 
differently by different audiences.54  
Linguistic analysis based on the DHA’s “linguistic means of realisation” invites an 
aspect of linguistics research that has been discarded by mainstream CDA – the 
Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) and discourse analytic tradition of Michael 
Halliday, Paul Grice and John Austin that looks at how meaning is understood 
54 Widdowson, Henry. 1995. Discourse Analysis: A Critical View. Language and Literature 4(3): 
157-172; Widdowson, Henry. 1996. Reply to Fairclough: Discourse and Interpretation: conjectures
and refutations. Language and Literatures, 5(1): 57-69; Breeze, Ruth. 2011. Critical Discourse
Analysis and its Critics. Pragmatics, 21(4): 493-525.
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pragmatically. 55  This study’s approach to discourse analysis assumes linguistic 
universals; that is, while lexical and grammatical features differ across languages, 
discursive functions do not.  
1.3.2.2. Electronic Resources 
There is an abundance of primary source electronic data on ROC government and 
domestic interest group websites. In addition to systematically collected, reliable 
datasets for quantitative research, supplementary datasets derived from electronic 
primary sources can be used to gather information on elite speech. For instance, a 
range of texts created by salient political actors in the context of domestic politics 
and in the context of cross-Strait discussions are easily accessible online. These texts 
can be processed and rendered in machine-readable format for analysis by means of 
computer-assisted content analysis software. 56  
In short, the methodology chapter (q.v. 5.4) relates how a master Taiwanese Political 
Speech corpus (and a number of sub corpora) was created and texts selected from it 
for closer examination in the empirical chapters. The process was abductive. First, 
the IR and area-studies literature was reviewed with the main research question and 
hypothesis in mind, salient post-1945 historical events and themes identified and 
explanatory gaps located. Second, corpus linguistics was employed to locate salient 
and valent text and to avoid selection and interpretation bias. Important texts less 
noticed in the relevant literature were unearthed in this process. Recurrent themes 
and discourses were identified and triangulated to historical events, permitting 
55 Halliday, Michael. 1994; Austin, John Langshaw.  2005 [1962].  How to Do Things with Words. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Grice, H. Paul. 1957. Meaning. The Philosophical Review, 66: 
377–88. Reprinted in Grice, H. Paul. 1989.  Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
56 Sullivan, Jonathan. 2013. Electronic Resources in the Study of Elite Political Behaviour in Taiwan. 
The China Quarterly, 213: 172-188 
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location of a synchronic huadu discourse. Third, linguistic methods were used to 
analyse how huadu is presupposed, implied and enacted in Taiwanese political 
speech. Fourth, the findings were interpreted in historical context through 
triangulation to Realist Constructivism and to the linguistics-informed methodology. 
1.4. Findings, Originality and Expected Limitations 
1.4.1. Findings and Originality 
US material power may permit Taiwan to exercise power in the first place, but it is 
abstracted out for two reasons. First, US policy is (however disingenuous) that 
Taiwan’s status is a matter for Taiwan’s people and that Washington does not seek to 
interfere in Taipei’s relations with China. Second, huadu as a state identity has been 
constructed in the context of cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s domestic politics. 
First, this thesis will argue that China’s inability to force unification and Taiwan’s 
maintenance of its de facto independence are best understood through a RC 
framework.  Second, traditional materialist and rationalist conceptions of power 
cannot explain Taiwan’s more effective enactment of discursive power than Beijing. 
A RC framework synthesises power politics and intersubjectivity to show how 
domestic factors and interstate contact produce cross-Strait policy. Third, textual 
warrant for huadu is likely to be located through a linguistics-informed discourse 
analysis of the data.  
That Taiwan is able to maintain its de facto independence produces a number of 
findings: first and foremost, Taipei is able to deploy discursive power more 
effectively than Beijing to legitimate its sovereignty. Second, Taipei deploys 
discursive power in the form of huadu by adhering to the cross-Strait status quo. 
Third, the English term Taiwan Independence is inadequate if it is used to describe 
both de jure independence in a putative ROT and de facto independence under the 
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ROC. Fourth, neither taidu nor tongyi reflect cross-Strait relations as they are. Fifth, 
domestic preferences inform but do not determine Taipei’s cross-Strait policy; rather 
a huadu discourse constitutes Taipei’s cross-Strait policy and Taiwan’s domestic 
politics. 
In sum, the ROC appeals through huadu to powerful international norms to represent 
itself as the legitimate Taiwanese state and member of the international community. 
Powerful groups in Taiwan and abroad buy into this discourse. Forced unification by 
an authoritarian PRC is deemed unacceptable; unification under the ROC is a pipe 
dream. Taidu would invite a PRC attack and ROC state death; states do not 
voluntarily commit suicide. In the context of huadu, Beijing’s concerns around 
negative ramifications for its own legitimacy deter it from pursuing forced 
unification. Huadu would render such a move an invasion of a sovereign state rather 
than irredentist unification. Therefore, Beijing provisionally endorses huadu by 
sanctioning Taiwan’s Westphalian and domestic, though not international, 
sovereignty.57 
This project contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: 
 It shows how state identities construct the national interest through domestic
and interstate socialisation to impact on foreign policy.
 It resolves epistemological and methodological problems inherent in a
realist-constructivist synthesis by focusing on reconcilable core concepts
rather than irreconcilable positivist variables.
57 Chen, Dean P. 2014.  Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of “One 
China” and Beijing’s Taiwan Strait Policy. Asian Security, 10(1): 22-46; Li, Yitan. 2014. Constructing 
Peace in the Taiwan Strait: a constructivist analysis of the changing dynamics of identities and 
nationalisms. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(85): 119-142. 
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 It provides an appropriate conceptual angle from which to understand huadu
as discursive power and state identity.
In addition, this thesis is original in the following ways: 
 It identifies cross-Strait and domestic power politics as overlapping sites in
which huadu is constructed.
 It maps discursive power onto a RC synthesis to account for Taiwan’s
legitimation of its de facto independence.
 It identifies why Taiwan is able to deploy its power in the cross-Strait context
more effectively than China.
 It adopts a linguistics-informed approach to discourse analysis, thus
increasing the likelihood that firm textual warrant will be located for
reasoned judgements to be made on why huadu prevails and becomes policy.
 It repairs a flaw in CDA in general by extending the DHA’s “linguistic
means of realisation” to cover pragmatics, thus providing firm textual
warrant for claims as to the meaning of words.
1.4.1. Expected limitations 
1.4.1.1. Methodological Questions 
King et al point to the fundamental problem of qualitative research being “the 
pervasive failure to provide reasonable estimates of the uncertainty of the 
investigator’s inferences.” 58  Indeed, one of the main criticisms of CDA as it is 
sometimes practised in the social sciences is that it is interpretive, highly-selective 
58 King, Gary; Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney. 1994.  Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 32. 
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and partisan.59 This project, therefore, seeks to distinguish between interpretation and 
linguistic analysis in order to establish warranted inferences by increasing the 
number of observations, using careful cross-referencing and triangulation methods. 
The use of Corpus Linguistics provides a way into the text and ensures an acceptable 
level of bias, while pragmatics provides textual warrant for interpretations.  
1.4.1.2. Access to Sources 
Official PRC data is restricted and meaningful text is notoriously difficult to gain 
access to. Taiwan has an open-government stance with regard to internet access to 
government data and elite policy statements. Extensive and judicious examination of 
less-guarded text in the public domain can yield valuable data.  
1.5. Locating Taiwan 
1.5.1. Cross-Strait Relations: The State of the Field 
The KMT academic and diplomat, Su Chi, claims that cross-Strait relations began in 
1987, when Nationalist China on Taiwan began secret discussions with its mainland 
Communist Chinese counterparts that culminated in the 1992 Consensus.60 Taiwan is 
academically, not just politically, in China’s shadow and this power imbalance is 
evident in key debates in Taiwan Studies. The island went from being of marginal 
interest to political scientists in the 1960s to an important theoretical research area in 
the 1990s. The paradox of Taiwan’s contested political status, China’s irredentist 
claim, closer economic convergence and tense cross-Strait political divergence led to 
an interest in comparative politics, democratisation, national identity and asymmetric 
59 See: Stubbs, Michael. 1998. Text and Corpus Linguistics. Oxford: Blackwell; Cameron, Deborah. 
2001. Working with Spoken Discourse. London: Sage; Widdowson, H.G. 1998. The Theory and 
Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis. Applied Linguistics, 19 (1): 136-151. 
60 Su Chi. 2009. Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs. Abingdon: 
Routledge: 89-91. 
26 
power relations.61 Prior to that, Taiwan was treated simply as “another right-wing 
repressive dictatorship whose importance pales before that of the real “China.””62  
Even as recently as 2003, Shelly Rigger observed that Taiwan Studies occupied “a 
marginal position in the China studies field”.63 Yet, a steady rise in Taiwan-related 
scholarship was making a salient link among Taiwan’s domestic politics, cross-Strait 
relations and the US-China relationship. Jonathan Sullivan (2011) finds a 
preponderance of IR and security-themed articles in Area Studies journals, followed 
by domestic politics with a cross-Strait theme. High-impact IR journals between 
1998 and 2008 showed an overall rise in the number of Taiwan-themed articles with 
spikes in 1996, 2000-2001 and 2005-2006 following cross-Strait crises.64  
This study’s argument abstracts out Taiwan’s importance to US-China security 
policy as an explanation of its successful resistance to Beijing. So, while rationalist 
approaches repeatedly refer to the Taiwan Strait as the most likely location for 
nuclear power conflict,65 it is from their acknowledgement of Taiwan as “the one 
jurisdiction where borders and national identity (as well as political ideology) are 
subject to competing claims” that this study takes its cue. 66  Dafydd Fell (2012) 
observes that Taiwan is interesting for two reasons: first, its rapid political, social and 
economic change make it a useful case for comparative political scientists and, 
61 Cheng T.J. and Andrew D. Marble. 2004. Taiwan Studies and the Social Sciences. Issues and 
Studies. 40(3-4): 9-57. 
62 Appleton, Sheldon. 1980. Taiwan’s Politics: The Provincial Assemblyman’s World. By Arthur J.
Lerman (Washington D.C. University Press of America. 1978). American Political Science Review, 
74(1): 250. 
63 Rigger, Shelley. 2003. Political Science and Taiwan's Domestic Politics: The State of the Field. 
Issues and Studies, 38(4): 51 
64 Sullivan, Jonathan. 2011. Is Taiwan Studies in Decline? China Quarterly, 207: 706-7. 
65 Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Chicago: Norton: 2, 374-375 
Wachman, Alan M. 2008. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. 
Singapore: National University of Singapore Press. 
66 Moravcsik, Andrew. 2010. Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer. Princeton 
University.  
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second, cross-Strait  relations provide excellent cases for the study of IR theories. 67
This study indicates that Taiwan’s anomalous status provides unique insights into 
broader issues around sovereignty, state identity and legitimacy in IR.  
1.5.2. What and Where is Taiwan? 
Shaped like a sweet potato, Taiwan is an island the size of Wales lying a hundred 
miles off Fujian in South-East China and separated from the mainland by the Taiwan 
Strait.68  Alternatively, it is an economy the size of Sweden,69  situated to the north of 
the Philippines in the Western Pacific, facing China.70 A PRC website tells us that 
“lying off the south-eastern coast of the Chinese mainland, Taiwan is China’s largest 
island and forms an integral whole with the mainland.”71 Taiwan has been at various 
times Formosa - a “beautiful island” and exotic notion on the frontier of the 
European, Chinese and Japanese imaginations.72 It has also been Free China (ziyou 
zhongguo) an Asian Tiger and economic powerhouse and a renegade province of the 
PRC, controlled by the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. It is an unrecognised 
independent state that operates on the basis of human rights and the rule of law. Even 
Taiwan’s material ontology is contested before what might be considered 
constructivism’s discursive terrain proper is reached.  
67 Fell, Dafydd. 2012. Government and Politics in Taiwan. London: Routledge: 2-3. 
68 Fell, Dafydd. 2012: 1. 
69 International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook Database. [online] Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/weoselagr.aspx  [Accessed 26 August 
2018]. 
70 Mongabay. 2005. Country Profiles. Taiwan: Geography. Available at: 
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/new_profiles/201.html [Accessed 28 December 2011].  
71 Taiwan Affairs Office. People’s Republic of China. 1993. The Taiwan Question and the 
Reunification of China. [online] Available at: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/10-2.htm 
[Accessed 28th December 2011]. 
72 Harrison, Mark. 2006. Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 1-2. 
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1.5.3. Who, When and Why is Taiwan?
On the eve of Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential election, Chou Tzu-yu, a 16-year-
old Taiwanese pop singer, was accused by angry Chinese netizens of promoting 
taidu for waving Taiwan’s national flag on South Korean TV. Taiwanese voters 
hovered between outrage and perplexity when Chou was forced by her Chinese 
promoter to record a humiliating apology, not least because the flag of Taiwan is that 
of the ROC. Indeed, the mayor of Tainan pointed out that Chou could not be 
advocating taidu because “taidu elements do not acknowledge the national flag”.73 
Similarly, Beijing’s People’s Daily, cautioned Chinese netizens by pointing out that 
Chou’s flag waving actually acknowledged the one-China principle.74 However, the 
discursive damage was done in that the initial Chinese reaction presupposed an 
implicit recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty.  
On 16th January, the ostensibly Taiwanese nationalist Democratic Progressive Party’s 
(DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, had already defeated Eric Chu, the candidate for the 
incumbent KMT, and pledged to uphold the ROC constitution before a portrait of 
Sun Yat-sen, the father of the ROC. Yet, taidu groups took a different stance. Rather 
than defending Chou, Tsay Ting-kuei of the Free Taiwan Party accused her of 
mindlessly conniving in huadu. On 23rd February 2016, the ostensibly taidu New 
Power Party (NPP) legislator, Freddy Lim, said KMT prime minister, Chang Shan-
cheng, supported not tongyi, but huadu, since he had said that cross-Strait relations 
73 Liberty Times. 2016. Yi zhang tu gaosu ni hua du he taidu de chayi! Wangou zan: wanquan shuo 
chu chong dian (A picture tells you the difference between huadu and taidu! Netizen praise: full 
discussion of key points). 17 January 2016. [Online] Available at: 
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1575981 [Accessed 5 July 2018]. 
74 South China Morning Post. 2016. ‘Separatist’ label ‘unfair for Taiwan’s teen pop star Chou Tzu-yu: 
Chinese state media. 18 January 2018. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1902690/separatist-label-unfair-taiwans-
teen-pop-star-chou-tzu [Accessed 20 April 2018]. 
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were based on “equality and dignity”. 75 In accusing Chang of huadu sympathies, 
however, Lim inadvertently identified himself as a huaduer, drawing the ire of Tsay, 
who dismissed the NPP, the DPP and other “pan-Green” Taiwan-leaning parties as 
“conniving in the ROC colonial government-in-exile”.76 
Thus in 2016, huadu became both a rebuke and a pejorative definition of Taiwan’s 
provisional status, while taidu defined an aspiration to a Republic of Taiwan 
(ROT).77 Deep-Greens perceive ROC institutions and symbols as a threat. Yet the 
fact is that the ROC flag now represents Taiwan. Nowadays, young Taiwanese paint 
it on their cheeks as a mark of Taiwanese-ness. For hard-core taidu supporters, this is 
unthinking acquiescence to Chinese symbols. Yet it shows that, for most Taiwanese, 
ROC symbols legitimate Taiwan.  
The roots of huadu lie in the ROC’s illegitimacy, which led its elites to end 
authoritarian KMT rule and to democratise after 1987. Huadu is a status, an identity, 
an interest, a source of power and a discourse. It is the software that runs the 
operating system of state identity. Few political actors in Taiwan consciously utter 
the term huadu; it is rare outside of its pejorative use, yet in deploying it taiduers 
have inadvertently defined a powerful discourse that resolves Taipei’s sovereign 
status and stalemates Beijing’s power. 
75 Taipei Times. 2016. Taiwan never ‘equal’ under Ma: Freddy Lim. 24 February 2016. [online] 
Available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/02/24/2003640100 [Accessed 
20 April 2018]. 
76 Sanli News Network. 2016. zhe bushi taidu! Ju zhege qizi jiao ‘huadu’ yi miao rang ni gao qingchu 
(This is not taidu! Give me that ‘huadu’ flag a second so I can help you figure it out). [online] 
Available at: https://travel.setn.com/News/118880 [Accessed 20 March 2018]; Tsay, Ting-kuei. 2016. 
Facebook. February 23, 2016. [online] Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/tingkuei.tsay/posts/967539406664616 [Accessed 20 April 2018]. 
77 Yeh, Chieh-ting. 2016. ‘Taiwan Independence’ Doesn’t Mean What You Think. Foreign Policy. 
April 11, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/11/taiwan-independence-china-republic-huadu-
taidu/. [Accessed 20 April 2018. 
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Huadu’s power rests in its exploitation of a two-fold misconception. First, the PRC is 
the ROC’s, and by extension Taiwan’s, veto state.78 Beijing has the legal right to 
prevent Taiwan’s secession. Second, the PRC’s veto status is complicated by 
Taiwan’s unique two-host dilemma. 79  That is, a prospective secessionist state 
invariably has one host; for instance Catalonia seeks secession from one host state - 
Spain.80 Yet two states assert host status vis-à-vis Taiwan and the de facto host state, 
the ROC, is in turn subject to a host-state claim by the PRC, which threatens to 
enforce tongyi, in the event of a declaration of taidu.  
“Taiwan is not a State, because it does not claim to be”.81 Yet, it insists on exercising 
the rights of a state. It does this as the ROC. The PRC’s status as the ROC’s and 
Taiwan’s veto state is complicated as follows. First, neither the ROC nor Taiwan 
have seceded or sought to secede from the PRC. Rather, the ROC constitution 
formally claims jurisdiction over all of China, including Taiwan. Indeed, the ROC 
cannot secede from the PRC. Second, Taiwan seeks to secede not from the PRC, but 
from the ROC. Third, the ROC may be conceived of as China’s ancien regime and 
veto state of the PRC. Yet, it is unwilling and unable to exercise this role.  Fourth, as 
the asserted veto state, the PRC seeks to subvert and prevent the ROC’s wider 
recognition. In sum, the ROC “has a legal status that is uncertain, an international 
standing that is indefinite, a legal existence that is often relative, and a security 
78 Geldenhuys, Deon. 2009. Contested States in World Politics, London: Palgrave: 208. 
79 Wei, Chuanjuan Nancy. 2016. Taiwan’s Secession against Two Hosts: The Xi-Ma Summit and its 
Implications for Future cross-Strait Relations.  Teka Komisji Politologii i Stosunków 
Międzynarodowych, 11(1): 125–137; Liu, Frank C.S. 2012. When Taiwan Identifiers Embrace the 
ROC: The Complexity of State Identification in Taiwan. Issues and Studies, 48(2) 1-34. 
80 Pavkovic, A and Radan, Peter. 2007. Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession. 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing: 33–7. 
81 Crawford, James. 1979. The Creation of States in International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 119. 
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situation that is at times precarious.”82 This contested status creates the conditions for 
huadu. 
This makes taidu a misconception, since taidu seeks Taiwan’s independence from 
the ROC, not the PRC. Using taidu to describe Taiwan’s quest for sovereignty is 
therefore misplaced because it assumes that the ROC is still a colonial government-
in-exile. Huadu resolves this dilemma; rather than seceding from the ROC, Taiwan 
has appropriated the ROC and since it cannot secede from the PRC, the ROC 
maintains a formal claim to be China. Huadu is more than a rhetorical sleight of hand; 
it is a discursive shift in state identity from Chinese to Taiwanese. Beijing’s daguo 
irredentist claim and veto make it impossible for Taiwan formally to declare de jure 
independence,83  yet huadu stalemates Beijing’s claim, resists daguo and 
delegitimates both tongyi and taidu.   
1.5.4. Distinguishing huadu, taidu and tongyi 
Huadu is not a teleology. Rather it is an extended stage in ROC identity, 
transforming over time with its audience. The concept is encoded in a number of 
ROC policy documents, but not explicitly articulated as such. The Additional 
Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (1991) and the Act Governing 
Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (1991) 
provide the legal context for the ROC’s state identity change. 84 The “National 
82 Kurtulus, Ersun. 2005. State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon and Ramifications. Houndsmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan: 105. 
83 Fleischauer, Stefan. 2016. Taiwan Independence Today: The meaning of Taiwan Independence and 
the status quo of cross-Strait relations. In Schubert, Gunter (Ed.). 2016. The Routledge Handbook of 
Contemporary Taiwan. Abingdon: Routledge: 80-1. 
84 Ministry of Justice. Republic of China (Taiwan). 1991. Additional Articles of the Constitution of 
the Republic of China. [Online]. Available at: 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0000002 [Accessed: 10 June 2019]; 
Ministry of Justice. Republic of China (Taiwan). 1991. Act Governing Relations between the People 
of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. [Online]. Available at: 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=Q0010001 [Accessed: 10 June 2019]. 
32 
Unification Guidelines” (NUG) (1991) and "Definition of One China Resolution" 
(1992) seek to define one China as two equal political entities, referring to the ROC 
as the “one China”, while “Relations across the Taiwan Strait” (1994) acknowledges 
a cultural and historic “one China".  “The Official Position of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) on the People’s Republic of China’s Anti-Secession (Anti-Separation) Law” 
(2005) updates these. 85  Rather than three discrete categories, tongyi, huadu and 
taidu may be seen as three overlapping positions on a continuum from deep-Blue 
Chinese unification to a deep-Green Republic of Taiwan, limited to the Taiwan 
Area. 86   As such, taidu as de jure Taiwan Independence is a counter-factual 
aspiration and cannot account for this study’s research questions. Tongyi may be 
divided into zhongtong (PRC Unification) and huatong (ROC Unification). Beijing’s 
official policy is the former, but the 1992 Consensus permits Taipei formally to 
advocate the latter. It is formal huatong and its articulation in Free China as “[the 
ROC’s] sovereignty extends throughout China” that permits elision into huadu as 
“[the ROC’s] current governing authority is only over Taiwan”.87 Beijing actually 
perceives huadu in Taipei’s 1991 and 1992 statements on Taiwan’s status, observing 
that for Taipei “One China” entails "One China, two equal political entities" under 
85 See: Su Chi. 2009: 13; Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 1991. Guidelines for 
National Unification. 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=BEC36A4A0BB0663C&sms=BF821F021B2822
51&s=D0017062A39AF1C0 [Online]: Accessed 10 June 2019; Mainland Affairs Council. Republic 
of China (Taiwan). 1994. {Online.}. 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8A319E37A32E01EA&sms=2413CFE1BCE87E
0E&s=D6A36C53F3FB9CC1. Accessed: 10 June 2019; Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China 
(Taiwan). 2005. {Online.}. The Official Position of the Republic of China (Taiwan) on the People's 
Republic of China's Anti-Secession (Anti-Separation) Law. Accessed: 10 June 2019. 
86 Zhang Yazhong. 2012. bofu zhijian: liang’an hexin wenti tansuo. [Peeling off: exploring the core 
issues of the two sides] On Integration, Taipei: Sheng Chih Book Co Ltd 201: "On Integration", Hong 
Kong China Review Academic Press, 2014 edition, p. 320. [Online] Available at: 
http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/242340/2/%E5%89%9D%E5%BE%A9%E4%B9%8B%E
9%96%93%E5%85%A8%E6%96%87pdf.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1uUWr1iLDMdn4N8QaWoImDEe8Ly3
GQthNFriQZonFXVvwFrwfaE9yTNSs [Accessed 20 October 2018]. 
87 Su Chi. 2009: 13. 
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the ROC constitution acknowledges that "The Republic of China on Taiwan is a 
sovereign and independent country" but "at present, it doesn’t have the legitimacy 
(quan) of mainland China".88  For Beijing, huadu highlights Taiwan's sovereignty 
and statehood and seeks dual recognition to create a state identity equal to the PRC. 
In this regard, the question of whether huadu constitutes a one-China, a two-China or 
a one-China-one-Taiwan policy is moot. This study argues that the concept allows 
Taipei semantically to assert the one-China principle as two states within one 
Chinese nation while pragmatically oscillating between a two-China and a one-
China-one-Taiwan policy (q.v. 5.2; q.v. 8.5.). 
Although the term was coined by Tsay Ting-kuei in 2016 (q.v. 1.5.3.), huadu  is 
conceptually and analytically similar to the earlier term “stand alone”, or dutai, 
which became current during the 1990s and is used in the Chinese literature.89 Dutai 
originates in the Free China “idealis” of liberal KMT elites (q.v. 6.2.3.2.) who 
sought abandonment of the narrative of return and a “stand alone” democratic ROC 
in Taiwan.  Dutai also draws on Schubert’s (2004) recognition of political party 
convergence on national identity and on Fell’s (2005) “diluted” Taiwan 
independence, in which Taiwan’s political parties converge on the salient divisive 
88 The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. 2006. “taidu” yu “dutai” 
[“Taiwan Independence” and “Stand Alone”]. [online] Available at: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-
04/26/content_266038.htm [Accessed 17 October 2018]. 
89 Zou Liyong. 2016. Cai Dinggui [Tsay Ting-kuei]: Li Cai is huadu, the KMT is huatong. Zhongguo 
pinglun xinwen.27 February 2016. [Online] Available at: 
http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1041/3/5/9/104135952.html?coluid=93&kindid=2931&docid=104135952&m
date=0227011145 [Accessed 17 October 2018]. This author’s personal communication with Tsay 
confirms he coined the term huadu in January 2016. For Chinese sources, see: See: Wang, Yingjing. 
2017. tongyi luntan [Unification Forum], 2. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.toutiao.com/a6422305066133422338/?fbclid=IwAR02SpW4yG5Md-
0S8ICJXUmCLgL7waAgbEjcuLe_d8DuUwo_-KbM_LrAqlo [Accessed 18 October 2018]; Zhang 
Yazhong. 2014. bofu zhijian: liang’an hexin wenti tansuo. [Peeling off: exploring the core issues of 
the two sides] On Integration, Taipei: Sheng Chih Book Co Ltd: 320-1. A taidu party, Su Beng’s left-
leaning Taiwan Independence Association (duli taiwan dang) called itself dutai, but this appears to be 
anomalous. 
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national identity issue by appealing to maintenance of Taiwan’s de facto 
independence as the ROC, opposition to unification and pragmatic cross-Strait 
relations in contrast to a “pure independence” taidu position, which seeks a de jure 
ROT.90 
Huadu also effectively absorbs and articulates popular tianran duli, or “natural 
independence” sentiment. Articulated by DPP elite Lin Cho-shui in the context of the 
2014 Sunflower Movement, tianran duli locates a naturalised Taiwanese national 
identity in the generation born after 1980 that was educated in democratisation and 
Taiwanisation. Never having known authoritarian KMT rule, they exhibit less 
antipathy to the ROC and view Taiwan as a sovereign, independent state embodied 
in the ROC, without explicitly advocating a de jure ROT. This more internationalised 
and media-savvy “new Taiwan independence” stance stands in contrast to a more 
insular “old Taiwan independence” stance that positioned itself in direct opposition 
to the authoritarian ROC’s narrative of return and sought a de jure ROT.91  
The concepts of “natural independence” and “diluted independence” certainly inform 
huadu. However, neither in-and-of-themselves are state identities. Rather, “natural 
independence” appears to be a form of national subjectivity that attaches to a state, 
while “diluted independence” relates to party policy positioning rather than a state 
identity. Therefore, for clarity, because this is not a study of Taiwan’s party politics 
and because its semantic focus is on the ROC’s state identity, this study uses the term 
huadu. 
90 Fell, Dafydd. 2005. Party Politics in Taiwan. Abingdon: Routledge: 87; Schubert, Gunter. 2004. 
Taiwan’s Political Parties and National Identity: The Rise of an Overarching Consensus”. Asian 
Survey 44(4): 534-54. 
91 Lin Cho-shui. 2014. “Huashan lunjian” nanqing shidai de ziran du (1). “Huashan's sword” the 
"natural independence" of the younger generation (1). Thinking Taiwan. 25 July 2014. 
[Online]Available at: https://www.thinkingtaiwan.com/content/2275. [Accessed 3 June 2019].  
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By adopting the “divided state” concept, huadu produces “one-China-two-equal-
political-entities”. This allows Taipei to claim "the sovereignty of the Republic of 
China is independent in Taiwan" and the country’s name is the ROC.92  Whereas 
taidu is implicit in “One Country on Each Side” and “One China, One Taiwan”, 
huadu is implicit in the 1992 Consensus of OCRI, in One-Country-Two-Systems 
(OCTS) and the Two-State theory of “special state-to-state relations”. Huadu may 
converge with China; that is, it semantically entails a sovereign ROC. Conversely, it 
may diverge from China to pragmatically imply a sovereign ROT. The convergent 
form references Taiwan as the ROC; the divergent one, as part of a “cultural” China. 
Specifically, if the One China insisted on refers to the ROC, huadu is closer to tongyi; 
if it refers to a cultural China, it is closer to taidu.   
According to Zhang Yazhong, four positions on ROC state identity may be extracted 
from the tongyi (huatong), huadu, taidu continuum:  
• The ROC is legitimate; the PRC is illegitimate. This is Free China, huatong
and Chiang Ching-kuo’s (1979) Three Noes.
• The ROC is legitimate; Beijing only has legitimacy in mainland governance.
This is Lee Teng-hui’s NUG (1991) and "Definition of 'One China'
Resolution" (1992).  This is a sovereign ROC.
• The ROC is legitimate under the One-China principle, and recognises
Beijing’s sovereignty on the mainland. This is "Relations across the Taiwan
Strait" (1994) and the "Two-State Theory" (1999). This is Taiwan as part of
a cultural China.
92 Zhang Yazhong. 2014: 320. 
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• There is no "One China" and the ROC is sovereign and independent of the
PRC. This is "One country on each side" (2002) and the DPP’s Resolution
on the Future of Taiwan (1999). This acknowledges the provisional status of
the ROC.
The above are all consistent with the ROC’s sovereign independence.93 The first is 
One China under one ROC (tongyi as huatong); the fourth is covert taidu. Two and 
three are huadu, but are not equal. The second is a thin huadu in which the ROC state 
is the locus of One China, but the PRC has governing authority on the mainland; the 
third is a thick huadu in which the ROC is part of a virtual pan-Chinese cultural 
realm that is the locus of One China. PRC scholars formally claim that huadu is 
covert taidu.94 International scholars are ambivalent. Cole (2016) claims taidu and 
huadu represent two independence camps.95 Goren and Turton (2016) claim “there is 
no huadu” – that huadu and taidu are ontologically the same: “independence from 
China”.96 This oversimplifies huadu and effaces its discursive power to legitimate the 
ROC’s sovereignty. This study, however, maintains that neither tongyi nor taidu in 
fact exist, since both represent delegitimated aspirations and, as such, wishful 
thinking.  
Figure 0, below, provides a conceptualisation of the tongyi, huadu, taidu spectrum. 
As can be seen, there is overlap among the positions and they do not align neatly to 
93 Zhang Yazhong. On Integration: 320. 
94 The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. 2013 [2006]. “taidu” yu 
“dutai” [“Taiwan Independence” and “Stand Alone”]. [online] Available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-04/26/content_266038.htm [Accessed 17 October 2018].  
95 Cole, Michael. 2016. China Faces Not One But Two Forces for Independence in Taiwan. 25 March 
2016. [Online] Available at: http://thinking-taiwan.com/two-independence-taiwan/ [Accessed 15 
January 2017]. 
96 Goren, Ben and Turton, Michael. 2016. There is no huadu. Asia Dialogue. 28 March 2016. [online] 
Available at: http://theasiadialogue.com/2016/03/28/91241/ [Accessed 15 January 2017]. 
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constituencies and policy positions. This is indicative of the spectrum’s shifting, 
discursive nature.   
Fig 0 Tongyi, Huadu, Taidu Spectrum 
The key social constituencies of huadu’s legitimacy claim are domestic and 
transnational. The former include the island’s electorate and powerful domestic 
interest groups (DIGs). The KMT and the DPP seek to appeal to both. The latter 
include Taiwan lobbies in the US and the EU, such as the Congressional Taiwan 
Caucus and the European Parliament-Taiwan Friendship Group. It also includes 
transnational business organisations like the General Chamber of Commerce of the 
ROC (ROCCOC) and overseas chambers of commerce in Taiwan.97 The ROC and 
Taiwan’s political elites seek to appeal to these. A material “international community” 
is harder to pinpoint. However, Taipei maintains international de facto diplomatic 
and trading relations through its representative offices. The PRC forms a potential 
constituency in that it provisionally endorses huadu because it averts taidu.  
97 Fish, Isaac Stone. 2016. The Long Fall of Taiwan. The Atlantic. 5 December 2016. [online] 
Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/taiwan-china-trump-beijing-
mao-chiang/509582/ [Accessed 16 October 2018].  
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The New Power Party (NPP), represented by elites like Chiu Hsien-chih, Freddy Lim 
and Lin Fengzheng, espouse citizen democracy within the ROC. The same is true of 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) elites, Cheng Shang-chih and Jennifer Lu, who 
espouse anti-corruption and transparency. The SDP competes for a progressive 
Taiwan-identifying NPP/DPP constituency and reflects a clear shift away from the 
taidu - tongyi nationalist divide in its positioning as a centre-left party. The NPP 
seeks to “normalise” Taiwan by abolishing the provincial government, permitting 
territorial changes through a referendum and making cross-Strait relations formally 
international relations through ministerial realignment. Yet, none of these parties 
seek to dissolve the ROC. Hence, these changes are simply cosmetic for taidu forces, 
who seek a completely new ROT. 98  Current taidu DIGs and parties include the 
Taiwan Solidarity Union, which in fact does not seek immediate de jure 
independence. In contrast, the Free Taiwan Party and post-Sunflower “Third Force” 
groups such as the Formosa Alliance, Welcome Formosa Republic; Farewell to 
‘Republic of China’ 99  and From Ethnos to Nation campaign for a Republic of 
Taiwan.100 
Tongyi under a ROC (huatong) is based on the “deep-Blue” strand of the pan-Blue 
coalition. Its ideal end point is unification with a liberal democratic China, but some 
deep-Blue elites seek more immediate unification. The official New Party policy is 
eventual unification. However, Yok Mu-ming and Wang Chien-shien of the New 
Party explicitly call for more rapid unification, as does Chang An-le, the leader of the 
Bamboo Union gang and the China Unification Promotion Party. The KMT’s 
huangfuxing faction, which represents military veteran officers, and the 800 Heroes 
98 Chen Nai-chia. 2018.  Personal communication with NPP official. Facebook. 22 July 2018. 
99 Cole, Michael. 2016.  
100 From Ethnos to Nation. 2018. About. [online] Available at: https://www.fetn.co/ [Accessed 30 
August 2018]. 
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espouse huatong. The former authoritarian KMT governor of Taiwan, James Soong 
of the People First Party, oscillates between collaboration and competition with the 
KMT for the same constituency and, although seeking eventual huatong, promotes 
greater ROC representation in IGOs, thus betraying a huadu policy position. Very 
few KMT elites explicitly promote unification. Hung Hsiu-chu, the former 
presidential candidate, is an exception, but was replaced by Eric Chu in 2015 because 
she alienated the KMT‘s core huadu constituency. Wu Den-yih was seen as leader of 
the deep-Blue KMT faction under Ma, yet he made no calls for unification. Similarly, 
Lien Chan, who Beijing prefers to deal with because of his perceived Taiwanese-
Mainlander identity, articulates a huadu policy position.   
Crucial to this study’s argument is that maintenance of de facto independence is a 
question of sovereignty and that sovereignty is maintained by states rather than 
nations. This suggests that a focus on Taiwan’s national identity misdirects research 
to taidu while a focus on state identity properly directs research to huadu. It is a 
focus on huadu therefore that permits analysis of cross-Strait relations as they are 
and the ROC state as it is.  
1.5.5. What is the Status Quo? 
A status quo is a provisional situation within which movement is possible and 
expected. Philip Hsu (2010) provides an empirical account of the cross-Strait type 
that allows for multiple interpretations:  
…the preference for the status quo as an alternative other than unification or 
independence can be reasonably comprehended as leaving intact the de facto separation 
between the two governments in Taipei and Beijing of which each proclaims to be a 
representative of a sovereign country, without solving their difference in Beijing’s 
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denial of Taipei’s sovereignty claim and without bilateral military confrontation that 
could be attempted to solve it.101 
The status quo is not stasis; Taipei’s policies and identity have changed dramatically 
since 1987. Yet, cross-Strait relations occur “within the firewalls” of the 1992 
Consensus.102 Both tongyi and taidu would violate and nullify the status quo, causing 
ROC state death.  In this context, the status quo becomes more durable.103 Huang and 
James (2014) posit that the status quo has become codified through rational decision 
making, but that this does not account for what prompted the status quo in the first 
place.104 This study suggests such decision making reflects the need for policy to 
legitimate huadu.  
1.6. The Context 
The PRC’s claim is historical and successor-state based. To refute this, taiduers say a 
declaration of a Republic of Taiwan (ROT) would nullify the PRC’s claim by 
breaking the connection between the ROC and Taiwan. Yet, advocating a name 
change entails denying Taiwan’s de facto sovereign independence.    Because of this, 
taiduers claim that Taiwan is ruled by the ROC colonial government in exile, not by 
Taiwan under the name ROC. Yet, to claim that Taiwan seeks independence equates 
Taiwan with Scotland or Catalonia and inadvertently legitimates the PRC’s claim to 
Taiwan. For this reason, the 2008-16 KMT administration played along with the 
PRC’s first line of reasoning –discursively deploying history to say Taiwan has 
101 Hsu, S. Philip. 2010. Between identity quest and risk aversion: lessons from the Chen Shui-bian 
presidency for maintaining cross-Strait stability. Journal of Contemporary China, 19: 693–717 at 694. 
102 Huang, Chin-hao and James, Patrick. 2014. Blue, Green or Aquamarine? Taiwan and the Status 
Quo Preference in Cross-Strait Relations. The China Quarterly, 219: 670 – 692 at 677. 
103 Huang and James. 2014: 678 
104 Rational decision making; perceived transaction costs; uncertainty; cognitive misperceptions; 
psychological commitment; regret avoidance and the “endowment effect” (departing from the status 
quo is naturally risky) suggest policy will converge towards maintaining the status quo.  
See: Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler. 1991. Anomalies: the endowment 
effect, loss aversion and status quo bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5: 193–206 at 205. 
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always been part of a pan-Chinese cultural sphere. They flatly denied the PRC’s 
successor-state line. This created the discursive space for the ROC to equal Taiwan 
and to legitimate huadu. That the ostensibly Chinese Nationalist KMT itself was 
instrumental in this is important to this study; ROC Premier Jiang Yi-huah rejected 
alleged similarities with Scotland in 2014, reaffirming that “keeping the ROC as an 
independent and sovereign state is the government’s top priority”.105 
1.6.1. The cross-Strait Context 
Taiwan is an anomaly in the international system and an artefact of particular 
political and historical circumstances.  The island has no national past before 1945, 
when it was “gloriously returned” (guangfu) to the ROC at the end of WWII after 50 
years of Japanese colonial rule. 106 That is not to say Taiwan was not “Chinese” 
before then; no study of Taiwanese identity can ignore Han Chinese identities.107 The 
Dutch first brought Hoklo-speaking migrants from Fujian during the 1620s. The 
Hoklo, along with Hakka from Guangdong, continued to migrate under Qing rule 
and only partially integrated with Austronesian indigenous tribes.108 The Qing never 
completely controlled Taiwan, and ceded it to Japan in 1895. However, the Qing 
represented neither a Chinese state nor a Chinese nation, but a Manchu empire ruling 
a loose sinic culture to which Taiwan was peripheral. When Sun Yat-sen declared the 
ROC in 1912, Chinese Nationalists did not consider Taiwan to be Chinese. The ROC 
105 Taipei Times. 2014. ROC not Scotland, independence vote not needed: Jiang. September 17 2014. 
[online] Available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/09/17/2003599885 
[Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
106 See: Gold, Thoms B. 1986. State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe; Kerr, 
George. 2017 [1965]. Formosa Betrayed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin; Hughes, Christopher.1997. 
Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society. Abingdon: 
Routledge. All take this position. 
107 Melissa Brown, Melissa. 2005. Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power and Migration 
on Changing Identities. Berkeley: University of California Press,; Andrade, Tonio. 2006.  How 
Taiwan Became Chinese (Online) Available at: http://www.gutenberg-e.org/andrade/preface.html 
[Accessed 20 November 2011]. 
108 Brown, Melissa. 2005.   
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did not construct an irredentist claim until after the 1943 Cairo Declaration.109 By 
1945, Japanese rule had constructed a core “native” Taiwanese, or benshengren, 
community from the Hoklo and Hakka but it took the Chinese Nationalists to turn it 
into a Taiwanese nation. In doing so, the KMT shattered its legitimacy. In February 
1947, KMT forces massacred thousands of islanders in the 2-28 Incident and 
instituted the White Terror and martial law (q.v. 6.2.2.). Official sinification 
constructed Taiwan as Free China. In this way, the KMT party state enacted Chinese 
Mainlander, or waishengren, settler rule in in opposition to the “native Taiwanese” 
benshengren. Combined, these events became the founding national myth that made 
Taiwanese-ness imaginable.110  
In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT lost the Chinese Civil War to Mao Zedong’s 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which established the PRC. The KMT withdrew to 
Taiwan, taking the ROC apparatus and a large waishengren refugee community with 
it. The Soviet boycott of the UN and the Korean War ensured the ROC maintained 
China’s UN seat. The 1952 ROC-Japan Treaty of Taipei left Taiwan’s status 
undetermined, but under de facto ROC administration. The ROC remained 
recognised in the UN until 1971, when post-colonial support for the PRC and a US 
move to balance the Soviet Union through rapprochement with Beijing prompted the 
UN to “expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” and “restore all 
rights” to the PRC.111 
109 Callaghan, William A.  2010. China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
110 Edmonson, Robert. 2002. The February 28 Incident and National Identity. In Stephane Corcuff . ed. 
Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan. Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe: 25-46. 
111 United Nations n.d. Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Twenty-Sixth 
Session, 25 October 1971. [online] Available at: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed 25 
November 2011].112 Taiwan Documents Project. n.d. Joint Communique of the United States of 
America and the People's Republic of China February 28, 1972. [online] Available at: 
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The UN resolution shattered the ROC’s legitimacy to represent either China or 
Taiwan. In 1972, the US-China Shanghai Communique “acknowledged” Beijing’s 
claim that ‘”all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one 
China and that Taiwan is a part of China”.112 The ROC haemorrhaged diplomatic 
allies and, in 1979, following the PRC’s 1978 Open Door Policy, the US normalised 
relations with Beijing and ended official relations with Taipei. Beijing offered Taipei 
One Country Two Systems (OCTS), which Taipei rejected, officially maintaining 
Free China under the Three Noes of “no contact, no compromise and no negotiation 
with the Communist bandits”.113 However, the US did not abandon Taipei; instead, it 
passed the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which guaranteed Taiwan’s military security. 
The stand-off continued throughout the 1980s until the end of the Cold War changed 
the international system again. 
The hijacking of a Taiwanese cargo plane to Guangzhou in 1987 effectively reversed 
the Three Noes by creating a pretext for engagement with Beijing. Given that both 
sides claimed to be China, talks were conducted secretly, then through “white-glove” 
quasi-governmental organisations – the ROC’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 
and the PRC’s Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS).  Talks 
culminated in December 1992 with One China Respective Interpretations (OCRI), a 
verbally delivered statement that had been composed by the ROC Office of the 
President and thus represented Taipei’s policy on the One China question at the time: 
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China Principle, but the 
interpretations of the two sides are different […] Our side believes that One China 
should mean the Republic of China established in 1912 and existing today, and its 
112 Taiwan Documents Project. n.d. Joint Communique of the United States of America and the 
People's Republic of China February 28, 1972. [online] Available at: 
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique01.htm [Accessed 25 November 2011]. 
113 Wu, Yu-shan. 2005. Taiwan's Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations, The China Journal, 53: 
35-60.
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sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu. Admittedly, Taiwan is a part of China, but the 
mainland is also part of China.114 
The 1992 Consensus, as it became known, recognised the status quo that had existed 
since 1949 and allowed Taipei to seek greater political divergence from China 
between 1992 and 2008. 
By 1992, loss of legitimacy and the end of the Cold War had led the ROC to reassess 
its identity. Democratisation, industrialisation, social change and de facto inter-state 
relations were constructing a Taiwanised ROC that maintained a formal claim to 
China. Taipei diverged from China and Chinese-ness became less important to its 
state identity, despite a shared a cultural background.115 By 1998, SEF-ARATS talks 
had already broken down and would remain suspended until 2008.  In July 1999, 
ROC President Lee uttered the Two States Theory; that is, relations between Taipei 
and Beijing were “state-to-state” or “special state-to-state”. Despite its initial outrage, 
however, Beijing softened its One China principle (q.v. 7.5.). In September 1999, 
PRC President Jiang Zemin reiterated Beijing’s offer of OCTS, contingent on four 
red lines: involvement of a foreign power; a declaration of de jure independence 
(taidu); deployment of nuclear capability by Taiwan or “massive disorder” on the 
island. 116  In 2000, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian assumed the ROC presidency and 
114 Su, Chi 2009. Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs, Abingdon: 
Routledge: 13. 
115 Jacobs, Bruce. 2005. Taiwanization in Taiwan’s Politics. In Makeham, John and Hsiau, A-chin. 
eds. Cultural, Ethnic and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan:33. 
116 Minstry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 1995. Continue to Promote the 
Reunification of the Motherland. 30 January 1995. [online] Available at: 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/3568_665529/t17784.shtml [Accessed 25 November 
2011]. “Taiwan will keep its existing social and economic systems as well as way of life, and enjoy a 
high degree of autonomy”; that “the central government will not garrison any troops in Taiwan and 
people in Taiwan may take office in central government”. Beijing’s intervention doctrine contained 
four red lines: involvement of a foreign power; a declaration of independence (taidu); deployment of 
nuclear capability by Taiwan or “massive disorder” on the island.  
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called for cross-Strait talks without preconditions, but the PRC insisted he recognise 
the One-China principle. Despite leading an ostensibly pro-taidu party, Chen stressed 
shared Chinese culture and history, promised not to declare taidu and further 
liberalised cross-Strait trade.117 In 2002, Chen stated "with Taiwan and China on each 
side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country”.118 In 2003, in response to perceived 
threat from PRC missiles, a referendum law permitted a “defensive referendum”. 
Although the 2004 referndum’s content did not cross the huadu-taidu red line, 
Beijing saw it as a vote on sovereignty and a step towards taidu through 
constitutional change.119  The result was invalidated due to low turnout and Beijing’s 
response was initially restrained. 120  However, Beijing responded in 2005 with 
military drills and an Anti-Secession Law that explicitly threatened Taiwan with 
invasion if it declared taidu. 121  These were perceived as direct threats and Chen 
responded by restricting cross-Strait trade and further Taiwanising the ROC through 
a “Name Rectification Campaign”. 122 After the DPP victory in 2000, Beijing had 
rejected the 1992 Consensus and insisted on a strict one-China principle. However, 
back-door KMT-CCP talks after 2005 proposed it as a basis for rapprochement and 
117 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2000. Taiwan Stands Up: Presidential 
Inauguration Address, 20 May 2000. [Online] Available at: 
https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/2643 [Accessed 30 November 2011]. 
118 International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan. 2002. President Chen: “One country on 
each side” Our own Taiwanese road. Taiwan Communique, 102, September 2002. [Online] Available 
at: http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/tc102-int.pdf [Accessed 30 November 2011]. 
119 China Daily. 2003. Is Taiwan’s Chen a Master Puppet on the American Stage? 29 November , 
2003: 1. [Online.] Available at: http://bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/thread-27168-1-1.html [Accessed 14 
June 2019]; China Daily. 2004.  
'Stop playing with fire,' Taipei told. 8 January, 2004: 5. [Online.] Available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/cd/2004-01/08/content_296641.htm [Accessed 14 June 2019]. 
120 Mattlin. Mikael. 2004.  Same Content, Different Wrapping: Cross-Strait Policy Under DPP Rule
China Perspectives, 56 [Online] Available at: 
https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/436#bodyftn24 [Accessed 14 June 2019]. 
121 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States. 2005. Anti-Secession Law (Full 
text)(03/15/05). [online] Available at: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm 
[Accessed 20 November 2015]. 
122 Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016: 160-1. 
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Beijing offered to tolerate Taipei’s “respective interpretations” of OCRI. The KMT’s 
2008-16 cross-Strait policy turned notional rapprochement into official 
Rapprochement with Beijing. This entailed cosmetic re-sinification of the ROC and 
an attempt to drive through a comprehensive free trade agreement (ECFA) and 
several follow-on agreements, notably a trade-in-services pact (CSSTA). These 
policies were predicated on the 1992 Consensus. Domestic opposition to Ma’s cross-
Strait policies contributed to the KMT losing the 2014 mid-term elections. Yet, Ma 
still met Xi Jinping in 2015 in Singapore – the first ever meeting between ROC and 
PRC heads of state.  
Despite its rhetorical turn to China, however, the 2008-16 KMT administration had 
in fact constructed a huadu discourse (q.v. Ch 8).  Rapprochement foundered and, 
when the DPP returned to power in 2016, China suspended talks, citing the DPP’s 
refusal to recognise the 1992 Consensus. Yet the new president, Tsai Ing-wen, 
blocked a referendum on taidu because the DPP’s 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s 
Future recognises Taiwan’s title as the Republic of China. 123  This suggests that 
huadu was as far as Taipei wanted to go, regardless of administration. 
1.6.2. The Domestic Context 
In the domestic realm, the authoritarian KMT-ROC party state was Leninist, 
corporatist and anti-Communist.124 As a settler state, it was more resilient than a 
colonial state. Unlike the colonial state, the classic settler state exercises authoritarian 
123 New Taiwan Ilha Formosa, 2007. DPP Resolution on Taiwan's Future, 8 May 1999. [Online.] 
Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm [Accessed 14 June 2019]. 
The Resolution states “Taiwan, although named the Republic of China under its current constitution, 
is not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China. Any change in the independent 
status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite”. 
124 This apparent contradiction and the revolutionary nature of the KMT is well covered in: Teon, Aris. 
2016. The Guomindang, The Communist Party And Leninism. The Greater China Journal. [Online] 
Available at: https://china-journal.org/2016/06/01/guomindang-communist-party-and-leninism/ 
[Accessed 20 August 2018].  
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control to secure legitimacy and has substantial military and financial reserves to 
resist domestic threats.125 Taiwan represented a refuge and a permanent home for the 
waishengren, holding out against both metropolitan Communist and local 
benshengren resistance. Chinese ascendency over the Taiwanese required a de facto 
independent state to maintain legitimacy. 
At the same time, however, the ROC’s paternalistic, developmental nature facilitated 
economic growth and created a modern, industrial Chinese state on Taiwan. Land 
reform in 1950 had created a benshengren small-farmer class, beholden to the KMT 
and removed from its rural elite.126 Sinification made Mandarin the lingua franca for 
this native-Hoklo-speaking benshengren rural elite, which transferred to industry to 
become Taiwan’s bourgeoisie. KMT sinification forced the islanders to identify with 
the ROC. However, demographic change, reformist political pressure and the co-
opting of young benshengren technocrats into the KMT elite meant that the 
Taiwanese became a political force.127  
The death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 led to limited liberalisation under his son, 
Chiang Ching-kuo. 128  A social process known as bentuhua – localisation, or 
Taiwanisation –driven by the dangwai (outside the KMT party) movement drove this 
(q.v. Chapter 6).129 As Chiang Ching-kuo drew on bentuhua to Taiwanise the KMT 
and the provincial government, he liberalised Taiwan’s political culture, spawning 
Taiwan-identifying domestic interest groups (DIGs).130 With no ties to the Chinese 
mainland, benshengren KMT technocrats and dangwai activists aimed at common 
125 Weitzer, Ronald John. 1990. Transforming Settler States: communal conflict and internal security 
in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe. Berkeley: University of California Press: 34.  
126 Gold, Thomas. 1986; Tien, Hung-mao. 1989.  
127 Gold, Thomas. 1986. 
128 Jacobs, Bruce. 2012. Democratizing Taiwan. Leiden: Brill. 
129 Makeham, John and Hsiau, A-chin. eds. Cultural, Ethnic and Political Nationalism in 
Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 1. 
130 Jacobs, Bruce. 2012.  
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political ground between waishengren and benshengren.131 The explicit aim of the 
dangwai was state identity change through democratisation, with socialists, Chinese 
liberals and Taiwanese nationalists competing. Sequential domestic shifts in power 
from Chinese to Taiwanese prompted KMT loss of legitimacy, with the Zhongli 
Incident in 1977, the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 and the Lin Family Murders in 
1980 salient (q.v. Chapter 7).132 In 1987, the KMT ended martial law. The opposition 
DPP had already formed in 1986, presaging a liberal-democratic political spectrum 
based loosely on the benshengren – waishengren ethnic distinction and expressed 
through Taiwanese and divergence-leaning “pan-Green” and Chinese and 
convergence-leaning “pan-Blue” partisan groupings, centred on the DPP and the 
KMT respectively. Given the KMT’s penetration of society, however, it could still 
count on broad benshengren electoral support.  
The benshengren KMT leader, Lee Teng-hui, became President in 1988 and began 
democratic reforms that led to a loosening of waishengren power. However, the 
waishengren were 14% of the population in 1990 with 80% of the seats in the 
legislature and control of the military and provincial government. In 1991, Lee 
introduced constitutional reforms that limited the ROC’s sovereignty to the Taiwan 
Area and the electorate of Taiwan while implicitly recognising the PRC.133 In the 
same year, the DPP inserted a Taiwan Independence Clause in its party charter. In 
1996, in response to DPP and pro-Taiwan concerns, Lee imposed restrictions on 
cross-Strait trade (No Haste), to the chagrin of economically liberal business 
interests.134 This created space for the ROC to diverge further from China politically. 
131 Hughes, Christopher. 1997.   
132 Gold, Thomas. 1986.  
133 Lee’s constitutional reforms constituted huadu by aligning the ROC’s de facto territorial claims to 
the island of Taiwan and the offshore islands.  
134 Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016.  
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By retiring waishengren elites and co-opting others while working with the DPP on a 
top-down Taiwanese nation-building project, Lee made provocative statements on 
Taiwan’s political status, splitting the Taiwanised KMT mainstream, or zhulipai, and 
its Chinese Nationalist anti-mainstream, or feizhulipai. Yet, he maintained tongyi as 
the long-term goal and rejected the DPP’s taidu stance. However, on a private visit to 
Cornell University in 1995, Lee stated: “What actually is the goal of Taiwan’s 
democratization? Speaking simply, it is the ‘Taiwanization of Taiwan (taiwande 
bentuhua).”135 
Beijing was angered, and responded with verbal threats and missile tests before 
Taiwan’s first full democratic elections in 1996. Taiwanese voters elected Lee. Lee’s 
KMT faction, with DPP support, continued with its Taiwanese nation-building 
project. In 1998, Lee articulated a civic New Taiwanese, or xin taiwanren, national 
identity to assuage a perceived ethnic cleavage between waishengren and 
benshengren and to counteract the DPP’s lean towards taidu (q.v. 7.3.). As the ROC 
continued to Taiwanise, however, Taiwan Independence as taidu became a straw 
man.  In 1999, the DPP acknowledged the ROC’s legitimacy. 136   This “Grand 
Compromise” was struck because only a minority of Taiwan’s population supported 
taidu as de jure independence in the short term. Systemic factors aside, an 
independent Taiwan would require a new state.  
Despite post- 2008 Rapprochement under a China-identifying KMT, Taipei’s interest 
in tongyi continued to wane. Longitudinal data from National Chengchi University in 
figure 1 below indicate the island’s national identity shifted from predominantly 
135 Lee, Teng-hui, quoted in Jacobs, Bruce. 2005.  
136 Taiwan Documents Project. n.d. DPP Resolution on Taiwan's Future, 8 May 1999. [online] 
Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm [Accessed 3 January 2018]. The resolution 
stated: “although named the Republic of China under the current constitution…any change in the 
independent status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan by means of a plebiscite.” 
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Chinese at the start of democratisation to a prevailing Taiwanese identity by 2017. In 
1992, over 25% perceived themselves as exclusively Chinese. This fell to under 11% 
in 2001 at the start of Chen Shui-bian’s DPP administration and was just 3% in 2016. 
Conversely, exclusive Taiwanese identity rose dramatically from under 18% in 1992 
to over 41% in 2001 and almost 60% in 2016. Joint Taiwanese-Chinese identification 
also declined steadily from just over 46% to under 34% percent in the same period.137 
In other words, nearly two-thirds of Taiwan’s population identified as exclusively 
Taiwanese by 2017, and this crystalised under Ma Ying-jeou’s ostensibly China-
leaning post-2008 KMT administration. Even KMT elites suggest that Taiwanese 
national self-identification stands at 85% and Chinese at less than 5%.138 
A major challenge to the KMT arose in 2014. However, this time the challenge 
sought to defend the ROC’s liberal democratic identity and delegitimate the KMT as 
guardians of that identity. Intense opposition to the KMT’s cross-Strait policies arose 
when students and civic groups occupied Taiwan’s legislature and effectively 
blocked the CSSTA trade agreement, alleging lack of due diligence and democratic 
process. Pan-Green groups claimed it threatened national security, acquiesced in 
Beijing’s efforts to achieve tongyi by stealth and were a KMT attempt to sell Taiwan 
out. The Sunflower Movement, as it became known, appealed not to taidu but to the 
ROC constitution, thus consolidating huadu. At the same time, Taiwan’s business 
community (including the taishang – Taiwanese businesspeople in China) broadly 
supported the CSSTA while driving a business-friendly DPP economic policy in the 
137 Election Study Center. National Chengchi University. 2017. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese 
Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked by Surveys of the Election Study Center (NCCU)[Online] Available 
at: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/pic.php?img=166_8cefc9c5.jpg&dir=news&title=Image [Accessed 20 
January 2018].  
138 Jiang, Yi-hua. 2017. Taiwan’s National Identity and Cross-Strait Relations. In Dittmer, Lowell. 
2017. Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace. Oakland: University of California Press: 27 
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run-up to the 2016 presidential election, suggesting that the DPP had become the 
party of the Taiwanese bourgeoisie.139 
The contexts above confirm that all domestic politics imply cross-Strait relations and 
that the two are cross-cutting. Taiwan has diverged from China. At the same time, 
while there is little appetite for taidu, there is almost no desire for tongyi. In this 
context, Taipei pursues a cross-Strait status quo that eschews both taidu and tongyi. 
It is huadu embodied in the status quo that secures Taiwan’s de facto independence. 
1.7. Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 maps the Area Studies, Comparative Politics and IR literature on cross-
Strait relations to explore Taiwan’s maintenance of de facto independence and sets 
up knowledge gaps. It identifies the ROC’s crises of legitimacy, sinification, 
bentuhua and  democratisation  as a salient causes of ROC state identity change. 
While the literature itself does not explicitly identify huadu, it does two things: first, 
it locates huadu epistemologically and, second, it constitutes huadu by progressively 
constructing a categorical distinction between Beijing and Taipei. The theories, 
frameworks and concepts used in the literature are of value to a synthetic RC 
approach as are the historical findings. In this way, the literature review creates a gap 
for huadu. 
Chapter 3 outlines a RC theoretical framework that conceives of huadu as discursive 
power; that is, a form of legitimacy that maintains Taiwan’s de facto independence, 
139 Shu Keng and Lin, Emmy Ruihua. 2017. Mingling but Not Merging: Changes and Continuities in 
the Identity of Taiwanese in Mainland China. In Dittmer, Lowell. ed. 2017. China and Taiwan: Fitful 
Embrace. Oakland: University of California Press: 42-60. See also: Young, Parson. 2016.  The Time 
is Now. New Bloom, 14 January 2016. [Online] Available at: 
https://newbloommag.net/2016/01/14/the-time-is-now/ [Accessed 1 June 2019]; Isett, Christopher. 
2016. The Taiwanese Way. Jacobin. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/03/taiwan-sunflower-movement-china-tpp/ [Accessed 1 June 
2019]. 
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delegitimates tongyi and taidu and compels Beijing to sanction it. In this way, 
Taipei’s relational power stalemates Beijing. The framework resolves realist-
constructivist approaches by using the core-concepts of power politics and 
intersubjectivity and triangulates to DIG threat perception. In this way, it escapes the 
sterile language of positivism and scientific realism. In so doing, it constructs a two-
level, three-stage RC model of huadu’s inter-subjective co-constitution in domestic 
and cross-Strait power politics.  
Chapter 4 presents a state identity theoretical framework. This extends the RC 
theoretical framework to conceive of ROC state identity change as a form of 
legitimation constructed in crises of legitimacy. To do this, it acknowledges the 
modernist explanation of national identity in Taiwan and applies it to Wendtian 
understandings of state identity. Alexandrov’s concept of state identity politics (SIPs) 
show how huadu is diseminated in cross-Strait and domestic power politics. 
Chapter 5 sketches this study’s novel discourse analytic approach. It adopts an 
applied linguistics approach to IR conceptions of discourse. The framework is a 
systematic combination of corpus linguistics (CL), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
in the form of the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) and pragmatics. This 
approach does two things: first, while not going the full positivist hog, it permits 
empirically warranted evidence for interpratations based on pragmatic analysis and 
historical triangulation. Second, it distinguishes between Taipei’s diplomatic rhetoric 
and its authentic discourse of huadu. It is in this distinction that huadu is legitimated. 
Chapter 6 is the first of three empirical chapters. It triangulates theory and 
methodology to historical events, using this study’s data to account for a process: the 
construction of Taiwan as Free China between the late 1940s and 1987. It argues that 
the ROC has been independent of China since 1949 and that its state identity change 
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legitimated this separateness, creating an independent ROC. Huadu was constituted 
first through sinification and bentuhua under Free China and, second, in an extended 
crisis of legitimacy after 1971 and, third, through further Taiwanisation and cross-
Strait relations under a democratic ROC. 
Chapter 7 applies theory and methodology to historical events to account for the 
nucleation of huadu between 1987 and 2008,  Using this study’s data, it explores the 
political speech that constituted huadu in linguistic terms and triangulates to 
historical events, thus providing firm warrant for interpretations around the 
legitimation of huadu. 
Chapter 8 is also empirical. It examines how huadu underwent the litmus test of 
Rapprochement with Beijing. It relates how contending domestic  interests combined 
bottom-up with a powerful top-down discourse of huadu state identity to constitute 
ROC legitimacy and sovereignty, thus maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence 
in the status quo. This chapter refutes the claim of much area studies research that 
domestic preferences prevented a China-identifying KMT from converging with 
China to a degree that threatened its de facto independence.   
Chapter 9 presents a summary, conclusions and implications. These are that huadu 
accounts for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence as the ROC. This 
status secures Taiwan’s sovereignty and delegitimates China’s irridentist claim, since 
China deploys an anti-taidu, not an anti-huadu, discourse. In the process, Taipei 
compels Beijing to endorse huadu and, by extension, Taiwan’s sovereignty. The 
study is prescriptive in that it does not seek to predict cross-Strait outcomes. 
However, it argues that only huadu permits the status quo, that taidu and tongyi 
would result in ROC state death and that Beijing cannot violate huadu without 
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destroying its own legitimacy. This fragile situation secures peace and (potential) 
prosperity – a social purpose of  power beyond security itself. 
Chapter 2: Mapping the Literature on cross-Strait Relations 
2.1.Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on cross-Strait relations to ascertain the extent to 
which it answers the study’s central question: given China’s power 
preponderance, what accounts for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto 
independence? The review makes reference to a range of Political Science, Area 
Studies and IR research to provide intellectual, theoretical and methodological 
context. It establishes the argument that to answer the research question, no 
existing approach alone is adequate. Rather, one that foregrounds the 
discursive power of state identity is needed. For reasons of space and coherence 
around huadu and the ROC, the review intentionally excludes the literature on 
Beijing’s Taiwan policy. 
While cross-Strait Relations as a political phenomenon and a field of study in 
IR began in 1987, this review’s key sources draw on the broader historical and 
area-studies literature on Taiwan going back to the 1950s. The major issues and 
debates addressed centre on Taiwan’s political status; China’s irredentist claim and 
resultant unification-independence debate; the cross-Strait balance of power and 
security dilemma; the definition of One China; democratisation and  identity 
change in Taiwan – particularly the remarkable decline in Chinese and rise in 
Taiwanese national identity; the Washington-Taipei-Beijing strategic 
triangle; Washington’s and Taipei’s China policies; Taiwan’s domestic and party 
politics; the effects of KMT authoritarian rule; the role of interest groups  and the 
reciprocal effect of all of these on cross-Strait relations and their meanings for 
the nature of the cross-Strait status quo. Salient themes are the tenacity and 
viability of the status quo; the puzzle of economic convergence alongside 
political divergence and Taiwan’s resistance to China’s superior power. 
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The realist tradition explains China’s lack of power to force unification in terms 
of cross-Strait balance of power, Chinese threat and security dilemma in the 
broader context of US-China relations and US commitment to Taiwan. 
Neoliberal approaches address power ambivalently in the context of 
economic convergence, seeing in it prospects for peace, but accepting that China 
may deploy economic power to coerce Taiwan. Constructivist approaches bring in 
the power of Taiwan’s norms, values and identities to account for its 
effective resistance to Chinese power. It is clear that the literature constructs Taiwan 
in the act of naming it. 140 Yet, it does not satisfactorily explain how or why 
this identity operates to resist Beijing’s power. 
Crucially, the literature review identifies the following gaps: 
 None of the literature identifies the constitutive power of state identity in 
relation to domestic interests and Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy; There is no 
explicitly realist-constructivist research on cross-Strait relations;
 The literature is limited in its conceptualisation of Taiwan’s state identity. 
Much presupposes an inhibited binary choice between unification and de jure 
independence or linguistically implies a normative preference for de jure 
independence.
 There is almost no linguistics-driven discourse analytic research on 
Taiwanese political speech and, what there is is insufficient to locate textual 
warrant for Taiwan’s discursive power to maintain its autonomy from China;
 The existing literature does not adequately explain discursive power, 
legitimacy, state identity, security and interests in the context of Taiwan’s 
resistance to Chinese power.
 The existing literature does not adequately account for huadu and why 
Beijing sanctions it.
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2. outlines the political science, 
foreign policy and international legal literature around the KMT authoritarian period; 
140 Harrison, Mark. 2006: 1-2. 
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section 2.3. covers Taiwan Area Studies; 2.4. covers the IR theoretical literature on 
cross-Strait relations, dividing it into neorealist, (neo)liberal, constructivist and 
neoclassical realist (NCR) and domestic realist strands; section 2.5. reviews the 
discourse analytic work on Taiwanese political speech and cross-Strait relations. The 
conclusion in 2.6. argues that the literature fails satisfactorily to explain Taiwan’s 
maintenance of its de facto independence because it does not locate state identity as a 
constitutive and overarching discourse. The literature on Taiwanese national identity 
and nationalism is dealt with in chapter four for two reasons. First, its size and scope 
detract from this chapter’s purpose in ascertaining to what extent other concepts, 
ontologies and epistemologies account for the study’s central puzzle. Second, its 
conflation of state, ethnic and national identities requires clarification in the context 
of state identity theory.  
2.2. The KMT Authoritarian Period 
The Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s domestic politics became staples of US academic 
research from the 1950s primarily because of the ROC’s US proxy status vis-à-vis 
the PRC. Research on Taiwan’s security was linked to US China policy and 
Taiwan’s legal status. This early body of literature up to 1971 puts this study’s 
research question in context by highlighting a different perspective on China’s power 
preponderance and legitimacy; China was the ROC and US power had allowed it to 
subdue Taiwan but not the PRC.  
US policy and diplomatic briefings during the 1950s and 1960s frame ROC power as 
US power and ROC identity formally as Chinese. Yet, US and ROC government 
documentation together construct a separate Taiwan. “Formosa” and “Free China” 
are the default names for the polity in the US literature. “Free China” and “Taiwan” 
prevail in the ROC’s own policy statements. The US-ROC alignment on “Free China” 
58 
itself linguistically qualifies Taipei’s Chinese-ness, while the Taiwan-Formosa 
opposition presents a paradox; US preference for “Formosa” aligns to the Taiwan 
Independence Movement’s (TIM) (q.v. 6.3.1.) preferred nomenclature, while the 
ROC’s use of “Taiwan” aligns the territory categorically to “Free China”. All three 
forms linguistically isolate the polity from China proper.141 Indeed, the US articulates 
a Free China that is not free as the “Formosa Problem”.142  
Certainly ideological, but with little explicit reference to political philosophy or 
theory, the literature frames Chiang Kai-shek as a flawed but loyal ally in the UN 
and Taipei’s non-relations with Beijing as the object of US policy decisions. A 1952 
essay entitled Formosa Today, by Albert Ravenholt, is typical, calling for “military 
aid to Formosa” to repel the “Chinese Red Airforce”.143 Yet, in 1955, Arthur Dean 
argues for “flexible realism”: “the Peking government controls continental China” 
and “any prospect of stabilizing the Far East may of necessity entail that we 
negotiate with it,” the US holds that “the Government of Nationalist China on 
Formosa,” is the legitimate government of all of China, including “Formosa” and the 
US does not recognise the “Red Chinese Government”.144 In 1960, the US position is 
only clear on what it will not do: i.e. not recognise Beijing or accept PRC accession 
to the UN, since this would entail US recognition of PRC sovereignty over “the 
province of Formosa” and the ROC would reject a two-China UN solution.145 These 
early studies spawned a body of legal research on Taiwan’s status that was mostly 
confined to scholarly journals. O’Connell (1956), Walker (1959) and Jain (1963) are 
141 Harrison, Mark. 2006: 1-2. 
142 Ibid: 33 
143 Ravenholt, Arthur. 1952. Formosa Today. Foreign Affairs, 30: 612-624 
144 Dean, Arthur. 1955. United States Foreign Policy and Formosa. Foreign Affairs, 33: 3072. 
145 Bowles, Chester. 1960. The “China Problem” Reconsidered. Foreign Affairs. April 1960: 38: 476-
486.
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clearly relevant in revealing a gap between legality and legitimacy. 146  This pre-1971 
literature supports the KMT narrative of Taiwan as the repository of an authentic 
China. Yet, it is ambivalent on whether its separation from the mainland is temporary. 
Ralph Clough’s Island China (1968) and Leonard Gordon’s Taiwan: Studies in 
Chinese Local History (1970) are typical.147 Apart from Young’s (1968) volume on 
negotiating with the PRC, there are few studies of what might now be termed cross-
Strait relations and, even then, the relations are not cross-Strait but cross-Ocean.148  
Analyses of social, industrial and agricultural development like George Barclay’s 
Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan (1954) and Neil Jacoby’s US Aid to 
Taiwan (1966) 149  stand out among dry hagiographies to ROC land reform and 
economic development, 150 the legal and political status of Taiwan 151 and historical 
and social studies that place Taiwan squarely within a pan-Chinese cultural and 
social sphere.152 However, it is the work that links these themes to US policy that 
146 See: O’Connell, D.P. 1956. The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem. 
American Journal of International Law, 52(2): 405-416; Jain, J.P. 1963. The Legal Status of Formosa. 
American Journal of International Law, 57(1): 25-45. See also: Scalapino, Robert A. 1968. The 
question of two Chinas. In Tang Tsou (ed.) China in Crisis, 2, China’s Policies in Asia and America’s 
Alternatives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
147 See also: Koo, Anthony Y.C. 1968. The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development: A Case 
Study of Taiwan; The Journal of Economic History 29(3): 574-575.  
148 Young, Kenneth T. 1968. Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States 
Experience, 1953-1963. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
149 Barclay, George W. 1954. Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press; Jacoby, Neil H. 1966. US Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-
Help and Development. New York: Praeger. 
150 See: Koo, Anthony Y.C. 1968; Yang, Martin M.C. 1970. Socio-Economic  Results of Land Reform 
in Taiwan. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i, for East-West Centre; Shen, R.H. ed. 1974. Agriculture’s 
Place in the Strategy of Development: The Taiwan Experience. Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction. 
151 See: Morello, Frank  P. 1966. The International Legal Status of Formosa. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 
Chen, Lung-chu and Lasswell, Harold D. 1967. Formosa, China and the United Nations. New York: 
St Martin’s Press. Mancall, Mark. ed.1968. Formosa Today. New York: Praeger; O’Connell, D.P. 
1956. 
152 See: Goddard, W.G. 1966. Formosa: A Study in Chinese History. London: Macmillan.; Clough, 
Ralph N. 1968. Island China. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; Gordon, Leonard. 1970. 
Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History. New York: Colombia University Press. 
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makes the legitimation of the ROC on Taiwan a salient theme. 153  The implicit 
reference to classical realist notions of diplomacy, prudence, morality and caution in 
the practice of power is clear in US restraining policy on Chiang Kai-shek. These 
studies account not so much for China’s inability to subdue Taiwan as for US 
support for and restraining power on Taipei.  
Some sinologists recognised the dilemma. C.P. Fitzgerald argues that Taiwan 
“should be freed from the Nationalist regime, which is locally detested, and left 
under a Government of its own inhabitants, guaranteed by the United Nations”.154 
John Fairbank (1957) repeatedly interrogates ROC legitimacy, lamenting “we 
support Chiang Kai-shek’s claim to represent the Chinese one-quarter of mankind, 
though the chances of his regaining the mainland are so dim as to be invisible.”155 
George Kerr’s seminal work of scholarly reportage, Formosa Betrayed (1965) stands 
out in igniting international awareness of authoritarian KMT rule and US complicity, 
using eye-witness testimony of the 2-28 Incident and White Terror.156  
Richard Wilson’s 1968 study of political attitudes among mainlander and Taiwanese 
children and Sheldon Appleton’s Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan (1970), 
which interviews university students, makes salient an embryonic Taiwanese 
national identity. 157 Peng Ming-min’s classic autobiography and position paper, A 
Taste of Freedom (1970), outlines a programme for Taiwanese (Formosan) self-
salvation, rejects Chinese Nationalist rule as illegitimate and draws explicitly on 
Renan’s modernist concept of the nation. Much subsequent nationalism studies 
153 Weiss, Thomas. 1969. Taiwan and US policy. ORBIS, 12(4): 1165-1187; 
154 Fitzgerald, C.P. cited in Harrison, 2006: 34. 
155 Fairbank, John. 1957. China: Time for a Policy. Atlantic Monthly,36. 
156 Kerr, George. 2017 [1965].  
157 Mendel, Douglas. 1970. The Politics of Formosan Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. Wilson, Richard W. 1968. A comparison of political attitudes of Taiwanese and Mainlander 
children on Taiwan. Asian Survey, 8(12): 980-1000; Appleton, Sheldon. 1970. Taiwanese and 
Mainlanders on Taiwan: a survey of student attitudes China Quarterly, 44: 38-65; 
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literature on Taiwanese national identity (q.v. 4.2.) develops Peng’s normative 
approach. 
Taiwan becomes problematised in the literature following US rapprochement with 
Beijing in 1971. US studies name Taiwan and locate the security dilemma in the 
Taiwan Strait and its meaning for the US strategic balancing. Foreign policy studies 
point to uncertain US Taiwan policy and diplomatic and security strategy.158 For the 
first time, the logical inconsistency of recognising two Chinese states is revealed and 
the potential abandonment of Taiwan is explored.159  
Although Earl Ravenal presages OCRI with explicit permutations on the meaning of 
China,160 Taiwan independence (taidu) is not a major theme in the early literature. 
Indeed, Wei Yung’s framing of Taipei’s dilemma as one between continued 
confrontation between and unification of two Chinese states is typical. 161  While 
Taipei certainly perceives Beijing as a threat because of its irredentist claim, there is 
no question in these studies that the PRC poses a military threat to the ROC’s 
existence. The literature certainly accounts for Nationalist China’s subjugation of 
Taiwan, but it does not interrogate why the PRC is unable to do so. Rather, it 
questions the legitimacy of the ROC.  
158 See: Bueler, William, M. 1971. US China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan. Boulder: Colorado 
Associated University Press; Cohen, Jerome Alan, Friedman, Edward and Hindon, Harold C. 1971. 
Taiwan and American Policy: the Dilemma in US-China Relations. New York: Praeger; Hsiung, 
James C. 1979. US relations with China in the post-Kissingerian era: a sensible policy for the 1980s. 
Asian Survey, 17(8): 691-710; Scalapino, Robert A. 1974. China and the balance of power. Foreign 
Affairs, 52(1): 349-385; Solomon, Richard H. 1977. Thinking through the China problem. Foreign 
Affairs, 56(2): 324-356. 
159 Cohen, Jerome Alan. 1971. Recognizing China. Foreign Affairs. October 1971: 50(1): 30-43; Chen 
Lung-chu and Reisman W.M. 1972. Who Owns Taiwan? A Search for International Title. Yale Law 
Journal, 81 (4): 599-671; 
160 Ravenal, Earl C. 1971. Approaching China, Defending Taiwan. Foreign Affairs. October 1971: 
50(1): 44-58; 
161 Wei, Yung. 1976. Unification or confrontation: an assessment of future relations between mainland 
China and Taiwan. In Ray E. Johnston (ed.) The Politics of Division. New York: Praeger; 
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The meaning of Taiwan’s domestic politics for ROC legitimacy becomes a focus of 
study after 1971. A number of studies in the years between Kissinger’s first visit to 
China in 1971 and the US’s final de-recognition of the ROC in 1979 focus on socio-
political change in the context of latent Taiwanese nationalism. Elite identity 
transformation and economic development are identified as the causes of domestic 
transformation that has significantly altered the relationship between state and 
society. Mab Huang and Tien Hung-mao stand out in addressing socio-political 
change with an eye on the nascent Taiwanisation (bentuhua) movement. Their work 
is among the earliest to conceptualise Taiwan’s domestic political change in terms of 
confrontation between a Chinese governing elite and local Taiwanese political 
actors.162 Drawing on comparative political theory, Arthur Lerman (1978) traces a 
switch to local Taiwanese power through paternalistic relations between local leaders 
and elected officials in the late 1960s – earlier than indicated in other sources. 
However, he notes the contingency of Taiwan’s “fledgling state of political 
development”, noting that KMT power elites may find Taiwanese power 
intolerable.163  
The dramatic domestic events of the late 1970s developed earlier research on 
conflicting legal claims to the name of China, political change in Taiwan and the 
dangwai movement. The 1979 Kaohsiung Incident and subsequent trial sparked three 
themes in the scholarly literature of the 1970s and 1980s which have remained 
dominant up to the 2010s. These are the security dilemma, Taiwan’s legal and 
162 Tien, Hung-mao. 1975. Taiwan in transition: prospects for socio-political change. China Quarterly, 
64: 615-644; Huang, Mab. 1976. Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-73. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Wei, Yung. 1976. Modernization process in Taiwan: an 
Allocative analysis. Asian Survey, 16(3): 249-269; Williams, Jack F. ed. 1976. The Taiwan Issue. East 
Lansing: East Asian Series/ Occasional Paper No 5. 
163 Lerman, Arthur. 1978. Taiwan’s Politics: The Provincial Assemblyman’s World. Washington: 
University Press of America: 7. 
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political status and the effects of historical political repression.164 Huadu speaks to all 
three. 
A small number of works exposes a tension between Taipei’s China policy and the 
KMT’s domestic policy. John Copper (1979) and Thomas Bellows (1976) take 
Taiwan’s foreign policy strategies as their focus. The context of US-PRC 
rapprochement and loss of diplomatic partners is ameliorated by US defence 
guarantees in response to persistent KMT diplomacy. While no direct link between 
domestic and foreign policy is identified, it is clear that these are reciprocally driven. 
Bellows refers to Taiwan as a “nation” yet appears ideologically committed to US 
recognition of the ROC. At the same time, he identifies diplomatic adjustments and 
its policy of “national revival in Taiwan” as reasons for the ROC’s survival, thus 
presaging state identity change as a theme.165  
The link between cross-Strait material power and legitimacy becomes salient again in 
Chiu Huangdah’s China and the Taiwan Issue (1979).166 Chiu focuses on legal claims 
to sovereignty and legitimacy and predicts incremental political change in the context 
of the KMT’s orderly democratic reforms, but rules out constitutional change. In 
examining Taipei’s claim to legitimacy, however, Chiu discards a negotiated 
unification with the PRC since the KMT party state’s identity rules it out. In doing so, 
he opens space for this study’s conception of legitimacy as something beyond legal 
recognition. 
164 American Institute in Taiwan. 1980. Transcripts of the Trial of the Kaohsiung Eight. Taipei: AIT. 
165 Copper, John F. 1979. Taiwan’s Strategy and America’s China Policy. ORBIS 21(2): 261-276; 
Bellows, Thomas. 1976. Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of Adaptation and 
Viability. Asian Survey, 16(7): 593-610. 
166 Clough, Ralph. 1978. Island China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Chiu, Hungdah. 
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These studies are relevant to this study in that they set the historical, diplomatic and 
policy context in line with classical realist principles. In addition, they construct a 
huadu discourse by legitimating a separate ROC identity. They also identify an 
embryonic domestic-cross-Strait policy link. They do not directly query why China 
is unable to force unification since the ROC retained a material preponderance at the 
time and still claimed to be China. However, in addition to pointing out a Taiwanese 
interest in not being China, they presuppose a joint ROC and Taiwanese interest in 
not being part of the PRC, thus creating space for an analysis of huadu in terms of 
legitimacy. The domestic and systemic roots of Taipei’s loss of legitimacy that 
catalysed the elite and DIG-led aspects of its change in state identity are derived 
from the literature’s identification of this interest. In this regard, this early literature 
provides valuable insights that subsequent literature builds on. 
Criticised as journalism and historiography and for a lack of theory in the wake of 
new developments in IR research, these studies were subsumed by the tide of 
specialisation in the discipline of Taiwan Studies that began in the 1990s and was 
prompted by the rapid political, economic, cultural and social transformations that 
occurred in Taiwan during the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. 
Writing in the wake of Huntington’s (1991) Third Wave Democracy,167 Christopher 
Hughes, Denny Roy, Bruce Jacobs, Shelley Rigger, and Alan Wachman stand out as 
scholars who traced the shift in ROC identity with democratisation, Chinese and 
Taiwanese nationalism key factors.168 Developing earlier historical, sociological and 
comparative politics approaches, this research group argued that a reciprocal process 
167 Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
168 Wachman, Alan. 1994. Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. New York: M.E.Sharpe. 
Hughes, Christopher. 1997; Rigger, Shelley. 1997. Competing conceptions of Taiwan's identity: The 
irresolvable conflict in cross‐strait relations. Journal of Contemporary China, 6(15): 307-317. 
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of state and national identity transformation and democratisation changed Taiwan’s 
national interest and Taiwanised the ROC, causing it to diverge from China and 
abandon any interest in unification. This suggests that that the ROC’s inability to 
subdue Taiwan was a function of Taiwan’s identity-driven interest in separation from 
China. 
2.3. Taiwan Studies 
Apart from Lerman’s work above, there was a paucity of scholarly materials that 
took a theoretical position on domestic politics in Taiwan at the end of the 1980s.169 
Taiwan’s transition to democracy during the 1990s allowed Western scholars to 
access previously unavailable sources and produce well-researched general political 
histories of Taiwan.170 However,  three seminal texts: Tien Hung-mao’s The Great 
Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China, Thomas Gold’s 
State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle and Cheng Tun-jen’s Democratizing the 
quasi-Leninist regime in Taiwan, stand out as exceptions. 171  Additionally, Marc 
Cohen’s Taiwan at the Crossroads (1988) is salient for its close historical description 
and explanation of domestic policy decisions as responses to identity-driven 
liberalisation.172 Gold’s volume “awakened the field” of Taiwan Studies, by using 
frameworks of dependency, world systems and development that had been applied to 
169 Fell, Dafydd. 2012: 2. 
170 Rigger, Shelley. 1999. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. New York: Routledge. Rigger, 
Shelley. 2006. Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and Taiwanese Nationalism. 
PolicyStudies, 26. Washington, DC: East-West Center; Roy, Denny. 2003. Taiwan: A Political 
History. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Rubenstein, M.A. 2006. Taiwan: A New History. Armonk, 
NY: M.E.Sharpe;  
171 Tien Hung-mao 1989. The Great Transition: Politics and social change in the Republic of China. 
Taiwan: SMC Publishing; Cheng Jun-ten. 1989. Democratizing the quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan. 
World Politics, 41(4): 471-99; Gold, Thomas B. 1986. State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. 
Armonk: M.E. Sharpe 
172 Cohen, Marc J. 1988. Taiwan at the Crossroads. Washington DC: Asia Resource Center. 
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Latin America.173 Tien’s study is the most comprehensive examination of the final 
days of military rule and the influence of Cheng’s and Cohen’s ground-breaking 
research introduced Taiwan to the comparative politics field by applying the 
transition framework. 
Since these seminal works, the study of the relationship between Taiwan’s domestic 
politics and cross-Strait relations within Taiwan Studies has expanded rapidly. The 
main research strands of value to this study are derived from theoretically-driven and 
policy-oriented research that deals with themes of power politics; social change, 
national and state identity, democratisation and democratic consolidation; 
constitutional and institutional change; partisan, factional and DIG politics; 
diplomacy; policymaking; sovereignty and security. One observation concerning this 
strand is the positivist nature of its cause-and-effect analysis; certain historical events, 
or watersheds, are identified as prompting one-way shifts in domestic power from 
Chinese to Taiwanese, causing a domestic preference for democracy and thus 
prompting state identity change. What is important for a RC approach, however, is 
the intersubjective and co-constitutive nature of such events. 
The foreign policy literature published during the 2000s responds to Taipei’s 
attempts to change the discourse around Taiwan’s political status and is useful for 
this study in that it describes how Taipei’s elites make policy and the influences on 
it.174 Richard Bush’s (2005) absorbing and thoroughly researched study stands out 
since it is based on first-hand experience and access to ROC policy elites.175 Fell 
173 Rigger, Shelley. 2003. Political Science and Taiwan’s Domestic Politics: The State of the Field 
Politics. Issues and Studies, 38(4). 
174 Dickson, Bruce and Chao Chien-min. eds. 2002. Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy: Democratic 
Consolidation and External Relations. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
175 Bush, Richard. 2005. Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Washington DC: 
Brookings. Bush was Washington’s de facto ambassador to Taipei. 
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(2008) delineates how nationalism and national identity, the consolidation of 
democracy and party and local politics in Taiwan have consequences for Taipei’s 
cross-Strait policy.176 While these studies do not utilise concepts or theories of power, 
they explicate the nature of the relationship among perceived threat, domestic 
politics and cross-Strait relations.  
A series of post-2008 scholarly collaborations suggests China is unable to subdue 
Taiwan because systemic factors, domestic partisan conflict and the identity cleavage 
constrained the 2008-16 KMT administration’s policy choices, leading it to diverge 
politically.177 These suggest a RC inflection. First, Kevin Cai’s (2011) edited study of 
changes in cross-Strait institutions identifies a pattern of policy adjustment on both 
sides since 1979 resulting from both external and domestic factors.178 Second, Hu 
Weixing’s study concludes that dialogue is unlikely to change Taiwan’s 
preferences.179 Similarly, David Huang argues that the ECFA will not lead to closer 
political relations because of identity-driven domestic power struggles in Taiwan,180 
while Shu Keng and Emmy Lin point out Beijing’s “persuasive economic statecraft” 
has not persuaded the Taiwanese public on unification.181 Both Cai and Hu see Ma as 
constrained because of domestic opposition to closer political engagement. At the 
same time, any future DPP administration will be unable to move towards de jure 
176 Fell, Dafydd. 2008. The Politics of Modern Taiwan. London: Routledge. 
177 See: Cai, Kevin. ed. 2011. Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations since 1979: Policy Adjustment and 
Institutional Change across the Straits. Singapore: World Scientific; Hu Weixiang. ed. 2013. New 
Dynamics in cross-Strait Relations: How Far Can Rapprochement Go? Abingdon: Routledge; 
Cabestan, Jean-Pierre and Jacques deLisle. eds. 2014. Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-
jeou. London: Routledge. 
178 Cai, Kevin. ed. 2011. 
179 Hu, Weixiang. ed. 2013. 
180 Huang, David. 2013. On Spillover Effect of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement: 
Perspectives from the European Model of Functional Integration. In Hu, Weixing. ed. 2013.  
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independence because of Beijing’s stated position. 182 This invites interrogation of 
ROC state identity as a possible source of domestic preferences.  
Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle’s (2014) edited volume on political 
changes under Ma Ying-jeou’s administration takes the conversation up to the 
Sunflower occupation in March 2014.183  Their general thrust is that, domestic and 
ideational variables notwithstanding, overarching structural factors constrain 
Taiwan’s choices and weigh the balance of power in Beijing’s favour. In this regard, 
it aligns broadly to Ripsman et al’s (2016) NCR stance on power in the system. Yet, 
this still leaves the puzzle of why China is unable to subdue Taiwan and raises the 
question of what power Taiwan has. Cabestan and deLisle (2014) look to how 
partisan, DIG and elite power struggles combined to constrain Ma’s allegedly 
contentious cross-Strait policy choices.184 Christopher Hughes’ chapter claims that 
Ma substantially reversed Lee and Chen’s Taiwanisation policies against domestic 
preferences and were more China-identifying than they needed to be to maintain the 
status quo.185 This claim is challenged by the data in this study, but it reflects both a 
common liberal-inflected argument and a recognition that domestic and cross-Strait 
politics invariably cross-cut. 
These studies suggest that China is unable to subdue Taiwan and force unification 
because the power of Taiwan’s national identity operates bottom-up through 
domestic political struggle to create a national interest in maintaining the status quo. 
182 Cai, Kevin. ed. 2011. 
183 Liu Fu-kuo. 2014. Ma Ying-jeou’s rapprochement policy: cross-Strait progress and domestic 
constraints, in Cabestan, Jean-Pierre and deLisle, Jacques. 2014. Political Changes in Taiwan under 
Ma ing-jeou. London: Routledge: 139-55; Chu Shulong. 2014. Mainland China’s peaceful 
development strategy and cross-Strait relations. In Cabestan, Jean-Pierre and deLisle, Jacques. 2014: 
156-72.
184 Cabestan, Jean-Pierre and deLisle, Jacques. 2014.
185 Hughes, Christopher. 2014. Revisiting Identity Politics under Ma Ying-jeou. In Cabestan, Jean-
Pierre and deLisle, Jacques. 2014:120-36.
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Problematically, however, they also assume that Ma’s imputed Chinese identity 
implies policy preferences that domestic interests constrain; this is an essentially 
liberal-nationalist argument and (Cabestan and de Lisle aside) it does not isolate 
power conceptually. The strand provides clear epistemological insights that inform a 
RC approach. However, although they identify domestic constraints as a factor 
hindering alleged preferences, they fail to identify ROC state identity and its 
legitimation as a reason why China lacks the power to subdue Taiwan in the first 
place.  
2.4. IR Scholarship on cross-Strait Relations 
The historical, comparative politics and area studies literature is useful in that it 
provides data, observation and insights on historical events that can be drawn on to 
explain this study’s central puzzle. However, to account for Taiwan’s power as an 
explanation for China’s failure to subdue it, a clear understanding of how, and under 
what conditions, power operates is necessary. This section argues that IR theory 
allows the most credible assessment of Taiwan’s power to resist China. It focuses on 
the main paradigmatic approaches to the puzzles addressed in this study and reviews 
recent studies to assess their appropriateness, to identify gaps and to make 
suggestions for further development. 
Wu Yu-shan made a plea for theoretical guidance in 2000 when he emphasised that 
analysis of cross-Strait relations needed to move “beyond journalistic accounts of 
events, partisan arguments, policy debates, and wishful thinking”.186 As Wu argues, 
“only by theorising on cross-Strait relations can we get a firm grasp of the subject, 
186 Wu, Yu-shan. 2000. Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait: nine contending approaches. 
Journal of Contemporary China, 9(25): 407-428. 
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and avoid being driven by ephemeral incidents and breaking news”. 187   Amitav 
Acharya echoes Wu’s rationale with plea for a more theoretical approach.188  His 
utilitarian justifications are clearly aimed at policy makers in Taiwan. First, theory 
explains and produces better policy. Second, it helps leaders learn from others’ 
experiences. Third, it works as an organisational tool to make sense of different 
perspectives on the same events. Finally, it allows actors to anticipate events. In sum, 
it permits more considered policy responses and allows leaders to know why they are 
doing what they are doing.189 The following sub-sections review the IR theoretically-
driven literature under broad neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist headings and 
examine one particular approach - Neoclassical Realism (NCR) - that has sought to 
resolve the systemic-domestic tension in terms of power, identity and foreign policy. 
The section concludes that, while these approaches provide valuable insights into 
Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence, they fail satisfactorily to account 
for when, how and why Taiwan leverages its power.  
2.4.1. Neorealist IR Literature 
Studies of Taipei’s cross-Strait security policy see Taiwan’s oscillating defensive 
posture driven by the US-Taiwan-China triangle. These explain Taipei’s resistance to 
Chinese power in terms of deterrence and theories of balancing or bandwagoning.190 
Some cross-Strait balance-of-power analysis is ambivalent on whether Taiwan itself 
187 Wu, Yu-shan. 2000: 428 
188 Acharya, Amitav. 1999. International Relations Theory and cross-Strait Relations. Proceedings of 
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balances China; it explains China’s inability to subdue Taiwan as a function of 
Taiwan’s alignment to superior US power and situational determinants like economic 
dependence and military capabilities. 191  As Taiwan’s relative cross-Strait power 
declined, studies argued that Taiwan’s asymmetric dependence meant it was gaining 
relatively less than China, leading to economic insecurity and recourse to national 
security rather than economic cooperation. 192  This argument explains China’s 
inability to subdue Taiwan in terms of the security externality problem, hegemonic 
stability and alliance relationships along with relative gains theory. It reinforces 
Gilpin’s argument that economic interdependence may actually be a source of 
conflict.193 That is, economic interdependence reduces China’s power and increases 
Taiwan’s power. Yet, the neorealist literature cannot explain why Taipei would not 
seek de jure independence in taidu, opting instead for huadu. The neorealist literature 
in general takes the US-China strategic relationship as its framework. Rejecting the 
notion of Taiwan’s de facto independence as simply a function of enduring CCP-
KMT rivalry, Alan Wachman provides a compelling argument for Taiwan’s status as 
contested “buffer or bridgehead”. Drawing directly on Balance of Power and Balance 
of Threat and on classical realist conceptions of power politics, Wachman locates 
Taiwan in the context of the US-China and US-China-Japan strategic triangles.194 Wu 
191 See: Ross, Robert. 2006. Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and 
Balancing in East Asia. Security Studies, 15(3):  
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Chengqiu uses Game Theory to argue that the US has maintained the cross-Strait 
balance of threat, thus accounting in structural terms for China’s inability to subdue 
Taiwan.195 To this extent, these studies explain Taiwan’s de facto independence in 
terms of power and threat at the systemic level, but they do not consider how power 
legitimates state identity at the interstate or domestic levels. 
Several important studies from the 2000s that draw on structural deterrence theory to 
assess prospects for stable cross-Strait relations explain China’s failure to subdue 
Taiwan.196 197Robert Ross and Thomas Christensen’s work is seminal and identifies 
preferences, perceptions and capabilities as determining cross-Strait dynamics. First, 
China respects US power and resolve; second, China has the power to impose 
catastrophic costs on Taiwan in the event of taidu, and Taipei respects this; third, 
China seeks to deter taidu rather than enforce tongyi, and Taiwan knows 
this.198 Ross’s findings suggest stable security dilemma dynamics account for China’s 
inability to subdue Taiwan. US power aside, as long as Taiwan adopts a defensive 
posture and does not declare taidu it is free to engage with China and to remain 
secure. In this context, superior Chinese power simply permits Taiwan to deploy 
other forms of power more effectively than Beijing.  
Balance in the Taiwan Strait. Asia Policy, 8 (1); Wachman, Alan. 2008. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic 
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Christensen however argues that Taipei’s identity and its perception of Chinese 
threat mean cross-Strait stability is less stable than in Ross’s assessment. The very 
fact that Taiwan threatens its state identity, rather than territory, is destabilising for 
Beijing because it makes it potentially easier for Taiwan to declare taidu. The logic 
of preventive war suggests that if the US does not signal strongly to Taipei that it 
will not tolerate taidu, this may signal to Beijing a lack of US commitment that ends 
up enabling Taiwan’s permanent separation from China. This would prompt Chinese 
military action. Christensen’s argument approximates but misreads the nature of 
Taiwan’s power. In doing so, it also provides an explanation for China’s inability to 
subdue Taiwan. Taiwan’s defensive posture is in fact to do with its state identity; 
however, it is also territorial. The ROC’s 1991 constitutional reforms constituted the 
ROC as de facto territorially bounded within the Taiwan Area. Huadu allows Taipei 
discursively to project an identity-driven defensive posture as a territorially-driven 
one, thus respecting Beijing’s realist stance, stabilising deterrence, ensuring that 
China is unable to subdue it and maintaining Taiwan’s autonomy. Structural 
Deterrence Theory, like Neorealism itself, sees the key to international stability in 
the distribution of power within the system in general, and among the great powers in 
particular. Thus, logically it explains Taiwan’s resistance to Chinese power as 
epiphenomenal to China-US power relations. Yet, Christensen’s argument exposes 
great power anxiety around neighbouring secondary powers’ policies; in doing so, it 
opens a gap for constructivist approaches to cross-Strait power and identity. Some 
foreign policy work has coalesced around Ross and Christensen’s arguments to 
explore the risks posed to Taiwan’s security by the rapidly shifting balance of 
power. 199 Mostly, however, there has been little systemic rationalist theorising on 
199 Bush Richard.2013. Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations. Washington, DC: 
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how China’s deployment of power provokes Taiwan’s resistance to Chinese power. 
Since Chinese power influences the broader IR literature, its reciprocal effect on 
Taiwan’s power ought to be analysed more systematically.  
John Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism sees Taipei resisting Beijing only as a 
function of US power balancing. 200 Mearsheimer fails to acknowledge the 
ameliorating effect of classical realist principles on power politics. For Mearsheimer, 
only US power constrains China and guarantees Taiwan’s survival; yet this is to 
ignore the effect of diplomacy, culture, ideas, restraint, negotiation and statecraft in 
cross-Strait relations. Granted, he acknowledges that nationalism rather than core 
neorealist principles is determinant, thus leaving space for Taipei’s unique form of 
state identity.   
Other studies build on Taiwan’s oscillating defensive posture driven by the US-
Taiwan-China triangle. Neorealism infers that power disparity can lead to a switch in 
alliance structures, changes in polarity, power disparity and power transition. 201
Additionally, it asserts that a switch in leadership may prompt a reversal in policy, 
leading some liberal theorists to take leaders’ ideologies as evidence of their foreign 
policy priorities.202 The deployment of these in studies of post-2008 Rapprochement 
under Ma and in liberal-inflected neoclassical realist studies attempts to explain 
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perceived oscillation in Taipei’s policy in terms of leaders’ identity and ideology-
driven preferences. Yet, this raises the question of why China’s is unable to compel 
Taiwan into tongyi when it converges with it.203 Drawing on Alliance Politics Theory, 
Wu Yu-shan (2015) acknowledges that Taiwan is constrained from declaring 
taidu.204 Yet, he does not say why this does not lead to tongyi.205 
One foreign policy model derived from Neorealism explains China’s inability to 
compel Taiwan to accept unification as a function of US strategic ambiguity. 
Benson’s (2012) General Theory of Alliance Commitments sees strategic ambiguity 
as an optimal response to relative power shifts and transitions in preferences.206 Elite 
struggle within the US determines whether US commitment to Taiwan will be 
unconditional, conditional or ambiguous (q.v. 2.4.4.). To the degree that US 
intervention will shape a cross-Strait conflict in Taiwan’s favour and that US elites 
share a commitment to Taiwan’s elite’s ideal cross-Strait outcomes, 
optimal US policy is more or less likely to approach unconditional or ambiguous 
commitment to Taiwan. As an explanation of China’s inability to compel unification, 
however, this theory falls short. All the above create space for RC to explore huadu 
as Taiwan’s discursive power. 
2.4.2. (Neo)liberal IR Literature 
The neoliberal literature explains China’s inability to subdue Taiwan in terms of the 
power of liberal norms. The influence of post-Cold-War liberal thinking on cross-
Strait policy elites in the early 1990s cannot be underestimated.  In the wake of 
203 See: Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016. 
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increasing Taiwanese investment in China, economic interdependence and 
democratic-peace theorists like Francis Fukuyama and Bruce Russett began to 
influence policy elites in Washington, Taipei and Beijing.207 Liberal scholars believed 
that Taiwan’s democratisation meant cross-Strait economic and cultural links would 
mitigate mutual hostility and lead to a stable modus vivendi.208 Some went further, 
stressing that Cross-Strait and US-China economic linkages would make military 
confrontation over Taiwan too costly to even consider.209 Michael Yahuda claimed 
Beijing recognised this and would not risk China’s hard-won economic growth, the 
basis of the CCP’s legitimacy.210 Yet, the liberal literature seems unable to account 
for the ongoing puzzle of cross-Strait political hostility and close economic ties that 
are a function of China’s inability to enforce unification because they implies the 
practice of power and identity. As such, it simply makes salient the paradox of 
Taiwan’s resistance to China’s power.211  
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Despite this, post-2008 Rapprochement led to the renewed popularity of liberal 
scholars such as David Baldwin who claimed that interdependence represented too 
costly a relationship to break.212 Chung (2008; 2010) hailed Rapprochement as the 
vindication of liberal IR theories and of Ma’s liberal policies.213 Some studies use 
liberal IR theory to focus on the determinants of deepening economic 
integration.214 Kastner (2009) emphasises the power of norms to shape cross-Strait 
economic policy; suggesting that internationalist business interests prevented Taiwan 
from effectively restricting cross-Strait exchange, thus suggesting a less powerful 
policy elite. Syaru Lin’s (2016) study comes to the same conclusion from a liberal-
inflected political economy stance. 215  Yet, this research cannot explain why, if 
domestic interests determine policy, Taipei has continued to maintain the status quo. 
Clearly, liberal conceptions of power are of value to this study as they address why 
Taipei might appeal to and deploy the power of liberal norms to secure its 
sovereignty. However, they do not account for the constitutive source of Taiwan’s 
power, which this study locates in ROC state identity. 
A broader liberal literature explains China’s failure to compel unification in terms of 
costs to China and a desire for stability. It examines the political consequences of 
deeper cross-Strait economic convergence. Some studies draw on Commercial 
Liberalism to consider whether cross-Strait economic ties reduce the risk of war. For 
instance, McDonald (2009) develops a cross-Strait case study to argue for the 
Capitalist Peace. He claims that competitive private markets and reductions in trade 
212 Baldwin, D. 1980. Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis. International 
Organization 34:471-506; Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye.1989. Power and Interdependence. 
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and Beyond. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
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barriers reduce the risks of war among states. 216  In the cross-Strait case, large-scale 
cross-Strait trade and investment flows have created powerful domestic interests on 
both sides favouring peace. This allays fears in Beijing that Taiwan may be drifting 
toward taidu, and further encourages Chinese restraint. 217  Similarly, Steve Chan 
(2009) suggests Taipei’s willingness to engage in extensive cross-Strait economic 
convergence represents a tacit assurance not to declare taidu and therefore not to 
escalate political and military tension, given the costs.218 Peng Li (2013) views the 
ECFA as facilitating stability because it increases the costs of war, makes elites more 
cautious and helps reinforce China’s preferred policy of peaceful reunification with 
Taiwan.219 Gartzke and Li (2013) claim that cross-Strait economic integration fosters 
peace by enabling both sides to signal resolve more credibly; it makes both 
economies more sensitive to tension; any threats that are made therefore become 
more costly and credible, thereby reducing the risk that conflict could arise from 
misperception.220 Yet, this liberal peace argument in the case of cross-Strait relations 
is incoherent. It cannot explain China’s failure and Taiwan’s continued divergence. 
These studies explain China’s inability to compel Taiwan to unify in terms of costs 
to China, but not how Taiwan might deploy power in that knowledge. Costs aside, 
the desire for stability appears to be a discursively constructed norm that reflects 
216 McDonald, Patrick. 2009. The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and 
International Relations Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 15. 
217 Ibid. 
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power. As IR, Neoliberalism recognises the nation state, so must presuppose that 
Taiwan seeks sovereignty and that it exercises power in its national interest. None of 
these studies, however, examine power per se as a determinant or a consequence. 
This leaves a gap to see Rapprochement as   the enactment of Taiwan’s, not China’s, 
power. 
Other liberal studies claim economic integration gives China leverage and influence 
over Taiwan. Much economic statecraft literature highlights Taiwan’s vulnerability 
and asymmetrical dependence on China. By 2000, the literature pointed to a potential 
Hirschman-like effect in Taiwan, in which taishang would lobby to relax Taiwan’s 
defensive posture.221 This acknowledges that states may deploy economic power; in 
China’s case using liberal free trade agreements to hollow out and annex Taiwan by 
stealth. Indeed, post-2014 liberal scholarship acknowledges closer economic 
integration increases China’s power over Taiwan.  
Conversely, Doug Fuller’s observation that some pan-Green Taiwanese domestic 
responses to ECFA were based on threat misperception opens space for this study’s 
claim that Taiwan’s huadu state identity operated through elite and interest group 
discourses, rather than Taiwanese national identity at the domestic level constraining 
elites. ECFA, he claims, was merely a diversion that would neither increase Beijing’s 
power over Taiwan nor hasten convergence.222 This suggests economic integration 
itself actually accounts for China’s inability to compel Taiwan to unify because state 
identity becomes operative in that process. 
The literature on soft power actually exposes Taiwan’s weakness while claiming that 
it is potentially stronger than China. Global rankings tend to exclude Taiwan because 
221 Sterling-Folker. 2009.  
222 Fuller, Douglas. 2014. ECFA’s empty promise and hollow threat, in Cabestan, Jean-Pierre and 
deLisle, Jacques. 2014: 85-99. 
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of China’s relative soft-power strength in public diplomacy. The Soft Power 30, for 
instance, ranks China 25th, yet excludes Taiwan completely because it is not 
recognised as a state.223 Joseph Nye has written admiringly of China’s soft power, but 
concludes that it is an area in which it is weak.224  Conversely, Shelley Rigger sees 
soft power as an area in which Taiwan is potentially stronger than China; Taiwan 
accrues power from liberal norms to gain international support. Yet, Jacques deLisle 
claims Taiwan can only use soft power because of the hard-power advantage it 
retains through the US. 225  Rawnsley (2014) sees Taiwan’s structural soft power 
resources as weak, however, arguing that elite agency is required to transform these 
into power. 226  A problem with soft power as an explanation for both Taiwan’s 
maintenance of its de facto independence and China’s failure to compel unification is 
that, not only is it conceptually vague, it also assumes that liberal norms are self-
evidently preferential without exploring the material power liberal states have to 
back up such norms. Indeed, the Taiwan case may highlight a fundamental flaw in 
the soft power thesis; for a state to project soft power, international recognition is a 
prerequisite. That legitimacy trumps liberal democratic values and soft power is the 
223  McClory, Jonathan. 2017. The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power. University of 
Southern California, Center on Public Diplomacy. [online] Available at:  
https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/story/out-now-2017-soft-power-30 [Accessed 21 January 2018]. 
224 Nye, Joseph. 2005. The Rise of China’s Soft Power. Wall Street Journal. December 29  2005.  
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2013]. Nye, Joseph. 2012. Why China is Weak on Soft Power. New York Times. January 17 2012. 
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soft-power.html [Accessed 30 March 2013]. 
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preserve of those who have the coercive power to deploy it.227 So, any attempt to 
account for China’s failure to force unification and Taiwan’s resistance can discard 
soft power. The term’s inherent vagueness fails to account for what provides Taiwan 
with power in the first place.228 It is the existence of the ROC rather than liberal 
democratic values per se that provides Taiwan with power. After all, an authoritarian 
Free China retained power preponderance over Beijing.  The rationalist literature 
above cannot fully account for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence 
because, first, it does not adequately explore alternative conceptions of power 
politics and discursive power; second, it does not fully explore how state identity 
change has changed Taipei’s interests and preferences. This creates space for 
constructivist readings to show first, how power politics, discourse and identity are 
contingent and intersubjectively constructed and, second, how rationalist 
explanations do not fully account for seemingly irrational state behaviour.  
In short, the literature on the political and security implications of cross-Strait 
economic ties examines how and why economic ties might create an influence effect 
in Taiwan, thereby increasing China’s power and reducing Taiwan’s. Hence, these 
studies simply further entrench the puzzle. They say a lot about threat perception, but 
not much about why China cannot translate its power into subjugation of Taiwan. 
These studies themselves raise the question of the discursive power of Taipei’s state 
identity.  
227 Layne, Christopher. 2010. The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power, in: Inderjeet Parmar and 
Michael Cox.eds. Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 51–82. 
228 Breslin, Sean. 2011. The Soft notion of China’s Soft Power. Chatham House Asia Programme 
Paper ASP PP 2011/03. [online] Available at: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Asia/0211pp_breslin.pdf 
[Accessed 15 October 2014]. 
82 
2.4.3. Constructivist IR Literature 
A growing body of research draws on non-rationalist IR approaches to account for 
discursive power and threat perception in cross-Strait relations. There is ethnographic 
research on cross-Strait identities that takes a thick constructivist angle; Harrison 
(2006) and Hwang (2007) stand out.229 However, most IR contributions adopt the 
thinner constructivism of Onuf, Wendt and Katzenstein. 230 Constructivist research 
suggests Taiwan perceives an ideational threat in China’s power and responds to it 
accordingly. 231 While some argue that Beijing’s cross-Strait policy tends towards 
realist perspectives on pragmatic grounds,232 a significant body of research highlights 
nationalist sentiment within China constructing an irredentist claim to Taiwan. 233  
Rex Li argues that this threat is driven by the power of Chinese nationalism encoded 
in Beijing’s cross-Strait policy.234 William Callaghan and Peter Hayes Gries locate 
China’s claim to Taiwan in a discourse of a peaceful rise and great power status 
grounded in the Century of Humiliation as evidence of a strong constructivist vein 
historically promoted by Beijing’s policymakers.235  
229 Hwang, Jye. 2007. The Birth of the Taiwanese: A Discursive Constitution of the 'Taiwanese' as a 
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Although not strictly Constructivists, Zhang Yongjin and Zhao Shuisheng claim the 
PRC’s post-Tiananmen, post-Cold-War Patriotic Education Campaign directly 
constructed Beijing’s ”Great Power” (daguo) state identity and, by extension, its 
cross-Strait policy.236 In this context, Taiwan is daguo’s crucial missing piece and one 
without which national humiliation will never be expunged. 237  This rich research 
provides a constructivist context for China’s claim to Taiwan. It shows how Beijing 
constructed Taiwan as a threat to its ontological security and how this, in turn, 
created cross-Strait threat perception (q.v. 4.6.3.). It helps understand how KMT 
Chinese Nationalism constructed Taiwan as a bastion of Free China, simultaneously 
creating a Taiwanese Self and a Chinese Communist Other. Most of all, it accounts 
for the intensity of China’s discourse of national reunification. However, it does not 
explain why China is unable effectively to use this discourse to enforce unification or 
why the KMT discarded it.  Nor does it account for the power of Taipei’s state 
identity. To fully account for the influence of ideational factors on Taipei’s cross-
Strait policy, ROC identity change is crucial. 
A body of constructivist research has developed around the construction of 
Taiwanese and cross-Strait identities and interests that challenges both rationalist and 
Chinese nationalist explanations.This strand provides plausible insights into China’s 
inability to coerce Taiwan and, more pertinently, the discursive power of Taiwanese 
national identity to resist China. 238 Dean Chen draws on Wendt to challenge the 
236 Zhao, Suisheng. 2004. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. In Suisheng 
Zhao. ed. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe: 
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and Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press; Gries, 2004.; Callaghan, William A. 
2010. 
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rationalist belief that China’s conciliatory Taiwan policy on OCRI during 
rapprochement was strategic and cynical. Rather, he argues, the shifting discursive 
meaning of One China genuinely changed Chinese policymakers’ perceptions of 
Taiwan.239 Li Yitan (2014) suggests that this identity change accounts for the paradox 
of economic convergence and political divergence. As such, this suggests Beijing’s 
endorsement of huadu – a claim that this study seeks to return to.  
2.4.4. Neoclassical Realist and Domestic Realist IR Literature 
Neoclassical Realism (NCR) is a strand of Realism that draws on Constructivism to 
explore how domestic identities impact on foreign policy in the face of systemic 
power constraints. As an attempt to meld the domestic, the state and the systemic 
levels, it addresses this study’s theoretical framework. Drawing on earlier Taiwan 
Studies research and, crucially for this study in theoretical terms, 
Robert Putnam’s two-level game, 240  NCR and other domestic realist approaches 
provide a  number of narrative case studies of how Taiwan has responded to the rise 
in China’s relative power. 241  These studies suggest China’s inability to subdue 
Taiwan is a function not of its direct relative material capabilities and power position, 
but of Taiwan’s indirect power position; that is, power filtered through Taiwan’s 
domestic identities.  
analysis of the changing dynamics of identities and nationalisms . Journal of Contemporary China, 
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Amitav Acharya, for instance, accounts for Lee Teng-hui’s motivations for his state-
to-state relations comment on the grounds of domestic partisan imperatives.242 One of 
the most fascinating studies in this regard is Su Chi’s Taiwan’s Relations with 
Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (2009).243 This account of Taipei and 
Beijing’s moves towards detente during the 1990s provides first-hand accounts of the 
domestic political forces within Taiwan that impacted on cross-Strait policy 
decisions. Concentrating on the struggle for power within the KMT and between the 
KMT and the DPP, the book invites a domestic explanation of Taiwan’s cross-Strait 
policy centred on power politics. In this regard, it is realist. Yet, Su’s analysis also 
sheds light on how Taiwan’s state identity changed and was deployed in cross-Strait 
policy. Lee Teng-hui, as a skilled political entrepreneur, was able to manipulate the 
post-1995 tension between a prevailing “heart” of Taiwanese national identity and a 
state-centred “head” that sought to maintain the status quo. However, he was only 
able to do this in the domestic context; when he touched on the status quo “taboo” in 
his Two States Theory in 1999, he had to reassure the electorate and the US that “two 
states” meant the status quo and not taidu.244 In attempting to locate a taidu-seeking 
Taiwanese national identity as a danger to Taiwan’s autonomy through the status quo, 
Su inadvertently exposes the gap of huadu. 
These historical and foreign policy accounts reflect the effect of identity politics, 
social cohesion and liberal norms on perceptions of China leading to more assertive 
242 Acharya, Amitav. 1999. International Relations Theory and cross-Strait Relations. Proceedings of 
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and unpredictable cross-Strait policy statements from Taipei. 245  The picture of a 
deeply polarised domestic politics has been a prevailing feature in the literature. 
These studies suggest that China’s inability to subdue Taiwan is due to the influence 
of the countervailing power of domestic identity-driven politics on Taipei’s cross-
Strait policy. 
Recent NCR research by Björn Lindemann explains Taiwan’s more conciliatory 
approach towards relations with China over IGOs in 2008 in terms of the power of its 
liberal norms and a China-leaning state identity.246 Dean Chen’s study of Taipei’s 
cross-Strait policy under Ma Ying-jeou explains Taiwan’s rejection of ECFA and 
ousting of Ma as a function of bottom-up interest-group rejection of a China-
identifying KMT elite cross-Strait policy that threatened Taiwan’s security and 
therefore its autonomy. 247  Shirley Lin (2016) comes to a similar conclusion 
explaining a cross-Strait policy that oscillates between convergence and divergence 
as being based on identity change and DIG preferences. 248 Sterling-Folker (2009) 
adopts the same argument.249 The argument in this strand is, however, flawed. First, 
epistemologically, it is a liberal bottom-up argument and thus contrary to core realist 
assumptions (q.v. 3.2.2.). Second, empirically, in the case of Rapprochement, it 
commits an ideology-driven fallacy in claiming that domestic preferences saved 
Taiwan from being sold out by Ma. In both cases, this argument ignores, first, the 
245 Lee, Wei-chin. 2004. Field of Dreams: An Overview of the Practice and Study of Taiwan’s 
Foreign Policy Issues and Studies, 40(3-4):137-182; Sutter, Robert. 1998. US Policy toward China: 
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top-down role of state identity and as such violates realist principles and, second, the 
co-constitutive nature of identity construction, thus violating constructivist principles. 
Sterling-Folker and Shinko (2005) attempt to merge Realism and Constructivism by 
testing the theoretical predictions of NCR against case studies from the historical 
record; in so doing, they observe how each perspective conceptualises power in its 
empirical practice and application and how this affects foreign policy making across 
the Taiwan Strait.250 The exercise is a step towards Sterling-Folker’s (2009) NCR 
case study of Taiwan. 251 In this regard, then, it addresses this study’s conceptual 
focus on power. Again, however, its national-identity focus allows huadu to slip 
through the net. 
Two further domestic realist strands that shed light on China’s inability to subdue 
Taiwan are Diversionary Theory and Audience Costs Theory. Diversionary Theory 
suggests that Taiwan’s elites might deploy the power of national identity against 
China when their domestic support declines.  Li, James, and Drury (2009) find that 
Chen Shui-bian was particularly likely to emphasise taidu when his approval rating 
was low, seeking to distract voters from domestic problems by redirecting them to 
the sovereignty dispute. 252 However, creating a causal link between elite statements 
and underlying preferences is notoriously difficult and, as Sullivan (2011) and 
Sullivan and Lowe (2010) point out, leaders’ “tough talk” is contextually 
circumscribed. That is, political rhetoric – as this study affirms – is a poor indicator 
250 Sterling-Folker, Jennifer and Rosemary E Shinko. 2005. Traversing the Realist-Post-modern 
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of preferences, let alone policy positions.253 This is a gap that this study addresses 
through linguistics-informed discourse analysis to show how the discursive power of 
huadu is deployed in the lexico-grammar of Taiwanese political speech, rather than 
in rhetoric and diplomatic frames. 
A growing body of IR literature suggests audience costs are highly relevant in cross-
Strait relations. For China, any leader that loses Taiwan by acquiescing to taidu 
would risk the CCP’s legitimacy. 254 Similarly, any Taiwanese leader who appears 
either to acquiesce in China’s attempts to impose its cross-Strait policy on Taiwan or 
to endanger Taiwan’s survival by provoking China will suffer at election time. In this 
context, leaders who back down in a dispute in the Taiwan Strait are likely to pay 
substantial audience costs. Both diversionary theory and sensitivity to audience costs 
affect Taiwan’s elite policymaking and crisis decision-making. In this regard, they 
operate top-down in a reverse manner to NCR intervening variables. While they are 
difficult to prove empirically, they can be said partially to account for China’s 
inability to subdue Taiwan in that they show how Taiwan’s state identity is deployed 
in foreign policy. 
These studies are valuable in that they locate Taiwan’s maintenance of its 
sovereignty in terms of the discursive power of national identity. In doing so, 
however, they persist in the taidu fallacy; that is, they persist in conceiving of 
Taiwan’s unrecognised status as simply an inhibited search for a Republic of Taiwan. 
Hence, they miss how state identity, rather than national identity, drives preferences 
253 Sullivan, Jonathan and Lowe, Will. 2010. Chen Shui-bian: On Independence. The China Quarterly, 
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and policy. What is missing from the previous literature – and this is particularly 
pertinent in the case of NCR and other domestic realisms – is huadu.  That is, while 
the IR literature clearly suggests national identity is a constitutive factor in China’s 
inability to subdue Taiwan, it deals with it tangentially as a bottom-up phenomenon. 
The literature exposes and alludes to, but needs to make much more of the ROC’s 
state-identity change and Taipei as a state that is at times able to operate in a unitary 
manner for a plausible explanation of China’s inability enforce unification to be 
found. It is the literature that interrogates national identity directly that offers a better 
route to state identity and this study reviews this literature in Chapter 4. 
2.5. Discourse Analysis and cross-Strait Relations 
Much research on legitimacy in cross-Strait relations claims to use discourse analysis 
when, in fact, it is carrying out what Widdowson refers to as reader-response 
interpretive commentary more akin to literary criticism. A case in point is Harrison’s 
(2006) commentary on Peng Ming-min’s words in A Taste of Freedom (1970) about 
Peng’s father’s response to the arrival of KMT troops in 1945. In what is otherwise 
an extremely compelling analysis of the broader discursive construction of Taiwan’s 
legitimacy, Harrison simply repeats verbatim what he feels to be meaning-laden 
words used by Peng and interprets them as self-evidentlty expressing Taiwanese 
identity emerging from a cognitive dissonance. This is interpretation without textual 
analysis, since it provides no “textual warrant” for its assertions and singularly fails 
linguistically to convey what Harrison argues the point of the passage is – that is, to 
delegitimate the KMT and Taiwan’s putative Chinese identity.255 
Other research, correctly, argues that Beijing and Taipei routinely use instrumental 
rhetoric. Randolph Kluver (1996) sees PRC and ROC legitimacy resting on the use 
255 Harrison. 2006. 
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of rhetorical tropes and formulaic conventions.256 Ann-Marie Brady (2015) claims 
both states adhere to strict diplomatic framing techniques.257 However, such language 
has a transparently instrumental and diplomatic purpose. It cannot be argued that it 
functions covertly to exercise discursive power. Closer to the mark is what P.T. 
Jackson (2006) terms a “war of words” over legitimation. 258  Using Jackson’s 
conception, huadu, taidu and tongyi represent competing constituencies and 
competing forms of legitimation that cross-cut as “exchange[s] of rhetorical efforts to 
characterize the situation in particular ways that render certain” identities and 
interests legitimate while ruling others illegitimate. 259  Certain historical events 
(“magic moments” or exogenous shocks) operate to free agents from previous 
structures, granting them discursive power.260 Certain statements by state actors gain 
legitimacy because states can legitimately perform speech acts that other actors 
cannot. Thus, a state-uttered statement may legitimate huadu. For Jackson, such 
statements may not advance novel claims; rather, they draw on contextual “rhetorical 
commonplaces” and link them to cross-Strait policies. Jackson, again correctly, 
points out that such rhetorical commonplaces may invite multiple interpretations.261 
This preserves contingency and agency. Jackson’s approach resolves the contested 
relational nature of huadu. However, the loose term “rhetorical commonplaces” 
minimises the powerful linguistic nature of discourse. Further evidence in the form 
of linguistic analysis is needed to provide firm textual warrant. 
256 Kluver, Randolph. 1996. Legitimating the Chinese economic reforms: a rhetoric of myth and 
orthodoxy. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
257 Brady Anne-Marie. 2015. Unifying the Ancestral Land: The CCP's “Taiwan” Frames. China 
Quarterly, 223: 787-806. 
258 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006. Relational Constructivism: A War of Words. In Sterling-Folker, 
Jennifer. 2006. Making Sense of International Relations Theory, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner: 139-56; 
Krebs, Ronald and Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2007. Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The 
Power of Political Rhetoric. European Journal of International Relations 13: 35–66.  
259 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006: 139. 
260 Ibid 139 
261 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006: 144 
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Jackson’s discourse analysis claims to challenge “the very terms in which events are 
framed”. 262  The present study accepts that the framing of such events may be 
challenged epistemologically by researchers after the fact. However, it cannot be 
challenged linguistically by interlocutors in the course of a communicative event. 
Rather, the linguistic features deployed in such statements inhibit in-the-moment 
empirical evaluation and thus the statements “pass up” to the discourse unchallenged. 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) claims to locate and explain such linguistic 
features. 
Many CDA studies provide valuable insights into how power is deployed in 
Taiwanese political speech. However, they vary in the degree to which they deploy 
linguistics-informed methods such as pragmatic analysis and Corpus Linguistics 
(CL). In this regard, while they create space for linguistics-driven research that aligns 
to IR theoretically derived hypotheses, none specifically address Taiwan’s state 
identity. 
There is no research that uses CL as such. However, Jonathan Sullivan has used 
Computer Assisted Analysis (CAA) to mine large amounts of political text. Using 
quantitative content analysis, Sullivan codes text for salient content words in elite 
political speech such as ‘Taiwan’, ‘China’, ‘independence’, ‘unification’ and 
interprets the speaker’s policy position based on lexical salience. 263  His findings 
suggest that perceived policy proposals in ostensibly diversionary elite speeches are 
aimed simply at responding rhetorically to core constituency preferences. However, 
while Sullivan’s methods are valuable and his findings compelling, they do not cover 
262 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006. 
263 Sullivan, Jonathan; Yitan Li, Patrick James, and A. Cooper Drury. 2011; Sullivan, Jonathan. 2010; 
Sullivan, Jonathan and Sapir, Eliyahu. 2013. Strategic cross-Strait discourse: A comparative analysis 
of three presidential terms. China Information, 27(1) 11–30. 
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the context or co-text of the words uttered. As such, while they do reveal 
instrumental identity-driven discourses, they do not account for Taiwan’s successful 
resistance to Chinese power.  
Of the qualitative linguistics research that uses CDA, much draws on Kuo Sai-hua’s 
work on news text and political statements.264 Wang Honglei’s study of news reports 
of CCP-KMT discussions does employ CL as well as CDA. 265 Chang Hui-ching 
and Rich Holt’s work explores Chen Shui-bian’s unique rhetorical style, switching 
between the terms ‘Taiwan’ and ‘ROC’ to create a discourse of Taiwanese-ness.266 
However, a lack of linguistics-informed analysis renders the findings unconvincing 
without triangulation. Jie Cui and Diao Wenhua improve on these studies by 
analysing how pronouns are manipulated to present discourses of Chinese-ness in Hu 
Jintao and Ma Ying-jeou’s New Year Speeches.267 Lin Gang, using a textual analysis 
of Hu Jintao’s 2009 Six Points, to argue that Beijing actually recognises Taiwan’s de 
facto status, even if unification is the long-term goal, potentially confirms this 
study’s claim that huadu compels Bejing’s endorsement. 268 Wei Chi-hung (2015) 
adopts the linguistics approach that this study seeks to employ in his explication of 
264 Kuo Sai-hua. 2007. Language as Ideology: Analyzing Quotations in Taiwanese News Discourse. 
Journal of Asian Pacific Communication, 17(2): 281-301(21); Kuo Sai-hua and Mari Nakamura. 2005. 
Translation or transformation? A case study of language and ideology in the Taiwanese press. 
Discourse and Society. 16(3): 393-417. 
265 Wang, Honglei. 2009. Divergent news representations of Lien Chan's visit to China: A corpus-
based lexical comparison between the China Post and the China Daily Journal of Asian Pacific 
Communication, 19(2):179-198. 
266 Chang, Hui-Ching and  Holt, Rich. 2009.Taiwan and ROC: 
A critical analysis of President Chen Shui-bien's construction of Taiwan identity in national speeches. 
National Identities, 11(3): 301-330.  
267 Cui Jie and Diao Wenhua. 2011. Recontextualizing China in Hu Jintao and Ma Ying-jeou’s New 
Year’s Speeches. Texas Linguistics Forum 54:23-32 Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual 
Symposium about Language and Society – Austin April 15-17, 2011. [online] Available at: 
http://studentorgs.utexas.edu/salsa/proceedings/2011/02TLF54-CuiDiao.pdf  [Accessed 15 June 2012]. 
268 Lin, Gang. 2013. Beijing’s evolving policy and strategic thinking on Taiwan. In, Hu Weixing. Ed. 
New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: How Far Can the Rapprochement Go? Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
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the discursive construction of the 1992 Consensus. He argues that, as a discourse, the 
1992 Consensus shifted its meaning over time, constructing Taiwan’s identity in the 
process.269  With the exception of Cui and Diao (2011) and Wei Chi-hung (2015), the 
conclusions in all of these studies are interpretive in that they do not rest on 
established linguistics principles. They also do not align with CDA’s focus on power 
and resistance (q.v. 5.2.3.). There is therefore a clear gap for a linguistics-informed 
discourse analysis of Taiwanese political speech that draws on CL, CDA and 
pragmatics to locate how huadu is legitimated. 
2.6. Conclusion 
This review has mapped the literature from social and historical narrative through 
sociology, law, comparative politics, anthropology and development economics to IR 
theory-based studies. It has shown how Taiwan and cross-Strait relations as objects 
of study developed as distinctive fields. Arguing that Taiwan cannot be studied in the 
absence of China, it has also shown how political science and IR theoretical 
frameworks have been applied to the study of Taiwan and its relations with China. 
This has produced a body of research that provides important theoretical insights into 
this study’s research question. In this regard, Sil and Katzenstein’s approach to 
synthesis in Chapter 1 above applies (q.v. 1.7.1). 
As far as this study is concerned, the PS, IR and AS literature provides sufficient 
conceptual basis and context for plausible theory-driven answers. Neorealism goes 
some way to explaining the China-Taiwan-US triad materially and structurally in 
terms of power balancing and the security dilemma. However, it fails fully to answer 
this study’s research question because, first, it does not fully address Taipei’s cross-
269 Wei Chi-hung. 2015. Producing and Reproducing the 1992 Consensus: The Sociolinguistic 
Construction of the Political Economy of China-Taiwan Relations. Asian Security, 11(1): 72-88. 
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Strait policy; second, it cannot account for huadu either as state identity or discursive 
power and, third, it focuses on cause-and-effect relations rather than relations of co-
constitution. Neoliberal approaches shed some light on Taiwan’s search for 
international space and economic integration with China and also address power. 
However, they both fail to explain why China lacks the power to subdue Taiwan; 
they fail therefore to account for Taiwan’s de facto autonomy. Although there is 
cross-over in the literature reviewed, none says whether agency or structure is more 
important in Taiwan’s case.  The constructivist literature attempts to fill this gap 
using ideational variables, particularly norms and national identity construction. Its 
introduction of intersubjectivity and co-constitution resolves the agent-structure 
debate, but does not provide a satisfactory account of the state or of power politics.  
The political science, area studies and IR literature to this point also fails to link 
approaches and levels of analysis coherently to fully answer the research question 
because they do not link to Taipei’s cross-Strait policy. This leaves a realist-
constructivist gap. Accretions that take on board identity-driven interest construction, 
power politics, foreign policy, the state and domestic preferences provide a more 
satisfactory theoretical framework.  
Methodologically, much of the scholarly literature on Taiwan has been narrative 
description and interpretive commentary on domestic and foreign policy. 
Quantitative research using opinion polls and government economic and population 
data also features in the literature and quantitative research has been used in a limited 
way to analyse the discourse of political speeches. Qualitative research on foreign 
policy decisions is often ad hoc narrative case-study based and there is limited work 
using either CDA or sociolinguistic techniques of discourse analysis. This study aims 
to fill the gap through the critical application of a RC framework. In addition, 
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methodologically, it takes a critical approach to CDA to find textual warrant for the 
legitimating power of huadu in Taiwanese political speech of policy elites. More 
rigorous empirical evidence of discursive constitutive effects can be found in the text 
of Taiwanese political speech using linguistics-informed discourse analysis.  
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Chapter 3: Power – Theoretical Framework 
3.1. Introduction 
The inability of China to bring about unification with Taiwan suggests a more 
effective deployment of power by Taipei than by Beijing. This cannot be explained 
by the literature reviewed in this study. None of the approaches or theories alone 
satisfactorily explains the nature of Taipei’s power – that is its discursive power to 
secure its sovereignty in the face of Beijing’s superior material power.  This chapter 
proposes a realist-constructivist (RC) synthesis to account for Taiwan’s discursive 
power. It presents a synthetic two-level, three-stage systemic-domestic RC 
framework to explain this. 
Cross-Strait relations are international relations and are state and power-centred. 
Therefore, any exploration of Taipei’s deployment of its power cannot ignore IR 
theoretical debates. Power is implicit in cross-Strait policymaking; “international 
politics are always power politics, for it is impossible to eliminate power from 
them."270  This chapter locates Taiwan’s discursive power in the ROC’s huadu state 
identity.  
The chapter is structured as follows: first, it justifies a synthetic approach based on 
Western IR conceptualisations. Second, it briefly outlines the core realist and 
constructivist principles, axioms and concepts that make this framework possible. 
Third, it shows how a combination of realist and constructivist conceptualisations of 
power accounts for Taiwan’s situation. Specifically, it focuses on the power of huadu 
to legitimate Taiwan’s sovereignty as the ROC. Fourth, it presents a two-level, three-
stage systemic-domestic realist-constructivist framework that builds on RC in the 
form of Classical Realism and the constructivist literature on identity. The 
270 Carr, Edward Hallett. 2001. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939. New York: Palgrave: 130. 
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conclusion suggests that this RC conceptualisation and framework provides a 
plausible account for Taiwan’s de facto independence.  
3.2. Synthesising Theories 
As Waltz (1988) notes, while IR theories prioritise some factors over others for the 
sake of parsimony, phenomena and factors are in fact cross-cutting and interlinked.271  
With this in mind, a synthetic problem-driven framework is a more appropriate way 
of explaining Taiwan’s power to resist Beijing (q.v. 1.7.1.). As far as power itself is 
concerned, the complex relationship among power, identities, interests and norms 
cannot be explained by one paradigm alone, but by selective melding of concepts 
from different paradigms and approaches.  With this in mind, interconnections 
between material interests and ideational factors and attention to both the systemic 
and unit levels can solve the puzzle. So, in this way it is possible to retain the realist 
tradition’s power-related argument while drawing on a range of alternative readings 
of power.   
3.2.1. Conceptualisations 
The use of Western IR theoretical conceptions to explain power in cross-Strait 
relations has been challenged in three areas; whether it is appropriate to define these 
relations as “international” in the first place; the appropriateness of Western IR 
theories to what is a non-Western case and an alleged lack of conceptual crossover 
between Chinese and Western terms. First, Beijing refuses formally to treat cross-
Strait relations as international relations and, thus, some Chinese scholars deny that 
IR theories can be applied to what they say is a domestic issue. However, although it 
remains diplomatically isolated, Taiwan is “a human community that (successfully) 
                                                 
271 Waltz, Kenneth. 1988. The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory. The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 
18(4): 615-628. 
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claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory”.272  It also meets all the basic criteria used to define a state according to the 
Montevideo Convention. More importantly, though, other states recognise Taiwan’s 
statehood by engaging with it as if it were a state and scholarly community treats 
cross-Strait relations as international. 
Second, the degree to which Western theories can be applied to non-Western cases 
has been much debated, with David Kang arguing, “[b]ecause Europe was so 
important for so long a period, in seeking to understand international relations, 
scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories and experiences derived from 
the European experience to project onto and explain Asia.”273 A Confucian narrative 
promoted by Beijing (and in the past by the ROC) is that East Asian states have 
historically tended to align to rather than balance a rising China because of the 
Tributary System, which reinforced Chinese cultural norms and institutional 
diffusion. For this reason, Amitav Acharya claims, “East Asian regional relations 
have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful and more stable than those in the 
West,”274 The Opium Wars, the Century of Humiliation and Japanese aggression, it is 
alleged, disrupted this. 275  However, Wang Yuan-kang challenges claims for 
Confucian pacifism. Arguing that Chinese foreign policy has historically been 
assertive when the state was strong, he shows how historically China’s leaders have 
                                                 
272 Weber, Max. [1919] 1994. Politics as a Vocation. In Lassman, Peter and Spiers, Ronald. (eds). 
1994. Weber: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
273 Kang, David. 2003. Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks. International 
Security 27(4): 58. 
274 Acharya, Amitav. 2003/04. Will Asia's Past Be Its Future? International Security, 28(3): 149-164. 
275 Populist ‘Confucian peace’ texts by conservative intellectuals like Liu Mingfu’s The China Dream 
2015, Yan Xuetong’s  Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 2011, have been read by 
Chinese policy elites,  while scholarly studies like David Kang’s China Rising: Peace, Power and 
Order in East Asia (2007) influence Chinese and other academics. All use history to promote a 
peaceful narrative for the likely character of China’s rise in the twenty-first century. William 
Callaghan, 2012, argues that they simply give an academic spin to Chinese exceptionalism.  
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pursued realist conceptions of power.276 Indeed, Neorealists say their analyses reflect 
the mind-sets of East Asian policy elites in general and that analysts “should not 
underestimate the persistence of realist beliefs among political leaders” in the 
region.277 Furthermore, Taiwan is acknowledged as an exception; as it is the missing 
piece in the jigsaw of Chinese national humiliation and, China will spare no effort to 
redeem it.278 Indeed, Buzan and Acharya, like Kang, conclude that Western theories 
are already up to the analytical and explanatory job due to their capacity to evolve 
and absorb a range of other approaches.279 
Finally, the claim that it is not possible linguistically to align Chinese and Western 
philosophical concepts adds to confusion over Chinese exceptionalism. How can we 
be sure that policymakers are using concepts in the same way? For instance, three 
Chinese concepts broadly translate as “power” in English. The first, daode (道德), is 
more commonly translated as “virtue” or “morality” - but, according to Edmund 
Ryden, is more appropriately translated as “power” when used as daode liliang（道
德力量）, or “moral force”. In Daoism, it refers to the higher power that is “The 
Way”, but in Confucian usage the term translates as “awe”, “fear” or “terror” – 
words that imply a realist compulsion. The second term is quanli (權力), “power”, 
“strength” or “authority”, or the exercise of power by a ruler. The third is a 
homophone of the second, with a different meaning - quanli (權利), meaning “right”, 
                                                 
276 Wang, Yuan-kang. 2011. Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power. New York: 
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“benefit” or “interest”.280 The second is the term used for power in modern Chinese 
writing on IR, but is shortened to the first character, quan (權), in speech leading to 
ambiguity.281 Zhang Dainan interprets the second quanli (權力) in classical Chinese 
political philosophy as a ruler’s absolute power, arguing that law, confidence and 
authority are needed to impose power. Legalist texts recommend absolute 
concentration of power in the hands of the ruler and appeal to the people without 
recourse to ministers and advisors.282 This appears to be consistent with David Lake’s 
conception of power.283 It also seems to echo Hobbes’ “power of the mighty (the 
Leviathan) hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people”.284 Indeed, 
the difference between the two Chinese concepts appears to mirror Weber’s Macht 
and Herrschaft. This suggests functional equivalence between Confucian and 
Western IR conceptualisations. 285 This permits the use of Western IR theories to   
conceptualise and explain this study’s research question.  
3.2.2. Principles, Axioms and Core Concepts 
Morgenthau’s (1978) Six Principles of Political Realism provide the realist 
underpinning of this study. First, politics is governed by objective laws with roots in 
280  Ryden, Edmund. ed. 2002. Zhang, Dainan: Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy. Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press: 357-363. 
281 Cao, Deborah. 2018. Chinese Language in Law: Code Red. Lanham: Lexington Books: 104. 
282  Ryden, Edmund.  2002: 361. Legalism was a more pragmatic and ‘realist’ strand of classical 
Chinese political thought, which openly justified maximum state power and the use of fear and greed 
as the essential tools of statecraft 
283  See: Lake, David. 2013. Authority, Coercion and Power, in Finnemore, M and Goldstein, Judith 
(eds.). 2013. Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
284 Springborg, Patricia. 2007. The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’ Leviathan. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
285 See: Pinker, Steven. 2007. The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature. 
London: Penguin: 124-128; Steiner, George. 1998. After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: x. Steiner argues eruditely that comprehending texts that are the 
product of a distant past and foreign culture, written in a different language is nigh on impossible and 
great caution should be exercised. However, Pinker argues much more convincingly that the notion 
that concepts are inevitably culture-bound risks claiming that cognitive abilities vary across language 
groups, runs counter to common sense as well as notions of cause and effect and comes close to being 
racist. 
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human nature; second,  the power of interest gives rational order and theory to 
politics; third,  the meaning and practice of power are not fixed, but contextual; 
fourth, there are moral consequences to political action, but such principles are 
weighed and contingent on context and agency; fifth, a state’s claim to moral 
rightness and universal morality are unconnected; the power of interest saves states 
from unrestrained behaviour; sixth, “political man” is a necessary theoretical 
abstraction who in the real world makes utilitarian trade-offs in order to live 
politically with others.286  
Morgenthau’s principles produce certain broadly classical realist assumptions: first, 
the world is as it is, not as it ought to be; second, power produces recurrent patterns 
of conflict; third, agentive, security-seeking states are the focus of international 
relations, may be status-quo, revisionist or unitary, but are ultimately contingent.287 
Fourth, states seek survival as the most important national interest; fifth, anarchy 
permits rather than causes state behaviour; sixth, anarchy can hinder cooperation, 
pushing states towards relative over absolute gains.288 For Morgenthau, anarchy may 
inhibit or permit state behaviour, since ideas and domestic factors all influence 
foreign policy. 289  To these assumptions, Morgenthau adds morality. 290  For 
Morgenthau, power cannot be separately measured and it is always perceptual. 291 
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Power is not pure atavism; rather it is ameliorated in international relations by 
civilization. For this reason, events occur in a complex, historical dialectic between 
power and morality “because certain moral rules impose an absolute barrier”.292 For 
Morgenthau, power dictates the practice of cross-Strait relations. Morgenthau is 
sceptical on rationality, and complex on power and morality. 
Although expressed differently, the ontological and epistemological claims of IR 
Constructivism align with those of Classical Realism: there is a real world out there, 
but states exist in a world of their own making in which social facts depend on 
human action.293 Social reality is the product of social construction.294 International 
relations are shaped by changing identities, practices and norms.  In this sense, actors 
are social beings whose identities and interests are “the products of inter-subjective 
social structures”. 295  Wendt’s systemic Constructivism takes intersubjective co-
constitution and claims: first, states are the principal units of analysis for 
international political theory; second, the key structures in the states system are 
intersubjective rather than material; third, state identities and interests are constructed 
by these social structures, rather than exogenously given.296 These claims produce 
two core Wendtian axioms, namely “identities determine interests,”297 and “anarchy 
is what states make of it”.298 A social identity entails a collective interest.  
The claims, principles and assumptions above suggest that certain core concepts can 
be used to create a realist-constructivist framework that draws on Barkin (2010). This 
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core-conceptual approach takes Classical Realism’s interest in power politics and 
foreign policy and Constructivism’s intersubjectivity as its start point. 299  It then 
expands these into a framework. Classical Realism acknowledges morality, prudence 
and diplomacy in international relations, but may be combined with Constructivism 
for epistemological and ontological backing.  The political is the social, so the 
anarchic structure leads states to redefine their identities through socialization, co-
constituting each other and the structure. Material reality is the product of historical 
social practices and can be transcended in socialisation.300 Core concepts interact in 
complex ways, providing a lens to analyse connections among the material and the 
ideational, social construction and rationality, and identities and interests. This RC 
argues the following: first, the intersubjective co-constitution of agents and structure 
accounts for power politics; second, the distinction between what is given and what 
is contingent rather than the social construction, materialism and rationality 
distinction is the real dichotomy; third, Realism and Constructivism share a logic of 
the social, made explicit in the national interest; political ideas are contextual and 
perceived differently by different actors; fourth, social structures constrain and 
enable foreign policy, with human agency driving and changing it. Classical Realism 
indicates that Constructivism is neither necessarily idealist nor distinct from 
materialism or rationalism.301   
In attempting to create a systemic-domestic RC that accounts for foreign policy, the 
material-ideational problem presented by huadu can be addressed by treating state 
identity and its normative representations as aspects of power that can be understood 
and explained (q.v. 5.3.).  Appropriately explicated, these can be integrated into a 
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systemic-domestic RC. Walt’s Balance of Threat then provides a structural realist 
link with Classical Realism’s acknowledgement of domestic actors’ varying 
normative responses to policy choices, above.302 By accounting for threat perception, 
it brings in constructed identities and interests. Wendt’s bracketing of the domestic 
invites analysis of how powerful domestic interest groups relate to the state.  Such a 
two-level, three-stage RC framework looks at how power translates domestic 
preferences into systemic interaction.  
3.2.3. Power in the Realist Tradition 
The realist tradition suggests that power is ubiquitous in international relations. 
Weber’s claim that power is the ability to enforce one’s will despite resistance 
suggests China lacks the power to subdue Taiwan or that it uses that power 
ineffectively. 303 Morgenthau’s claim that humans have a universal will to power, 
filtered through interest and manifested in the desire of states to dominate other states, 
suggests cross-Strait relations are a power struggle that reflect elite will. 304 
“International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” and “statesmen think 
and act in terms of interests defined as power”.305 Robert Dahl’s explication of power 
as the ability of A to get B to do what B would otherwise not do provides a 
benchmark for realist power.306  His symbolic notation might be used to argue that the 
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difference between China’s maximum force and Taiwan’s maximum force is the 
figure for China’s power over Taiwan.307 Yet, Realists realise that compulsion needs 
to be balanced with interests. Interests last; capabilities are mutable. So realist power 
is not just material and tangible; rather, it may be ideational and intangible. Indeed, 
the oft-quoted Athenian assertion in Thucyidides’ The Peloponnesian War that “the 
strong do what they have the power to do; the weak accept what they must” 
challenges the implication that Taiwan ought necessarily to submit to China’s will.308 
Rather, it acts as a warning to China to know the limits of its power. 
Kenneth Waltz argues that power based on the distribution of states’ military 
capabilities creates a Balance of Power in the system.309 Although Waltz asserts that 
his Neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, it certainly informs foreign policy.310 
Waltz points to this in earlier work: “the first and second images describe the forces 
in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their 
importance or predict their results”.311 Neorealism may be seen as a framework for 
further inquiry into power. In predicting that states seek security, Waltz provides 
insights into why Taiwan exercises its power to this end.312 As Zakaria observes, 
states seek to implement their preferences by maximising influence, not material 
power. 313  Influence invokes discursive power and legitimacy and the internal 
working of state preferences reveal states’ motives. The apparatus of neorealist 
theory does not obviate an exploration of this claim. Yet Neorealism cannot explain a 
                                                 
307 Ibid: 202n. 
308 Thucydides. 2009. The Peloponnesian War. Oxford: Oxford University Press: Book V, 5.89-[1] 
309 Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
310 Elman, Colin. 1996. Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? Security 
Studies, 6(1): 7-53; Telhami, Shibley. 2002. Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism and Foreign Policy. Security 
Studies, 11(3): 158-70. 
311 Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. Man, the State and War. New York: Columbia University Press. 
312 Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill: 6. 
313 Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
106 
state’s foreign policy without examining state and domestic motivations; it is from 
this premise that RC takes a cue.  
The anarchic international system and power competition within it create a security 
dilemma for Taiwan. For such a neorealist-inflected foreign policy account, the US – 
China balance of power determines Taiwan’s ability to maintain its autonomy, with 
Taiwan-China relations contingent on US coercive power.314 In other words, cross-
Strait stability is down to exogenous material and military factors, particularly the 
forward military posture of the US against a rising China. Hence, Taiwan free rides 
on US power because the balance of power produced by anarchy ties great powers to 
small powers. Any rapprochement over Taiwan between China and the US would 
falsify Neorealism. So, while Balance of Power explains Taiwan’s maintenance of its 
sovereignty in terms of US material power, it fails to explain why Taiwan should 
need to change its state identity in the first place and this alone permits the present 
study’s abstracting out of US power. Steven Walt’s defensive realism better explains 
Taiwan’s deployment of power as a response to Chinese threat, regardless of China’s 
power. That is, Taiwan perceives a Chinese threat to its survival and deploys power 
to balance it. Taiwan might rationally choose to bandwagon with China in order to 
“share the spoils of victory,” but chooses to balance by aligning to the US instead 
“rather than to risk subordination to a potential hegemon”.315  
Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism also sees power as ubiquitous, but that the 
structure of the international system encourages not just survival, but the aggressive 
pursuit of hegemony, with all states seeking to increase their relative power. On the 
grounds that "[t]he most dangerous states in the international system are continental 
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powers with large armies," he puts Taiwan’s dilemma into brutal perspective when 
he says “[i]n the anarchic world of international politics, it is better to be Godzilla 
than Bambi”.316 For this reason, “[s]tates recognize that the more powerful they are 
relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival” and for all Realists, 
“calculations of power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around 
them”. 317  Since the more powerful state prevails in any given dispute, for 
Mearsheimer, Taiwan’s outlook is bleak.318 Randall Schweller adds that as long as 
power-seeking agents remain unchallenged through balancing, there will be 
insecurity.319 So the effective deployment of material power is crucial to security. 
Analysis of China’s material capabilities certainly indicates that it is becoming a 
continental power with a capability to subdue Taiwan before US help can arrive.320 
Mearsheimer claims “China and the US are destined to be adversaries” and Taiwan 
will be the catalyst that sparks military conflict.321 That has not happened yet, he 
argues, because the US retains a material and coercive power advantage over China.  
Mearsheimer’s reference to Godzilla falls victim to the fallacy presented in some 
readings of Thuycidides’ axiom from the Melian Dialogue that “the weak suffer what 
they must”. That is, in the long run, nemesis follows hubris. That observation, 
however, does not console the weak in the short term. Mearsheimer’s claim refers to 
“any given dispute,” not the long run. Mearsheimer’s argument, therefore, would 
seem to suggest that Taiwan’s power derives from US power and that, once China’s 
power surpasses that of the US, it will subdue Taiwan.  
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On the face of it, then, Neorealism provides parsimonious ontologies of power, a 
framework for the security dilemma across the Taiwan Strait and an explanation for 
Taiwan’s maintenance of its autonomy. However, these tend to be predictive and to 
concentrate on compulsory and relative power. Traditional realist power remains the 
capacity of A to achieve its material interests by getting B to do what B would 
otherwise not do. Nevertheless, it must be noted that reading realist power politics as 
the politics of brute force ignores its contextual, relational and social nature. For this 
reason, this study’s framework discards US power as a factor and abstracts out the 
US security guarantee to concentrate on the domestic and cross-Strait context. 
3.2.4. Conceptualising Discursive Power 
In its most abstracted form, discursive power is power politics. More specifically, it 
may be defined as a linguistic phenomenon that constitutes the ideational power to 
achieve desired material effects in power politics322 For Taiwan, since huadu is a 
discourse and a state identity, it means Taiwan exploits the power of ideas to secure 
de facto independence by legitimating its state identity in the domestic and cross-
Strait arenas (q.v. 3.2.7.).323  That process constructs a discourse that takes on a life of 
its own, recreating the ROC state (and cross-Strait relations and domestic politics) as 
the social structure in which it is embedded.  
This constructivist approach complements classical realist understandings to provide 
a realist-constructivist definition of discursive power (q.v. 3.2.6.). Constructivism 
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reinforces the classical realist acknowledgement that ideas provide the context for 
power.324   
It is realist power’s relational turn that initially permits a realist-constructivist 
discursive power. The dialectic between realist interactional and constructivist 
constitutive power then creates space for power politics, rather than power per se, 
providing a bridge to a realist-constructivist discursive power. 325  Power for 
Constructivists is shared knowledge – or discourse – but there is still a real world out 
there and, in this sense, it aligns to classical realism in seeing power politics as an 
external social fact.326 
Morgenthau acknowledges that power may inhere in any social relationship and that 
it is contextually contingent. 327  Discursive power “inheres in structures and 
discourses that are not possessed and controlled by any single actor”.328 Yet, actors 
may strategically exploit tensions and gaps in such power to achieve desired 
outcomes.329 That is, although it has material effects, power is not purely material. 
Rather, it may inhere linguistically in the illocutionary-perlocutionary gap (q.v. 5.2). 
This discourse itself empowers the actor (state) as a social structure. Yet, the state 
may in turn manipulate the discourse. 
Figure 4 demonstrates how classical realism and constructivism have compatible 
understandings that permit this study’s conception of discursive power. 
Constructivism sees international relations as discursively co-constituted through 
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power; classical realism accepts this dialectical logic and accepts that non-material 
factors are essential to power.330 So, classical-realist power discursively constructs 
material reality in the social institutions that reproduce it.331  
Classical realist power is relative, relational, interactional and social. Constructivist 
power is intersubjective, constitutive, productive and structural. For a realist-
constructivist reading, classical realism’s core concept is power politics, not 
realpolitik or power per se. That is, Taiwan’s power is contingent on China’s power 
and the cross-Strait context, visible in practice (doing) and outcomes, corporate 
(state-based) and not equal to China’s in content. The logic of power politics rests on 
classical realism’s core axioms and principles above. 
For realist-constructivist discursive power, classical realism’s morality is seen as 
analagous to constructivist norms.332 A dialectic between norms and power operates 
through morality and the practice of prudence and diplomacy in power politics.  RC 
accepts classical realism’s observation that states must distinguish between the ideal 
and the possible and filter their moral principles (norms) “through the concrete 
circumstances of time and place”.333 A classical-realist thesis of socially contingent 
power constructing morality and a constructivist antithesis of socially contingent 
norms constructing power produce a RC synthesis of mutually constitutive morality 
and power visible in huadu’s normative representations. 
Prudence constitutes rational and pragmatic power politics; it is the ability to 
recognise the political consequences of deploying norms. In cross-Strait policy, 
therefore, the enactment of huadu’s normative representations must entail self-
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reflective prudence on the part of Taipei’s elites. Self-reflection guides moral action 
instrumentally by recognising the role of power and rational self-interest in decision-
making. Morgenthau sees power operating in the context of morality through 
internationally sanctioned norms that exist as a policy template, even if anarchy 
prevents their enforcement.  
Normative representations, tempered by morality, are asserted in power politics; the 
enactment of power without morality is sterile. 334  A realist-constructivist discursive 
power reveals that morality inheres in state normative representations, that it 
provides legitimacy and that states use the power of norms, tempered by morality, as 
a means to foreign policy ends.  
Power politics plus morality invokes the discursive power of the ROC’s normative 
representations to legitimate its state identity. The tension between the ROC’s 
normative transformation and the limits imposed by power on huadu invokes 
morality. States deploy norms discursively to enact foreign policy, while that norm-
governed foreign policy relationally invokes morality to recreate structural power. So 
the limits of huadu’s power depend on China’s power and the norms and morality 
operative in the cross-Strait context.335 
For Constructivists, non-material, ideational forces co-constitute state power, 
allowing underdogs to exert pressure on international relations. 336  This suggests that 
China, as Dahl’s powerful A state, may acquiesce to the power of a weaker 
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Taiwanese B state. Constructivism suggests that Taiwan’s power is not given by 
anarchy. Rather, in line with classical realism, it sees it as socially constructed. 
Social processes can be interstate, suggesting Wendt’s systemic theory, or domestic, 
invoking Wendt’s domestic dimension. Using constructivist approaches, classical 
realist social power more visibly becomes the cross-Strait and domestic inter-
subjective co-constitution of power politics.  
In this context, Taiwan has the discursive power to deploy normative representations, 
tempered by morality and prudence in power politics, to trade on its status as a 
pluralistic, liberal democracy, in contrast to an authoritarian China, thus reinforcing 
the informal liberal norm that the takeover of a liberal democracy by an authoritarian 
state cannot be tolerated. Taiwan linguistically legitimates huadu, and delegitimates 
tongyi and taidu and, in so doing, causes China and competing domestic 
constituencies to buy into, or sanction, huadu. To do this, Taiwan, as a 
“knowledgeable” actor, strategically exploits “discursive tensions and fissures,” in 
cross-Strait relations “to increase [its] sovereignty, control [its] own fate, and remake 
[its] very identit[y].”337 Huadu gives Taiwan the power to determine who, when and 
why it is and to secure its national interest in the status quo. 338  Huadu is the 
articulation (locution) of Taiwan’s discursive power (q.v. 5.3.).  
Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) constructivist conceptualisation of power acknowledges 
classical-realist understandings. It sees power as constitutive and interactive; 
operating structurally and agentively.339 Within the constitutive-interactive dialectic, 
productive power constitutes identities. This means that Taiwan and its DIGs are 
                                                 
337 Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond. eds. 2004.: 23. 
338 George, Alexander and Keohane, Robert. 1980. The Concept of National Interests: Uses and 
Limitations, in Presidential Decision making in Foreign Policy.Boulder: Westview: 217-38. 
339 Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. Power in International Politics. International 
Organization, 59 (1): 39–75. 
113 
constrained and enabled in the extent to which they are able to determine their own 
fates through social relations with others. Equally, China is constrained and enabled 
by this dialectic. In this regard, productive power co-constitutes structures and 
institutions. 
Figure 4 Realist-Constructivist Taxonomy of Discursive Power 
 
Discursive power dialectically generates dominance and resistance and Taiwan 
resists China’s institutional power by deploying the constructivist productive and 
realist interactional power of huadu to affect the cross-Strait structure (maintain the 
status quo). Such discursive power operates even when A does not act intentionally 
to exercise control over B.340 Productive power concerns the limits of the power of 
huadu in cross-Strait relations.341 In this regard, Taiwan has the productive power to 
maintain huadu, but not to declare taidu. Productive power also involves the 
discursive processes and practices of cross-Strait relations and domestic power 
politics that produce Taiwan’s social identities and capacities as they give meaning 
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to them. So, Taiwan and the Taiwanese, as actors, are the effects as well as the 
intended targets of power. Productive power constructs huadu socially by 
constituting structure, co-constituting Taiwan and the Taiwanese-based on norms, 
discourses and identities, by framing meaning. 342   So, categories like “peaceful”, 
“stable”, “mainland”, “side” and “China” are contested to generate asymmetric 
capacities.343 Similarly, how Taiwan names itself and China is associated with what 
is politically imaginable.344 For instance, contested efforts to fix meanings to “1992 
Consensus” and “One China” are expressive of productive power. 345  Both are 
intersubjectively co-constituted, shaping actors’ social capacities, self-
understandings and perceived interests. Most importantly, huadu represents Taiwan’s 
productive remaking of its identity. Thus, Taipei, as a canny actor, is able to identify 
discursive gaps and subvert them to increase its sovereignty.346 Huadu is therefore 
both productive and structural and it operates to legitimate Taiwan as sovereign in 
the ROC. 
3.2.5. Giving Wendt Some Power 
Wendt’s systemic Constructivism aligns to mainstream rationalist approaches, 
providing Realism with enough ontological common ground to show that reality can 
be accounted for by social facts.347 It accepts anarchy, but sees it not as a cause of 
conflict or cooperation but as an outcome of international relations.348 In other words, 
interaction creates anarchy, but it is a contingent and socially constructed ideational 
phenomenon. For Wendt, the “structures of human association (in this case, cross-
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Strait relations) are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces 
and the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared 
ideas rather than given by nature”.349  Hence, as Katzenstein argues, “state interests 
do not exist to be ‘discovered’ by self-interested, rational actors”; rather, they are 
“constructed through a process of social interaction”. 350  This does not mean that 
anything goes. States may be historically contingent, but they also exist and are 
governed by rules and patterns. Norms and ideas influence human agency, behaviour 
and motivations, but there is still a real world of power politics out there.351 In other 
words, to paraphrase Wendt, anarchy may be what states make of it, but states cannot 
make of it whatever they want. 
Wendt’s thin Constructivism accepts that the world exists independently of human 
observations of it and that “the state and states system are real structures whose 
nature can be approximated through science”.352 However, “the social structure of 
international politics does not exist prior to or outside of the mutable norms and 
discourses that define the identities and interests of actors”.353  So social structures, 
while material and “real”, are also co-constituted and inter-subjective. That is, both 
“people and society” and “identities and structures” are inter-subjectively co-
constituted; neither has ontological priority. 354  Discourses create identities and 
structures that are neither subjective nor objective, but socially embedded and 
reproduced by “interpreters who participate in their production and workings”.355 For 
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Constructivists, “it is the fact that we hold ideas and understandings in common, 
rather than any objective status of those ideas and understandings, that matters in 
international relations”.356  
Wendt’s approach has a clear application to cross-Strait relations in its focus on the 
importance of inter-state socialisation to identity and national interests. However, it 
needs modifications to fully account for Taiwan’s state identity. First, it lacks 
theoretical application to country-specific empirical case studies. 357 Thus, while it 
may theorise an idealised liberal cross-Strait systemic identity, it does not explicitly 
account for how interstate socialisation interacts with elite and domestic group 
preferences to construct state identities, or how these identities are generated in the 
first place. Second, it has nothing to say about the role of state identity politics or 
power politics in general. Rather, it assumes that the corporate state acts consciously 
and rationally in transferring from trade interests to the development of foreign 
policy. Third, it fails to account for what happens if states do not move to the 
Kantian peace, but remain stuck as Lockean rivals or return to Hobbesian enemies or 
what states might do discursively to evade this (q.v. 3.3.). 
Wendt does not provide a separate conceptualisation of power. However, he argues 
that power politics are not logical or causal outcomes of structure but of process. 
Power politics are an institution, not essential features of anarchy. So, anarchy is 
what states make of it. For Wendt, “people act towards objects, including other 
actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them”.358  Material 
356 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 27. 
357 Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. ed.. 2006.: 115-122. 
358 Wendt, Alexander. 1992.   
117 
forces matter, people act intentionally and states are the focus of analysis in IR. 
However, the core realist concept of power politics is socially constructed.359  
Wendt’s ideational reading of power in and of itself, however, is insufficient. If 
power is constituted by ideas, then it needs to be used to explain the practice of 
international relations. Wendt provides no definition or rival conceptualisation of 
power, so his Constructivism needs to be contextualised in order to give it 
explanatory force. RC provides a bridge.  
3.2.6. Realist – Constructivist Power 
Discursive power combines classical realist and constructivist understandings, 
permitting a revised conceptualisation of Taiwan’s power (q.v. 3.4.2.).  The ability of 
A to achieve its interests by getting B to do what B would otherwise not do remains 
the realist baseline.360 This seems reasonable because, first, it adheres to the principle 
of defaulting to realism; second, it provides an ontological focal point for 
constructivist conceptions and, third, it invites empirical evidence, thus aligning to 
the data in the study.  However, rather than relative power, it is Taiwan’s relational 
capacity to shape China’s norms and values or its ability to determine outcomes that 
reflects its constructed identities. Clearly, Taiwan does not have raw, relative “power 
over” China. Yet, it does have the “power of” its state identity and “power to” act 
and effect outcomes. 361  Classical realist readings acknowledge that “power over 
opinion … is a necessary part of all power”. 362  Morgenthau calls power “the 
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domination of man by man,” regardless of ends, safeguards or justification.363 Even 
Neorealism acknowledges that power is not just an exogenous systemic variable; 
Waltz’s claim that “states are differently placed by their power” presupposes that this 
power must be generated endogenously too. 364 It also suggests states accrue power 
through behaviour.  
An alternative reading of the realist literature suggests that power is not absolute, but 
contingent, in that the power that A enforces on B is only meaningful in terms of B’s 
power or the context. Non-material factors are also necessary for a complete 
understanding of Taiwan’s power in cross-Strait relations and power politics cannot 
be reduced to positivist measurements of material capabilities.365 Taiwan’s power is 
more aptly considered, not relative to China’s but in relation to it. Even Waltz states 
“the extent of one’s power cannot be inferred from the results one may or may not 
get,” implying that power is not the property of a single state actor and “an agent is 
powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him”.366 This is 
clearly a relational argument.  
Realist Constructivism, as a prescriptive approach, seeks to account for what Taiwan 
has done. Therefore, to account for Taiwan’s power to maintain its sovereignty, 
huadu is crucial, since it sets the parameters of the status quo. There is space for 
convergence between Realism’s traditional biasing of power towards interaction and 
Constructivism’s focus on constitutive power. For constructivists, as for realists, 
power in cross-Strait relations may be seen as “a contest about shaping and being 
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responsible for the future”.367 By deploying huadu to resist Chinese power, Taiwan 
produces in and through cross-Strait relations, effects that shape its capacity to 
maintain its autonomy and reconstruct the nature of cross-Strait relations. This can be 
interpreted as the effective exploitation of discursive gaps. That is, the occupation of 
the locutionary space between what is uttered (illocution) and what is perceived 
(perlocution) in political speech (q.v. 5.3; 5.3.7.). The historical shift in the official 
terms used by Beijing to describe Taiwan indicates that Taipei has effectively 
deployed the discursive (structural and productive) power to construct what Taiwan 
is more effectively than Beijing has.  
Taiwan’s pursuit of the status quo invites a conception that still accepts a realist 
benchmark of power as winning conflicts. Berenskotter’s (2007) “limiting 
alternatives” and “shaping normality” suggest voluntary compliance and threats of 
enforcement constitute political power. 368 The threat of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is, 
in theory, ever-present and power politics are fundamentally about the capacity and 
authority to use violence. So, this conceptualisation retains the realist analytical link 
while allowing constructivist readings.369  
For a RC reading, however, power also operates in diffuse rather than direct social 
relations. Diffuse discourses rather than isolated, direct actions produce subjects like 
Taiwan. But warrant for diffuse discourses can only be located in isolated events. 
Constructivist readings of power complement, rather than contradict, realist readings. 
Constructivism finds “power operating in structures of thinking and behavior that 
previously seemed to be devoid of power relations”. 370  Barnett and Duvall’s 
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contrasting of interactional power and intersubjective power covers material and 
ideational sources.371 So, the strong do not necessarily do what they can and the weak 
do not have to do what they must. In this regard, then, there is space for convergence 
between Realism’s interactive and Constructivism’s constitutive, or intersubjective, 
power. 372  Power politics provide the realist-constructivist context for this 
convergence. 
Waltz’s structural realism is not the hard core of the realist research program. 
Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat provides a more appropriate structural link to 
domestic and inter-state contexts to account for threat perception. Rather than 
Structural Realism, it is Classical Realism that this study’s RC adopts. First, the state 
is the dominant actor, but states impose their identities on DIGs in power politics. 
The power of those identities explains the relationship between the state and the 
identities and norms that motivate states’ actions.373 Second, foreign policy closes 
the gap with power politics and links with Constructivism through state identity 
formation. Third, the dynamics of inter-state and domestic power politics explain 
inter-state conflict. Fourth, RC allows for policymakers playing a two-level game, 
responding to systemic incentives while dealing with domestic constraints. A RC 
focus on domestic variables sees Taipei’s cross-Strait policy not simply as the 
neoclassical realist outcome of the domestic identities and interests that prevail in 
domestic power competition and state institutions. For RC, Taipei is able to resist 
Beijing’s threat and to perceive a Chinese security threat accurately. Rather, what 
accounts for perceived underbalancing is DIG (mis)perception of leaders’ intentions 
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and the nature of Ripsman et al’s (2016) three intervening variables - leaders’ 
perceptions, the state’s relations with DIGs and state extractive and mobilisation 
capacity – are determined by state identity. 374 
This study’s RC adopts the classical realist logic that state power itself, derived from 
state identity, constitutes domestic identities and interests and, by extension elite 
preferences and foreign policy. This suggests that those powerful domestic groups 
that respond coherently in line with state identity prevail and that their threat 
perception is a function of top-down state power over identity, not just bottom-up. 
This study’s RC therefore suggests that powerful domestic groups simply perceive 
state underbalancing as a threat to security and identity; that is, through the prism of 
threat perception. In fact, huadu ensures that Taiwan’s power prevails domestically. 
For sure, “understanding the links between power and policy…requires close 
examination of both the international and the domestic contexts within which foreign 
policy is formulated and implemented”. 375  Relative power capabilities, like state 
identity, act indirectly on policy in complex ways through domestic politics.376 Thus, 
Taiwan’s power results from political decisions and agency that derive from 
perceptions of power. 377  Systemic analysis alone cannot explain this. Domestic 
groups bargain, lobby and deploy power to obstruct the policy elite.378 But the power 
of those groups that prevail is constituted by state power.  
So, the value of RC to this framework is that it allows for domestic effects on policy. 
In this way, it shows how domestic and interstate constraints impede rational choice 
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(as opposed to rationality) and bring Classical Realism back in by looking at foreign 
policy and the state.  In this analysis, rather than being constrained by domestic 
power struggle, Taipei’s elites cannot accede to Beijing’s demands for unification 
because of the power of the ROC state. An individual policymaker’s national identity 
and ideology is irrelevant. Classical Realism’s focus on the state and 
Constructivism’s focus on identity permit a RC domestic realist argument for Taiwan 
that is not the bottom-up liberal one but one that examines how a prevailing huadu 
corporate identity is domestically constructed in the first place and determines policy 
responses, regardless of interest group perceptions around threat. This invites 
analysis of state identity construction in chapter four, but makes salient for this 
framework the power that the ROC possesses.  
In sum, then, the intersubjective relationship between state power and state identity 
in power politics is the basis of RC analysis.  Domestic elite interaction and state 
identity lead to states being concerned with relative power; from this, foreign policy 
results.379 Socialisation creates state identities that involve self-other distinctions and, 
therefore, impact on domestic and external politics. This creates space for power as a 
social phenomenon that provokes domestic and inter-state power competition 
through competing state identities. Domestic groups perceive external threats and 
jostle for control of the state in order to create foreign policy in response to those 
threats. Yet, that threat perception is a function not only of threatening state or home 
state policy elite actions but of a determinative state identity.  Relative power within 
states is as important as between them, but, contra NCR, Taiwan’s identity-driven 
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power competition has never trumped “rational and consciously desired peace 
dividends”.380  
State power is the ability to extract resources to pursue foreign policy.381 Taiwan’s 
deployment of state power in domestic politics after US de-recognition led to its 
deployment in cross-Strait relations. Subsequent domestic power competition in 
response to the perceived threat derived from cross-Strait relations resulted in further 
state-domestic group interaction that reconstructed Taiwan’s state power. So, while 
domestic groups may attempt to lobby Taipei in the context of cross-Strait 
interaction in an attempt to determine Taipei’s cross-Strait policy choices, a RC 
reading suggests it is Taiwan’s prevailing state power that determines policy choices 
and which domestic interests will apparently prevail. Domestic groups may only 
prevail if they assume the power of the state. 
In conclusion, then, realist-constructivist power is contextual, social and relational; it 
is not just the capacity to compel but the ability of the user to effect outcomes. 
“Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man 
over man” and “its content and manner of its use are determined by the political and 
cultural environment”.382 In other words, A is constrained by B’s response. So, realist 
analysis of power needs to be aware of political and cultural contexts and the norms 
that both the subject and object share. On this reading of realist power, then, China 
lacks sufficient coercive power to prevail over Taiwan because it is constrained by 
Taiwan’s discursive power, which is a function of the power of Taiwan’s state 
identity to legitimate its sovereignty.  
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3.2.7 Power as Legitimacy 
Legitimacy invokes social recognition through discursive power. Lipset (1983) 
defines legitimacy as “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief 
that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society”.383 
That is, legitimacy is a general understanding that a polity’s actions align to a 
“socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.384 While for 
Classical Realists, power bestows legitimacy, Constructivists see legitimacy as a 
source of power.385  For Arendt, the power of legitimacy is productive (q.v. 3.2.4.).386 
For Reus-Smit (2007), legitimate actors may draw on the “resources and energies” of 
certain actors to achieve the compliance of a third actor “in accordance with their 
rules, decisions, or commands”, obviating coercion and bribery.387 For Franck (1990), 
international society legitimates states, pulling them toward normative compliance 
with rules.388 For Bukovansky (2010) legitimacy is a discursive phenomenon.389 The 
power of such rules rests in sovereignty and democracy; “sovereignty is conditioned 
by legitimacy” and “the existence in the system of a form of rule considered to be the 
most powerful and legitimate … facilitate[s] the accumulation of material 
preponderance”.390 Reus-Smit (2007) concurs, arguing that actors establish legitimacy 
through language by constructing “self-images and the public justification of 
priorities and practices”. Other actors linguistically contest or endorse such 
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representations in the context of the prevailing social norms that determine what can 
and cannot be said.391 Thus, language invokes discursive power (q.v. 3.2.4; 5.2.).   
Legitimacy operates in power politics, specifically in state identity politics (SIPs), 
and it conditions the practice of power. Actors ascribe power to the ROC based on 
the legitimacy of its state identity and they do so with reference to norms that specify 
how a democratic Taiwan ought to act. Even when China contests the ROC’s right, it 
does so on the grounds of what constitute the operative norms and their interpretation. 
Ascribing legitimacy is also dependent on discursive practice; Taiwan establishes its 
legitimacy through the rhetorical and discursive construction of contested self-
images. Maintaining ROC legitimacy through huadu constitutes discursive power, 
and its content depends on prevailing cross-Strait and international norms.392  
Taipei’s legitimacy is crucially related to post-Cold War discourses of liberal 
democracy and self-determination alongside wider Westphalian norms and an 
international norm against secession. These provide order and stability. 393  Clark 
(2001) suggests such norms crystalise in “inauspicious circumstances” after 
exogenous shocks in which broad principles of pragmatism and consensus-building 
are operative.394 Such norms became deeply embedded in state-building. Rather than 
an essentialist apologia for liberal democracy, such norms operate as a set of ideal 
membership rules for new states, drawing even non-democratic states into the 
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discourse.395 Clark suggests actors come to understand, accept and internalise such 
norms through “setting an example”. 396  Yet, others argue that the international 
community’s inconsistency around Taiwan shows liberal democracy can never be a 
norm in a world of power politics.397 Others describe the norm of liberal democracy 
as an imperialistic project aimed at protecting US hegemony.398 Such perceptions 
miss the legitimating power of liberal discourse. Granted, power politics trump legal 
and ethical considerations, but liberal norms are “not just a rhetorical veneer”. There 
is, as yet, no other macro-political game in town to legitimate the exercise of state 
power.399  
Material power can only sustain legitimacy for Beijing if Taipei and others judge, 
first, that such power reflects a China whose identity and interests are compatible 
with international norms and, second, that China will use its power in line with 
prevailing norms of rightful state action (q.v. 4.5.). Taipei and Beijing judge each 
others’ legitimacy through the filter of norms. The relationship between legitimacy, 
on the one hand, and norms, on the other, is necessarily mediated by discursive 
power. 
The RC synthetic conceptualisation generated above means that huadu is a question 
of the practice of power. As a form of discursive power constituted through SIPs in 
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domestic and cross-Strait power politics, huadu legitimates Taiwan’s de facto 
independence. An RC approach reveals that huadu represents the linguistically 
enacted material outcome of ideational phenomena and is neither conceptually, 
culturally nor linguistically exceptional. Thus, it may be accounted for using Western 
IR approaches and understandings of power. In this regard, core classical realist and 
constructivist precepts show that, while it is social and productive, huadu represents 
Taiwan’s status as it actually is. Accretions from Wendt’s systemic constructivism 
and Walt’s Balance of Threat show huadu is co-constitutive of Chinese threat and 
Taiwanese norms and enacted through a prudent morality in cross-Strait policy 
within an anarchy that is what Taipei (and huadu) makes of it. In this regard, DIGs 
may misperceive elite cross-Strait policy and both DIG misperception and Taiwan’s 
de facto independence as a cross-Strait policy outcome are determined by the power 
of huadu.  
3.3. From Power Politics to Foreign Policy 
For Wendt, anarchy does not compel states to competitive power politics; inter-state 
socialisation can overcome this logic and certain aspects of anarchy are changeable. 
Yet power politics must be operative whether they enact change in the system or co-
constitute it. A Wendtian reading suggests huadu matters to its deployment of power 
because it informs cross-Strait relations and policy. RC shows how when Taiwan’s 
interests became coherent, they prevailed and gave motivation and power to huadu. 
For Wendt, Taiwan’s power in cross-Strait relations, as a discourse, is contingent on 
shared ideas, identities and interests.400  
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Realist logics of power express it as relative and based on interest; constructivist 
logics as relational and based on identities.401 The fundamental power link between 
Classical Realism and Constructivsim therefore is the RC view that power is social 
and relational, as well as relative; that it involves agency and the ability of an actor to 
effect outcomes to his own benefit and that it is ideationally influenced. Wendt 
resolves this by using intersubjective co-constitution to explain the relationship 
between identities and interests. Constructivism accepts that actors may deploy 
power to invoke identities instrumentally to maximise their interests.402  
Wendt’s Constructivism above suggests that states will change their identity through 
socialisation from Hobbesian enemy to Lockean rival to Kantian friend. 403  This 
follows a firmly liberal ontology and is prevalent in the literature and in Taipei’s 
foreign policy thinking. As such, it informs economic convergence and is the 
philosophy behind Rapprochement. In fact, “most leaders still cling to the 
longstanding belief that expanding economic ties will cement the bonds of friendship 
between and within nations that make the resort to arms unfathomable,” and “few 
scholars today question the belief that trade brings universal beneﬁts and peace under 
all conceivable conditions”.404  RC helps to explain why this is not necessarily the 
case. In focusing on state identity, this study’s RC permits the incorporation of 
constructivist core concepts; identities are intersubjectively co-constituted. Classical 
Realism then examines power politics, agency and how the state constructs the 
national interest. The outcome for a RC synthesis is that socialisation with other 
                                                 
401 Barkin, J. Samuel. 2010. Realist Constructivism: 72. 
402 Mattern, Janice Bially. 2005. Why `Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the 
Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics: Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies. 33(3): 583-612 
403 Wendt, Alexander. 1999.  
404 Barbieri, Katherine and Schneider, Gerald. 1999. Globalization and Peace: Assessing New 
Directions in the Study of Trade and Conﬂict. Journal of Peace Research, 36 (4): 387–404, at 387 and 
390. 
129 
states and domestic competition blend with state identity politics, threat perception 
and foreign policy choices.405 In this way, an ideational as well as a material security 
dilemma may exist alongside economic interdependence and a state may trade with a 
security threat while enacting its own state identity; a weaker state may resist a 
stronger state’s coercive material power. The possibility of convergence between 
Classical Realism and Constructivism is clear.   
3.4. A Two-Level, Three-Stage Framework 
This theoretical framework does the following: first, it combines the core concepts 
outlined above to create a two-level, three-stage, RC framework; second, it states the 
methods employed; third, it outlines the data gathered to relate these concepts to the 
research question.  The framework in figure 5 below shows how discursive power 
legitimates huadu and deploys it in foreign policy and how these phenomena are co-
constituted within and across domestic and inter-state socialisation. There is nothing 
analytically fundamental to Realism or Constructivism that says they must 
exclusively concern themselves with interstate interaction.  
This framework adapts Bozdağlıoğlu’s (2007) constructivist model to classical realist 
principles to show how huadu is enacted in foreign policy, acknowledging 
intersubjectivity as the processual catalyst of power politics.406 First, the ROC state 
accrues discursive power and legitimacy domestically - a stage theoretically implied 
by WC, but observed in the realist practice of power in domestic politics and in 
modernist national-identity theory; that is, the ROC created the Taiwanese nation. In 
doing so, the state appeals to state identity-driven normative representations, 
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invoking classical-realist morality. Second, that domestic power is deployed through 
inter-state socialisation – assumed by Wendt’s Constructivism, but also core to 
Classical Realism. Here, the state’s identity-driven interests are discursively enacted 
as normative representations, again implying classical realism’s morality. Third, in 
observing inter-state (cross-Strait) socialisation, powerful Taiwan-identifying 
domestic groups perceive a threat and re-deploy identity-and-norm-driven power 
(bestowed by the state) in domestic politics, a stage implied by Classical Realism and 
by Walt. The actors then return to stage two in Figure 5. In the power political 
process, the ROC and Taiwan converge (Figure 5, stage b) in a process of 
Taiwanisation of the ROC state that causes the ROC’s state identity to diverge from 
that of China (Figure 5, stage b), legitimating huadu, enacting Taiwan’s national 
interest in security in the status quo of de facto independence and determining the 
systemic identity, or cross-Strait culture of anarchy, that prevails around that.  
The power of huadu is operative domestically and in cross-Strait relations. It is 
Wendt’s distinction between corporate and social state identities and his concept of 
the first encounter that opens a gap for systemic-domestic discursive power as 
legitimacy (q.v. 4.5.). The link may be summarised here. First, Wendt’s identities 
entail interests “because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it 
is.”407  Second, states do not have a portfolio of decontextualised interests; rather, 
“they define their interests in the process of defining situations”.408 For Wendt, the 
former implies that corporate identities are acquired prior to first encounter while 
social identities are acquired afterwards through socialisation. This means power 
must be operative in their construction and deployment at both levels. Since power 
arises from intersubjective processes of knowledge creation, intersubjectivity must 
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operate domestically too. Granted, how a state deploys power to fulfil its corporate 
interests depends on its view of self and other, which entails power deployed in the 
system, but its genesis must be domestic.409  
RC’s acknowledgement that social facts are discursive permits Wendt’s Hobbesian, 
Lockean and Kantian systemic identities (cultures of anarchy) whose representations 
of enmity, rivalry and friend are determined through socialisation.410 Accordingly, for 
Wendt, as states engage and threat perception changes, structure determines how 
power is deployed. 411 However, Wendt’s first encounter suggests states bring the 
power of unshared and unrefined a priori national interests and state identities.412 
These are exogenous to first-encounter because Wendt treats “identities and interests 
as endogenous to interaction”.413 Yet, they cannot be exogenous to their domestic 
formation. Thus, power is exogenous and endogenous. 
For a workable RC domestic-systemic argument, therefore, Wendt’s constructed 
corporate identities need domestic power for three reasons. First, state power in 
state-national socialisation changes state identity and interests before the other’s 
recognition. Wendt identifies the two sources, but fails fully to account for their co-
constitution because he has bracketed the domestic. One could argue that by 
bracketing he is saying what is true of the system is true of the domestic, but this 
would still make them discrete rather than interconnecting categories. Second, Wendt 
treats states as unitary actors, stripped of contingency; domestic realism brings power 
and agency to state identity construction. Third, the content of a state’s corporate 
identity may predict who it will identify with, despite Wendt’s assumption that inter-
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state socialisation determines in or out-groupness.414 Granted, a state may do this and 
subsequently be disabused of the idea in socialisation, causing cultures of anarchy to 
oscillate after first encounter.  
Power politics transform state corporate identity through strategic practice; Taipei’s 
discursive power transforms huadu through domestic politics. Social processes such 
as democratisation, constitutional changes and elections alter domestic actors’ roles 
in the state-making process.415 Powerful groups institutionalise their own preferences 
to resist and disrupt state power as foreign policy is developed; this may create 
cleavage and oscillation. 416   The perceived threat of systemic changes caused by 
inter-state trade policies can affect domestic cleavages, weakening or consolidating 
state power. 417  Figure 5, stage b points to where such changes may stabilise or 
weaken identification with others, shifting from selfish to collective or vice versa. It 
is not necessarily Wendt’s one-way Liberal argument. However, over the long term, 
neither DIGs nor the executive can retain an identity separate to that of the nation 
that the state constructed. A two-level, three-stage systemic-domestic process can 
exacerbate domestic identity conflict that rebounds in inter-state socialisation and 
foreign policy.  
The RC framework above modifies Wendt’s systemic model to bring in the domestic. 
It combines classical-realist and constructivist understandings of power with Walt’s 
Balance of Threat to create a RC synthesis that accounts for Taipei’s cross-Strait 
policy in the constitution of huadu. The framework shows how huadu refutes 
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Wendt’s liberal constructivist argument to demonstrate how cross-Strait relations 
default to an oscillating Lockean status quo rather than fulfilling policy aspirations to 
a Kantian liberal peace. Granted, huadu has ended the Hobbesian enemy stance that 
prevailed under the authoritarian ROC.  
 
Figure 5 Two-Level-Three-Stage Model of Discursive Power 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
The RC conception of power and the theoretical model above explain Taiwan’s 
successful deployment of discursive power to maintain its autonomy from a 
perspective that takes threat perception and cross-Strait and domestic power politics 
into account. Taiwan’s maintenance of the status quo represents an impressive 
deployment of huadu, since it effectively stalemates Beijing. 
China has compulsory power over Taiwan not just because it can use brute force, but 
because Taiwan knows it. 418  However, China is also constrained by Taiwan’s 
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responses. In this context, and despite representing a nominally Chinese Nationalist 
party, Taipei’s KMT policy elites resisted Beijing’s attempts to set a timetable for 
unification after 2008. The concepts highlighted above explain why maintenance of 
the status quo is the logical outcome.  
Relative power has switched from Taiwan to China since the early 1990s when 
Taiwan was investing in China. Now the roles have reversed, but Taiwan is a 
sovereign political entity; Taiwanese identity is now embedded as the norm. The 
framework above accounts for oscillating cross-Strait relations up to 2008 and 
Rapprochement and its reversal after that. At the same time, China now enjoys a 
relative material power advantage, meaning the resources and policy options 
available to each side differ. This determines that in order to maintain its de facto 
independence, Taiwan must continue to deploy the discursive power of huadu. The 
next chapter shows how Taipei enacts the discursive power of its state identity in 
power politics to legitimate its de facto independence. 
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Chapter 4: State Identity – Theoretical Framework 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter provisionally argued that huadu draws on and bestows 
discursive power on the ROC to maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence. That is, it 
legitimates Taiwan’s sovereign status. This chapter takes up and develops a 
framework of huadu as a state identity. This is necessary because discursive power in 
and of itself is not legitimacy; rather, it is derived from legitimacy which, in turn, is 
bestowed by state identity. Legitimacy permits the enactment of discursive power in 
foreign policy. That is, Taiwan’s legitimacy is both a source and a product of its 
discursive power to maintain its de facto independence and it is enacted in cross-
Strait relations, stalemating China’s power in the process. 
This study’s realist-constructivist (RC) framework holds that power and state identity 
is intersubjectively co-constituted in power politics. Hence, neither materialist and 
rationalist IR accounts nor modernist national identity theories can fully explain why 
Taiwan is able to use huadu to maintain its de facto independence. Rather a RC state 
identity framework that conceptualises legitimacy does. Huadu arose as a necessary 
ROC reassertion of preferences in response to a threat to its legitimacy entailed in 
domestic and international crises of legitimacy. 419 So, huadu represents the co-
constitutive legitimation of ROC power, identity and interest in response to internal 
and external threats to these. Huadu provides a cognitive framework for Taiwan’s 
preferences and cross-Strait policy. 
This chapter does the following: first, as indicated in Chapter 2, it reviews the 
literature on Taiwan’s national identity to locate gaps for huadu as state identity. 
Second, it conceptualises Taiwan’s sub-state identities to show how, while none of 
419 Reus-Smit. Christian. 2007. International Crises of Legitimacy. International Politics, 44(2-3): 158. 
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these are sufficient to explain huadu, a modernist conception of national identity 
helps. Third, it offers a framework for huadu as state identity. Fourth, it conceives of 
huadu in relation to legitimacy and argues that it arose in different ways from the 
authoritarian ROC’s loss of legitimacy as Free China. Fifth, it links huadu to cross-
Strait policy, showing how it is intersubjectively co-constituted in anarchical norms 
and deployed in power politics through state identity politics (SIPs). Finally, it 
argues that huadu provides Taiwan with ontological security – or security in its ROC 
state identity - and that this enables Taiwan to maintain the status quo of de facto 
independence while compelling China to sanction this status. Without huadu, there is 
no conceptualisation or theorisation of the cross-Strait status quo. The alternative is 
simply extrapolation of an inhibited struggle between two impossible choices, 
Chinese unification in tongyi and de jure Taiwan independence in taidu. 
4.2. Literature on Taiwan’s National Identity  
This section argues that while the literature on Taiwanese national identity lacks a 
clear conceptualisation of Taipei’s state identity, it provides pointers to that identity 
both in its understanding of national identity construction and in its linking of it to 
cross-Strait policy preferences. Any national identity theory may account for 
Taiwan’s divergence from China; it is how Taipei exploits national identity that 
matters and that implies a state identity. Studies of democratisation go back to post-
1945 authoritarian rule to understand its genesis in ROC state identity change (q.v. 
2.2; 2.3.). The literature on Taiwanese national identity itself presupposes a 
legitimate ROC state identity that aligns to huadu.  
Like the IR literature, much of the NI-driven literature views Taiwan’s political 
divergence from China as either an inhibited search for taidu or a false choice 
between taidu and tongyi, effacing the ROC. The dominant approach is positivist and 
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sticks close to NI modernism; Taiwanese national identity developed in opposition to 
the authoritarian ROC other after 1945 and cannot be considered without reference to 
Chinese national identity.420 In the 1990s, Taiwanese national identity, driven by the 
consolidation of democracy, pivoted to mainland China as its other, drawing the 
ROC into its scope in the process. State identity is implied throughout the literature. 
This provides an explanatory way out of the tongyi-taidu puzzle. 
Alan Wachman’s seminal 1994 study Taiwan: National Identity and 
Democratization identified a lack of KMT-DPP consensus on national identity 
alongside consensus on civic democratic identity. 421  Christopher Hughes’ (1997) 
Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism locates Taiwanese national identity in democracy; 
this broke the link between Chinese Nationalism and KMT legitimacy and decoupled 
the ROC from Chinese Nationalism. This clearly implies a shift to “an intermediate” 
state identity.422 The salience of a pronounced post-democracy shift from a Chinese to 
a Taiwanese state identity and a corresponding shift towards a policy preference for 
the status quo that eschews both tongyi and taidu (q.v. 1.4.) is a broad theme 
operating through two cross-cutting strands: first, post-democracy changes in 
Taiwan’s partisan structure involving factional tension; second, the shift from an 
ethnic to a civic national identity. These two strands further explain how 
Taiwanisation of the KMT and the ROC caused national identity to impact on 
domestic power politics and cross-Strait relations. What is left insufficiently explored 
is a conceptualization of state identity as the solution to the sovereignty issue. Huadu 
provides this. 
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With regard to the first strand above, post-democracy changes in Taiwan’s partisan 
structure led to competing nation-building projects, with the DPP-KMT opposition 
dominating. 423  National identity was the dominant party cleavage. Yet, there was 
consensus on Taiwan’s sovereignty and nation-building required the ROC state.424 
This elite-led project co-opted Taiwanese national identity to the ROC to head off 
taidu between 1991 and 2000. 425 Between 2000 and 2008, the DPP sought to re-
construct the ROC as a Taiwanese nation state while rhetorically threatening to enact 
taidu. 426 This presupposes ROC state power and identity. Niou (2004) uses 
Constructivism to show how Taiwanese identity was talked into being. 427 
Quantitative analyses of elite discourse by Sullivan and Lowe (2010) and Sullivan 
and Sapir (2012) confirm Schubert’s (2004) qualitative research revealing 
converging KMT and DPP positions on a Taiwanese national identity linked to the 
ROC.428 This suggests huadu.  
The second strand shows how sub-ethnic identities influenced domestic politics from 
1945 and constituted a Taiwanese national identity that gelled in democratisation. A 
Mainlander (waishengren)-Taiwanese (benshengren) cleavage arose from brutal 
KMT suppression and hampered sinification during the 1950s and 1960s, ensuring 
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an oppositional state-seeking Taiwanese national identity. 429  A number of books 
expose KMT brutality: Mancall’s (1964) Taiwan: Island of Resignation and Despair 
and Mendel’s (1970) The Politics of Formosan Nationalism relay a sense of 
benshengren hatred towards waishengren. 430 Harrison (2006) provides a thick 
constructivist account of historical national identity construction. These allude to 
taidu as Taiwan’s independence from the authoritarian ROC, not the PRC. This 
strand invites examination of huadu as a response to an earlier KMT crisis of 
legitimacy – that is the one sparked by 2-28 in 1947.  
The striking shift from sub-ethnic identities to a civic national identity driven by 
democratisation was already visible in 1997, when Lee Teng-hui articulated the New 
Taiwanese identity (q.v. 7.3.).431 Taiwanese accept China as a cultural and ancestral 
focus, but identify nationally with Taiwan in the form of the ROC.432 With ethnic 
identity resolved, civic democracy represents Taiwanese identity. Despite a positivist 
bent, however, a closer reading of the literature invites a RC conceptualisation of 
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democratisation; that is, rather than Taiwanese national identity causing the ROC to 
democratise, democratisation was co-constituted by the state and the national group.  
National identity in ethnic struggle gathered power in the 1990s but was also visible 
in local elections from the 1950s.  Chao (1992) and Chen (1995) confirm a tension 
between local and national KMT factions that contrasts the Chinese Confucian 
political culture of KMT elites and their Taiwanised local-government 
counterparts.433 Chao and Myers (2000) claim these pre-democratic elections worked 
as pressure valves for grievances against the KMT while allowing it to embed 
patronage through the party state.434 This strand culminated in Makeham and Hsiau’s 
(2005) magisterial study of the dangwai movement that tracked the progression of 
bentuhua outside of the KMT party structure and which was to form the nucleus of 
the DPP (q.v. 6.4.).435 An overall tension between a Free China state identity and a 
Taiwanese national identity is clear. 
Research based on mass surveys pointed to a general civic national identity 
developing in Taiwan during the 1990s that was culturally Chinese, but politically 
Taiwanese. Democratisation and Chinese threats were its drivers. Mainlanders 
(waishengren) developed a more flexible national identity between 1997 and 2008.436  
The 2000 DPP victory marked a shift to an overtly “self-conscious nation-building 
project”, reflecting anxiety over increasing economic convergence with China with 
research exploring the DPP administration’s construction of a Taiwanese national 
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memory.437 By 2008, though, what Beijing and the pan-Blues perceived as a move to 
taidu led to electoral defeat for the DPP. Quantitative studies and opinion polls 
revealed that the electorate was pragmatic on unification/ independence. 438  This 
reflected a salient rise in pro-independence and fall in pro-unification sentiment 
overall between 1992 and 2016, but with the majority preferring the status quo.439 
These studies locate Taiwan’s preference for the status quo in China’s inhibition of 
Taiwanese nationalism’s desire for taidu and Taiwan’s inability to accept tongyi 
leading to an “unresolved national identity dilemma”.440 Liu and Ho (1999) identify a 
decline in Chinese identity and a rise in Taiwanese identity regardless of ethnicity; 
they locate national identity as the key variable in political thinking and attitudes. 
The NCCU data point to a sharp rise in Taiwanese identity and fall in Chinese 
identity after ROC constitutional changes (q.v. 1.3.2.). The elite-led decoupling of 
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the tongyi-taidu debate from national identity and democracy created a space for 
huadu to occupy, making civic identity prominent. 441   
KMT Taiwanisation remained an important research theme throughout the 2000s. 
Research revealed that to equate Chinese identity, support for the KMT and pro-
tongyi sentiment on the one hand and Taiwanese identity, support for the DPP and a 
pro-taidu stance on the other based on an imprecise Taiwanese-Mainlander 
distinction was simplistic. By 2000, the KMT itself had democratised and 
Taiwanised and the party showed no appetite for tongyi in the short term, while by 
2000 the DPP showed less appetite for taidu. Yu Wu-shan (2011) argues that a 
rational KMT sought a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis China that could be 
modified to maximise votes. To this end, it moved towards the DPP on identity and 
sovereignty during the 1990s. In opposition during the 2000s, it shifted to Chinese 
nationalism to appeal to a core constituency alarmed at perceived shifts to taidu by 
the DPP, but the 2008-16 KMT position under Rapprochement was practical, hoping 
to strengthen Taiwan’s economy and achieve a modus vivendi with Beijing.442  
Such endogenous partisan change reflects findings on state identity change. Winckler 
(1984) and Tien Hung-mao (1989) suggest ROC institutional change, a generational 
shift in power from Chinese to Taiwanese leaders and to liberal authoritarianism 
presaged change.443  Gold (1986) suggests social change meant ROC identity had to 
change. 444 Bruce Jacobs (2012) sees the KMT as a Chinese colonial regime that 
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Taiwanised.445 Phillips (2003) relates Chinese Nationalist elites negotiating Chinese 
and Taiwanese state identities.446 Dickson (1993; 1997) identifies KMT elite agency 
as motivating state identity change.447 Mattlin (2011) argues that it was the KMT’s 
penetration of Taiwanese society itself that facilitated intense politicisation of the 
polity.448 All of these make state and elite agency salient in national identity change. 
These insights into the dynamics of Taiwan’s complex national identity formation 
show how it is co-constitutive of huadu. First, Taiwan’s national identity has been 
formed at the domestic and cross-Strait levels; second, this national identity 
reinforces Taipei’s sovereignty claim around the status quo; third, it restrains top-
down Taiwanisation and sinification policies, coalescing around the status quo; 
fourth, it was constituted by democracy - democratisation is Taiwanisation.449  
In sum, elite-led national identity construction, tempered by the intervening role of 
civil society, constitutes huadu. Yet, much research is too influenced by a misplaced 
debate over the role of nationalism and national identity in an inhibited search for 
taidu to fully account for the constitution of ROC state identity. Indeed, Dawley 
notes that post-2000 research in particular tends to conflate national, state and ethnic 
categories while being “too heavily influenced by contemporary debates over 
Taiwanese independence”.450 Admittedly, to distinguish among these categories is 
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not easy; national and state identities often overlap epistemologically (q.v. 4.2.) and 
ethnic identity has been strategically deployed alongside national identity in 
Taiwan’s domestic politics.  The two-host dilemma (q.v. 1.1.) invites conflation of 
the Chinese nation and state but, theoretically, some scholars do use national identity 
for what is clearly state identity.451 
This study argues that there is, in a huadu conceptualisation, no necessarily inhibited 
“quest for Taiwanese sovereignty” vis-à-vis Beijing.452 Taiwanese sovereignty has 
already been achieved through huadu and that invites an account of ROC state 
identity change. In order to conceptualise huadu as state identity, it must be separated 
from its sub-state identities. This entails first exploring how those sub-state identities 
constitute state identity. 
4.3. Sub-State Social Identities 
Aristotle’s first principle of being states “why a thing is itself” is self-evident, since it 
is not something else. 453 This principle confirms an ontological difference among 
huadu, tongyi and taidu, belying any overlap (q.v. 1.5.). It supports the claim that the 
ROC is a contingent, constitutive actor that combines sub-state identities in an 
individual huadu corporate one that is Taiwanese because it is not Chinese.  
Identity may consist in Taylor’s (1969) self-consciously acting. 454 It may also be 
Erikson’s (1968) observation of the individual’s ontological reflective start point as 
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“what do I want to make of myself and what do I have to work with?”455 Indeed, 
Chen Shui-bian, invokes this question at the national (state) level in his 2000 
inauguration speech.456 Huadu is performative, that is being and acting Taiwanese. A 
Taiwanese state is Taiwanese not simply because it is not Chinese, but because it 
“does” Taiwanese-ness in huadu.  
The Taiwanese nation and the ROC state constitute each other in huadu, since all 
collectives require that members internalise their identity within them. 457  As a 
corporate identity, huadu represents the collective location of the Taiwanese Self in 
relation to the Chinese Other. No other collective identity within Taiwan overrides 
the power of “we are Taiwanese” and “we are Taiwanese” cannot operate absent the 
ROC. The ROC, discursively through power politics, requires that Taiwan’s other 
identities identify with it. 
4.3.1. Ethnic Identity 
While there is no phenotypical difference between Chinese and Taiwanese, Taiwan 
has instrumentally mobilised perceived ethnic identity in power politics in the 
pragmatic pursuit of its interests. Giddens’ definition of ethnicity as self-
identification allows for Taiwanese “cultural practices and outlooks” that “set them 
apart from” Chinese and provides some insight into the early development of the 
domestic identity cleavage. 458 Ethnicity in this sense has been instrumentally co-
opted in the construction of Taiwanese and Mainlanders as benshengren and 
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waishengreng, defining Taiwan in the context of KMT sinification and bentuhua (q.v. 
Ch 1). 459  However, ethnic identity is neither national identity nor state identity 
because it does not attach itself to a state or seek to operate in foreign policy.  This 
study rejects any link between benshengren clan bonds and a putatively modern 
Taiwanese nation since the former have no “necessary” relation with Taiwan as a 
territorial unit. 460 Hence, ethnicity may be discarded as necessarily constitutive of 
huadu and as an explanation of Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence.  
4.3.2. National and State Identities 
A nation itself cannot be an agent of foreign policy. So, a conception of group 
identity that links the Taiwanese nation to its state is required. This means the terms 
“nation” and “state” need to be clarified. Anthony Smith (2001) provides a working 
definition of national identity as “the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of 
the patterns of values, symbols and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of 
a nation, and the identification by individual members with that pattern and heritage 
and with its cultural elements”. 461 Yet, Verba (1971) restricts national identity to 
those who “fall within the decision-making scope of the state”.462 A state, according 
to Barrington (1997), is “the principal political unit in the international political 
system,” as distinct from the nation, or “a collective of people, whose belief in the 
right to territorial self-determination is what unites them”.463 However, this suggests 
the state appropriates national identity to locate itself ideationally in relation to other 
states. That is, state identity is a set of representations ascribed to the state by elites 
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and recognised and understood by the other states’ elites to determine that state’s 
foreign policy. 464  The nation identifies with the state as the social institution 
determining external relations and securing its sovereignty and both are co-
constituted in domestic and inter-state power politics. To account for power’s co-
constitution of the national interest, domestic and international factors need to be 
considered. Hopf (1997) sees the identity of a state implying its preferences and 
consequent actions:  
a state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while 
simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice. The producer 
of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective 
structure is the final arbiter of meaning.465  
The state deploys nationalism to construct a nation and that nation seeks a state to 
represent it.  Hence, national identity cannot be separated from state identity. In this 
sense, the ROC and its nation are mutually sustaining and mutually legitimating. 
As state identities, Free China and huadu (and tongyi and taidu), differ in their 
power to command legitimacy. The sovereignty of Taiwan as the ROC is derived 
from the assumed individual sovereignties of each Taiwanese, not Chinese. Thus 
huadu is a corporate state identity, existing as long as the Taiwanese nation keeps the 
same preferences.  Free China claimed to be that of a collective Chinese individual 
prevailing over the wills of individual “Chinese” citizens.  Huadu identity is civic in 
that it entails citizenship which may be voluntarily acquired or abandoned. The 
principles of huadu’s civic identity are those of liberal democracy; that is, it appeals 
to an enfranchised middle class, yet serves the interests of elites and powerful DIGs. 
Free China represented a limited social basis: that is, it was adopted by and served 
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the interests of a narrow waishengren elite intent on preserving its status (q.v. 6.2.). 
The new technocrats and dangwai trying to attain status within this traditional social 
framework then transformed it in a crisis of legitimacy and transmitted it to the 
masses through bentuhua (q.v. 6.4.).466  
Certainly, then, the national-identity dynamic has influenced Taiwanese state-
building through cross-Strait policy and this is salient in the literature. However, the 
focus on national identity causes research to fall into the tongyi-taidu fallacy, 
ignoring huadu. This section argues that while national and state identities are co-
constituted, analytical separation of state identity better explains huadu and its 
deployment in cross-Strait policy. 
4.3.3. Taiwan’s Modernist National Identity 
A more promising explanation of the sources of huadu state identity is offered by 
modernist national identity theory. This explains Taiwan’s interest in independence 
from China in terms of the ROC’s creation of the Taiwanese nation. The concept of 
the nation is salient in Taiwanese political speech. Peng Ming-min and the dangwai 
refer to Renan’s conception, while Lee Teng-hui talks of the Taiwanese nation in 
Biblical terms as a City on a Hill.467  A city implies a state. Nationalism offers a clear 
policy platform of self-determination, territorial integrity, national autonomy and 
unity based on a state. 468   
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The ROC provides the Taiwanese nation with a ready-made state through which it 
seeks political autonomy from China.469 The question then arises whether the ROC 
created Taiwan or vice versa. The modernist paradigm sees the ROC structurally and 
historically creating Taiwan. As such, huadu aligns to Gellner’s (1983) principle that 
the nation and the state should be congruous.470 For modernists, the Taiwanese nation 
is an entirely recent socio-political construct created by the ROC using nationalist 
ideologies, which themselves are the expression of industrial society.471 Modernism 
sees nationalism’s focus on the will of the people that “[t]he source of all sovereignty 
resides essentially in the Nation”.472 This makes salient the tension between Chinese 
and Taiwanese nationalisms embodied in the ROC and invokes huadu to resolve this 
tension.  Since nationalism arose instrumentally to create industrial societies through 
state power, this materialist argument would see the Taiwanese nation as objectively 
necessary for the ROC state. The Taiwanese nation was created as the means of 
production determined necessary by the ROC.473 It was not accidental or invented, 
but the inevitable result of Taiwan’s shift to modernity, logically contingent, but 
politically necessary. 474   In other words, modernity, in the shape of nationalism, 
required and created Taiwan as follows:  
First, the Taiwanese nation was mobilised in industrial capitalism during the Taiwan 
Miracle by authoritarian KMT political elites operating through the ROC Party 
State;475 second, it was socially necessary for modern industrial capitalism, requiring 
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a high culture in the form of Standard Chinese provided by a public education 
system; 476  Standard Mandarin, restricted to a tiny elite in 1945, became national 
under the authoritarian ROC;477  third, it developed through a technocratic ROC state 
using Chinese nationalism to support state sovereignty; 478  fourth, it is a wholly 
modern, instrumental, self-serving elite construction.479 Taiwanese national identity 
arose from the island’s geographical and political separation from China, KMT 
authoritarian rule and subsequent democratisation. Huntington’s Third Wave 
nationalism fleshes out Taiwan’s case to account for dangwai influence post-
liberalisation.480 In other words, Taiwan is a modern nation constructed by elite KMT 
and dangwai-inspired DPP craftsmen who constructed an identity in pursuit of their 
interests.481 In this sense, Taiwan is a rationalist project aiming to build a new state 
using the existing ROC framework.482   
Yet, this alone does not fully answer why the Chinese state that created a Taiwanese 
nation would generate an interest in state identity change.  After all, the ROC 
explicitly claimed to be constructing a Chinese nation. This suggests it was not the 
shift to modernity alone, but the ROC’s crises of legitimacy that constructed the 
Taiwanese nation. These crises were also necessary in ideological terms, since loss 
of legitimacy entailed an ideological shift. This invites a realist-constructivist 
explanation of Taiwan’s resistance to China first as the ROC and then as the PRC.  
Huadu is a rational response by the authoritarian ROC state to its two crises of 
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legitimacy in 1947 and 1971. The former created an inhibited Taiwanese interest in 
taidu as independence from the ROC. The ROC responded with supression, 
sinification and a change in state identity to Free China. Bentuhua was the antithesis 
as sinification deepened. The latter, more prolonged, crisis created an ultimately 
sucessful Taiwanese interest in democratisation. The ROC responded by 
appropriating bentuhua, liberalising and changing state identity from Chinese to 
Taiwanese in huadu. Huadu as state identity was co-constituted by the ROC using 
Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism to reassert legitimacy as it pivoted to the PRC 
between 1987 and 1992. 
The modernist paradigm provides a partial account of state interests determining 
state identity.  For Hechter (2000), modern nationalism is motivated by reason, 
rational choice and informed group identity.483 The sources of huadu can therefore be 
explained rationally in terms of powerful domestic groups’ perceptions of the 
strength of China and benefit to those interests if Taiwan’s autonomy is maintained. 
In this view, Taiwanese nationalist subversion of Chinese nationalist control of the 
ROC was employed strategically and produced sovereignty. The ROC was weakened 
by a crisis of legitimacy and dangwai resistance during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Taiwanese nationalism was a peripheral elite response to direct ROC rule over 
Taiwan. So, Taiwanese nationalism bound the peripheral people to its elite against 
the centralising ROC (which was itself territorially detached from its metropolis) in 
the form of a nation. Hechter’s thesis explains Taiwan’s resistance to the Chinese 
metropolis represented locally by the ROC and Taiwan’s search for taidu. It may 
also explain the Taiwanisation of the KMT, but it does not explain why the 
authoritarian ROC was a state that was one-and the-same with its periphery. Nor 
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does it explain the constitution of huadu as a state identity socially constructed and 
deployed in cross-Strait relations.  The modernist approach partly explains why 
Taiwan sought a state and why that state gave it a national character. It does not 
explain why that state should remain the ROC and not become the ROT.  
Weber claims “a nation…tends to produce a state of its own”, 484 while Rousseau 
proposes that if a nation lacks a national character, “we must start endowing it with 
one”.485 Taiwanese elites captured the ROC and explained Taiwan’s distinct historical 
character by articulating “who we are”, “when we began” and “where we are 
going”.486 This approach explains Taiwanese elite actions as entirely rational; there 
exists a nation called Taiwan that has an explicit character whose interests align with 
the realist political goals of the modern ROC state (authoritarian and democratic). 
Non-material explanations can be discarded in rational terms. By 1992, neither 
tongyi nor taidu forces were strong enough to push Taiwan towards unification or de 
jure independence. There was, however, a broad consensus on Taiwanese national 
identity. 487  This invited tongyi and taidu constituencies to buy into huadu, 
Taiwanising the ROC in the process. 
Modernist approaches alone cannot provide a satisfactory framework for huadu; nor 
can they account for its role in Taiwan’s successful maintenance of its de jure 
independence. This is because they do not account for state identity change in the 
context of a crisis of legitimacy and the relationship between domestic and cross-
Strait construction of that identity. Specifically, they do not account for the 
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relationship among power, interest, domestic politics, cross-Strait policy and threat. 
Crucially, they cannot explain how and why Taipei chose among tongyi, taidu and 
huadu identities. These issues are crucial in explaining how huadu secures Taiwan’s 
autonomy and stalemates Chinese power. Once Taiwan’s de facto independence was 
secured in the form of huadu, NI approaches are less successful at explaining 
Taiwan’s resistance to China as the PRC. In other words, NI explains the domestic 
co-constitution of a corporate state identity, but not its constitution or deployment as 
a social identity in cross-Strait relations (q.v. 3.2.7.). Thus, a RC approach that draws 
on IR state identity theories is required. 
In this regard, Gunter Schubert (2004) conceives of Taiwan’s national identity as 
adhering to the ROC state and observed in partisan policy preferences.488  That is, all 
mainstream parties agree that the ROC’s constitution must be protected and asserted. 
In Taiwan’s quest for sovereignty, taidu and tongyi are “obsolete as genuine political 
objectives”. The Taiwanese nation exists, based on state identity (guojia rentong) not 
ethno-cultural identity (minzu rentong), and stressed in mainstream party policy. 
Thus, no party has a mandate for taidu or tongyi.489 Rather, huadu is recognised and 
endorsed by a preponderance of Taiwanese and Taiwanese identity is primarily a 
state identity that constitutes the Taiwanese as a political community.490However, 
Schubert’s conception of this identity is still ontologically and epistemologically 
national; it refers to a political community that acknowledges a state rather than a 
state as such. 
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4.4. States and State Identity 
The idea of the state is central to IR. States have existed in various forms at various 
times in history and states, not nations, act in international relations.491  Modernist 
approaches to national identity make salient its state-driven character; that is, states 
create nations. The primary identity accounting for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de 
facto independence must therefore be its state identity. Taiwan may be a self-
conscious nation, but it is the ROC that constitutes the political institutions that 
represent the Taiwanese nation and its territorial juridical unit. The academic debate 
around defining the ROC state in the literature on Taiwan reflects foreign policy 
analysis and IR perspectives. The former sees the ROC from a domestic political 
science and sociology perspective, distinguishing state from society and seeking to 
understand their interaction.492 The latter focuses on external relations, viewing the 
ROC as a territorial entity interacting with the PRC in cross-Strait relations.493 This 
distinction leads to two definitions. First, a Weberian one sees state and society as 
separate phenomena and the state as an almost entirely institutional construct. That is, 
the state means the central government.494 Second, a Durkheimian one in which the 
state operates within a system and is legitimated by that interaction. That is, the state 
is a territorially defined socio-political entity.495 Clearly, Taiwan’s contested status 
complicates these perspectives, yet both are necessary to understand huadu.  
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AWeberian institutional approach to state identity sees the state as “a human 
community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory”.496 In other words, the state is the institution sanctioned 
to administer and coerce all other groups over which it claims authority. States are 
the most powerful units in the system and, as a form of political organisation, the 
state constitutes political legitimacy. The state’s legitimacy implies a state identity 
and interests and, by extension, foreign policy. 
Conversely, a Durkheimian legitimacy approach acknowledges that institutional 
capacities are important, but that “it is in the realm of ideas and sentiment that the 
fate of states is primarily determined”; a state’s power is its capacity to command 
loyalty – in other words, its right to rule.497 Hence, states face crises when they lack 
legitimacy rather than material power. This section argues not that the authoritarian 
ROC lacked power to perform the functions of statehood. Rather, it lacked an 
underlying legitimacy, both as China and Taiwan. 
Thomas Gold uses Skocpol’s Weberian definition to frame the authoritarian ROC 
state as “a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and 
more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority” that controls a specific 
territory.498 For Gold, the KMT party state was the “pact of domination” that served 
Chinese Nationalist interests, guaranteed elite Chinese control over Taiwanese 
society and sought its own survival.499 Although partially penetrated by Taiwanese 
technocrats, the ROC preserved itself by acting against Taiwanese nationalist 
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interests and enjoyed autonomy from domestic and foreign groups.500 The KMT, as a 
“tightly organized, well-disciplined political party representing Chinese elite interests” 
recreated and dominated the ROC state on Taiwan after 1947. This state and its elite 
began to change its identity in a second crisis of legitimacy after 1971 (q.v. 6.4.1.). 
Buzan adopts a Durkheimian approach. He argues that, while all states have 
institutional and physical components that provide civil order, collective goods and 
protection, they also require legitimacy. In other words, the state is an idea as well as 
an institution.501 Without a broad and rooted idea of the state within its constituency, 
its institutions could not survive. Furthermore, Buzan points out, not all states are 
alike.502 The ROC, for instance, is formally unrecognised and this, along with China’s 
irredentist threat, helps understand why the ROC behaves differently, even though it 
shares certain characteristics with the PRC.  Having said that, without an 
understanding of ROC state-like characteristics Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto 
independence cannot be explained.   
The ROC faced sequential crises of, rather than collapse of, its legitimacy between 
1947 and 1987. That is, its structure and authority did not fall apart such that it 
necessitated reconstitution in a ROT or as part of the PRC. In Taiwan, the ROC has 
never lost its right to control public affairs.503 
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4.4.1. A Constructed huadu State Identity 
Wendt (1999) and Katzenstein (1996) provide rationalist, though not rational-choice, 
state identity frameworks.504  These allow changes in ROC interests to be integrated. 
The ROC’s interest in becoming Taiwanese and observing liberal democratic norms 
is in its self-interest and becomes internalised in huadu. Wendt’s (1999) “identities 
determine interests” provides a constructivist pointer to the construction of huadu. 
States are actors; socialisation among states involves state identities; these identities 
constitute the structures of international relations through inter-subjectively held 
beliefs. These structures in turn constitute states as actors by defining their roles and 
goals in the system, and thus their identities. State identities tell states who they are 
and what their interests are, provide them with a method of predicting the behaviour 
of other states, and provide a framework for action.505 Thus, for Wendt’s systemic 
approach, huadu arose out of interaction with China. Yet, Wendt’s corporate identity 
(q.v. 3.4.) and the political science and area studies literature (q.v. 2.3.) suggest that 
huadu also arose in domestic interaction between the ROC and Taiwan.  
In a Wendtian conception, huadu is culture as well as identity; that is, it is “socially 
shared knowledge”, with “knowledge” as “any belief an actor takes to be true”.506 
Since for WC, the ROC is a unitary cross-Strait actor, the domestically shared 
knowledge that comprises huadu as a corporate culture must enter a culture of 
anarchy only when shared between China and Taiwan. The “1992 Consensus” 
constitutes the encoding of the shift from corporate to social huadu identity and 
suggests a transition from “first encounter” in 1987 that represents a tentative shift to 
inter-state relations. 
                                                 
504 Wendt, Alexander. 1999; Katzenstein, Peter. 1996. 
505 Wendt, Alexander. 1994: 396. 
506 Wendt, Alexander. 1999: 140-1. 
158 
Cultures of anarchy mutually constitute a huadu social, or role identity as Taiwan’s 
“distinct posture or orientation of the Self” toward the Chinese Other “with respect to 
the use of violence”.507 For Wendt, Taiwan’s interest in sovereignty is a by-product 
of that system-level role. Certainly, Taiwan and China have moved from a 
Hobbesian enemy culture to an oscillating Lockean rival culture to a failed attempt at 
a Kantian friend culture.508 Yet, Wendt’s theory suggests an unproblematic shift from 
Hobbesian to Kantian culture. 509 This suggests the puzzle of China’s buying into 
huadu as implicit recognition of cross-Strait Westphalian sovereignty and 
internalising of a tenuous rival/friend role relationship.510 
Wendt would conceive of huadu as a unitary ROC and PRC view of Self and Other 
in a shared cross-Strait culture of anarchy. But there must be a difference between 
the culture of anarchy and the huadu identity it is supposed to constitute. Unlike, say, 
Canada and the US, Taiwan and China have quite different corporate identities; 
hence it is not surprising that 2008-16 Rapprochement failed to align to Wendt’s 
model. Corporate and social role identities will always be in conflict and huadu itself 
presupposes a ROC interest in maintenance of de facto independence – something 
that is in conflict with tongyi. 511  To operationalise huadu as state identity, a RC 
definition that acknowledges its cross-cutting internal and external dynamics of co-
constitution in power politics is needed.  
4.4.2. A Realist-Constructivist huadu State Identity Framework 
Drawing on Alexandrov (2003), this framework proposes a definition of huadu as a 
set of discursive representations of the ROC’s qualities in relation to the PRC 
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alongside beliefs about how it should act to maintain legitimacy.512 The Taiwanese 
state is the ROC. 513  The ROC has a huadu identity. A huadu identity has two 
dimensions. The internal one exhibits the representations and beliefs held by the 
nation in the form of elites and powerful domestic groups within the state. The 
external dimension consists of representations and beliefs about the Taiwanese (ROC) 
state held in common by Beijing’s and Taipei’s elites in cross-Strait socialisation. 
This synthesises RC and shows the degree to which China and powerful tongyi and 
taidu domestic constituencies in Taiwan buy into huadu. Wendt brackets the 
domestic, so by acknowledging that there must be a point at which the state becomes 
and starts acting as a unitary actor, the unitary-actor ontology can be relaxed and 
domestic realist aspects of RC can be brought in (q.v. 2.2; 3.7). The point at which 
the state becomes and starts acting as a unitary actor is between the DIG-FPE and 
state-state interfaces (q.v. 3.4.). Such a definition implies agency, ascribes state 
identity construction to power (politics) and resolves the agent-structure problem. 
For RC, power politics involve identity politics. A huadu identity of itself cannot 
causally determine ROC interest and policies. It has to be mediated by threat 
perception and interest and enacted through power (politics) in a given cross-Strait 
policy. Thus, huadu is co-constitutive of power politics in cross-Strait relations, but it 
is also co-constitutive of domestic elite and interest-group political struggle that 
responds to Taipei’s cross-Strait policy. Such domestic struggle constructs huadu 
representations. By implicitly presenting a given cross-Strait policy as an expression 
of huadu, actors construct huadu in power politics, thus legitimating it. Similarly, 
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Chinese actors are acutely aware of and attempt to influence Taiwan’s domestic 
power politics by supporting tongyi constituencies or attempting to win over taidu 
ones, principally to delegitimate taidu. Conversely, taidu-supporting actors in 
Taiwan may perceive huadu as tongyi-by-the-back-door. 
In response, elite actors may exercise agency to redefine internal and external 
identity. Both domestic and cross-Strait dimensions of huadu include multiple, 
contradictory representations of appropriate behavior. Dominant huadu 
representations may be supplanted by influential taidu or tongyi representations that 
mobilise resources in domestic power politics over time and change both huadu and 
Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy. For instance, cross-Strait relations reveal a tension 
between representations of cross-Strait convergence and divergence and between 
liberalism and protectionism among Taiwan’s elites. In response to Beijing’s elites’ 
denoting Taiwan as a “splittist” province during the first DPP administration between 
2000 and 2004, KMT elites visited China, ostensibly to build bridges using a tongyi 
discourse that emphasised common Chinese identities. Rapprochement was a 
conscious effort to get China to reject taidu and tongyi representations and buy into 
huadu ones. However, through repeated protests against any perceived Taiwanese 
moves towards taidu, China has also participated in Taiwan’s domestic power 
politics.  Moreover, many Taiwanese policymakers are acutely aware that certain 
policies could endanger huadu, reinforcing China’s taidu representation. In so far as 
these policymakers avoid such policies, Chinese protests influence Taiwan’s cross-
Strait policy. Apart from the external dimension of Taiwan’s identity, Taipei’s name 
rectification and constitutional reform show that China’s actors actively respond to 
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Taiwan’s internal identity debates in power politics. Huadu has prevailed, so China 
has succeeded in averting taidu but not enforcing tongyi.514  
This study goes beyond the content of huadu to examine its enactment in power 
politics to explain Taipei’s interest in maintaining the status quo. This requires 
foreign policy. Since discursive power is the legitimation of state representations, 
power politics constitute a site of contestation and negotiation for state legitimacy. 
Hence, legitimation in power politics may be conceived of as the defining 
mechanism of international relations. 
In international and domestic politics, power benefits from being perceived to have 
legitimacy. This study therefore takes a RC approach to discursive power as the 
legitimation of huadu operating in power politics as state identity politics (SIPs).515 
China’s compulsory power provokes resistance in Taiwan, yet its prevention of taidu 
functions through its broad recognition of huadu as a state representation that defines 
appropriate behaviour for China and Taiwan. In other words, as long as Taiwan 
maintains huadu, China will not enforce tongyi. The reason why China insists so 
much on the 1992 Consensus is that, rather than permitting tongyi, it encodes huadu, 
thus averting taidu. State self-understanding is discursive power; that is, 
representations that invoke legitimacy. Legitimacy enables actors to impose state 
representations through SIPs. This power is not compulsory as it is not direct. It is 
more diffuse than material power, endowing Taiwan and its DIGs with more 
influence than their material capabilities alone permit. 
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4.5. Huadu as Legitimacy 
Chapter 3 conceptualised legitimacy as an aspect of discursive power (q.v. 3.2.7). 
This section returns to that concept to account for huadu as state identity. In a 
Lockean sense state identity confers legitimacy and presupposes consent.516 That is, 
a state identity becomes legitimate when its foreign policy is socially endorsed, or 
sanctioned. Recognition of a mandate entails an external perception that a state’s 
identity is rightful (q.v. 3.2.1). 517  Legitimacy therefore represents the Weberian 
probability that a state will be in a position to use its identity to enact its will “despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability exists”.518 The power of 
huadu, therefore, is more than a resource; huadu represents Taipei’s power to 
engender cross-Strait and domestic behavioural change and effect the outcomes it 
wants.519 The material effect of Taiwan’s maintenance of the status quo therefore 
rests on the legitimacy of the ROC and the legitimacy of the ROC rests on huadu. 
Huadu operates in What Reus-Smit (2007) terms the state’s “realm of political action” 
– the geopolitical scope that includes Taiwan and cross-Strait relations to legitimate 
Taipei’s identity. The state’s “social constituency of legitimation” constitutes the 
actual social groupings among which a state identity seeks and commands legitimacy; 
that is, legitimacy requires a claimant (huadu) and an endorser who sanctions or 
recognises that claim. A social constituency of legitimation provides the latter and 
must have legitimacy itself as “the social grouping in which legitimacy is sought, 
ordained or both”.520  
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For this study, huadu’s “subject constituency of legitimation” constitutes Taiwan’s 
electorate, policy elites and powerful interest groups, including domestic and 
transnational non-state actors such as Taiwanese business elites operating in China 
and the taishang (q.v. 8.3.). Huadu’s “non-subject constituency” encompasses 
Beijing, Washington and the international community as its realm expands. Domestic 
taidu and tongyi constituencies are tiny and represent huadu subject constituencies as 
huadu’s legitimacy expands. Beijing, as Taiwan’s veto state, becomes a non-subject 
constituency as huadu commands its endorsement in cross-Strait relations. 
The concepts of realm of political action and social constituency of legitimation 
present a dissonance for Taipei. The ROC’s second crisis of legitimacy from the 
1970s made salient a disjuncture between these as international, transnational and 
domestic, with “domestic” shifting from including the mainland to being simply 
Taiwan. Cross-Strait relations recalibrated both to include the mainland again. This 
resulted in cross-cutting subject and non-subject realms and social constituencies. 
Reus-Smit (2007) suggests powerful non-subject constituencies must also buy into 
state identity for it to be legitimate. Symons (2011) points out states “do not need to 
gain legitimacy among all subject constituencies within their political realm of 
action”. 521  The degree of sanction varies within a constituency. Thus, what 
legitimates the ROC as Taiwan is a viable huadu “legitimacy nexus” that includes 
Taiwan, Beijing and the international community in its scope. In this regard, taidu 
and tongyi as subject constituencies and Beijing as a non-subject constituency lack 
the discursive power to delegitimate huadu. 
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In itself, Taiwan’s success in maintaining its de facto independence does not bestow 
legitimacy on huadu; the meaning of huadu as well as how it is perceived by others 
must also be considered. For instance, if huadu is simply a price Taiwan pays for 
cross-Strait peace that effectively subdues Taiwan to China’s power, it will not be 
seen as “rightful”. In Reus-Smit’s (1999) conception, huadu is not legitimate simply 
because it effectively secures Taiwan’s sovereignty; that sovereignty must align to 
prevailing international norms. What bestows legitimacy on huadu is that it aligns to 
normative representations that are recognised not only by Washington and the 
international community, but also by Beijing. Huadu legitimates the ROC by giving 
it the “right” to enact “huadu-ness”. Huadu-ness entails liberal democracy and self-
determination as norms that are perceived as rightful to the international community, 
but it also entails Westphalian statehood. The latter compels Beijing’s tacit 
endorsement even as it formally refuses to recognise Taipei. That is, the ROC is “a 
stable set of norms, rules, and principles” that constitute Taiwan’s sub-state actors 
and China “as knowledgeable social agents” (q.v. 3.2.4.).522 Taipei deploys huadu to 
regulate these social agents’ behaviour, causing them to sanction that identity.  ROC 
legitimacy therefore requires Beijing’s social perception and recognition.  Huadu 
commands legitimacy because the ROC issues successful legitimacy claims that 
denote the politics of legitimation encoded in state identity politics (SIPs).523  
4.5.1. A Crisis of Legitimacy 
Many IR scholars see state identity as slow-forming and unchanging. Yet, to 
understand huadu, such a view is limiting. While some state identities endure over 
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long periods, in states that experience rapid socio-political change, state identity may 
shift rapidly in a crisis of legitimacy. A state faces a crisis of legitimacy when 
recognition of its state identity as rightful declines to the point where, rather than 
deploying material coercive power, it has to reconstitute the social bases of its 
legitimacy.  Such crises are “critical turning points in which the imperative to adapt 
is heightened by the imminant possibility of (state) death”.524 To resolve a crisis of 
legitimacy, a state must reconcile its identity with the normative expectations of 
other actors within its realm. 525 This entails an internal and an external dimension 
and the crisis may be both domestic and international.  A crisis of legitimacy, 
therefore, is the “critical turning point when decline in an actor’s or institution’s 
legitimacy forces adaptation (through re-legitimation or material inducement) or 
disempowerment”.526 For huadu to achieve a “legitimacy dividend”, its realm and its 
social constituency need to approximate one another.527 Taiwan’s process of crisis - 
and hence ROC identity – resolution, therefore, involves domestic debate over social 
norms among tongyi, taidu and huadu constituencies. That means achieving a degree 
of consensus by delegitimating and compelling tongyi and taidu constituencies to 
buy into huadu. It also requires not delegitimation of Beijing’s sovereignty, but of its 
Great Power (daguo) state identity’s claim on Taiwan. Once the ROC, as an actor 
and an institution, has achieved sufficient legitimacy within its new realm of political 
action to achieve its objectives through right and voluntary compliance then the crisis 
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is resolved. 528  Democratic transformation is essential to change in security 
structure.529 
4.6. A Realist-Constructivist Model of State Identity, Security and cross 
Strait Policy 
Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy is national security policy and it is shaped by state 
identity. Its social construction occurs in both cross-Strait and domestic dimensions 
in the context of contested authority, conflicting interests and power relations.530 A 
crisis of legitimacy originally prompted the ROC to change identity and this change 
became most salient in post-1987 democratisation and cross-Strait relations. This 
invites a RC model of state identity, security and cross-Strait policy. 
Huadu means that the ROC is Taiwan. Taiwan’s national interest and national 
security are state interest and state security.531 For Wendt the state is the subject of 
security; national insecurity arises when the state locates an external threat to its 
identity. States respond to threats by deploying the discursive power of their identity 
and the two-level, three-stage framework in chapter three resolves this by locating 
the discursive power of Taiwan’s state identity in huadu (q.v. 3.4.). Huadu resolves 
the two-host dilemma (q.v. 1.2.3.) by making the ROC Taiwan. In so doing, it 
resolves Shih Cheng-fong’s (2004) puzzle that locates Taiwan’s national identity and 
security in the ROC’s state identity and security. First, Taiwan’s national identity 
impacts on its perception of state security; second, national security and perception 
of Chinese (PRC) threat make the ROC reconcile its identity with Taiwan, resolving 
earlier antagonistic national (Taiwanese) and state (Chinese) identities. Finally, since 
China is the object of Taiwan’s threat perception, Taiwan’s national (state) security 
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policy is cross-Strait policy and the constitutive link between state identity and cross-
Strait policy is intermediated by DIG struggle and cross-Strait socialisation. 532  This 
invites a RC reading. Taiwanese national identity co-constitutes ROC state identity 
as huadu. For Shih, the historical paradox of ROC national (state) security in 
opposition to China (PRC) created a pan-Blue-pan-Green tension between tongyi and 
taidu in which neither outcome could be achieved because of the threat from China 
on the one hand and the strength of anti-tongyi sentiment on the other. Yet, the 
prevalence of huadu confirms that the state deploys its identity to ensure ROC state 
survival, regardless of Beijing’s and domestic Taiwanese preferences.   
Huadu influences Taiwan’s threat perception, constituting state identity formation.533 
Walt’s neorealism would see identity as a stable, exogenous element; Taiwan’s 
national interests determine Chinese threats, and threats in turn determine Taiwan’s 
policy of huadu to maintain its autonomy. However, Constructivism sees identities as 
malleable and endogenous to the process.534 For RC, state identity and interests co-
constitute each other and decide how threats are perceived.535 For Wendt, identities 
determine interests and are an independent variable.  A RC approach moves away 
from the positivist language of variables to show how huadu, as a state identity, is 
intersubjectively co-constituted in cross-Strait and domestic power politics to 
legitimate Taiwan as a sovereign state that successfully resists China’s power.  
                                                 
532 Shih Cheng-fong. 2004. National Identity and National Security: The Case of Taiwan. 
Unpublished seminar paper. [online] Available at: 
http://mail.tku.edu.tw/cfshih/seminar/20030225/20030225.htm [Accessed 15 November 2011]. 
533 Katzenstein, Peter. 1996: 52-53.  
534 Katzenstein, Peter.  1996.  : 1-32;  Wendt, Alexander.  1992.   
535 McSweeny, Bill.  1999.  Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International 
Relations.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 167-72, 195, 123, 214.  
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4.6.1. Huadu and Anarchical Norms 
Huadu presupposes Westphalian anarchical norms. Wendt says states follow norms 
because they have internalised those norms into their identities. Yet Chapter 3 in this 
study suggests that whether states see norms as legitimate depends on their corporate 
identities and these are not constructed in anarchy, but domestically. Therefore 
Katzenstein (1996) makes explicit reference to state identity when he defines norms 
as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity”. 
Katzenstein distinguishes between liberal regulatory norms and constitutive norms 
that construct states’ identities and interests.536 Despite the formal rhetoric, post-2008 
Rapprochement attempted to create a cross-Strait relationship based on “standards of 
appropriate behavior within a diplomatic relationship defined in terms of long-term 
interests”.537  
Huadu goes beyond the rational-choice view of norms. A particular action prohibited 
by huadu norms, tongyi, becomes incompatible with Taiwan’s Self-image and 
therefore illegitimate. However, the norm that forbids tongyi does not in itself call for 
taidu since the ROC’s earlier anti-Communist Chinese state identity forbade both. 
Democratisation changed that, permitting huadu which is, in fact, an ideologically 
rearticulated rendering of the authoritarian ROC’s identity.  Norms are therefore part 
of state identity. Without state identity, Wendtian norms would be analytically 
neoliberal. Huadu is thus a repository for norms constituted in power politics. By 
conceiving of the ROC as a unitary actor, Wendt’s approach offers a parsimonious 
definition of huadu as the ROC’s self-understanding. 538  In this view, huadu shapes 
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the ROC’s interests, which in turn guide its cross-Strait policy. This invites a RC 
framework.  
The state-identity framework presented here better explains huadu. It does so by 
resolving three RC problems with state identity: first, it specifies the relationship 
among state identity, power, interest, foreign policy and threat; second, it locates a 
way of identifying how the ROC state chose among tongyi, taidu and huadu 
identities; third, it provides a RC definition and framework for the link between 
huadu as identity and huadu as power. Huadu, as a tool of cross-Strait strategic 
interaction, must be analytically separated from national identity for two reasons: 
first, power (politics) is the key concept in realist approaches; second, the case of the 
ROC exposes a clear national-state identity puzzle in the form of the two-host 
phenomenon.539 
Wendt (1992; 1994; 1999) underspecifies the relationship among state identity, 
power, interests, threat, foreign policy and how states choose among alternative 
identities. Wendt (1999) sees inter-state socialisation in three cultures of anarchy as 
the primary determinant of state identity. When internalised, these cultures co-
constitute state identities and interests that are secondary to these system-level 
identities. Ideal socialisation between state A and state B should lead from 
Hobbesian through Lockean to Kantian, co-constituting a shared state identity in 
which the boundaries of the Self expand to include the Other.540  
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Huadu must be ontologically separate from Wendt’s culture of anarchy, since a 
culture is simply a context. 541  However, Wendt’s intersubjectivity itself actually 
resolves a number of other puzzles. Abductive analysis reveals that huadu is the 
intersubjectively co-constituted synthetic outcome of a dialectical struggle between a 
thesis of tongyi and an antithesis of taidu. Reconceptualising state identity by linking 
it to power therefore creates a broad realist-constructivist conception. Domestic 
realist aspects of Classical Realism imply socialisation in power politics among 
domestic interest groups as a source of state identity, Wendt’s pre-first-encounter 
corporate identity resolves the mismatch between domestic and systemic state-
identity construction (q.v. 3.3.). For instance, first, state identity, interest and policy 
outcomes are co-constitutive. Second, Taipei chooses among tongyi, taidu and huadu 
on the basis of salience and place in the hierarchy co-constituted in power politics; 
that is preferences change and become legitimated in SIPs.542 This also opens the way 
for state-identity modification of DIG interests in the foreign-policy construction 
process. Neither identities nor interests therefore are ontologically prior. Interests are 
produced by identities, but then identities are chosen because of certain interests.543  
4.6.2. Huadu in Power (State Identity) Politics 
Huadu operationalises discursive power (operating system) in the form of state 
identity (software). State identity consists of representations that are enacted in SIPs 
to produce legitimacy. Such a RC conception is acceptable to Constructivism and to 
Classical Realists. It also assumes that the ROC is a rational, self-interested actor 
because legitimation implies rationality.  
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Only through SIPs can huadu articulate Taiwan’s interests and policies. SIPs 
constitute attempts through power politics by elites and DIGs to deploy existing 
representations of state identity and beliefs by mobilising resources to capture the 
state or influence its foreign policy by influencing its identity.544 SIPs are ubiquitous 
in cross-Strait and domestic power politics and are explicitly and implicitly deployed 
to exert the power of huadu.  
How the ROC enacts huadu-driven cross-Strait policies that result in strengthening 
or weakening those representations, depending on the outcome. So, linking a policy 
with huadu as compatible with, say, democracy, economic liberalism or peace and 
prosperity may be considered an expression of ROC SIPs. This framework avoids 
privileging either the internal or external dimension of huadu and accepts crossover.  
Actors who use SIPs, domestically or cross-Strait, come from both inside and outside 
the ROC state; they may be the foreign policy executive, public servants, societal 
elites or domestic interest groups. Domestic elites and interest groups are aware of 
and can influence the cross-Strait deployment of huadu, while the foreign policy 
executive and cross-Strait actors may participate in domestic SIPs. For instance, 
Taiwan’s cross-Strait identity still includes the representation of “troublemaker”, 
with “splittist elements” that seek to disrupt the status quo; this is consciously 
reinforced by Beijing’s elites. Through regular reassurances (or not) by Taipei that it 
seeks not to disrupt the status quo, Taipei reinforces huadu, deploying SIPs 
domestically.  
As a RC framework, this one sees discursive power as central to huadu. China has 
military and economic superiority over Taiwan but, while this is a superior form of 
compulsion, the potential cost in resistance is high. Even China’s recourse to the 
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discursive power of a putative tongyi identity engenders resistance. Authority and 
rule require legitimacy. The ROC’s legitimacy and the cross-Strait status quo that it 
constitutes function through the state representations that define how Taipei should 
act from its actual power position. This suggests that Taipei is able to impose huadu 
interpretations and indirectly compel Beijing to buy into them. This is more diffuse 
than structural power, constituting much more productive power in the ROC and 
powerful interest groups than their material capabilities alone allow.  
4.6.3. Ontological Security  
Ontological security - a state’s security in its own identity achieved through a search 
for a stable inter-state context - is an IR concept that explains how the ROC 
mobilises huadu in response to perceived Chinese threat.545 Jennifer Mitzen (2006) 
argues that state identity and foreign policy are co-constituted. 546  All states seek 
territorial security and all realist scholars agree uncertainty causes conflict in state 
interactions.547 The extent to which there is an ideational security dilemma across the 
Taiwan Strait rests on each side’s perceptions of the other’s intentions and the extent 
to which China and Taiwan are status quo or revisionist powers.548  An ideal-type 
model would see China, as a greedy state, creating cross-Strait ideational dilemmas 
and insecurity through tongyi discourses while Taiwan, as a security seeker, creates 
ideational uncertainty through taidu discourses, causing China to react with threats. 
However, this is to underplay the potential for state identity change. Taipei, 
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perceiving a Chinese threat, seeks to reassure Beijing by using huadu to maintain the 
status quo, thus securing its own autonomy and stalemating China’s power. 
States become ontologically insecure when perceived threats disrupt the status quo, 
raising fundamental questions about state identity. 549 Taiwan’s security requires a 
secure state identity and ontological insecurity represents a threat to its identity.550 
Agency for Taiwan requires a stable status quo in which Beijing and Taipei establish 
routines that create certainty. Huadu, therefore, creates ontological security on both 
sides, since it creates predictable routines. In this context, post-2008 Rapprochement 
was a concerted attempt to routinise the language of cross-Strait conflict by framing 
it diplomatically and rhetorically at the surface level.  Taipei cannot sustain huadu 
without Beijing reciprocating; the Other’s recognition allows the Self to retain its 
type.551 This suggests that huadu provides ontological security for both China and 
Taiwan by maintaining the status quo and averting taidu. Cross-Strait relations 
constitute a routinisation of conflict that actually avoids uncertainty as to China’s and 
Taiwan’s identities. Because of loss of legitimacy and Chinese threat, the ROC 
cannot securitise a Chinese identity. For this reason, it reconstructed its identity and 
sought certainty in what appears to be an uncertain huadu state identity to maintain 
the status quo. This creates a paradox. 
Since it is not uncertainty but certainty that provokes cross-Strait threat perception, 
huadu actually creates certainty in routinisation.   Thus, Taipei may in the long run 
be creating uncertainty for Beijing since huadu entails a Taiwanese ROC state 
identity and, consequently, political divergence. Therefore, the increasing ontological 
certainty entailed in huadu may actually deepen the security dilemma. Material 
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security for Beijing means neutralising Taiwan as a neorealist threat. Ontological 
security for Beijing means Taiwan must be Chinese. For this, huadu must entail 
eventual tongyi; yet the discourse shows that it is code for taidu. So, by deploying 
huadu, Taiwan threatens China’s ontological security. “No realist argument fully 
captures the identity effects of persistent conflict because none acknowledges the 
social construction of state identity”. 552  Huadu, as a form of ontological security 
seeking, gives a structural explanation for irrational conflicts, inviting a RC 
conception. The paradox exists in the gap between semantic and pragmatic meaning 
in illocution and perlocution (q.v. 5.3; 5.3.7.). 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that huadu is a state identity that draws on and deploys 
discursive power to bestow legitimacy on the ROC as Taiwan. As such, it constitutes 
Taiwan’s de facto independence. The literature on Taiwan’s national identity cannot 
fully account for huadu because it conflates state, national and ethnic identities and 
misunderstands Taiwan Independence.  This gap prompts this study’s state-identity 
framework. Five observations are salient. First, NI modernism suggests that the ROC 
created the Taiwanese nation and that the latter identifies with the ROC. Second, 
huadu is a state identity that achieves legitimacy through its de facto authority to 
govern and in Taiwanese norms. Thus, it achieves the sanction of a broad legitimacy 
nexus that includes the international community and Beijing. Third, modernist NI, 
Weberian and Durkheimian approaches, Wendtian constructivism and Alexandrov’s 
IR model together provide a RC framework that accounts for huadu’s construction in 
ROC crises of legitimacy, cross-Strait relations and domestic politics through SIPs. 
Such SIPs are linguistically enacted in power politics as discursive power. Fourth, an 
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RC framework shows how huadu resolves the ROC-Taiwan cleavage and the two-
host dilemma. In doing so, it defines Taiwan’s preferences and normative 
representations in a Lockean culture of anarchy, providing a more expansive 
explanation than Wendt’s alone. Fifth, the 1992 Consensus provides the permissive 
cross-Strait encoding of huadu as state identity, achieving Beijing’s buy-in because it 
semantically averts taidu. This potentially provides ontological security on both sides 
because routinisation creates certainty. Yet, paradoxically, such certainty creates 
ontological insecurity for Beijing because read pragmatically huadu is tacit taidu.  
Huadu maintains Taiwan’s de facto independence through the status quo and resists 
China’s power. It is co-constitutive of state sovereignty and determines what 
constitutes security and the national interest. Thus, state identity construction always 
occurs in the context of power politics. Discursive power creates state identity as 
legitimacy and uses it to bolster its own position.  
In short, Taiwan is an example of a general phenomenon; the co-constitutive 
dynamics of power, interests, threat perception and identity determine whether and 
how states emerge as independent and sovereign. Most importantly, huadu as state 
identity is inert unless catalysed through power politics (SIPs), interest and threat 
perception in cross-Strait policy.  
Huadu constitutes prevailing discourses concerning the Taiwanese (ROC) state’s 
relationship to China (and the Taiwanese nation). These discourses are socially 
constructed in power politics internally and externally in preference to tongyi and 
taidu and represent discursive power - that is, legitimation. They deploy traditional 
ROC symbols such as the flag and names and more recent Taiwanese attributes such 
as democracy to create a Taiwanised synthesis. As such, huadu prevails over tongyi 
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and taidu and secures Taiwan’s sovereignty, stalemating China’s power in the 
process. 
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Chapter 5: Discourse Analysis 
Prosaic, routine words … rather than grand memorable phrases 553 
5.1. Introduction 
In the film The Godfather Part II, the head of a Mafia family, Michael Corleone, is 
brought before a congressional committee hearing to answer an investigation into 
organised crime. Frank Pentangeli, a Made Man in the Corleone family, is about to 
testify for the FBI against the family. When he arrives at the hearing, Pentangeli sees 
his long-lost brother sitting next to Corleone and immediately retracts his testimony. 
The chair of the committee is exasperated and asks who the man next to Corleone is. 
Corleone’s consigliere, Frank Hagen, explains “he came at his own expense, to aid 
his brother in his trouble”. As a member of Corleone’s subject social constituency, 
Pentangeli perceives a rebuke in Hagen’s words: a Made Man is not expected to 
break the omertà – the Mafia’s moral code of honour and silence. In appearing 
willing to violate the normative representations of his Mafia identity by selling 
Corleone out, Pentangeli has lost personal legitimacy and threatened the Family’s 
legitimacy. However, in addition to a rebuke, Pentangeli also perceives a veiled 
threat: snitch and your brother gets it. Either way, he and Michael Corleone face a 
crisis of legitimacy. As an outsider, the chair of the committee blusters “I don’t know 
what is going on here, but I’ll get to the bottom of it”. 554  Michael Corleone is 
operating outside of his subject realm and social constituency, but he achieves 
legitimacy by compeling not only Pentangeli’s compliance (and subsequent suicide) 
but also the committee’s provisional sanction in their adjournement of the hearing.  
553 Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage:  6.  
554 The Godfather II. 1974. [film]. Directed by Francis Ford Coppola. USA. Paramount Pictures. 
[online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3FeMvQR-0VA [Accessed 4 December 
2018]. 
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Threats are often issued in covert language because the target might call the issuer’s 
bluff by responding with defiance or force. In order to maintain the legitimacy on 
which survival depends, the issuer would have to carry out the threat – a pointless 
move, if its aim is to coerce the target into doing what he would otherwise not do. An 
implied threat solves the problem. If the threat is covert, the issuer is harder to pin 
down; if defied, he can opt not to carry it out and still maintain his legitimacy.555 In 
this way, as the concept of ontological security suggests, covert threats provide 
security for the issuer and insecurity for the target. The same is true of rebukes (q.v. 
4.6.3.). 
The previous chapters have presented a realist-constructivist framework for Taipei’s 
ability to enforce its legitimacy in the face of Beijing’s superior material power 
through huadu. Huadu legitimates Taiwan’s de facto sovereign independence by 
achieving sanction in a legitimacy nexus that includes Beijing. The process by which 
Taipei has legitimated huadu is discursive and involves the covert threat of taidu. 
Taiwan’s discursive power is linguistic and operates through state identity politics 
(SIPs). In line with Realist Constructivsm, Taiwan’s SIPs have a social purpose; that 
is, they represent what P.T. Jackson (2006) terms a “war of words” over 
legitimation.556 This linguistic struggle reveals how huadu has come to mean what it 
does and and how it is able to do what it does.  
This chapter outlines a linguistics-informed discourse-analytic method that locates 
firm textual warrant for the legitimation of huadu. The chapter is divided into two 
main parts. The first (q.v. 5.2.) sketches a philosophical and methodological 
framework for IR discourse analysis that draws on linguistic concepts. More 
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specifically, it draws on the linguistics sub-field of pragmatics to expose two 
phenomena: 
• Political actors legitimate huadu in the discursive gap between illocutionary 
force (what the speaker means) and perlocutionary effect (what the listener 
understands). They do this by linguistically manipulating the “Cooperative 
Principle” and by harnessing discursive knowledge routinely to presuppose, 
imply and index huadu.  
• Competing actors misperceive each others’ policy preferences because they 
read plausible meanings into each others’ statements based on context. 
Context and identity are co-constitutive. 
To locate these phenomena, this approach synthesises Corpus Linguistics (CL), 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and pragmatics. The form of CDA used is the 
Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). The design is synthetic in that CL, the DHA 
and pragmatics are used abductively to inform each other. In so doing, it balances 
post-positivist and interpretive methods to align to RC.  
The second part (q.v. 5.6.) operationalises the philosophical and methodological 
framework in the form of a research design. First, it relates how data were gathered 
and analysed. Second, it presents overarching linguistic findings to apply to 
subsequent empirical chapters.  
The value of this approach is threefold. First, it aligns to a RC framework in 
revealing how huadu has come to mean what it does and and how it is able to do 
what it does in power politics. That is, it separates the semantic meanings of huadu 
from their pragmatic, or communicative, effect on different constituencies. Second, it 
permits a large amount of data to be analysed, providing a way into the text to locate 
salient themes and language and significantly reducing researcher bias. Third, it 
identifies the crucial difference between instrumental political rhetoric and discourse 
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proper. In this way it shows how, since identities are “embedded in linguistic 
structures such as vocabulary and syntax,” huadu is implicitly encoded in the lexico-
grammar (vocabulary and grammar) of political speech. 557  It is such implicit 
language that powerfully legitimates huadu, compels Beijing’s sanction and 
stalemates Beijing’s power. Huadu constitutes a meaningful discourse, encoded in 
Taiwanese political speech and “it is for this reason that the study of discourse … 
cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it”.558 
Such a linguistics-driven research design is innovative in IR.  
To understand huadu requires focusing on language in the context of salient 
historical themes, events and watersheds. It highlights co-constitution, rather than 
cause-and-effect. It foregrounds methodology and epistemology to argue that while 
huadu is not teleologically achieved, it is “out there” and can be apprehended. 
However, huadu’s “out-thereness” is contingent. A purely positivist approach cannot 
fully account for huadu’s discursive production. Yet, a purely heuristic one effaces 
its empirical linguistic evidence and risks subjective over-interpretation, or what this 
study calls the “parsing fallacy”. This design, therefore, acknowledges the value of 
post-positivism in analysing textual evidence using linguistics methods. This requires 
revealing the rhetoric and the words and grammar that construct and legitimate 
huadu and, crucially, how these are perceived and misperceived in communication.  
5.2. Discourse: A Philosophical and Methodological Framework 
Statements by state actors gain legitimacy because states can legitimately perform 
speech acts that other actors cannot. Thus, a state-uttered statement may legitimate 
557 Fowler, Roger and Hodge, Robert.  1979. Critical linguistics, in Fowler, Roger; Hodge, Robert; 
Kress, Gunther and Trew, Tony. eds. Language and Control.  London: Routledge and Keegan Paul: 
185-213
558 Halliday, Michael A.K. 1994: 366559 Wodak, Ruth and Meyer, Michael. 2009: 110.
181 
huadu. Such statements may not advance novel claims; rather, they draw on agreed 
diplomatic frames and rhetorical conventions. Wodak and Meyer (2009) outline two 
common rhetorical features used in political speech: topoi and fallacies. Topoi are 
“formal or content-related warrants…which connect the argument with the claim”. 
Fallacies occur when actors flout the accepted rules of rational dispute.559 Such topi 
and fallacies may exploit Jackson’s (2006) “rhetorical commonplaces” or Anne-
Marie Brady’s (2015) diplomatic frames to make their point.560 In this way, cross-
Strait relations and Taiwan’s domestic politics cross-cut as rhetorical exchanges that 
legitimate and delegitimate competing state identities and make huadu possible. In 
this way, huadu is legitimated in rhetorical struggle with tongyi and taidu in the form 
of state identity politics (SIPs). Such rhetorical phenomena are powerful, but they are 
often banal, surface-level and instrumental in purpose and are open to being 
perceived as such by others.  For this reason, this study’s approach also seeks to 
locate the underlying textual features that legitimate huadu. To do so, this chapter 
sketches a framework that permits the linguistic evaluation of such rhetoric. To do 
this, it argues the following: 
• Political statements constitute functional speech acts that are intended by the
utterer variously to assert, justify, warn, rebuke, threaten, advise, protest,
offer and so on;
• Such intended meanings may be misinterpreted by hearers based on a
discursive mismatch between the speaker’s intention and the hearer’s
understanding;
• Speakers encode the truth of their statements not just rhetorically, but
grammatically in a way that inhibits challenge by hearers on linguistic
grounds.
559 Wodak, Ruth and Meyer, Michael. 2009: 110. 
560 Brady Anne-Marie. 2015. 
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This framework permits, first, the resolution of post-positivist, scientific realist, 
rationalist and interpretive methodologies using qualitative and quantitative methods; 
second, a response to the explaining versus understanding debate in IR; third, the 
application of a discourse analysis that produces robustly warranted evidence for 
interpretive claims. 
First, this framework aims to address a methodological problem inherent in a realist-
constructivist synthesis. If theory dictates methodology, then this study’s recourse to 
a modified Wendtian constructivist account of state identity construction must be 
reconciled with a RC approach (q.v. 3.3.). This means that discourse analysis must 
rely on linguistically-warranted textual evidence. Therefore, this research design 
takes a middle way between positivism and interpretivism.561 To do this, it assumes 
that discourse: 
ERWKUHIOHFWVDQGFRQVWUXFWVPDWHULDOSROLWLFDOHIIHFWVWKDWDUHPLQG
   LQGHSHQGHQW 562
LVERWK³ODQJXDJHLQXVH´DQG³DFRQWH[WGHSHQGHQWORJLFRIVRFLDODFWLRQWKDW
   reflects power relations”.563
The research design shows how identities and power politics are co-constituted by 
focusing on: 
• an abductive/ recursive analysis among individual texts in institutional
contexts and texts as historically aggregated evidence for broader structural
discourses;
561 See: Adler, Emmanuel. 1997. Seizing the Middle-Ground. Constructivism in World Politics. 
European Journal of International Relations 3: 319–363; Krebs, Ronald and Jackson, Patrick 
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563 van Dijk, Teun A.  1997. ed.  Discourse as Social Interaction. London: Sage. 
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• discourses as reflective of realist power at the micro and macro-levels; actors
deploy power through interactions that perpetuate structural power
asymmetries while claiming to redress them.
This research design seeks not to produce falsifiable results in the manner required 
by King, Keohane and Verba, but plausible ones that pass P.T. Jackson’s notional 
“baloney test” to provide empirically grounded justifiable claims.564 In so doing, it 
challenges King et al’s thesis that qualitative research should align to a quantitative 
and positivist template. 
Second, the research design addresses the explaining-versus-understanding debate in 
IR. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1990) define explanation as the location of 
exogenous material causes, while understanding is to do with endogenous ideational 
meaning.565 Yet, as Jackson (2011) points out, plausible research findings are iterative 
and abductive, rather than simply deductive. Thus, in order to explain Taiwan’s 
maintenance of its de facto independence, understanding huadu is a prerequisite. 
Third, the discourse-analytic approach in this research design provides a way of 
locating and analysing textual evidence in a way that provides robustly warranted 
support for interpretive claims. This design uses quantitative Corpus Linguistics (CL) 
methods as a way into the data before qualitative, interpretive CDA (DHA) analysis 
of the data. It does this to locate salient themes and linguistic features in the data 
rather than to carry out statistical analysis.  The pragmatic analysis provides warrant 
for interpretive claims.  A design that combines CL, the DHA and pragmatics implies 
an abductive dialogue between historical events and interpretation.  In applying these 
564 King, Gary et al. 1994; Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
565 Hollis, Martin and Smith. 1990. Explaining and Understanding in International Relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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methods, this study seeks to be judged on its pragmatic explanatory utility rather than 
whether it follows a strictly positivist scientific methodology.   
In sum, this form of discourse analysis satisfies a RC approach by marrying positivist 
and heuristic and quantitative and qualitative methods. In doing so, it amends flaws 
in IR and CDA approaches by locating discourses in text, analysing them in terms of 
pragmatic principles and triangulating findings historically to provide justified 
interpretations. In this way, it locates the legitimating power of huadu in rhetorical 
commonplaces, but more crucially in the lexico-grammar of political speech.  
This section does the following: first, it outlines an IR approach to discourse analysis; 
second, it clarifies a number of discourse-analytic phenomena to lay the groundwork 
for this study’s linguistics approach; third, it offers a critical interpretation of the 
CDA approach; fourth, it presents the DHA as a valid form of CDA; fifth it justifies 
corpus linguistics as a way into the text and, sixth, it presents pragmatics as a robust 
linguistics-driven approach to CDA. The DHA, CL and pragmatics together address 
CDA’s methodological flaws and permit a positivist-interpretivist synthesis. 
5.2.1. IR Discourse Analysis 
This study aligns to contemporary IR discourse analysis in two ways. First, it 
assumes the ideational and the material are inter-subjectively co-constituted. Second, 
it adheres to a core CDA discourse-analytic tenet that conceives of discourse as “talk 
and text in context”.566 That is, context implies a material world out there that humans 
cannot relate to without language.567 This study also addresses debates in three areas: 
first, the nature of discourse and how it relates to Constructivism, in figure 6 below; 
566 Van Dijk, Teun. ed. 1997: 3. 
567 Onuf, Nicholas. 1989. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. 
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second, the agent-structure debate, in figure 7 below and, third, the relationship 
between power and the agent-structure debate in figure 8 below. 
To do this, the research design adheres to a thin IR Constructivism that 
acknowledges material reality (Fig. 6). This means the macro-structure and the 
micro-structure are co-constitutive (Fig. 7). It then uses both the micro-interactional 
and macro-structural approaches to productive power (Fig. 8) to find huadu in cross-
Strait and domestic discourses. Since Taiwan’s discursive power is conceived of as 
interactional and constitutive, productive and structural power (q.v.3.2.4.), textual 
warrant for a macrostructural huadu discourse is best located in actors’ linguistic 
micro-interactions.  
Such a RC IR discourse-analytic synthesis marries core concepts of power politics 
and identity and resolves the agent-structure debate to recognise co-constitution all 
the way down. 568  
Thin Constructivism Thick Constructivism 
Discourse and Reality Some forms of communication 
mirror the world out there 
(bargaining by coercion); others 
construct that world (arguing by 
discourse). 
Material reality can never 
exist independently of 
discourse —the world is 
always talked into existence. 
Definition of Discourse A specific form of social 
interaction and a particular logic of 
action that depends on institutional 
and normative setting within which 
communicative interaction takes 
place. 
Constitutive of social reality; 
no social reality conceivable 
outside of the meaning-
structure that influences how 
individuals perceive and act 
toward the world. 
Figure 6 The Role of Discourse in Thin and Thick Constructivism 
(Adapted from: Holzscheiter. 2014) 
568 Holzscheiter, Anna. 2014. Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: 
Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations. International Studies Perspectives, 15. 142-
162, at 143. 
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 Micro-interaction Approach Macro-Structure Approach 
Discourse Definition Text in context but emphasis on 
discourse as communicative 
exchange 
Text in context but emphasis 
on historically grown 
structures of signification 
Predominant Level of 
Analysis 
Agents/Individual—“Subjects make 
meaning” 
Text: Small instances of everyday 
communication. 
Context: Institutional Setting for 
communicative Exchange 
Structure/Holistic—
“Meaning makes Subjects” 
Text: Texts as aggregated 
evidence for large meaning-
structures. 
Context: Broad historical or 
sociopolitical context 
Figure 7 Ontological Differences among Discourses 
(Adapted from: Holzscheiter. 2014) 
 
 
 L1: Agent Micro-interaction L2: Macro-Structure 
P1: Deliberative Discourse as communicative 
rationality—discourse as the place 
where “power of the better 
argument” comes to bear 
Johnstone (2003, 2011) UN SC 
Deliberative design of 
institutions allows 
redressing power 
asymmetries in global 
politics through discourse 
Payne & Samhat (2004) 
WTO 
P2: Productive Discourse as knowledge–power 
nexus: Actors strive to impose their 
view of reality on others in 
discourse 
Bially-Mattern (2005) Suez Crisis 
Discourses as 
institutionalised meaning-
structures inevitably 
produce and perpetuate 
power asymmetries 
Epstein (2011)Anti-Whaling 
Figure 8 Levels of Discourse-Analysis (L) and Discourse-Power Relationship (P) 
(Adapted from: Holzscheiter. 2014) 
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5.2.2. Text, Context, Co-text, Discourse and Discourse Analysis 
This study acknowledges Foucault’s claim that discourse is part of a broader social 
process that reflects power relations in society. 569 However, Foucault does not 
articulate any empirical methods apart from his “little toolbox” and rules for locating 
what he terms “discursive formation”.570 None of Foucault’s rules articulate a set of 
techniques based on the linguistic features of the text itself.  
For a linguistics-informed discourse analysis, text and discourse must be seen as 
separate categories. Widdowson (2008) defines discourse as “the pragmatic process 
of meaning negotiation” and the “acting of context on code”. “Text is its product”.571 
That is, discourse is a meta-textual phenomenon in which meaning is conveyed 
beyond the level of the text. Text, conversely, is a discourse codified in the lexico-
grammar.  
As The Godfather example above demonstrates (q.v. 5.1.), discourses more often 
than not (almost always) produce texts that attempt but fail semantically to align to 
their pragmatic meanings, leading to a gap between pragmatic meaning and textual 
form. 572  Discourse is what happens beyond the text when meaning needs to be 
inferred, but evidence of a discourse can only be located in text.573 Thus, all human 
communication is a process of filling in textual gaps using contextual information – 
reproducing the discourse in the process.  
Context refers to shared historical and schematic knowledge beyond the text, while 
co-text is text around the text being analysed, within the text itself. Just as anarchy is 
                                                 
569 Foucault, Michel. 1972.  
570 Foucault, Michel 1972: 107. 
571 Widdowson, Henry. 2008: 8.  
572 Lemke, Jay. 1995. Textual Politics: Discourse and Social Dynamics. London: Taylor & Francis: 7. 
573  Widdowson, Henry. 1998. The Theory and Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis. Applied 
Linguistics 19(1): 136-151; see also: Widdowson, Henry. 2008: 3. 
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what states make of it, so texts are what recipients make of them - or mistake them 
for - and what they make of them are discourses. Readers do not read possible 
meanings off from a text, but plausible meanings into a text.574 This reading is an 
interpretation based on identity, interests, historical context and power relations.575 
Widdowson’s definition above suggests that a speaker’s intended meaning and a 
hearer’s interpretation can converge or diverge, depending on context.576  
5.2.3. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
As a heterogeneous tendency within the field of discourse analysis, CDA is a well-
established approach in IR.577 Unlike traditional linguistics, CDA studies discourse by 
analysing texts in context, rather than as isolated objects.578 As part of the linguistic 
turn in social science, CDA also displays an “interest in the relationship between 
language and power [and] overt relations of struggle and conflict”.579 Its focus on 
power and discourse as “socially constitutive as well as socially shaped” invites 
Realist Constructivism.580 CDA is political discourse analysis and is ideally suited to 
this study’s research hypothesis.  
                                                 
574 Widdowson, Henry. 2010. Text, Grammar and Critical Discourse Analysis, in Coffin, Caroline, 
Lillis, Theresa and O’Halloran, Kieran. 2010. Applied Linguistics Methods. Abingdon: Routledge. 165. 
575 Fowler, Roger. 1996. Linguistic Criticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 7. 
576 Milliken, Sarah. 1999. The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research 
and Methods European Journal of International Relations, 5: 225-254 at 235.  
577 Holzscheiter, Anna. 2014; Milliken, Sarah. 1999. Initially drawing on Michael Halliday’s Systemic 
Functional Grammar and Roger Fowler’s Critical Linguistics, as well as on Frankfurt-School Critical 
Theory and Foucauldian post-structuralism, there are several CDA schools ranging from Fairclough’s 
textually oriented (1985, 1989) and van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach (1991) to Ruth Wodak’s 
(2001) DHA. 
578 Fairclough, Norman. 2010. Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. Harlow: 
Pearson. 
579 Weiss, G., and R. Wodak. 2002. Introduction: Theory, interdisciplinarity and critical discourse 
analysis.In G. Weiss and R. Wodak (eds.), Critical Discourse Analysis: Theory and Interdisciplinarity. 
London:Palgrave Macmillan: 1-32. 
580 Fairclough, Norman and Wodak, Ruth. 1997. Critical Discourse Analysis, In Teun van Dijk. 
ed. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Vol. 2. London: Sage. 
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The strategic driver of discourse is power; the elite enactment of power produces 
discourse.581 Power is deployed grammatically to reproduce state identity; linguistic 
analysis locates and exposes that identity and explains foreign policy choices. 582 
Political actors may deploy power by variously constructing new ones and 
deconstructing existing ones. In this way, actors deploy generic discourses to coerce, 
resist and dissimulate in order to legitimate state identities. 583   
Traditional CDA has been severely critiqued on epistemological and methodological 
grounds. Widdowson (1995; 1996) accused it of a highly interpretive, emancipatory 
agenda that misrepresented basic linguistic conceps and leapt from description to 
interpretation, bypassing analysis. In particular CDA has been accused of selection 
bias and of eschewing firm textual warrant for interpretive claims around the 
meaning of political statements.584 The most notable CDA development in response 
to this critique is Ruth Wodak’s DHA.585  
5.2.4. The Discourse Historical Approach 
Wodak’s Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) may be used to measure the 
discursive construction and legitimation of huadu and to explain its deployment to 
                                                 
581 Van Dijk, Teun. 2009.  Society and Discourse: How Context Controls Text and Talk. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 62. 
582 Fairclough, Norman and Ruth Wodak. 1997. Critical discourse analysis. In T. van Dijk. ed. 
Discourse as Social Interaction. London: Sage:.258. 
583 Chilton, Paul and Schaffner, Christina. 1997. Discourse and politics. In Teun A. van Dijk (eds.) 
Discourse as Social Interaction: 206-230 at 212–213. 
584 Widdowson, Henry. 1995. Discourse Analysis: A Critical View. Language and Literature 4(3): 
157-172; Widdowson, Henry. 1996. Reply to Fairclough: Discourse and Interpretation: conjectures 
and refutations. Language and Literatures, 5(1): 57-69. The CDA tendency subsequently amended 
many epistemological and methodological shortcomings around its application of underlying theories; 
separation of interpretation from linguistic analysis; the gaps among expression, reception and 
interpretation of discourses, the question of context; selective analysis and confirmation bias. 
585 Wodak, Ruth. 2009. The discourse-historical approach. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer. eds. Methods 
of critical discourse analysis. London: Sage: 63-95. 
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maintain Taiwan’s sovereignty. 586  The DHA is a thorough, methodical and 
systematic procedure that identifies five discursive strategies for identity construction 
and the deployment of power through language: 
1) How are actors named and referred to linguistically? 
2) What representations are attributed to them? 
3) By means of what argumentation schemes do actors legitimate themselves and 
delegitimate others? 
4) From what perspective are these argumentation schemes expressed? 
5) Are actors’ utterances articulated implicitly or explicitly, intensified or 
mitigated?587 
These five strategies fall into categories of themes, argumentation schemes and 
rhetorical patterns and linguistic means of realisation. It is this step that crucially 
permits this study’s separation of rhetoric from discourse proper. It accounts for 
misperception of elite policy preferences in terms of the tendency of different actors 
to read plausible meanings into texts based on context (q.v. 5.1.). 
These strategies and categories are located in a wide range of scripted, semi-scripted 
and unscripted political genres including policy documents, inauguration speeches, 
diplomatic meetings, government information leaflets, campaign speeches, press 
conferences, newspaper editorials and social media. Applied to the data, DHA 
analysis finds textual warrant for an overarching huadu discourse.  
                                                 
586 Wodak, Ruth and Meyer, Michael. 2009.63-95; Wodak, Ruth; de Cillia, Rudolf; Reisigl, Martin 
and Liebhardt, Karin. 2009. The Discursive Construction of National Identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press: 3-4. 
587 Wodak, Ruth. 2009:73. I have reworded these to orient them towards an empirical IR reading 
rather than an emancipatory CDA one. 
191 
The DHA contains a promising set of methods for measuring and explaining the 
discursive power of huadu to secure Taiwan’s sovereignty. Most importantly, it 
resolves language as lexico-grammar and language as rhetoric. The DHA establishes 
a methodological separation between data collection and objective linguistic 
description and analysis. In substituting a more Kantian concept of critique as kritik 
for traditional CDA’s Critical Theory approach, the DHA permits an empirical as 
opposed to an emancipatory application of CDA methods. In doing so, it paves the 
way for a reintroduction of CDA’s Critical Linguistics heritage, based on pragmatics.  
5.2.5. Corpus Linguistics 
Corpus Linguistics (CL) is an analytic and descriptive method that uses computer 
software to analyse corpora to find probabilities, trends, patterns and co-occurrences 
in linguistic features to make inferences about linguistic phenomena. 588  Basic 
methods include word lists, key words, collocates and concordances. The results can 
be used in qualitative discourse analysis to interpret and explain the political 
significance of linguistic phenomena. Stubbs (1997) suggests using CL to bolster 
CDA through random sampling, large data sets, and comparison of textual features 
with language norms captured in a corpus to make reliable generalisations about 
typical language use. CDA scholars now accept the innovation of combining CL and 
CDA for methodological rigour.589  This study seeks to use CL in two ways: first, as a 
way into the data to locate salient linguistic features and themes and, second, to 
locate, analyse and interpret (measure) linguistic features that encode huadu. 
                                                 
588 Teubert, W., & Krishnamurthy, R. 2007. General introduction. In W. Teubert and R. 
Krishnamurthy.Eds. Corpus linguistics: Critical concepts in linguistics (pp. 1–37). London, England: 
Routledge. 
589 Baker, Paul, Costas Gabrielatos, Majid KhosraviNik, Michal Krzyzanowski, TonyMcEnery and 
Ruth Wodak. 2008. A useful methodological synergy? Combining critical discourse analysis and 
corpus linguistics to examine discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press. Discourse 
and Society, 19: 273; Baker, Paul. 2012. Acceptable bias? Using corpus linguistics methods with 
critical discourse analysis. Critical Discourse Studies. 9(3): 247-256. 
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5.2.6. Pragmatics 
Morgenthau claims that facts have no social meaning outside context. Widdowson 
argues that such meanings are read into texts rather than off of them. Pragmatics 
seeks to locate these meanings through a problem-solving, abductive approach that 
draws on experience rather than a deductive model. As a subfield of linguistics, it 
examines not the direct semantic meaning of a text but its inferred contextual, or 
discursive, meaning.  That is, pragmatic analysis reads between the lines using covert 
linguistic triggers in the text. 590  Discourse studies suggest that most meaning is 
inferred pragmatically in context. 591  Pragmatic analysis compensates for and 
plausibly explains meaning by locating the lexico-grammatical triggers that prompt 
interpretation. As such, it acts as a necessary positivist corrective to purely 
interpretive analysis. Morgenthau’s social world cannot simply be an artefact of 
man’s mind and his is not an argument for crude relativism. There must be a truth out 
there otherwise huadu would have no meaning and no communicative effect.  
Wodak (2007) outlines the need for a return to pragmatics in CDA analysis, 
including the DHA, in order empirically to locate powerful actors’ assumptions and 
stances in the lexico-grammar. 592  As a powerful assumption or taken-for-granted 
stance, huadu is ripe for pragmatic analysis. The DHA’s broad category of linguistic 
means of realisation can be used as a template to analyse huadu’s legitimating power 
pragmatically. 
The following sub-sections elucidate a number of concepts that are crucial to this 
study’s use of pragmatics within the DHA. First, Halliday’s Systemic Functional 
                                                 
590 Widdowson, Henry. 2008.  
591 Ibid. 
592 Wodak, Ruth. 2007. Pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis. A cross-disciplinary inquiry. 
Pragmatics and Cognition, 15(1): 203-225. 
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Grammar shows how grammar functions ideationally to legitimate identities. Second, 
Austin’s Speech Act Theory exposes the gap between illocution (intended meaning) 
and perlocution (understood meaning) that makes legitimation contestable. Third, 
Grice’s Theory of Meaning and the Cooperative Principle reveal how actors exploit 
the discursive gap between illocution and perlocution to legitimate identities. So, 
whether Jackson’s (2006) rhetorical commonplaces and Brady’s (2015) diplomatic 
frames (q.v. 5.1.) legitimate huadu or not depends on their relationship to the 
phenomena described here. Statements succeed in legitimating identities because, 
first, the Cooperative Principle rather than the listener’s critical faculties prohibits 
their being challenged and, second, political actors exploit the discursive gap 
between illocution and perlocution to deploy discursive power.   
5.2.6.1. Systemic Functional Grammar and Speech Acts 
Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) presents language as a system that 
construes meaning. That is, unlike Saussurean and Chomskyan grammar, the purpose 
of SFG is to locate social meaning and communicative effect in language. For this 
reason, all human languages have an ideational component and a social-relational 
component that are combined in a coherent textual component.593 Austin argues this 
means interlocutors  are attuned not explicitly to each other’s words and grammar, 
but to the speech acts that those words and grammar perform: requests; threats; 
invitations; assertions;  promises; refusals; apologies; predictions; prescriptions and 
so on. 594  Austin’s identification of a gap between the illocutionary force of a 
speaker’s utterance – that is, whether they meant it as a threat or not – and its 
perlocutionary effect – that is, whether the addressee perceives it as a threat or not – 
                                                 
593 Halliday, Michael. A. K. 1977.  Text as semantic choice in social contexts. In T. A. van Dijk and J. 
S. Petfi. eds.  Grammar and Description. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 176–226.. Reprinted in M.A.K. 
Halliday, 2002. Linguistic Studies of Text and Discourse. London: Continuum. 
594 Austin, John Langshaw. 2005 [1962]. 
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creates space for this study’s conception of discursive power as legitimation. That is, 
knowledgeable political actors actively exploit discursive fissures in Taiwanese 
political speech to construct and enact huadu.595 At the same time, competing actors 
misperceive such discursive exploitation based on identity-driven shared knowledge. 
5.2.6.2. (Un)Cooperative Speech Acts 
Language is a cooperative phenomenon and Grice’s Cooperative Principle 
determines how a speaker’s words are perceived; that is, how discourses are read into 
texts. 596  As a linguistic “Highway Code”, the Cooperative Principle sums up 
prototypical communicative assumptions that hold across languages. That is, all 
human conversation is, in a linguistic sense, as clear as necessary, as much as 
necessary, truthful and delivered in the right way.    This is not to say that speakers 
do not routinely lie and dissimulate. However, they do this by strategically flouting 
or violating the Cooperative Principle. It is in this way that actors signal policy and 
legitimate identities (q.v. 5.2.6.3 and 5.2.6.4.). 597 Cross-Strait and domestic power 
politics determine whether the Cooperative Principle should be respected or violated 
and this entails the use of implicit language.598 Austin’s Speech Act Theory reveals 
how such implicitness results in a mismatch between intended meaning and 
                                                 
595 Barnett and Duval. 2005 
596 Grice, H. Paul. [1957] 1989.  The Cooperative Principle: Make your contribution as is required, 
when it is required, by the conversation in which you are engaged. a) Quality: Contribute only what 
you know to be true. Do not say false things. Do not say things for which you lack evidence. b) 
Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not say more than is required. c) 
Relation (Relevance): Make your contribution relevant. d) Manner: (i) Avoid obscurity; (ii) avoid 
ambiguity; (iii) be brief; (iv) be orderly 
597 In order to convey meaning effectively, for instance, Ma Ying-jeou will not say to Xi Jinping at a 
summit “I hope you had a pleasant journey here, Mr Xi” and expect Xi Jinping to understand by that 
utterance that he means “I am the President of the ROC and I seek no change in Taiwan’s political 
status”. Ma may, however say “we wish to maintain the status quo of peace and prosperity” and 
expect Xi or another third party to perceive that utterance as an assertion of sovereignty and not 
simply advisory. Indeed, it is 
598 Chan Hui-chen. 2000. Anaphoric Choice in Social Context. hanxue yanjiu [Sinology Studies] 18: 
299-321. 
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perceived meaning (q.v. 5.2.6.1.). This occurs in the discursive gap between 
illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect. Barnett and Duval’s (2005) productive 
power shows how canny political actors manipulate that gap to legitimate identity 
(q.v. 3.2.4.). Identities are legitimated by violating the Cooperative Principle, but 
meaning may remain contested because of misperception in the gap between 
illocution and perlocution.  
5.2.6.3. Presupposition and Implicature 
Presupposition and implicature are types of implied meaning. They are notoriously 
hard to separate and a presupposition may also operate as an implicature. A 
presupposition is an assumption about the context of an utterance that the speaker 
assumes the addressee will take as read.599 For instance, a 2003 speech by George W. 
Bush included the utterance: 
(1) British Intelligence has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant 
quantities of uranium from Africa.600 
>> Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.601 
It later became apparent that this intelligence was incorrect, but Bush’s phrasing of 
the utterance, using the factive verb learn in the present perfect tense to imply 
resultative knowledge, implicitly framed it as true. Consider the following: 
(2) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday strongly condemned China’s poaching of yet 
another of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, the Dominican Republic.602 
>> China has poached Taiwan’s diplomatic allies before. 
                                                 
599 Kartunnen, Lauri. 1974. Presupposition and Linguistic Context. Theoretical Linguistics 1, 181-94. 
600 Bush, George W. 2003.  Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union. 
In Gerhard Peters and John T. Wooley. eds. The American Presidency Project. January 28, 
2003. [Online] Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29645 [Accessed 3 September 
2012]. 
601 The symbolic notation >> denotes “presupposes”. In this study, it also denotes an implicature. 
602 Taipei Times. China Lures Dominican Republic. 2nd May 2018. [online] Available at: 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/05/02/2003692352 [Accessed 3 July 2018]. 
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>> Taiwan has a Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is not Chinese. 
>> Taiwan practices international relations. 
These presuppositions invite certain implicatures, such as: 
>> Taiwan is a sovereign state. 
>> Taiwan is not China. 
>> China’s behaviour is unethical.603  
>> The utterer of the statement is annoyed.604  
Presuppositions serve to legitimate a stance covertly. They aim to make a piece of 
information that the speaker believes (or asserts that he believes) what the listener 
should believe, even when it is untrue or contested.605 In legitimating huadu in the 
form of presupposition, its representations (and, by implication, those of taidu and 
tongyi) are taken for granted and hence need not be specifically asserted. Unlike an 
assertion, a presupposition is usually linguistically accepted without much critical 
attention. States, as knowledgeable actors, use presupposition to legitimate their 
identities and compel sanction. 
Implicature (implication) is to say something and to mean something else by it.606 It 
refers to what is suggested, rather than explicitly expressed or logically entailed, by 
an utterance.607 For example:  
(3) Beijing will have to take the largest share of responsibility for any possible 
consequences. 
                                                 
603 CL reveals that the verb ‘to poach’ (steal) occurs invariably in negative co-texts. 
604 CL reveals that the adverbial construction ‘yet another’ often occurs in co-texts that encode the 
speaker’s frustration or exasperation. 
605 Yule, George. 1996. Pragmatics. Oxford: OUP: 29. 
606 Grice, Paul. 1957: 382. 
607 Davis, Wayne. 2014.  Implicature. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta. ed. [online] Available at: 
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197 
>> there may be a negative outcome for Beijing. 
As an Austinian speech act, this statement may constitute a (hollow) implicit threat 
by Taipei to Beijing since Taipei lacks the power to make good on its threat. Yet, if 
we acknowledge the discursive power entailed by huadu, the threat is not hollow 
because it may be addressed not just to Beijing but to the international community.   
Presupposition and implicature are pragmatic phenomena whose meanings rely on 
context for interpretation, but they may be located through explicit lexico-
grammatical features in the co-text.  
Kartunnen (1979) and Levinson (1983) cite a number of presupposition triggers that 
may indicate both presuppositions and implicatures. 608  These include a range of 
lexico-grammatical features. 609 These triggers’ Chinese equivalents carry a similar 
pragmatic force.610 In this study’s data, Ma’s statement to Xi that Taiwan “seeks to 
maintain the status quo of peace and prosperity” gives four presuppositions in the 
English text: first, through the definite article “the status quo” that “there is a status 
quo”; second, through the implicative verb “to maintain” that the status quo has 
existed, exists and will continue to exist; third, through the preposition “of” that 
peace and prosperity define the status quo; fourth, through the factive verb “to seek” 
that this is a policy statement. Whether or not Xi accepts Ma’s policy statement 
critically, the linguistic presupposition must remain unchallenged. In this way, Ma– 
as a knowledgeable actor speaking for the ROC - legitimates huadu and compels Xi 
Jinping – as a knowledgeable actor speaking for the PRC – to allow huadu to pass up 
                                                 
608 Kartunnen, Laurii. 1971. Implicative Verbs. Language, 47(2): 340-58; Levinson, George. 1983. 
Pragmatics. Oxford: OUP: 29. 
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into the discourse.  As such, huadu is an extremely powerful discourse when it is 
unchallenged or implicit because it delegitimates tongyi and taidu and compels 
Beijing’s sanction. 
5.2.6.4. The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity 
Language conveys power as “an asymmetrical and antagonistic drive for dominance”. 
By the same token, it also conveys solidarity – “a symmetrical and reciprocal drive 
for rapport”.611 Power politics entail tension between power and solidarity and invite 
the unconscious use of implicit, covert and strategic language.612 Power and solidarity 
are thus invoked by breaking sociolinguistic rules to include or exclude others and 
actors may legitimate an identity by implicitly including or excluding others’ in its 
scope. Conversely, in line with illocution and perlocution, others may include or 
exclude themselves.613 Such inclusion and exclusion is commonly invoked in English 
and in Chinese through deixis. That is, by linguistically pointing through address 
forms and pronouns.614  
Brown and Gilman’s (1960) seminal study, The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity, 
shows how a speaker’s choice between the familiar/informal tu form and the 
polite/formal vous form in French (the t/v semantic) enacts either power or solidarity 
in the interaction.615 The t/v semantic applies to a number of languages, including 
Chinese between ni （你） (t) and nin （您）(v). However, while Brown and 
Gilman focus on second-person pronouns, power and solidarity dynamics are salient 
in the first-person pronouns, I and we.  
                                                 
611 Tannen. Deborah. 1986. That’s Not What I Meant! New York: Ballantine Books: 93. 
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614 Li, Chunrong. 2015. Aspects of Address Forms in Chinese and English: A Comparative Study. 
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Giglioli. eds. Language and Social Context, 252-282. Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
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Figure 9 Deixis: The ‘We’ of Power and Solidarity  
(Adapted from: Widdowson, 2010: 172) 
The first-person plural, we, is the most socially powerful pronoun.616 Yet, traditional 
grammars do not fully account for we’s complex identity-legitimating functions. 617 
Unlike its singular counterpart, the plural we denotes “I + powerful”.618 The royal or 
presidential we is the most well-known form, but we invariably speaks like a Greek 
Chorus with one voice multiplied. This allows the speaker to reinforce the collective 
power of Self (us) against Other (them).619 Political actors exploit we discursively to 
assume and deny agency, to assert ideology and policy, to index identity and status 
                                                 
616 See: Wales, Katherine. 1996. Personal Pronouns in Present-Day English. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press for a comprehensive exploration of the use of we to legitimate, enact authority 
(power) and communality (solidarity) in political speech. For comparable findings in Chinese, see: 
Yang, Hsin-yi and Lai Chiu-yueh. 2010. Some Non-canonical Uses of Personal Pronouns in Mandarin 
Chinese and English. Unpublished paper. [online] Available at: 
http://140.127.82.166/bitstream/987654321/2032/1/14.pdf [Accessed 23 February 2015].  
617 Wales, Katherine. 1996.  
618 Brown, Penelope and Levinson, Stephen. 1987. Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. 
Cambridge: CUP: 202.  
619 Wales, Katie. 1996. Personal Pronouns in Present-Day English. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 60. 
200 
and to include and exclude.620 In this view, we does legitimating work locating actors 
in power relations with each other. This approach shows how pronouns signal pivots 
towards Self and Other. As a referent of state identity, we compels sanction by a 
social constituency through the deployment of power and solidarity. We is will-
enforcing and rightful (q.v. 4.3). We may include and exclude other actors within and 
across subject and non-subject social constituencies (q.v. Fig 9 above). 
Huadu has a national limit that extends to its social constituency.  The constituency 
referred to by the we of huadu continues until it reaches the boundary formed by 
another group marked by they. 621  This national limit can be contested though; 
pronominal inclusivity suggests the limit of the we of huadu surpasses its core social 
constituency to include competing subject constituencies within its realm (q.v. 4.3.). 
So, although the we of huadu is used to denote Taiwan, it necessarily seeks to extend 
to tongyi and taidu constituencies, to appeal to the international community and to 
compel Beijing’s sanction.   
5.3. Provisional Concluding Remarks 
This section has shown how a linguistics approach to discourse analysis best 
operationalises this study’s hypotheses and theory. The model is novel and marries 
post-positivist and heuristic methods to provide linguistic warrant for interpretive 
claims around the meaning of huadu, thus countering the “parsing fallacy”. This 
model respects the intersubjective construction of state identity in power politics 
across micro-interactions and the macro-structure, resolving the agent-structure 
problem (q.v. 5.2.1.). Speech Act Theory and the Cooperative Principle account for 
621 Carbo, Teresa. 1997 Who are they? The rhetoric of institutional policies toward the indigenous 
populations of postrevolutionary Mexico. In Stephen H. Riggins. ed. 1997. The Language 
and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse. London: Sage: 95. 
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knowledgeable actors’ legitimation of huadu and delegitimation of tongyi and taidu.  
Actors seek rhetorically to legitimate huadu through fallacies and topoi. However, 
textual features, specifically, presupposition, implicature and deixis, more subtly and 
powerfully index Taiwan’s sovereign status, compelling Beijing’s sanction. 
The use of the pronoun we in political speech provides better evidence of huadu’s 
legitimation than diplomatic frames, topoi and fallacies because the latter are often 
banal and explicitly instrumental in purpose and thus more consciously manipulable.   
Elite actors legitimate state identity when they speak (or write) because they create 
the context. This implies a consensus whenever language is discursively manipulated; 
it anticipates acceptance on the part of the listener. 622  When an utterance goes 
linguistically unchallenged, it passes up to and constructs the discourse.623  
5.4. Data Collection, Ordering and Analysis  
In line with its philosophical and methodological framework (q.v. 5.3.), this study’s 
discourse analysis proceeded abductively as follows: first, data collection to create 
corpora; second, corpus linguistic processing as a way into the text; third discourse 
analysis using the DHA; fourth, pragmatic analysis. An iterative, abductive approach 
meant findings could be revised, defining concepts against the data and IR discourse 
analytic models (q.v. 5.2.1.). 624  Analysing the data as corpora permitted further 
hypotheses and modification of the design. This revised design was then applied to 
and tested on the data and the historical record in the empirical chapters.  
                                                 
622 Fowler, Roger. 1991. Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press. London: 
Routledge. Of course, a listener may flout the Cooperative Principle by saying “speak for yourself, 
mate”, but the power of we is not negated by this, since such a response represents a social rather than 
a linguistic challenge. 
623 Brookes, Rod. 1999. Newspapers and national Identity. Media, Culture and Society, 25(2): 187-
207 at 256. 
624 Wodak, Ruth and Meyer, Michael.  2009: 23-24. 
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Political text provides a better source for data than polls and interviews for three 
reasons. First, polls in Taiwan are insufficient to identify those who favour the status 
quo as a categorical and self-conscious “legitimacy nexus” that aligns to huadu. 
After all, huadu’s social constituency and the ROC’s realm extend beyond the 
Taiwanese electorate. Second, elite interviews are subject to subjective bias and 
forgetting. Third, a unitary ROC implies a state-constituted huadu discourse. 
Political text is an under-utilised resource, often treated as a mere bi-product of 
strategic political activity.625 Yet, it is legitimating and state bodies, political parties 
and domestic interest groups in Taiwan have a large amount of online policy-related 
text in English and Chinese. YouTube also contains a large number of English-
language and subtitled interviews, documentaries and policy speeches by elite and 
DIG actors. This study hypothesised, first, that a large enough corpus of Taiwanese 
political text from the period 1945-2016 would produce data from which a huadu 
discourse might be derived and, second, that it would encode a legitimating huadu 
discourse. 
5.4.1. Corpus Linguistics 
The literature was surveyed and primary political text extracted and converted into 
Word and .txt files. A range of ROC government and Taiwanese non-statewebsites 
were crawled in order to mine English-language data and process it into machine-
readable .txt files. A number of texts containing relevant English-language political 
speech by Taiwanese elites and interest groups across a number of genres were 
downloaded from the Internet and manually processed into .txt files. A number of 
YouTube videos containing interviews with elites and DIGs were transcribed 
manually. Many of the YouTube interviews and speeches already contained 
                                                 
625 Slapin, Jonathan and Prokesh, Sven. 2009. How to Avoid Pitfalls in Statistical Analysis of Political 
Texts: The Case of Germany. German Politics. 18 (3), 323-344. 
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machine-generated transcripts; these required editing to make them grammatical. 
Those videos that did not have transcripts were transcribed by hand by the researcher. 
Chinese-language text was translated by the researcher. The resulting data was 
cleaned to remove rubric so that it represented as closely as possible the speech of 
the actor who uttered it. The resulting .txt files were then sorted into a single 5-
million-word master corpus labelled Taiwanese Political Speech. A range of study 
corpora were then extracted. 
The corpora are listed as follows: 
Master corpus 
1. Taiwanese Political Speech. 
Study corpora 
2. SEF-MAC text 1992-2016 (SEF-MAC policy statements, reports of SEF-
ARATS meetings, SEF official speeches) 
3. Presidential Office text 1996-2016 (including presidential speeches) 
4. Pan-Blue elite text 1992-2016 (including KMT and Taiwan industry) 
5. Pan-Green elite text 1992–2016 (including DPP, student and civic groups) 
6. ROC Cross-Strait Policy Documents  
7. Taiwanese Political Speech (ROC and Opposition elite text): 1945-1992  
Each of the study corpora were divided into sub-corpora containing political 
speech by individual actors, divided by genre among media interviews, press 
conferences, speeches, policy statements, press releases, presidential speeches, 
social elite speeches and interviews and official government reports. 
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5.4.2. Provisional Hypotheses across Data 
The researcher hypothesised the following: 
H1 Pan-blue DIG data will seek to legitimate tongyi; 
H2 Pan-green DIG data will resist H1 and seek to legitimate taidu;  
H3 State-produced data, including elite speech, will legitimate prevailing DIG 
discourses 
H4 Official diplomatic frames and rhetoric will mask an underlying discourse 
encoded in the lexico-grammar; 
H5 State-produced data including elite speech will legitimate huadu; 
5.4.3. Salient Linguistic Data 
The purpose of CL in this study was not to carry out quantitative statistical analysis 
on the data, but to provide a way into the data by unearthing salient themes and 
discourses for further analysis using the DHA and pragmatic analysis. As such, it 
aligns to Baker’s (2008; 2012; 2013) use of CL to reduce selection bias. The analysis 
of word frequency, clusters and co-textual features permits the identification of 
potential sites of interest, including themes, rhetorical and argumentation strategies 
and lexico-grammatical features. This study specifically sought to locate those 
features that trigger presuppositions, implicatures and deixis. Using the ‘find’ 
function on Microsoft Word and the online concordancers, Yoshikoder, Sketch 
Engine and AntConc, the SEF-MAC 1992-2016 corpus was analysed to locate the 
most prolific actors in cross-Strait talks mediated by SEF-MAC and ARATS-TAO.626 
                                                 
626 See: Harvard University. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. n.d. Yoshikoder. [online] 
Available at: http://yoshikoder.sourceforge.net/ [Accessed 30 September 2011]; Anthony, Laurence. 
2018. AntConc (Version 3.5.7) [Computer Software]. Tokyo, Japan: Waseda University. [online] 
Available at: http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software [Accessed 20 September 2018]; Kilgarriff A, 
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Figure 10 shows the most prolific actors, listed by frequency of mention and cross-
referenced to one salient cross-Strait SEF-ARATS-sponsored event they attended. 
This allowed the researcher to cross-reference different actors to events. To compile 
Figure 10, the researcher created a keyword list using Yoshikoder’s word count 
function and searched it manually for the organisational names, surnames and given 
names of all actors and copied them into an Excel spreadsheet, listing them by 
frequency of mention. The data in Figure 10 was then analysed and a further online 
search done to locate political speech by the actors selected. The resulting data was 
then added to the existing corpora and the initial Taiwanese Political Speech corpus 
enlarged.  The same process was repeated for Figure 11, which shows the most 
frequently mentioned organisations, which were compiled in the same way. A 
manual examination of Figures 10 and 11 facilitated the location of further text to 
create a mental picture of the most influential DIGs and elites with an interest in 
cross-Strait negotiations. 
Of course, the researcher’s own knowledge of the domestic political context in 
Taiwan confirmed that the SEF-ARATS site did not contain a representative sample 
of potentially influential Taiwanese elites and interest groups, since it referred 
overwhelmingly to KMT appointees and pan-Blue-sympathising business 
constituencies involved in cross-Strait diplomacy. To correct this, it was assumed 
that opposition domestic elites and interest groups who were not involved in cross-
Strait talks would also influence KMT cross-Strait policy. A manual search of 
websites related to the DPP, the Sunflower Student Movement and other pan-Green 
constituencies was therefore searched and the resulting data processed as above. The 
                                                                                                                                          
Baisa V, Bušta J. 2014. The sketch engine: Ten years on. Lexicography, 1: 7–36; See: Sketch Engine. 
[online] Available at: https://www.sketchengine.eu/  
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process of corpus enlargement was again repeated until a final master corpus and set 
of study corpora were arrived at. 
 
海基會 Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 3498 
 海协会 Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) 2097 
大陸委員會 Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) 513 
經濟部 Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) 208 
国台办 Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) 155 
中国共产党 Communist Party of China (CPC) 153 
台商协会 Taiwanese Businessmen's Association (TBA) 122 
中國國民黨 Kuomintang (KMT) 81 
兩岸經合會 Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC) 77 
民主進步黨 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 53 
金管會 Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) 50 
中華民國財政部 Ministry of Finance (MOF) 41 
中华人民共和国
商务部 Ministry of Commerce (MOC) 35 
中華民國全國工
業總會 Chinese National Federation of Industries (CNFI) 29 
中華民國外貿協
會 Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) 27 
大陸台灣同胞投
資企業聯誼會 
Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the 
Mainland (ATIEM) 38 
中華民國交通部 Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MOTC) 28 
中国公证员协会 China Notaries' Association (CNA) 27 
国家统计局 National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 27 
教育部 Ministry of Education (MOE) 26 
Figure 10 Most frequently mentioned corporate actors in SEF-ARATS negotiations 
(2008-2016) 627 
  
                                                 
627 Straits Exchange Foundation. n.d. Policies and Issues. [online] Available at: 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=5169&CtUnit=2831&BaseDSD=7&mp=300 [Accessed 15 
May 2016]. 
Straits Exchange Foundation. n.d. Dialogue and Negotiation. [online] Available at: 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300 [Accessed 15 
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江丙坤 Chiang  Pin-kung 179 Chairman SEF, Former VC KMT KMT 
高孔廉 Kao Koong-lian 171 
SEF VC & SG 2008-14; KMT China 
Affs Head 2014 KMT 
林中森 Lin Join-sane 168 SEF Chair 2012; KMT SG KMT 
馬英九 Ma Ying-jeou 149 President ROC KMT 
陈云林 Chen Yunlin 120 Chairman ARATS CCP 
郑立中 Zheng Lizhong 82 Exec VC ARATS CCP 
陈德铭 Chen Deming 51 President ARATS CCP 
蕭萬長 Siew Vincent 48 VP ROC KMT 
吳敦義 Wu Den-yi(h) 44 Premier ROC KMT 
王毅 Wang Yi 40 
PRC Minister Foreign Affs; TALSG, 
TAO CCP 
张志军 Zhang Zhijun 37 DG TAO CCP 
連戰 Lien Chan 34 KMT Hon Chair, APEC Envoy KMT 
辜振甫 Koo Chen-fu 33 
Chairman SEF, CEO Koos Group, Film 
producer KMT 
习近平 Xi Jinping 30 PRC President, TALSG CCP 
王郁琦 Wang Yu-chi 28 MAC Minister KMT 
汪道涵 Wang Daohan 30 Chairman ARATS CCP 
賴幸媛 Lai Shin-yuan 26 MAC Minister, Chairwoman KMT 
唐树备 Tang Shubei 25 Permanent VC ARATS CCP 
李亞飛 Li  Yafei 21 SG ARATS CCP 
蒋耀平 Jiang Yaoping 17 VM Commerce, Hon Chair AETATS CCP 
Figure 11 Most frequently mentioned individual actors in SEF-sponsored activity 
1994 -2016 628 
 
                                                 
628 Straits Exchange Foundation. n.d. Policies and Issues. [online] Available at: 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=5169&CtUnit=2831&BaseDSD=7&mp=300 [Accessed 15 
May 2016]; Straits Exchange Foundation. n.d. Dialogue and Negotiation. [online] Available at: 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300 [Accessed 15 
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蔡練生 Lien-sheng Tsai  Secretary General, CNFI 
陳清男 Joseph C. Chen  
Deputy Secretary General 
CNFI 
蔡宏明 Hong-ming Tsai  
Deputy Secretary General 
CNFI 
馮鋕瓏 Jason Fong  
Deputy Secretary General 
CNFI 
辜振甫 Dr. C. F. Koo  Perm Hon Chair, CNAIC 
辜濂松 
Dr. Jeffrey L. S. 
Koo Hon Chair, CNAIC 
駱錦明 Kenneth C.M. Lo Hon Chair, CNAIC 
林伯豐 Por-Fong Lin 
Chairman, CNAIC, VC, 
CNFI 
辜成允 Leslie Koo VC, CNAIC 
蔡明忠 Daniel Tsai VC, CNAIC 
張忠謀 Morris Chang Executive Director, CNAIC 
吳東進 Eugene T. C. Wu Executive Director, CNAIC 
王文淵 
William W. 
Wong Executive Director, CNAIC 
蔡宏圖 Hong-tu Tsai Executive Director, CNAIC 
劉金標 King Liu Executive Director, CNAIC 
徐旭東 
Douglas Tong 
Hsu Executive Director, CNAIC 
何壽川 Show-Chung Ho Executive Director, CNAIC 
林明成 Ming-Cheng Lin Executive Director, CNAIC 
嚴凱泰 Kai-Tai Yan Board Director, CNAIC 
林百里 Barry Lam Board Director, CNAIC 
Figure 12 Most Salient Taiwanese Businesspeople 2008-2016 629 
 
As an initial way into the resulting text, the final Taiwanese Political Speech corpus 
was machine-processed in Yoshikoder for lexical frequency and the words manually 
sorted into parts of speech. Dividing by part of speech facilitates linguistic analysis 
since, in line with the DHA’s section on linguistic means of realisation, verb, noun, 
                                                 
629 Straits Exchange Foundation. n.d. Policies and Issues. [online] Available at: 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=5169&CtUnit=2831&BaseDSD=7&mp=300 [Accessed 15 
May 2016]; 
Straits Exchange Foundation. n.d. Dialogue and Negotiation. [online] Available at: 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300 [Accessed 15 
May 2016]. 
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adjective and adverb forms carry specific discursive force.630 Chinese, like English, 
is a subject-verb-object language. However, it does not have a tense system, has no 
plural forms and does not distinguish among noun, verb, adjective and adverb forms, 
relying on other adverbial and aspectual markers to convey temporal information and 
part of speech in a text. Unlike English, Chinese text is noun rather than verb driven 
and this is reflected in the official English translations of the original Chinese text; 
nouns outnumber verbs by around four-to-one. Therefore, for this study plural forms 
were collapsed into singular and the different verb tenses aggregated to their 
infinitives in English in order to reflect both Chinese semantic prosody and the true 
number of verbal concepts in the data. Modal verbs were left as they were because, 
first, language processing software cannot distinguish between temporal and modal 
forms and, second, because their functional equivalence in English does not reflect 
the Chinese. English personal pronominal forms were stripped down to their subject 
forms to reflect Chinese grammar. Figure 13 shows the resulting lexical preference 
sorted by part of speech. The figure demonstrates which concepts, actions and 
attitudes are most salient in ROC state speech. As such, it operates as an important 
first step in unearthing and accounting for a huadu discourse by identifying what 
Taipei considers imporatnt in its relations with Beijing. The nouns indicate the most 
salient concepts and ideas (people, places and things) for Taipei; the verbs point to 
Taipei’s foreign policy actions; the adjectives show how Taipei qualifies or interprets 
salient concepts and ideas; the adverbs demonstrate the manner in which Taipei 
seeks to implement foreign policy actions in power politics. 
                                                 
630 Reisigl, Martin and Ruth Wodak. 2009. In Wodak, Ruth and Meyer. eds. 2009.  Methods of 
Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage:87-121. 
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SEF 1994-2016 Lexical preference 
Noun Verb Adjective Adverb 
    
taiwan be cross-strait also 
mainland have economic jointly 
side hold vice actively 
chairman visit new promptly 
agreement sign taiwanese mutually 
cooperation say related fully 
trade make mutual forward 
talks agree chinese especially 
china lead public nearly 
negotiation hope well greatly 
people reach taiwan's effectively 
president continue international highly 
development promote financial officially 
relations help joint formally 
year support last without 
exchange travel cultural furthermore 
agreement create national smoothly 
meeting visit past gradually 
investment strengthen chiang-chen closely 
exchanges announce further recently 
affairs express major finally 
straits meet deputy currently 
issues increase institutionalized steadily 
ecfa order important certainly 
delegation provide industrial successfully 
Figure 13 Taiwanese Political Speech: Lexical Preference 631 
 
Salience indicates how important a theme, concept or word is to an actor. However, 
salience is not valence and raw frequency gives a limited picture of what the speaker 
intends each time he utters a word or what the addressee understands each time he 
hears it. Some software allows words and phrases to be analysed in co-text. 
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Yoshikoder allows the researcher to create multiple dictionaries, to apply these to 
multiple corpora and to create concordance lines to examine how terms collocate. 
AntConc allows for direct collocation of words. Sketch Engine allows words to be 
analysed in multiple grammatical co-texts. 
A master dictionary was then compiled in Yoshikoder. Five steps were followed.  
First, Sullivan’s (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013) indicative dictionary of elite Taiwanese 
political speech was consulted.632 Second, the researcher used his own contextual and 
historical knowledge to manually combine words from Table 10 into terms, for 
instance, 1992 with Consensus, peace with prosperity, mainland with China and so 
on. Third, salient terms were grouped into themes of economy, sovereignty, identity 
and security. Fourth, the Taiwanese Political Speech corpus was then searched 
manually using Microsoft Word to locate the most salient themes and language and, 
this language added to the dictionary categories using ‘*’ as a wild card. For example, 
for the sovereignty category, appending the word “nation” with ‘*’ to produce 
“nation*” allowed the dictionary to recognise the words “national”, “nationality” and 
“nationally”, while creating “democ*” allowed the dictionary to locate “democracy”, 
“democratic” and “democratically” in the texts it was applied to. Clearly, the 
boundaries among the categories are fuzzy, but they permit the researcher to bridge 
salience and valence, semantic and pragmatic analysis and corpus processing and 
qualitative DHA analysis. The master dictionary is shown in Appendix 1. While 
themes and discourses are not separate categories per se, within these themes, salient 
                                                 
632 Sullivan, Jonathan and Lowe, William.  2010. Chen Shui-bian: On independence. The China 
Quarterly. 203, 619-638; Sullivan, Jonathan and Sapir, Eliahu. 2012. Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential 
discourse. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. 41(3), 33-68; Sullivan, Jonathan and Sapir, 
Eliahu. 2013. Strategic cross-Strait discourse: Comparing three presidential terms. China 
Information. 27(1), 11-30; Sullivan, Jonathan, Li, Y. T and James, P. and Drury, A. C., 2011. An 
Exchange on “Diversionary Dragons, or ‘Talking Tough in Taipei’”. Journal of East Asian 
Studies. 11(1), 137-52. 
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discourses could be identified; these were among others One China/ 1992 Consensus, 
peace and prosperity, status quo, democracy, shared interests, benefit of the people, 
and peaceful development. Of course, huadu is a discourse par excellence, since (q.v. 
1.2.3.) the word almost never appears and is almost never uttered other than as a 
pejorative. Rather, huadu can be deduced from elite references to nominal phrases 
like the 1992 Consensus and the status quo and located in the concept of “ROC 
Sovereignty” and phrases like “the ROC is already an independent country”; 
“Taiwan is already independent”; “Taiwan is a sovereign state called the ROC”. It is 
also presupposed, implied and indexed lexico-grammatically throughout the corpus.  
Clearly, individual words change meaning in co-text and context. For this reason, 
using the WordSketch function in Sketch Engine, the researcher took an interest in 
the words Taiwan, Taiwanese and Taiwan’s and did the same for China and its 
derivatives. Contextual knowledge allowed the researcher to separate out different 
Chinese-language terms for Chinese to differentiate between zhongguoren (PRC 
Chinese people – political) and huaren (ethnic Chinese people) and to create a 
separate category for One-China-Respective-Interpretations and its derivatives. The 
researcher searched for terms that legitimated Taiwan as a sovereign state by locating 
the words state, nation and country. However, it was not considered necessary to 
differentiate semantically among state, nation and country, since the popular use of 
these terms and their Chinese versions does not conform to IR conventions. These 
words were treated as indexing huadu and processed using WordSketch. Appendix 2 
shows a WordSketch of names for Taiwan. 
Drawing on Baker (2012; 2013), in order to get a better picture of the co-texts in 
which sovereignty-and–state-identity-indexing (SSII), or huadu legitimating, words 
occur, the researcher created a list of the ten most salient patterns in their noun forms, 
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applied the dictionary to the Taiwanese Political Speech master corpus and selected 
the patterns in turn using the concordance function. This produced the ten most 
salient adjective and verb collocates of words linked to huadu. The WordSketch of 
these SSII terms is shown in Appendix 3. A further application of WordSketch 
permitted a co-textual analysis of the discourses identified above. This is shown in 
Appendix 4. Concordance lists were then created using the Taiwanese Political 
Speech master corpus. Appendix 5 shows a set of concordance lines for the phrase 
Taiwan is. This gives an indication of how huadu is predicated in elite state and 
domestic political speech. The most salient predications of huadu from 
concordancing and dictionary exercises provide huadu’s normative representations. 
As such, these predications legitimate huadu. The most frequent are of Taiwan as “a 
pluralistic society where people are free to express their views”; “a society of 
freedom, democracy and the rule of law” and “a democratic society”. It is also “a 
major trading power”. This three-part step provided a way to select salient language 
for further analysis in subsequent chapters using the DHA.  
5.4.4. Revised Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Extraction of salient data produced a revised set of research questions: 
(a) Does the data provide plausible support for the claim that the 2008-2016 
KMT administration was constrained in its preferred cross-Strait policy by 
DIG interests? 
(b) Does the data provide plausible support for the claim that ROC state identity 
was operative in power politics between 1945 and 2016? 
(c) Does the data indicate that huadu legitimated the ROC as Taiwan? 
(d) Does the data support the claim that ROC state identity changed 
diachronically from Chinese to Taiwanese between 1945 and 2016? 
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In this regard, the research questions considered competing tongyi and taidu policy 
positions, since all co-constitute huadu. 
Thus, detailed hypotheses became: 
i) An overarching Free China discourse constituted huadu  
ii) Huadu is legitimated in Taiwanese Political Speech 1992-2016. 
iii) Free China and huadu are co-constituted in Taiwanese Political Speech: 
1945-1992  
5.4.5. DHA and Pragmatic Analysis 
Texts were then selected from the study corpora and revisited abductively. These 
became the basis for analysis of the discursive construction and legitimation of 
huadu. The DHA’s alternative categories of argumentation schemes and rhetorical 
patterns and linguistic means of realisation permit the separation of diplomatic 
frames, topoi and fallacies from the lexico-grammatical features (see appendix). In 
analysing the texts in terms of these categories, the researcher sought to identify the 
following: 
1. How huadu was rhetorically legitimated through tropes, fallacies, topoi and 
argumentation schemes in Taiwanese political speech; 
2. How huadu was linguistically legitimated through presupposition, implicature and 
deixis in Taiwanese political speech. 
 
A pilot study based on Ma Ying-jeou’s political speech around the Xi-Ma summit in 
November 2015 confirmed that the research design worked as predicted. It showed 
that, contrary to the pan-Green claim that the KMT sought to sell Taiwan out, Ma’s 
discourse in this case legitimated huadu. This research design is operationalised in 
subsequent chapters where political speech is triangulated to political context and 
historical description.   
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5.4.6. Legitimating Taiwan through the “we” of huadu 
Drawing on the pronouns of power and solidarity (q.v. 5.3.7.4.), the researcher 
sought to locate the we of huadu in the Taiwanese political speech corpus.  This 
section finds that we is deployed discursively to legitimate Taiwan as a sovereign 
state. It operates in a cross-cutting manner across its realm and social constituency 
(q.v. 4.3). First, it does this directly by invoking power in relation to China and to 
tongyi and taidu constituencies to exclude them.  Second, it does it indirectly by 
strategically invoking solidarity to include these constituencies. Third, it operates 
vaguely to leave inclusion or exclusion undetermined. Vague uses of we mean the 
line is not always clear (q.v. Fig. 9).633  
This third “wandering” we permits listeners to include themselves in its scope 
irrespective of the speaker’s intentions. Indeed, the fact that Taiwanese political 
actors may have to address huadu, tongyi and taidu constituencies as well as China 
and the world simultaneously requires vagueness in the we of huadu and demands its 
strategic exploitation. So, while the prototypical we operates to draw clear 
distinctions between in and out-groups, it is used in SIPs to make the border fuzzy 
(q.v. 4.2.2.). This suggests that there is a kaleidoscope of different wes of huadu in 
Taiwanese political speech and, rather than unconsciously assuming a we of huadu, 
listeners may need to bring contextual knowledge to bear to recognise the particular 
we being invoked. Since Austin’s Speech Act Theory (illocution-perlocution) claims 
it is the addressee who decides who we refers to and who is excluded, context 
                                                 
633 Pennycook, Alistair. 1993. The politics of pronouns. English Language Teaching Journal, 48(2). 
Kuo Sai-hua. 2002. From solidarity to antagonism: The uses of the second- person singular pronoun in 
Chinese political discourse. Text, 22 (1), 29-55; de Fina, A. 1995). Pronominal choice, identity and 
solidarity in political discourse. Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse, 15 (3): 379-410; 
Petersoo, Pille. 2007. What does ‘we’ mean? National deixis in the media. Journal of 
Language and Politics 6(3): 419-436;  Íñigo-Mora, Isabel. 2004. On the use of the personal pronoun 
we in communities. Journal of Language and Politics, 3(1): 27–52. 
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determines pragmatic interpretation and whether and why hearers (Beijing; 
international community; tongyi and taidu constituencies) act on it. 
Fairclough (2000) argues that this “constant ambivalence and slippage between 
exclusive and inclusive we” means that we is a powerful tool of political persuasion 
and state identity construction. 634 In all cases, huadu deploys we in order to gain 
legitimacy. The meaning of the we of huadu is contextual, understood pragmatically 
and used to legitimate huadu through shifts in power and solidarity and exploitation 
of the discursive gap between illocution and perlocution. The scope of we in English 
and Chinese can often only be inferred from context. And as the gap between 
illocution and perlocution means actors in an interaction interpret the context in 
different ways, there is often the possibility that hearers will include themselves in 
the scope when the speaker did not intend to do this, or vice versa.  
The we of huadu is the we of Taiwan. This double inference is made possible not just 
by the politics of Taiwan’s contested status, but by the inclusive-exclusive overlap 
inherent in we that makes the “wandering” we possible in the first place. It is this 
double-inferential quality of we that asserts and legitimates Taiwan’s de facto 
independence and resists China’s power. To locate it, this section takes Fairclough 
and Wodak’s (2010) framework in figure 5 as an ideal-type starting point. This ideal-
type taxonomy abstracts out inherent vagueness to argue that a propositional we may 
be identified semantically as referring inclusively or exclusively to I (Taiwan – ROC) 
and certain others. Whether we indexes Taiwan (ROC) regardless of inclusion or 
exclusion is also of interest. 
                                                 
634 Fairclough, Norman. 2000. New Labour, New Language? London, Routledge: 35; Petersoo, Pille. 
2007. What does ‘we’ mean? Journal of Language and Politics, 6(3): 419-36. 
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Elites may exploit the inclusive-exclusive boundary to deploy the we of huadu, 
instrumentally using a double-inference we to speak exclusively for the ROC 
(Taiwan) and inclusively for the audience. 635  Thus, through the inclusive we, 
Taiwanese elites speaking for the ROC (Taiwan) may imply a generic collective we 
that assumes that addressees recognise themselves in huadu.636 It is what we indexes 
– or points to - that is important in legitimating huadu. Like all pragmatic political 
speech, personal pronouns represent verbal coercion through the strategic interplay 
of inclusion and exclusion. 
States rarely feature explicitly as actors in political text in the sense that they are not 
usually nominalised. Because of its contested status, this is even more the case with 
Taiwan. The strategic use of we threrefore bestows agency on Taipei and has a 
number of potential pay-offs in terms of legitimacy. First, it compels a unified stance 
between speaker and addressee; second, it obviates the political challenge of 
explicitly mentioning Taiwan or the ROC; third, it determines the responses of all 
addressees within an expanding social constituency; the core subject huadu 
constituency can interpret we as meaning Taiwan, while taidu and tongyi 
constituencies are drawn into the subject constituency’s scope; fourth, the 
international community, as a non-subject constituency is invited to endorse huadu in 
its recognition of the we of huadu’s reference to liberal norms; finally, Beijing is 
compelled to recognise its own relationship to the we of huadu thus compelling its 
sanction of huadu over time.  
Based on the discussion above, this study seeks to locate the following uses of the we 
of huadu in the data: 
                                                 
635 See: Wales, Katherine. 1996: 62. 
636 See: Fairclough, Norman. 1989 [2001].  Language and Power. Harlow: Pearson: 127f. 
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• Exclusive we — the speaker-inclusive, addressee-exclusive we, where we 
denotes the speaker as the ROC identifying with Taiwan.  
• Inclusive Taiwanese we — the speaker-and addressee-inclusive we, where we 
refers to the speaker as the ROC and his constituency in Taiwan.  
• Exclusive cross-Strait we – the speaker and addressee-exclusive we, where 
the speaker as the ROC is speaking to China and including Taiwan in we.  
• Inclusive cross-Strait we- the speaker and addressee-inclusive we, where we 
denotes both sides acting together, or a pan-Chinese zhonghua identity.   
• Instrumentally vague or wandering we – strategic and hedging. 
a) I + you addressee-inclusive 
b) I + (s)he addressee-exclusive 
c) I + you (plural) 
(= I + n + you) 
addressee-inclusive 
d) I + they 
(= I + n + (s)he) 
addressee-exclusive 
e) I + you + (s)he addressee-inclusive + ? 
f) I + you (plural) + (s)he addressee inclusive + ? 
g) I + you (plural) + they 
(= I + n X you + n X (s)he) 
addressee-inclusive + ? 
Figure 14 Symmetrical v asymmetrical power relations with we 
(Fairclough and Wodak (2010) after Lakoff (1990)).637 
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5.5. Conclusion 
This research design successfully operationalises this study’s research hypothesis and 
theoretical framework. It accounts for China’s inability to subdue Taiwan in terms of 
Taipei’s deployment of a powerful huadu discourse, thus legitimating and securing 
Taiwan’s sovereignty. The data shows that an overarching huadu macro-discourse is 
co-constitutive of domestic Taiwanese and cross-Strait power politics. Discourse 
analysis is not to do with the subjective and interpretive parsing of political speech. 
Discursive patterns encoded in language manipulate readers’ perceptions and 
“politics, knowledge and transformation are the products of myriad collective 
linguistic interchanges”.638  
While it is true that Taipei and Beijing have created a diplomatic rhetorical 
framework that seeks to avoid ascribing legitimacy to each other, the pragmatic 
meaning unconsciously and less-guardedly encoded in cross-Strait text tells a 
different story. Rhetoric and diplomatic frames permit constructive ambiguity in elite 
political speech. Taiwanese political speech does not spout propaganda; rather, it 
positions actors so that they impose their identities on others’ interpretation of text 
and both inter-subjectively reproduce that text as discourse. Thus, huadu is flagged 
unconsciously on a daily basis. Huadu may have become salient in a crisis of 
legitimacy, but it is legitimated every day in Taiwanese political speech as its 
normative representations are signalled and reproduced in “prosaic, routine words” 
that take the ROC’s sovereign independence for granted.639  
                                                                                                                                          
Abingdon: Routledge: 98-111; Lakoff, Robin. T. 1990. Talking Power: The Politics of Language. 
Basic Books. 
638 Chilton, Paul. Tian Hailong and Wodak, Ruth. 2010. Discourse and Socio-Political 
Transformations in Contemporary China. Journal of Language and Politics 9(4):485-487. 
639 Billig, Michael. 1995: 6-8.  
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Chapter 6: Building and Dismantling Free China 1947- 1987 
One day I fell into conversation with two Americans in a jeep beside the road and, in 
passing, explained to them that I was not a Japanese but a Chinese from Formosa. It 
was something of a shock to find myself for the first time openly and proudly making 
this distinction.640 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter argues the seeds of ROC Independence, or huadu, can be found in the 
authoritarian KMT’s failed attempt to legitimate itself as Free China, or ziyou 
zhongguo.  Between the late 1940s and 1987, a dialectical process of sinification 
(zhongguohua) and Taiwanisation (bentuhua) constituted and then dismantled a de 
facto independent Free China, separate from China proper. This process in turn 
constituted huadu. This and subsequent chapters operationalise this study’s realist-
constructivist framework and discourse analysis by triangulating to historical and 
linguistic description. They offer empirical evidence for the hypotheses generated in 
the introduction and the research design. That is, first, the discursive power of huadu 
legitimates Taiwan’s ROC state identity, trumping Beijing’s material power, 
compelling its sanction and securing Taipei’s de facto independence. Second, textual 
warrant for this claim exists in Taiwanese political speech. Third, that textual warrant 
indicates that an overarching huadu discourse is operative in Taiwanese political 
speech regardless of political party. As such, it reveals a process of state identity 
change that accounts for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto sovereignty in the face 
of Beijing’s power.  
640 Peng Ming-min. 1972. A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader. New 
York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston: 51-52. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows: Free China rose and fell in response to two 
extended crises of legitimacy for the ROC. Both involved fundamental state identity 
change to achieve sanction across a shifting realm of political action and social 
constituency of legitimation. Taiwan’s cession to the ROC in 1945 led to a 
Taiwanese revolt, the 1947 28th February Incident (2-28). The KMT responded to 
this with brutal suppression in martial law and the White Terror from 1947. After its 
retreat to the island in 1949, the KMT restructured and imposed Free China on 
Taiwan through sinification. Second, from the 1970s, Free China metamorphosed 
into Taiwan through bentuhua even as sinification policies intensified. International 
de-recognition prompted delegitimation in the context of domestic protest. This time, 
the state responded with liberalisation, ending martial law in 1987 and paving the 
way for democratisation and huadu. Between these crises, resistance to authoritarian 
Free China took cross-cutting Taiwanese and Chinese liberal and nationalist forms, 
but these achieved limited sanction in the face of KMT power. Sinification attempted 
and failed to maintain a Nationalist Chinese state identity on Taiwan; Taiwanisation 
dismantled that state identity, but secured the ROC.  
6.2. Sinification 
Sinification (zhongguohua) represents China’s (as the ROC) efforts to make Taiwan 
Chinese in Free China, while Taiwanisation (bentuhua) represents Taiwan’s efforts 
to make China (as the ROC) Taiwanese in huadu.641 The ROC is the locus of the shift 
from one to the other. While the principles of huadu are the ideological and moral 
tenets of liberal democracy, with sovereignty embodied in the Taiwanese nation, 
Free China permitted the ROC to assert the sovereignty of the Chinese nation in 
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Taiwan. That most citizens were Taiwanese necessitated an authoritarian Chinese 
nationalism to legitimate China’s claim. This claim was based, first, on the 
successor-state principle (the ROC had succeeded the Qing, which had surrendered 
Taiwan to Japan); second, the illegitimacy of Japan’s rule (the 1895 Treaty of 
Shimonosekei was an unequal treaty); third, a primordialist claim that Taiwan had 
been “Chinese since antiquity”; fourth, the “narrative of return” that delegitimated 
Communist rule on the mainland. The ROC claimed sovereignty over all of China 
based on Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, the 1947 Constitution and the 
1948 Nanjing parliament. The outbreak of the Korean War bestowed international 
legitimacy on Free China as an anti-Communist state. As the narrative of return 
became less tenable, it attempted to sinify Taiwan and create the ROC anew as Free 
China.  The ROC legitimated this identity semantically, through explicit assertions 
and rhetorical tropes, and pragmatically through implicit linguistic formulations.  
The ROC sought to delegitimate both Taiwan Independence (taidu) under a putative 
ROT and zhongtong (PRC-led) Chinese Unification (tongyi). Yet, in asserting Free 
China, the ROC constructed a categorical difference between itself and the PRC and 
qualified its Chinese-ness. In setting Free China’s normative representations in 
opposition to those of the PRC, the ROC enacted a norm-based morality that 
constituted a realm and constituency in Taiwan alone. Thus, sinification isolated 
Taiwan from China since it was enacted not by the metropolis, but by a state 
insulated from its metropolis.  
In sinifying Taiwan, the KMT made the island Free China’s realm and the 
Taiwanese its constituency. 642  Yet, these constructs were contingent and only 
remained legitimate for the ROC as long as the ROC itself retained legitimacy. Free 
                                                 
642 See Reus-Smit, Christian. 2007. 
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China represented a limited social base: it served elite Chinese Nationalist interests 
and made the Taiwanese a persecuted minority, even as sinification made them 
citizens of China. As sinification intensified, Taiwanese elites within the KMT and 
the non-KMT dangwai challenged Free China through bentuhua.643 In the process, 
the KMT abandoned Free China, using the same linguistic techniques used during 
sinification. It is Taiwan’s optimistic, then wary, then traumatic contact with the 
ROC between 1945 and 1950 that constitutes the first phase in the transition to Free 
China.  
6.2.1. Retrocession 
A national consciousness implies a group aspiration to statehood and that did not 
exist for Taiwan until contact with the ROC. 644 Yet, the arrival of the KMT in 
September 1945 prompted an identity crisis, since any residual pre-1895 Chinese 
consciousness had taken a Taiwanese form under Japanese rule. This exhibited itself 
in local elites acting Japanese in public, but practising a maritime sinic culture based 
on the Hoklo and Hakka languages and on folklore and religion at home. 645 
Mandarin-speaking Taiwanese elites initially welcomed Retrocession. 646 Yet, Peng 
Ming-min (1972) relates the shame and confusion felt by his Taiwanese elite father 
on formally welcoming the KMT army to Kaohsiung: 
The ship docked … and off came the troops of China, the victors. The first man to 
appear was a bedraggled fellow who looked and behaved more like a coolie than a 
soldier, walking off with a carrying pole across his shoulder, from which was suspended 
his umbrella, sleeping mat, cooking pot, and cup. Others like him followed, some with 
shoes, some without. Few had guns. With no attempt to maintain order or discipline, 
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they pushed off the ship, glad to be on firm land, but hesitant to face the Japanese lined 
up and saluting smartly on both sides. My father wondered what the Japanese could 
possibly think. He had never felt so ashamed in his life.647 
Peng implies that the “hesitant” Chinese lacked the confidence “to face” (a verb that 
implies threat) the Japanese, “saluting smartly”. The presupposition in “few had guns” 
and “no attempt to maintain order or discipline” is that armies have guns and are 
ordered and disciplined. Therefore, by implication, the KMT is not a legitimate army 
and cannot provide security (and therefore constitute a threat). The co-textual 
juxtaposition of the grandiose term “the troops of China, the victors” with the 
demeaning terms “bedraggled fellow” and “coolie” discursively dismiss the KMT 
army (corpus analysis and Speech Act Theory indicate that these terms imply an 
insult). Peng’s musing over his father’s thoughts acts as a presuppositional trigger, 
inviting a flood of negative interpretations of the Chinese. Read pragmatically, the 
text may be interpreted as appealing to an international audience, with knowledge of 
2-28 and The White Terror, to delegitimate China’s rule from the outset. 
Retrocession set the stage for the Taiwanese (benshengren) – Mainlander 
(waishengren) cleavage that set a Hoklo/Hakka core in opposition to a heterogeneous 
Mainlander one based on loyalty to the KMT. General Chen Yi, the new Chinese 
governor, viewed the Taiwanese as Japanese collaborators and set the tone for 2-28.  
The resentment and bitterness generated by Chen’s governorship was reflected in a 
graffito that appeared in Taipei, referring to the departure of the Japanese and the 
arrival of the Chinese: “Dogs go, pigs come”.648 
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6.2.2. February 28 and the Settlement Committee 
As a founding massacre, 2-28 represents a clear watershed in the articulation of 
Taiwanese nationalism. In February 1947 the Taiwanese, increasingly disenchanted 
with Chinese maladministration and brutality, revolted.649 Locals took over the KMT 
administration on 4th March and a locally-constituted Settlement Committee 
attempted to negotiate with Chen Yi. Its early demands were varied: democratic 
elections; surrender of the KMT army; greater autonomy within the ROC; 
representation in peace-treaty negotiations with Japan; a referendum on Taiwan’s 
political future and an end to corruption. 650 Others sought UN trusteeship, full 
independence and an alliance with the Chinese Communists.651 The conveners spoke 
as legitimate representatives of Taiwan and on 5th March the Committee stated:  
Pending approval by the Central Government, the … Committee to Settle the February 
28 Incident will undertake reorganization of the present administration…we should 
acknowledge the aim of this action, that there is no other desire except to demand a 
reformation of Government.652  
But “reformation of Government” could be read differently in the discursive gap 
between illocution and perlocution and, thus, mean many things. Power was up for 
grabs and the Committee sought to legitimate its own role in the ROC with rhetorical 
references to Chinese nationalist ideology. In their 32 demands, they stated, “we are 
all sons of the Yellow Emperor and of the Han race. The quality of national 
government depends on all citizens of the republic”. 
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The 32 Demands may be read pragmatically in the discursive gap that arose in the 
state’s crisis of legitimacy. Normatively, they oscillate between taidu and tongyi, 
presaging an ideal Free China, yet creating a gap for what would become huadu 
norms. While retaining the ROC, they deploy both nascent Taiwanese nationalism 
and liberal Chinese nationalism in civic democracy. 653  The demands pledge 
allegiance semantically to the ROC since there is no alternative institutional 
infrastructure to legitimate a sovereign Taiwanese state. Yet the KMT had not yet 
legitimated China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. The KMT had established the 
institutions to propagate Chinese norms. But ROC legitimacy had collapsed under 
KMT’s governance by 2-28.  
The KMT exploited the gap, making administrative amends and acceding to some of 
the Committee’s demands. Seven Taiwanese were brought into the 14-strong Taiwan 
Provincial Commission. 654  At the same time, it brutally suppressed the wider 
revolt.655 By the end of March, the KMT had instituted the White Terror, imprisoned 
and executed local leaders and elites. The number killed is a matter of debate.656 2-28, 
as it became known, became both taboo and totemic – the “most important single 
event in Taiwan’s history because it made Taiwanese history thinkable”.657  
Free China had not yet been born and the ROC was still based in Nanjing, but 2-28 
was a crisis of legitimacy for the ROC, which responded with coercion, martial law 
and terror to maintain its identity as an anti-Communist, Chinese Nationalist party 
state.  The White Terror peaked between 1950 and 1953 and overlapped with martial 
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law, which was instituted in May 1949 and lasted until August 1987. About 140,000 
Communists and Taiwan independentists were imprisoned and 3,000 to 4,000 
executed. Later prosecutions were of liberal Mainlander (waishengren) intellectuals 
who had fled the Communists in 1949.658  The White Terror effectively neutered the 
Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) (q.v. 6.3.1.), which went into exile, 
penetrated by KMT agents. The result was that there was no effective domestic 
independence movement during martial law. As such, the White Terror enabled 
sinification, constituting the ROC as Free China in opposition to the PRC in 
isolation on Taiwan. Yet, it also presaged huadu by constituting a Taiwanese 
constituency through agricultural, economic and educational reform.  These led to 
economic development in the Taiwan Miracle while allowing a distinctive 
Taiwanese identity to flourish. Through land reform, the KMT had hoped to separate 
Taiwan’s rural elite from its constituency.  However, excluded from political life, 
rural elites moved to manufacturing, becoming the Taiwanese bourgeoisie. 659 
6.2.3. Constructing and Legitimating Free China 
Free China arose in a traumatic, fundamental crisis of legitimacy. 660 It was 
consolidated in KMT reform and institutional restructuring in Taiwan between 1950 
and 1952. Yet, Free China was in fact two identities –a KMT party-state one and a 
quasi-opposition KMT one. This study conceives of these as Free China “realis” and 
Free China “idealis”. The former represents authoritarian KMT rule encoded in the 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for 
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Suppression of the Communist Rebellion and the Taiwan Garrison Command and 
enacted in martial law and White Terror. The latter represents an idealised ROC as 
conceived in Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles and visible in liberal Chinese 
Nationalist discourse. Sinification exhibits a tension between them. This section 
argues that huadu was dialectically constructed in this tension since it mutually 
constituted the ROC and Taiwan as separate to China.  
To legitimate Free China, the KMT had to enact Chinese nationalism using 
sinification to penetrate and mobilise Taiwanese society. 661 This required a police 
state. Writing in January 1949, Chiang Kai-shek wrote:  
The biggest reason for our defeat was that we never have been able to establish a new, 
solid organizational system. The old one had long deteriorated and collapsed. In the 
current, crucial phase between the old and the new, we have lost the basic means to 
rebuild and save our country. This is why we have been defeated.662 
Between 1950 and 1952, the KMT party state reformed and became Free China. 
This state identity constructed Taiwan in its own right in successive discourses. 
“Defend Taiwan” became “Develop Taiwan” and “Build Taiwan”. Granted, in their 
original form these were simply mobilising slogans. Read retrospectively in the 
context of huadu, however, they reveal the intersubjective, co-constitutive and 
dialectical nature of state identity construction. While not an explicit plan to build a 
Taiwanese state, these discourses reflect SIPs that constituted Taiwan as the ROC’s 
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realm and constituency, constructing Taiwan in its own right from the earliest days 
of the KMT rule.663 
In January 1950 the recently exiled ROC perceived a threat to its survival when the 
US decided not to intervene in the event of a Communist attack. In March, Premier 
Chen Cheng told the National Assembly, “We must concentrate all our efforts to 
defend Taiwan and prepare for a counteroffensive on the mainland”. 664  Between 
April and May, Chiang Kai-shek enacted local elections to legitimate a defeated 
Chinese regime that had no Taiwanese support after 2-28. The outbreak of the 
Korean War in June 1950 saved the KMT. Although the US acknowledged Taiwan’s 
unresolved status, it secured the ROC, impeding a Republic of Taiwan.665 Yet, the 
resulting KMT reforms constituted the ROC’s realm and constituency within Taiwan 
alone. 
In reforming its normative representations and organisational structure, the KMT 
sought to reassert legitimacy at the Seventh National Congress in October 1952. 
These included the revolutionary, nationalist and democratic aspects of the Three 
Principles and the Party’s Leninist structure.666 Yet, representational inconsistency 
highlighted the Free China “realis-idealis” split. KMT General Chang Ch'i-yun 
stated the KMT was revolutionary in its methods but not in its goals, while for Fu 
Xuming the goal was democracy.667 Fu invoked the Three Principles’ military rule 
and tutelage, justifying the White Terror and sinification. Leninist reorganisation 
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allowed the KMT to secure Free China’s long-term goals of political stability, 
economic growth and anti-Communism, to survive and subjugate Taiwan’s political 
elites. The naming of Taiwan by the KMT pragmatically isolated and insulated the 
ROC, synthesising pan-Chinese and Taiwanese discourses to legitimate Free China 
in opposition to Red China.668 In doing so, it constituted Taiwan as a separate realm 
and constituency. 
6.2.3.1. Free China “Realis”: Build Taiwan and Prepare for the Counter offensive 
Free China “realis” was constituted in the authoritarian ROC’s development policies, 
framed as anti-Communism and enacted in Martial Law and the White Terror. Yet, 
these implicitly defined Free China as independent, presaging huadu:  
The aim [of development] is to protect the freedom of the people (minzu) and national 
(state - guojia) independence. The measures of the Communist bandits … are premised 
upon class interests. This poisonous … rebellion shatters social cohesion ... confounds 
ethics and annuls morality. . . . To target this cultural aggression, we must strengthen 
education in the cultural movements of the Three Principles … and ensure the fostering 
of national consciousness.669 
Linguistically, the KMT co-textually juxtaposes securitising verbs (“protect”; 
“strengthen”; “ensure”; “foster”, “target”) with destructive ones (“shatter”; 
“confound”; “annul”) to frame Beijing as a threat. The ROC is legitimated 
rhetorically in “the freedom of the people”, “national consciousness” and “national 
independence”, while the “poisonous” “Communist bandits”, who carry out “cultural 
aggression” and “rebellion” against the KMT’s “social cohesion”, “ethics” and 
“morality” are linguistically delegitimated. The illocutionary-pelocutionary gap 
explains why Taiwanese addressees may have perceived a dissonance between “the 
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people” and “national independence”. Yet, for the KMT, such a Free China “realis” 
offered Taiwan a corporatist, nationalist state identity that sought to naturalise a 
5,000-year Chinese cultural identity. 670  It followed Sun’s Three Principles of 
nationalism, democracy and livelihood, which envisaged three stages: military rule, 
tutelage and then democracy. Yet, under KMT restructuring, it focused on military 
rule and tutelage, shelving democracy in the process. Free China “realis” legitimated 
the ROC’s claims to territories lost by the Qing, including Taiwan.671  
Chiang re-introduced the ROC’s 1930s quasi-fascist and militaristic aspects, 
fetishising submission to the state. 672 In his speeches and interviews through the 
1950s and 1960s, he exhorted the people to resist Communism and build a New 
China that spoke to an independent Republic of China. In his 1951 national day 
speech, Chiang said:  
A democratic and free Republic of China has now been established for forty years. . . . 
the glorious record of our revolutionary martyrs who struggled with blood and tears to 
save and reconstruct the nation. . . . In spite of the failure of our anti-Communist war on 
the mainland, we continue to vigorously struggle for national independence…. Now 
Taiwan, the base area of Free China, is the foundation of national recovery and 
reconstruction. . . . Everyone should reflect on whether he has lived up to the 
expectations of the father of the nation, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionary 
martyrs.673 
From the earliest days of the “independent” ROC in Taiwan, “the nation” reflected a 
discursive dependence on Chinese nationalist language. “The nation” is China and 
Chiang constitutes a narrative of Chinese national unity from 1911 in Nanjing to 
1951 in Taiwan. Yet, the realm and constituency are Taiwan. Here, the word 
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“independence” changes pragmatic meaning. For Chiang, independence meant 
China’s aspiration to self-determination and non-dependence on foreign powers. But 
in fact it constituted the ROC’s material non-dependence on a mainland realm and 
constituency and self-determination in the ROC’s discursive and material 
independence from China.  
The 1950s and 1960s saw the consolidation of Free China “realis” as the KMT 
enforced sinification through the ROC. Educational reform was part of the 
legitimating process. In order to align to Sun’s Three Principles, Taiwan’s 
inhabitants had to be made Chinese and anti-Communist and share a destiny with the 
Mainland. Mandarin was imposed in schools, local varieties suppressed, and a 
Nationalist Chinese curriculum imposed. Yet, its harshness varied and a vibrant 
bentuhua appropriated Mandarin while resisting cultural sinification (q.v. 7.3.). The 
KMT’s response was further sinification in 1966 and even as it sought to liberalise 
from 1975 it formally enacted Free China in education. 674  The result was that a 
generation of Taiwanese identified with the ROC in opposition to the PRC. 
However, while the KMT legitimated Chinese nationalism through economic and 
social development, its state identity became ambivalent. Tongyi under the PRC 
(zhongtong) and taidu in a ROT were sedition; this meant Free China sought 
sanction from a Taiwanese constituency. Authoritarian development legitimated Free 
China by de-legitimating the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Yet, 
relentless delegitimation of the PRC created a deeper state identity gap, 
delegitimating Taipei’s claim to Chinese-ness. Paradoxically, Free China “realis” 
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permitted the Taiwan Miracle, legitimating Taiwan in terms of its own name and 
economic performance.675  
6.2.3.2. Free China “Idealis”: “Develop the Freedom and Democracy of Society” 
The presence of waishengren intellectuals such as Lei Chen, Bo Yang, Li Ao and Hu 
Fo within the KMT after 1949 prompted a more liberal form of Chinese nationalism 
in opposition to Free China “realis”. This is salient in the opposition between 
Taipei’s asserted identity and that of the propaganda vehicle it set up to promote that 
identity, the liberal-nationalist Free China Fortnightly (ziyou zhongguo 
banyuekan). 676 A forum for free discussion and propaganda against the PRC, the 
KMT suppressed it when it became critical of its own Party State.  
Lei Chen, who edited Free China Fortnightly, sought a Chinese civic democracy 
based on the 1919 May 4th Movement and Sun’s Three Principles. This Free China 
“idealis” aspired to ROC-led tongyi, not taidu. The editors switched between support 
for and open critique of KMT policies. In 1957, the journal asserted, “assuming the 
existence of a strong opposition to the party is one of the fundamental conditions of 
democratic government”.677 Lei Chen went further to openly challenge the KMT’s 
rhetoric and policies. In “Opposing the Mainland,” Lei wrote: “Our opposition to 
communism is not for political rights, rather it is a way of life, covering everything 
from ideology to lifestyle, and in substance it is no different from communism 
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itself”. 678 In 1958, the Free China Fortnightly presented a Free China Movement 
manifesto:  
1. We must declare to all the people of the world that freedom and democracy are absolutely 
fundamental, and then that we must urge the government (at all levels) that in addition to 
reform of economic governance, we must develop the freedom and democracy of society.  
2. We must support the government using all possible efforts to fight for freedom under the 
iron curtain of communism.  
3. We must use all our strength to assist the compatriots in occupied territories, and help them 
to recover their freedoms.  
4. Our first goal must be to establish all of the Republic of China as a free China.679 
In epistemically asserting the norms of freedom and democracy to “all the people of 
the world” through the modal verb “must”, the Manifesto explicitly seeks 
international legitimation of a Free China “idealis” and delegitimation of Chinese 
Communism. Yet, through the implicative verb “urge” and the conjunction “in 
addition to” in the co-text of “economic governance” and “freedom and democracy”, 
it also implies pragmatically that these do not exist under Free China “realis”. Rather 
than a semantic assertion of ROC norms, the manifesto was therefore read by the 
state pragmatically as an implicit rebuke and threat (q.v. 5.1).   
Free China Fortnightly helped create a proto civil society in Taiwan and presaged 
the dangwai through a liberal, urban Chinese nationalist tradition.  Yet, it constituted 
Free China as separate from China. Lei implicitly criticised the KMT for failing to 
live up to Free China’s normative representations, but avoided explicitly asserting 
normative representations different to those ideally claimed by the KMT, such as 
self-determination for Taiwan. The KMT shut Free China Fortnightly down in 1960 
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when Lei and Yin Haiguang called the KMT “political garbage”, proposed a China 
Democratic Party and advocated a Democratic Republic of Chinese Taiwan 
(zhonghua taiwan minzhuguo). Lei was charged with sedition for “harbouring a 
Communist agent” and imprisoned. 680  
Free China “idealis” surfaced again in the context of the ROC’s expulsion from the 
UN in 1971. Yang Hsi-kun proposed to the US ambassador that Taiwan’s ties with 
China should be cut and the ROC renamed the “Chinese Republic of Taiwan” 
(zhonghua Taiwan gongheguo).681  Unconsciously presaging a form of huadu (q.v. 
1.5.), the ambassador interpreted “Chinese” as “a generic term stemming from the 
Chinese ethnic origin of the populace on Taiwan” rather than a “political 
meaning”.682  
6.3. Resistance 
In 1948, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported: “What information leaks out of 
Taiwan … is a story of exploitation and oppression suffered by the natives at the 
hands of the Chinese masters.”683 Some Taiwanese fled to mainland China, seeking 
zhongtong under the CCP. 684  However, a more prominent group, the Taiwan 
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Independence Movement (TIM - or haiwai taidu yundong), escaped to Hong Kong, 
Japan and the US.  
The TIM should not be conflated with taidu constituencies in democratic Taiwan; it 
was a disparate collection of exiled interest groups that drew on Formosan 
nationalism between the late 1940s and early 1980s. Because of KMT penetration of 
Taiwanese society and taidu’s status as sedition, the TIM remained the strongest 
articulation of an aspiration to taidu during Martial Law.685  
6.3.1. The Taiwan Independence Movement 
As a nationalist response to 2-28, the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) 
coalesced semi-clandestinely among exiled dissidents and overseas sojourners. Shu’s 
(2002) research suggests most TIM activists were “privileged”, “marginalized”, 
“educated” benshengren graduate students who had been “exposed to liberal 
professors who … criticised the KMT’s record on the Mainland and attributed the 
debacle of 1949 to the corruption and ineffectual leadership of the KMT”.686  
The TIM’s disparate organisations merged in 1970 as the World United Formosans 
for Independence (WUFI). 687 Yet, while it was capable of mobilisation and direct 
action overseas, the TIM singularly failed either to penetrate Taiwanese society or to 
achieve a RoT and was effectively delegitimated by the KMT and marginalised by 
the dangwai movement within Taiwan. 688  While TIM activists used the name 
“Taiwan” in Chinese, in English propaganda they used “Formosa” to counter ROC 
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naming practices, to highlight the “Formosa Problem” and to present Free China as 
linguistically and conceptually illegitimate. 689  In doing so, they appealed for 
legitimacy to a broader international constituency. 
The TIM sought a plebiscite on self-determination and UN trusteeship until this 
could be held. In September 1948, they petitioned the UN to demand “all properties 
and assets taken over or away by the Chinese rulers be conserved in the hands of the 
provisional Formosan administration until the wishes of the people, after the 
plebiscite, have become known” and that “all Chinese nationals who arrived after 
August 15, 1945, be concentrated and repatriated.”690 In a memorandum to the UN, 
Formosa Speaks, in September 1950 the TIM advocated a state identity based on an 
incoherent mix of primordialist, racial, cultural and liberal representations. 691 The 
legitimacy of such a taidu identity was challenged by the reality of Taiwan’s material 
link to the ROC and its Chinese cultural heritage. 
By 1955, the brothers Joshua and Thomas Liao had formed a “hapless … fractious 
and ineffective” Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa (Taiwan 
gongheguo linshi zhengfu) and a Provisional National Congress in Japan. While The 
Cold War marginalised them in the face of KMT and CCP ideology, they operated 
within UN norms and the institutions of the Provisional Government provided a 
degree of legitimacy. 692  Campaigning for a new state based on Wilsonian self-
determination and decolonisation, taidu remained an aspiration.693  
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The Provisional Government used publications – Formosa Quarterly and 
Independent Formosa – to promote taidu. Yet, although their political speech 
contained Republic of Taiwan rhetoric, it did not encode a state identity as the Three 
Principles or Free China had done. Rather, it sought to undermine Free China by 
reporting human rights abuses and articulating an ethnic Taiwanese national identity. 
As Free China gained a degree of legitimacy, Formosan nationalists developed a 
sentimental counter-narrative of an oppressed nation, denied statehood. In 1963, 
Formosa Quarterly lamented: “the ten million Formosans living in Formosa are 
groaning under the heartless mechanism of oppression”.694  
In 1965 the exile, Ko Kiansing, ramblingly attempted to define Taiwanese national 
identity, but failed to articulate a state identity:  
What is this nation called Formosa? The Formosan and the Chinese themselves 
correctly distinguish one another by instinct. Be that as it may … rooted essentially in 
nationalism … the Formosan may be defined as those, their descendants inclusive, who 
(1) had maintained continuous living in the island until the time of its cession to Japan 
on 2nd June, 1895, in consequence of the Sino-Japanese War terminated earlier that 
year, (2) chose to remain Formosan by staying in the island after 8th May, 1897, the day 
the people of Formosa were given a chance to decide their future path—whether or not 
to leave the island of Formosa. . . . Their decision was, in fact, an indication of the will 
of the Formosan to share the same fate with the land and, furthermore, of the birth or 
awakening of the “Formosan Consciousness” omnipresent in the minds of the people of 
Formosa.695 
As an attempt to distinguish Taiwan from China, this does not define any normative 
representations beyond nationalism and its concepts of “the Formosan”, “the 
Chinese”, “continuous living”, “instinct”, “will”, “fate” and “land”. For Ko, simply 
existing or being in Taiwan before 1895 and after 1897 makes one nationally 
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Taiwanese. There is no “doing” of Taiwanese-ness. Rather, the subject merely 
exercises a “choice” to “awaken” a “Formosan Consciousness”. Granted, “choice” 
may be seen as presaging Lee Teng-hui’s concept of the New Taiwanese, but 
citizenship, sovereignty and state-seeking are absent and the latter accepts incomers 
from the mainland while Ko’s articulation excludes them. Formosan nationalism is 
not then, as Harrison (2006) claims, a clear break with Sun Yat-sen’s essentialist 
concept of the nation; it simply switches essentialism from China to Taiwan.  
In May 1965, the KMT managed to split the Provisional Government, co-opting 
Thomas Liao, who returned to Taiwan, stating: 
I, Thomas Liao have been working for the interests and happiness of the Taiwanese 
people overseas for almost 20 years ... But now I recognize … that the biggest threat is 
the infiltration and subversion by the Chinese Communists. Thus, I have renounced my 
Taiwanese independence activities and have decided to answer the call from President 
Chiang's Anti-Communist Union.696 
The KMT reported Liao’s return with glee in the Free China Review. The report 
rhetorically deploys Free China “idealis” norms of magnanimity, unity, freedom and 
democracy. However, a pragmatic reading exposes the chilling Free China “realis” 
beneath the rhetoric. The counter-factual, “any government so challenged might have 
put a price on his head and hunted him to the ends of the earth” would have been 
read by taidu constituencies as a thinly veiled threat since it references what the 
KMT actually did to other dissidents.697 Free China Review identified Beijing as its 
main threat and definitively delegitimated the TIM as “a weak but noisy” nuisance 
that needed to be co-opted in the struggle for tongyi (huatong) under the ROC: 
What mattered to the Chinese government was not the past error of Dr. Liao's thinking, 
but his awakening to the fact that he had played into the hands of Communism and his 
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decision to stand foursquare with President Chiang Kai-shek in fighting the supreme 
enemy of the Chinese people and nation. As for separatism, [Liao] said he had come to 
realize the impracticality of an independent Taiwan. President Chiang and the 
government showed their magnanimity … with a full pardon for Dr. Liao [who] elected 
to return to Taiwan …to heed the call of duty in defending it from the Communists.698 
In December 1965 a TIM offshoot, the United Young Formosans for Independence, 
advocated a more civic taidu that presages Lee Teng-hui’s New 
Taiwanese:”’Formosan’ refers to all people who love Formosa as their homeland, 
who seek independence and happiness for Formosa, and who pray for her progress 
and prosperity.” 699Paradoxically, while it failed in its aims, Formosan nationalism 
constituted Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence from China. While 
compared to the Communists, it was not a serious threat to ROC legitimacy, it failed 
to articulate any state representations beyond nationalism itself and had no effective 
realm or constituency. The TIM’s presence legitimated the ROC by providing the 
latter with a scapegoat. Yet, it also kept Taiwanese nationalism alive when this was 
sedition and so not an option for the dangwai within Taiwan. In doing so, it co-
constituted huadu since a huadu without Taiwanese nationalism would simply be 
Free China “idealis”. 
6.3.2. A Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation 
Within Taiwan, the benshengren dissident KMT technocrat Peng Ming-min’s 1964 
critique of Free China “realis” and “idealis” provides a more compelling articulation 
of resistance. As such, it forms the political underpinnings of bentuhua. Using 
Renan’s claim that national identity rests only loosely on imprecise notions of 
language, ethnicity and culture, it conceives of  a state that represents “neither race, 
language, nor culture”  but rather “a deeply felt Taiwanese sense of community and 
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shared destiny” (mingyun gongtongti).700 Peng identified the KMT claim to Taiwan 
as modernist and realist wrapped in primordialist appeals. 701  First, just because 
Taiwan had “always” been part of China did not mean that it had to remain so; 
second, the ROC attitude to Taiwan was cynical since, for centuries, the mainland 
authorities had dismissed it as a pirates’ lair; third, since 1895, there had been only 
four years of contact between Taiwan and the mainland under a joint government – 
and these had been traumatic; fourth, the KMT claim that Taiwan was crucial to 
salving national humiliation was bogus; China might have been a victim, but it had 
stood up under the Communists in 1949. Finally, he argued, the KMT was using 
Chinese nationalist mythology to maintain a corrupt and brutal regime that could 
represent neither China nor Taiwan. 702  Peng’s determination to break the link 
between ethnicity and the state is clear in his claim that the Chinese should learn:  
to distinguish clearly between ethnic origin, culture and language on the one hand, and 
politics and law on the other, and to abandon the idea that those who are ethnically, 
culturally, and linguistically Chinese must be politically and legally Chinese as well.703 
This social-contract, Peng believed, would more effectively undermine Free China 
“realis” ethnic nationalism than an exclusive sub-ethnic Taiwanese nationalism.704 
Peng was arrested and exiled in 1970 and the extent of his influence on bentuhua in 
the early 1970s was hidden until the dangwai revived it in the discourse of the 
Meilidao protests at Kaohsiung in 1979 (q.v. 6.4.2.). 
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6.4. Taiwanisation 
Bentuhua – Taiwanisation or localisation – was a discursive social process co-
constituted by sinification.705 As a cultural and intellectual response to KMT rule and 
deepening sinification in the 1960s, it became political in the 1970s. 706  Political 
bentuhua developed in ROC liberalisation between 1975 and 1987 as a response to 
the ROC’s extended crisis of legitimacy. Appropriated by the ROC, it helped 
dismantle Free China “realis”. Bentuhua was instrumental in the construction of 
huadu and maintenance of Taiwan’s de facto independence after democratisation and 
up to 2016.707  
If KMT sinification meant making Taiwan align to Chinese norms, bentuhua meant 
aligning China, first as the ROC, then as the PRC, to Taiwanese norms.708 It aligned 
the ROC to Taiwan by appropriating it; it aligned the PRC to Taiwan by compelling 
its provisional sanction. On the one hand, a ROC centre, detached from its 
metropolis, attempted to remake the Taiwanese periphery in China’s image through 
Free China. On the other, the Taiwanese periphery appropriated aspects of the 
Chinese centre, particularly in the dangwai’s absorption of Free China “idealis” 
liberal and democratic norms. These processes were knowingly absorbed by 
Taiwanese political entrepreneurs. 709 As such, bentuhua expanded the ROC’s realm 
and constituency.  
6.4.1. Dismantling Free China 
Several political events facilitated bentuhua’s dismantling of Free China. These 
prompted policies that cannot be explained in purely rational-choice terms; the data 
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strongly indicate that legitimacy was crucial. The ROC’s loss of legitimacy meant 
Free China could no longer define the island’s identity, so the state’s identity had to 
change.   
First, in October 1971, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, 
recognising the PRC and expelling “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the 
place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations”.710 Yet, the subsequent 
1972 Shanghai Communique between the US and the PRC ambiguously 
acknowledged both PRC and ROC One-China principles, creating a linguistic pretext 
for huadu.711 The ROC shed diplomatic allies, but Taiwan’s importance as a trading 
economy, discursively constructed an Asian Tiger and “Made in Taiwan” economic 
identity and a Taiwanese state that was categorically not China.712  This led other 
states to sanction Taiwan’s de facto statehood and engage Taipei in functional terms 
through commercial representation.  
Second, after Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975 his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, co-opted 
bentuhua to liberalise the ROC through limited elections, bringing Taiwanese 
technocrats into the Mainlander-elite dominated state. However, these first steps 
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towards Taiwanising the ROC were aimed at securing KMT rule and did not 
constitute democratic reforms.713  
Third, a bentuhua discourse of resistance became embodied in the dangwai, a loose 
confederation of non-KMT Mainlander and Taiwanese democracy activists. 714 
Drawing on the ideas of Peng Ming-min and local waishengren liberals, the dangwai 
rejected replacing the ROC’s Chinese nationalism with a Hoklo-based ethnic 
Taiwanese nationalism. Instead, they sought a participatory civic culture. 715 
Advocating taidu was sedition and a capital offence, despite taidu forces within the 
broader dangwai constituency. For instance, in 1977, the Presbyterian Church, which 
had agitated alongside the dangwai, issued a proclamation that urged “our 
government to face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan might 
become a new and independent country”.716  
Later that year, the dangwai won over a third of the vote in the Taiwan provincial 
elections and this had an effect on liberal and Taiwanese elements within the KMT. 
A KMT councillor, Hsu Hsin-liang, ran as a dangwai candidate at Zhongli on an 
anti-corruption, socialist ticket that advocated human rights and parliamentary 
democracy. Hsu's supporters rioted and burned down a police station in response to 
KMT ballot-stuffing. The KMT deployed young Taiwanese conscripts, prompting 
                                                 
713 Jacobs, Bruce. 2012.  
714 Jacobs, Bruce. 2005:17-54; Fulda, Andreas Martin. 2002. Re-evaluating the Taiwanese Democracy 
Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Opposition Organizations under Japanese and KMT Rule. 
Critical Asian Studies, 34(3): 357-394. 
715 Extensive accounts of the development of Taiwanese identity from the dangwai to the KMT can be 
found in Hughes, 1997, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism and in Makeham, John and Hsiau, A-chin 
(eds.) Cultural, Ethnic and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua and Jacobs, 
Bruce. 2012. Democratizing Taiwan. 
716 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. 1977. A Declaration on Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church 
in Taiwan. 16 August 1977. [online] Available at: 
http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19770816.html [Accessed 15 March 2015]. 
245 
protestors to chant “do not beat your fellow Taiwanese”. The Zhongli Incident 
marked a definitive shift in legitimacy away from Free China in domestic politics.717  
Fourth, PRC reforms and US de-recognition in December 1978 followed by 
Beijing’s January 1979 offer of OCTS deepened Taipei’s crisis of legitimacy, 
prompting business interests to pressure Taipei to permit trade with the PRC. The 
context of the PRC’s reforms and the ROC’s tongyi identity ought to have prompted 
negotiation. Yet, the ROC responded with the Three Noes of “no contact, no 
compromise and no negotiation” with “the Chinese Communists”, formally asserting 
the ROC’s legitimacy. Taipei’s rejection of business lobbying suggests a unitary 
state balancing a perceived Chinese threat.  
During the 1980s, the KMT continued rhetorically to assert Free China, while 
instituting liberal reforms. At its 13th National Congress in 1981, it announced 
defiantly “the Chinese Communist regime is at death's door” and reasserted its 
mission as an “anti-Communist revolutionary party” that sought to “unify China 
under the Three Principles of the People by completing “the economic development 
of the Taiwan bastion” for “the people’s well-being.”718 The hijacking to China of a 
ROC cargo plane in 1986 provided a pretext for Taipei to abandon the Three Noes 
and re-establish unofficial contact with Beijing as a de facto independent state. While 
making salient the dissonance between Free China and Taipei’s legitimacy to act as 
such, de facto state-to-state contact offered an opportunity to re-legitimate the ROC 
in an expanded realm and constituency.  
Fifth, the publication of Formosa Magazine (Meilidao), by dangwai activists in 1979 
promoted a democratic Taiwanese voice. Meilidao drew on Peng Ming-min’s 1964 
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Declaration to argue that the KMT’s legitimacy was flawed since the ROC was 
detached from its sovereign metropolis, thus presenting a dilemma: the ROC’s link 
with the Chinese nation was premised on the 1948 Nanjing parliament, yet local 
democracy meant that the demos was Taiwan, meaning the ROC legislature could 
represent neither Taiwan nor China.  
Sixth, In September 1986, eighteen dangwai defied the ban on opposition parties and 
founded the DPP, contesting the 1986 election. Committed to constitutional change, 
freedom of speech and association, the ending of censorship, the environment and 
democracy, the DPP did not initially support taidu, as this was sedition. However, it 
did insert a Taiwan Independence Clause into its charter; this clause foresaw a future 
de jure independent state. Once the DPP had representation in the legislature, it 
challenged the KMT. However, it lacked power until 1991, when elderly KMT 
legislators, elected in Nanjing in 1948, were retired. Lee Teng-hui sought to 
strengthen his presidential power so that the DPP could not take control of the 
legislature and declare taidu. In doing so, he delegitimated taidu, secured huadu and 
averted a Chinese Nationalist coup. 
Wang Fu-chang, claims a bottom-up shift in sub-ethnic and domestic politics during 
the 1970s and 1980s caused by bentuhua led inexorably to delegitimation of Free 
China. However, Bruce Jacobs argues that KMT elite-led, top-down liberalisation 
shifted state identity, leading to subsequent democratisation and Taiwanisation under 
Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.719 This study’s Realist-Constructivism resolves the 
debate. Co-constitution in power politics, rather than cause-and-effect, accounts for 
policy outcomes.  
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6.4.2. In Politics, Learn from Kaohsiung! 
The Kaohsiung Incident of 10th December 1979 stands out as a relentless linguistic 
delegitimation of Free China. It resulted from a Meilidao demonstration to mark 
International Human Rights Day. 720  The title of Meilidao’s pre-demonstration 
editorial meeting, “Democracy, Unity, Love Taiwan”, summarised its policy 
concerns.721 In an act of explicit and implicit linguistic delegitimation, the Meilidao 
leader, Shih Ming-teh, invoked Taiwanese nationalism to appeal to local conscripts 
policing the demonstration: 
All armed troops: You are the sons and brothers of Taiwanese. You are the troops of the 
Taiwanese … Taiwanese must not fight Taiwanese. … The Taiwanese are to be pitied; 
do not fight them. Taiwan soldiers withdraw! Taiwan soldiers go! … Taiwanese 
soldiers, move back! … They have their own problems. Let them get away. Don’t fight 
the Taiwanese soldiers. … Don’t fight the Taiwanese people. Taiwanese people, move 
back a bit … Taiwanese people don’t fight each other.722  
As more riot police arrived, Shih addressed them: 
I hope the security police will constrain themselves and will not trample on the 
Taiwanese people. I warn the security police not to trample on the Taiwanese people. 
Take your weapons home …. This NT$ 60 billion worth of equipment of yours is meant 
to fight our enemies, not to fight your fellow Taiwanese.723 
In addressing both the troops and demonstrators in Hoklo, in the presence of 
Nationalist Chinese officers and watching KMT elites, he excludes Free China and 
creates a Taiwanese national solidarity.724 Shih’s micro-discourse reflects a bentuhua 
macro-discourse understood by the participants in the context of the ROC’s wider 
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delegitimation (q.v. 5.2.1.). Indeed, to ascribe Taiwanese-ness to the KMT troops 
was to urge them to reject the legitimacy of the KMT to call them Chinese. Although 
the word “Chinese” is not uttered, it is understood pragmatically in context by all 
participants and thus passes up to the discourse. The outcome, however, indicates 
that while Free China may have been shaky, the KMT still retained enough 
legitimacy to assert authority through coercion. There was no mutiny and the troops 
broke up the demonstration. 
Shih’s micro-discourse also instrumentally invokes the legitimacy of a Chinese 
historical macro-discourse to delegitimate Free China: “Taiwanese must not fight 
Taiwanese” invokes the 1937-45 anti-Japanese War when the Chinese Communists 
used the slogan “Chinese should not fight Chinese but should fight Japanese” to 
rebuke the KMT for lack of patriotism in attacking the Communists.725 In addressing 
the troops as his proximal audience, Shih invites his distal – secondary but intended  
- elite KMT audience to perceive a rebuke. In fact, they perceive a threat (q.v. 
5.2.6.1.). He appropriates the language of Chinese nationalism as uttered by the 
KMT’s enemies and retools it for Taiwanese nationalism. In doing so, Shih 
delegitimates the KMT as defenders of the Chinese and the Taiwanese nations. 
Austin’s Speech Act Theory elucidates how, paradoxically, Taiwan’s Chinese 
heritage allows Shih, as a knowledgeable actor, to exploit the discursive gap between 
his instruction to his proximal audience and his rebuke to his distal audience to make 
Taiwanese identity pass up to the discourse. Grice’s implicature accounts for how, in 
doing this, Shih implies linguistically that the KMT can represent neither China nor 
Taiwan.  “This NT$ 60 billion worth of equipment of yours is meant to fight our 
enemies, not to fight your fellow Taiwanese” discursively exploits the pronouns  
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“yours”, “our” and “your” to expose shifting identities and loyalties and invite the 
troops’ commanders to recognise that “our enemies” means Beijing, since that is the 
only threat to Taipei’s sovereignty.  
Before Kaohsiung, Chiang Ching-kuo had stated “we cannot afford dissent,” 
reinforcing the Free China “realis” aim of retaining power. Yet, Premier Sun had 
aluded to Free China “idealis” representations, implying that the ROC was not 
liberal enough: “if we are to unite with China, then in politics the mainland must 
follow the example of Taipei. 726 Yet, at Kaohsiung, Lu Hsiu-lien (later, the DPP 
legislator Anette Lu) suggests that it is not Taipei that should serve as a model for 
Beijing but the protestors in Kaohsiung who represent the liberal norms that the ROC 
merely claims to aspire to: 
Premier Sun said that in politics the mainland should learn from Taipei. We all 
understand quite clearly what he means by this. But when I think of this meeting here 
tonight, it seems to me that the Chinese Communists should not be learning from Taipei, 
but they should be learning from Kaohsiung! … Article 11 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of China reads as follows: “The people shall have freedom of speech, 
teaching … and publication.” They have “freedom of assembly, and of association.” 727 
Although freedom of speech, assembly and association were the pretexts, Taiwanese 
nationalism and ascription of norms of popular sovereignty to that Taiwanese-ness 
were also implicit in Lu’s speech.  Rallying the protestors, she ridiculed watching 
KMT elites and warned CPP elites through a rebuke to the troops that invoked Free 
China “idealis” norms to legitimate Taiwanese ones by oscillating between the two 
identities:  
Dear fellow Taiwanese … all you people with a conscience and with compassion … 
The founder of our nation, Sun Yat-sen once said: “People’s rights don’t fall from 
heaven, you have to fight for them.” … Dear members of the security police …. You 
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are human beings too. You are Taiwanese … Today you have already gone against 
many of President Chiang Ching-kuo’s own teachings. Your behavior today has been 
very violent. You have brought disgrace to Prime Minister Sun’s words [to the Chinese 
Communists]: “In politics learn from Taipei” … and you have made him lose face [and] 
you will make the people on the other side of the Taiwan Straits laugh ... You are not 
counterattacking the mainland. Rather, you are providing the communists with good 
propaganda! … But without your … uniforms, your hearts are the same as ours, your 
blood is the same as ours. Please … be Taiwanese too. I can see inside your hearts 
today … perhaps you are being deceived. It doesn’t matter. The taxes of eighteen 
million Taiwanese people should not be used to trample our Taiwanese people, but 
rather against those on the other side of the Taiwan Straits.728  
This speech constitutes a shift in state-identity perception. It articulates the Meilidao 
protestors’ productive power to legitimate the protestors’ cause and change the 
structure (q.v. 3.2.4.). In accusing the troops of disloyalty in not adhering to Free 
China “idealis”, Lu rebukes the ROC as hypocritical. Taiwanese protestors in the 
crowd would perceive this as a legitimation of a Taiwanese identity, while the KMT 
would perceive it as a taidu threat to its security. 
The Meilidao activists repeatedly use the trope of “freedom” in contradistinction to 
the Free China articulation, making “freedom” linguistically contested. For the ROC, 
to be free is to sanction Free China “idealis”; for Meilidao, it is to refuse Free China 
“realis” and “idealis”. The introduction of Taiwanese nationalism at Kaohsiung 
delegitimates Free China, full stop. From this point, the Three Principles cannot save 
the ROC. Rather, liberal democratic norms must do so in Taiwanisation. 
Power requires state capture. In discursively attempting to align the ROC to Taiwan, 
Lu Hsiu-lien articulates the greater discursive power of the dangwai to claim 
legitimacy in referencing the KMT’s 1965 claim that taidu forces were simply an 
irritant compared to the Communist Chinese: “Possibly the authorities of Taiwan 
may feel that we outside the Party are a nuisance. But unlike them, we rely upon 
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words, not guns. Does this not make us superior?”729 She appeals to solidarity and 
popular sovereignty, refers to the mainland Chinese threat and refuses the ROC’s 
legitimacy to represent Taiwan by repeated rhetorical questions:  
How are we going to be able to talk about a peaceful solution? What capability do we 
have to discuss weighty matters of international affairs? I ask you, who is qualified to 
represent our eighteen million people and negotiate a peaceful solution? Who is 
qualified to represent us and fight for our rights? Has the KMT government the full 
legal authority to represent the opinions of the eighteen million Taiwanese people? 
Please answer me! Can the present members of the National Assembly and of the 
Legislative Yuan represent us? Can the members of the Provincial Assembly and the 
five wan [yuan - branches of government] represent the eighteen million people of 
Taiwan?730 
The Meilidao leaders were tried by a military court. Before the trial, Premier Sun 
chillingly attempted to reassert the legitimacy of Free China “realis” through an 
implicit threat: “the Kaohsiung Incident involved nothing but a handful of radicals 
who acted beyond the bounds of democracy. Our handling of the incident will teach 
them the real meaning of democracy”.731 Yet, the trial itself delegitimated the ROC 
domestically and internationally. The KMT crackdown after Kaohsiung lasted until 
1985. During that time, however, a number of civic groups arose to challenge the 
ROC.732 The end of martial law in 1987 came as a co-constitutive process involving 
public demonstrations, the KMT and liberal academics. By liberalising, the ROC was 
able to survive and maintain its independence when it pivoted to Beijing after 1987. 
The DPP was founded on 28 September 1986 by dangwai activists and the KMT let 
it stand. The press made it public. On 5th October 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo told the 
KMT Central Standing Committee: 
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Times are changing, circumstances are changing, and the tide is changing. To meet 
these changes, the ruling party must push reforms according to new ideas, new methods, 
and based on constitutional democracy. Only so will our party be able to move with the 
tide and to be with the people all the time.733 
Rather than a failed bottom-up attempt by Taiwanese interest groups to influence 
Taipei’s relations with China, Kaohsiung may be seen as a key event in the 
dismantling of Free China. Chapter three explains it as the intersubjective domestic 
construction of a Wendtian corporate state identity prior to first contact with China. 
Meilidao activists co-constituted huadu by synthesising taidu and Free China 
“idealis” conceptualisations. A single political event threatened the ROC’s security, 
becoming integral to state identity change. The Taiwanese political speech data 
indicates a macro-discursive continuity from pre-1987 to post-1987. The Meilidao 
leaders’ speech is an articulation of this, incorporated into the corpus and the canon 
of Taiwanese political speech and passing up to the discourse. 
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how sinification and bentuhua built and dismantled Free 
China, legitimating Taiwan’s de facto independence in the status quo in the process. 
It has argued that bentuhua resolved the authoritarian ROC’s second crisis of 
legitimacy in liberalisation and state identity change. The KMT’s 1950s defensive 
realist needs and the myth of ROC-led tongyi necessitated economic reconsolidation 
and sinification to ensure ROC survival. However, state identity became dislocated 
through isolation from the metropolis. ROC power was clear under martial law, yet it 
lacked legitimacy. The Party-State attempted to maintain legitimacy by 
instrumentally deploying Free China “idealis”, but more saliently through Free 
China “realis”. There was no effective civil society until the dangwai. The TIM was 
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ineffective. KMT military, financial and organisational power maintained control 
over other sectors. But, KMT land reform ensured benshengren support. Zhongli, 
then Kaohsiung shifted legitimacy from Chinese to Taiwanese, but the ROC 
reasserted itself to appropriate bentuhua and change state identity. The next chapter 
accounts for the nucleation of huadu in domestic and cross-Strait politics.  
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Chapter 7: The Nucleation of huadu: The End of Martial Law 
and Democratisation 
Democratisation is simply Taiwanisation.734 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter does the following: first, it shows how post-1987 ROC identity change 
in domestic and cross-Strait power politics (q.v. 7.1.) led to a flexible and tentative 
huadu in the 1992 Consensus (q.v. 7.2.). Second, it relates how huadu was embedded 
and achieved domestic sanction under the KMT and DPP in democratic politics 
between 1992 and 2008 (q.v. 7.3. and 7.4.). Third, it shows how Beijing also 
sanctioned huadu, implicitly affording Taipei the legitimacy that it formally denies 
(q.v. 7.5).  
The chapter concludes that the ending of martial law in 1987 and subsequent 
democratisation and cross-Strait relations prompted a profound reassessment of ROC 
identity that led to the nucleation of huadu (q.v. 7.6). The ROC’s loss of legitimacy 
had sown the seeds of taidu, but domestic and cross-Strait politics meant taidu was 
misconceived in terms of Taiwan’s relations with the PRC. Cross-Strait relations 
shifted the state identity dimension from a domestic ROC (China)-Taiwan one to a 
cross-Strait PRC (China)-Taiwan one with the ROC becoming Taiwan. The ROC’s 
pivot to the PRC as Taiwan meant taidu’s pivot from the ROC to the PRC was 
problematic. The PRC had an irredentist claim to Taiwan, but Taipei did not seek 
independence from Beijing. Hence, it sought to deflect the PRC’s irredentist claim 
by rejecting both tongyi and taidu and maintaining the cross-Strait status quo in 
huadu. Taipei did this by appealing to liberal democratic normative representations. 
734 Lan,Yiping. 1983: 11-12. 
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To define Taiwan’s democracy, this study adopts Jacobs’ (2012; 2017) definition of 
liberal democracy as a political system in which people regularly choose their leaders 
freely and peacefully and make opposition in government with freedom of speech, 
press freedom and equality before the law.735 It does not make any normative claims 
around liberal democracy. Rather, it recognises the legitimating power of Taipei’s 
appeal to it. 
7.2 Cross-Strait Identity Change 
In 1988, the KMT elite began to extract itself from Free China through democratic 
reform.736 When Lee Teng-hui became ROC president and KMT chairman that year, 
the KMT was already Taiwanese in terms of membership and elite constitution.737 
Believing that the KMT had to identify with Taiwan to survive in a democratic 
system, Lee developed a more inclusive, civic politics to counter exclusive 
Taiwanese nationalism.738 He co-opted the KMT elite in appointing the waishengren 
KMT general and defence minister, Hau Pei-tsun, as Premier in 1990. In this way, he 
neutralised the conservative Mainlander feizhulipai, or anti-mainstream KMT faction, 
that had organised against him. Hau refused to carry out a coup against Lee and thus 
Lee’s democratic, Taiwanese-oriented mainstream faction, or zhulipai, maintained 
power and instituted constitutional reforms that changed ROC identity.739 In 1994, 
Lee stated: 
Anybody facing the enthusiastic competition of party politics in Taiwan, if they cannot 
sincerely identify with Taiwan as the paramount objective, definitely cannot survive. 
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Moreover, there are priorities. The reasoning is plain to see. If you go beyond 
identifying with Taiwan, and just strive to identify with something at an even higher 
level, the result must definitely be the loss of both.740 
By shifting between inclusion and exclusion in addressing tongyi-identifying pan-
Blue elites, using the words “anybody”, “they” and “you”, Lee implies that these 
elites risk losing the legitimacy to represent both China and Taiwan (“something at 
an even higher level…losing both”) in a realm and social constituency that identifies 
with Taiwan. It is unclear whether Lee is promoting taidu at this point; however, in 
the context of rapidly developing cross-Strait relations and domestic electioneering 
Lee is responding not only to elite SIPs, but also to demands from civil society, 
articulated by competing DIGs. 741 Huadu is thus co-constituted in tongyi-taidu 
contestation and the ROC made to identify with Taiwan. ROC institutional changes 
in response to cross-Strait contact constituted huadu by creating a bureaucratic 
mechanism for cross-Strait relations. They functioned to ascribe a new state identity 
to the ROC. In October 1990, Lee Teng-hui set up the National Unification Council 
(NUC); this included KMT and former dangwai DPP elites. This was followed in 
January 1991 by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), with Ma Ying-jeou as head. 
In February 1991, the MAC created the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), a 
“white-glove” quango to enable “unofficial” cross-Strait contact. The National 
Unification Guidelines (NUGs) constituted the guiding principles for Lee’s mainland 
policy. Later, Lee was to confirm that the NUC and NUGs were simply strategic pro-
tongyi moves designed to outwit the KMT old guard and consolidate his position.742 
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In practical terms, however, the NUGs set tongyi as a long-term objective contingent 
on the Mainland’s “political democratisation and economic liberalisation”.743 In this 
regard, they became a consensual “document sustaining the status quo”.744 As such, 
the NUGs constituted a thin huadu (q.v. 1.5). That is, a sovereign, independent ROC 
state became the locus of One China. 
The KMT constituted huadu in democracy by pursuing a policy that secured the 
status quo. That is, it actively resisted both tongyi and taidu, legitimating itself as 
sufficiently Taiwanese in its realm and constituency. During the 1991 National 
Assembly elections, its discourse shifted from “Unite China under the Three 
Principles of the People” to “reform, security and prosperity” and “Be Taiwan’s 
masters! Elect your own president!”745 TV adverts depicted a Chinese soldier arriving 
in Taiwan in 1949 and not being understood by a local Taiwanese family; fast 
forward to 1991 and they are all smiling and criticising the DPP in Taiwan-accented 
Mandarin.746 The DPP was unable to block the KMT’s constitutional reforms and it 
moved away from taidu towards the status quo, sanctioning huadu in the process.747 
In this way, huadu extended its subject social constituency within its realm. 
ROC institutional changes between 1987 and 1992 nucleated huadu in state identity 
change. In 1991, the KMT secured the ROC and huadu through constitutional reform. 
In institutionalising The Free Area of the Republic of China as coterminous with the 
Taiwan Area, Lee Teng-hui legitimated huadu and delegitimated both tongyi and 
taidu in one move. In April 1991, the National Assembly passed the Additional 
743 Su Chi. 2009: 5. 
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Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, including the Termination of 
the Period of General Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion 
and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and 
Mainland Area. This had two effects; first, it completed the ending of martial law 
and, second, it changed the ROC’s definition of the Mainland from a “bandit group” 
to an equal part of China. This move fundamentally changed ROC identity, changed 
Chiang Ching-kuo’s Three Noes (q.v. 1.3.1.) and implicitly entailed ROC recognition 
of the PRC. At the start of the 1990s, then, ROC constitutional change formalised 
cross-Strait relations as huadu. 748  In effect, Taiwan had declared its de facto 
independence and recognised the PRC.  Without huadu’s nucleation in this process, 
there could be no cross-Strait relations. 
With regard to whether huadu is essentially a “Two Chinas” policy, this study’s 
separation of semantic meaning from pragmatic meaning explains the puzzle. The 
policy documents referred to here semantically encode “One China” as the Republic 
of China. Yet, their tacit recognition of the PRC’s governing authority on the 
mainland and the ROC’s actual authority within the Taiwan Area in fact creates a 
“Two Chinas” puzzle. The solution to the puzzle is pragmatic. That is, although the 
ROC constitution does not permit “Two Chinas” or “One-China-One-Taiwan”, these 
documents pragmatically encode the ROC as Taiwan only under the legal artefact of 
the ROC. In other words, these documents permit observers to read Taiwan into the 
ROC by exploiting the illocutionary-perlocutionary gap between what is meant and 
what is understood. In this way, these documents create space for a huadu discourse 
that takes on a life of its own and permit de facto diplomatic relations between China 
(PRC) and Taiwan (ROC).  
748 Ibid: 7. 
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7.3 The 1992 Consensus: One China Respective Interpretations 
ROC identity change in cross-Strait relations required elite agency. The period of 
identity change between May 1987 and August 1992 was accompanied by nine 
highly secret meetings between PRC and ROC elites. Functional matters aside, 
Taipei sought to convince Beijing that Lee did not advocate taidu. ROC envoys were 
under Lee’s direct orders; Taipei was autocratic, while Beijing operated on CCP 
policy consensus.749 However, the 1992 Koo-Wang Talks in Hong Kong, the first 
SEF-ARATS open talks, broke down on sovereignty in the context of the One-China 
principle. The resolution came down to the issue of text and its discursive 
interpretation. In August 1992, the NUC issued a Definition of One China Resolution. 
It stated: 
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China Principle, but the 
interpretations of the two sides are different…Our side believes that One China should 
mean the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty 
extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan... 
Admittedly, Taiwan is a part of China, but the mainland is also a part of China.750 
A semantic reading of this text is minimally ambiguous; the locus of One China is 
the state, not the nation, and that state is the ROC. Taiwan and the mainland are part 
of the ROC and “current governing authority” implies that the ROC is a provisional 
government that aspires to de jure sovereignty over all of China. However, the 
context of constitutional change and ROC Taiwanisation invites another pragmatic 
reading; “current governing authority” is also a provisional status that encodes 
Taiwan’s de facto independence as the ROC, restricted to the Taiwan Area. That is 
the status quo. This permits interpretive slippage and discursive change in huadu. 
749 Ibid: 10-12. 
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According to Su Chi (2009), this wording “represented Taiwan’s internal consensus” 
(that is, its elite consensus) and gave Taiwan “maximum negotiating power”.751 On 
3rd November 1992, in the wake of the collapse of the Hong Kong talks, the SEF 
proposed that each side state its position verbally to break the impasse; Taipei then 
verbally reaffirmed the NUC resolution. On 16th November, ARATS sent a formal 
letter stating it “fully respects and accepts your Foundation’s suggestion”, adding: 
both sides of the Strait uphold the principle of One China, and actively seek national 
unification, but the political interpretation of the One China principle will not be 
referred to in the cross-Strait negotiations on functional issues.752 
Like huadu, therefore, the 1992 Consensus is a discourse without a written 
definitional text. First, there was no official document and, in diplomatic terms, it 
represented simply an “exchange of notes”; second, it has no legal standing, but was 
a “perfectly simple and appropriate description of the mutual views expressed”.753 
Third, the term One-China- Respective-Interpretations (OCRI) did not appear in the 
verbal text, yet they discursively summarise the intention of the text. Fourth, the 
substance of the consensus was that while Taipei’s wording, “Taiwan and China are 
both parts of China”, implied parity, Beijing’s “Taiwan is a part of China” implied a 
subordinate relationship. Because of the commonality of “One China”, the existence 
of the NUG and the secret negotiation channels however, Beijing was confident that 
Taipei would not declare taidu.754 It allowed functional talks to go ahead. However, 
the discursive power of the 1992 Consensus and OCRI is clear. It is the ROC 
constitutional changes and attendant texts followed by the 1992 Consensus that 
legitimated Taiwan’s de facto independence in huadu as OCRI This represents a thin 
751 Ibid: 13. 
752 Su, Chi and Cheng. 2002: 44. Quoted in Su, Chi. 2009: 14. 
753 Su, Chi. 2009: 14-15. 
754 Ibid:  15-16. 
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huadu (q.v. 1.5.) and Beijing’s sanction means that huadu – as Taipei’s state identity 
– had expanded its realm to the cross-Strait arena and its social constituency to a
non-subject Other. 
Taiwan’s elites see the 1992 Consensus as “a point of departure for assessing where 
things are now”.755 That is, the 1992 Consensus delegitimates taidu and tongyi and 
legitimates huadu. While pan-Blue and pan-Green micro-interpretations clash, both 
camps implicitly recognise it, bringing their potential taidu and tongyi constituencies 
with them. For the KMT and the CCP, it is a “basis of trust”. By contrast, while for 
the DPP the 1992 Consensus is an agreement between the CCP and the KMT for 
which there is no legal basis, the party acknowledges it in substance. The 1992 
Consensus enjoys “the beauty of ambiguity”.756 In this sense, for Su Chi “confusion 
represents safety” provides for strategic ambiguity, political confidence and security-
building mechanisms. 757 It also permits mutual non-denial between cross-Strait 
institutions, allowing formal political talks to be deferred in favour of de facto state-
to-state relations. Yet, as shown in Chapter 5, such ambiguous language carries 
implicit threat (q.v. 5.1.) and Beijing’s recognition of huadu’s threat to its security 
(q.v. 4.6.3.) became apparent as relations progressed. 
Despite the DPP’s refusal formally to accept the 1992 Consensus in 2016 and 
Beijing’s breaking off of cross-Strait talks, Taiwan’s elites agree that the logic of the 
1992 Consensus is the default option. That is, the status quo secures Taiwan’s de 
facto independence. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration speech alluded to the 
spirit of the 1992 Consensus and Tsai Ing-wen repeated the term. Both have used the 
term “ROC”. Tsai’s 2012 and 2016 cross-Strait policy platform was that the ROC is 
755 Huang, Chin-hao and James, Patrick. 2014. 678. 
756 Su, Chi. 2009: 15. 
757 Ibid: 15-16. 
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Taiwan’s state and the prevailing pan-Green domestic coalition that delegitimated 
KMT rule between 2014 and 2016 adheres to and seeks to defend that stance.758 
7.4 Lee Teng-hui’s Discursive Construction of huadu 
While the 1992 Consensus provided a stop-gap that secured the status quo, 
subsequent competing definitions of One China by Beijing and Taipei changed 
huadu’s meaning. Beijing noted bentuhua’s reconstitution of the ROC and it 
reiterated the One-China Principle in its seminal 1993 policy statement, The Taiwan 
Question and the Reunification of China: “there is only one China in the world, 
Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the seat of China's central government is 
in Beijing”. 759  Taipei sought to reassert the ROC’s expanded realm and social 
constituency while not provoking Beijing, stating that while Taiwan and the 
mainland  were both Chinese territory, “it is an undeniable fact that the two have 
been divided and ruled separately since 1949”.760 Its description of China as an entity 
with “multifaceted geographical, political, historical, and cultural meanings” was a 
clear attempt to break the link between the ROC and the mainland and to redefine 
huadu as the thicker, cultural version in Chapter 1 (q.v. 1.5.).761 
Beijing perceived a threat, but Lee Teng-hui’s articulation of a civic ROC identity 
meant he was able to respond to domestic interests at a time of relative military 
advantage while not provoking either Beijing or pro-tongyi KMT elites. In December 
1991, Lee stated “we cannot break our relations with the rest of the Chinese people, 
nor can we cut our links with Chinese culture”, reminding Taiwan that its interests 
758 Huang and James. 2014: 680 
759 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2014 [1993] The Taiwan Question 
and Reunification of China. [online] Available at: 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/3568_665529/t17792.shtml [Accessed 8 July 2018].  
760 Mainland Affairs Council.  1993. There is no ‘Taiwan Question’ There is Only a ‘China Question’:
views on the Chinese Communists' white paper "The Taiwan question and reunification of China": 4.   
761 Ibid: 4. 
263 
lay not in alienating the island from Chinese culture. 762  His use of the 
presuppositional trigger “the rest of” invites Taiwanese to identify as Chinese too 
and appropriates Free China “idealis” tropes (“unify the country”; “revive the 
nation”; “Three Principles”) to secure the Taiwanese nation’s survival. As Lee 
explained:  
Identify with Taiwan, cherish Taiwan, struggle hard for Taiwan; that is a Taiwanese; do 
not give up the hard work and hope of unifying the country and reviving the nation 
(minzu); that is Chinese . . . This view of identity is the understanding that “with 
survival is hope; only with survival is there development”. Only by advocating this 
view of identity can the nationalism of the Three Principles of the People serve the new 
significance of the age.763 
For Lee, the survival of the ROC is paramount, yet he invokes both bentuhua and 
sinification instrumentally to rearticulate Free China “idealis” as huadu.764  
While adhering to Renan’s doctrine of nation-state congruence in his constitutional 
reforms, Lee appealed to liberal democracy as grounds for nationhood. Within 
constraints, Lee developed a civic huadu. By August 1991, Lee was able to suggest 
“grafting the concept of Gemeinschaft onto traditional Chinese family ethics”.765 This 
shares Peng Ming-min’s (1964) proposition that a political community arises when 
citizens identify with the state. Lee developed this as locating sovereignty in the 
people: 
The establishment of the ideal of sovereignty in the people is to stir up every citizen to 
use his consciousness of being master of his own country (guojia), contributing his 
wisdom and strength, realizing the respect that should be given to a complete individual. 
762 Lee Teng-hui, 1992. Love and Faith, Creating the Future, 133. Complete text in China Post 
(Taipei). 
763 Lee Teng-hui. 1992. Complete text in China Post (Taipei) 
764 Lee Teng-hui, 1992. Towards the 21st Century Arm in Arm -- The Republic of China and the New 
Asia-Pacific Situation’, Creating the Future: China Post. 121-27.   
765 Lee Teng-hui, ‘From Uncertainty to Pragmatism’. In Creating the Future: 117. The term 
‘shengming gongtong’ is translated into English using the German term, Gemeinschaft. Of course, the 
German term is simply ‘Community’ as in Europaische Gemeinschaft. 
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And the cohesion of a Gemeinschaft, is to mutually integrate the free will of the 
individual with the whole wealth and good of society, to establish a civilized society 
with individual freedom, social harmony and prosperity.766 
Lee's Gemeinschaft rejects cleansing Taiwan of Chinese influence; rather, the state 
should encourage a pluralistic identity: 
Among the 21 million people in Taiwan, there are aboriginals, and there are the 
compatriots who have come from the mainland over several hundred years. Between us, 
there should be no argument about ethnic division. We are all Chinese. Only identify 
with Taiwan, give your heart to preserving and developing Taiwan, no matter what 
ethnic group, no matter whether you came to Taiwan early or late, then all are 
Taiwanese.767 
Lee names Taiwan as a polity. His articulation of Chinese, however, is not a political 
one linked to the PRC (zhongguo). Rather, “Chinese” (huaren) is a pan-Chinese 
cultural category into which Taiwanese can slot as “Australian” might slot into 
“English-speaking” or “Anglo”. Lee invited the ROC’s social constituency to 
identify politically with a Taiwanised ROC. Overall, this identity rested on full 
participation in democracy by all citizens of the Taiwan Area based on a social 
contract.768  
In 1994, in an interview with a Japanese journalist, Lee spoke of “the sorrow of 
being born Taiwanese”.  He lamented that “until today, all those who have held 
power in Taiwan have been foreign regimes”. 769  Beijing read it as reflecting a 
sinophobic, taidu mindset. Pan-Green, taidu-leaning constituencies read it as 
766 Speech to KMT conference held to examine performance in the elections for provincial governor 
and city mayors. Full text in Zhongguo shibao (China Times), 31 December 1994.   
767 Quoted in Hughes, Christopher. 2011: 9.  See: Jacobs, Bruce and I-hao Ben Liu. 2007. Lee Teng-
Hui and the Idea of "Taiwan". The China Quarterly, 190: 375-393;  
768 Hughes, Christopher. 2011: 10 
769 Shiba, Ryotaro. 1994. The Grief of Being Born a Taiwanese: A dialogue between President Lee 
Teng-hui and writer Ryatoro Shiba reprinted from Asahi Weekly in Congressional Record, 96 103rd 
Congress, 2nd Session. 21 July 1994. [online] Available at: http://webarchive.loc.gov/congressional-
record/20160316142653/http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r103:57:./temp/~r103RgdC42:e19274: 
[Accessed 2 October 2018]. 
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bentuhua sentiment. The PRC claimed Lee lacked the “sentiments of a Chinese”. In 
June 1995, Lee made a private visit to Cornell University, where he gave a speech 
entitled “The Longing of the People is Always in my Heart”. 770  The visit was 
followed by high profile” vacation diplomacy”. This in turn encouraged pro-taidu 
constituencies to assert an exclusive Taiwanese ethnic identity. Lee manipulated this 
polarisation to mobilise support. In September 1995, he challenged those who did not 
want to contribute to Taiwan to “emigrate quickly”.771 Beijing launched a propaganda 
campaign against Lee in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election; polarisation 
among ethnic and interest groups became marked.772 Yet, Lee was ambivalent on 
how Taiwanese the ROC was when he exhorted competing constituencies to 
“contribute” and “identify with” Taiwan. By invoking taidu through a thicker huadu 
he was able implicitly to threaten Beijing before rowing back to a thinner huadu. The 
DPP rejected the One-China Principle, opposed cross-Strait trade and demanded the 
PRC "treat Taiwan as an equal”. Yet, they took the broad huadu position that Taiwan 
was already independent, so taidu was unnecessary unless the PRC attacked.  
Non-aligned pan-Blue elites supported the One-China Principle and supported deeper 
cross-Strait links, claiming that Lee had abandoned tongyi. In 1996, Beijing 
perceived Lee’s huadu stance as backdoor taidu and China fired missiles in the 
Taiwan Strait to deter Taiwanese voters from voting for Lee. Taiwan responded by 
electing Lee, thus legitimating huadu, even though the concept remained 
unarticulated as such.  
770 Lee Teng-hui. 1995. Always in my Heart: Olin Lecture at Cornell University. Reprinted in 
Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks E1314. 22 June 1995. [online] Available at: 
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1995/06/22/CREC-1995-06-22-pt1-PgE1314-4.pdf [Accessed 2 
October 2018].  
771 Lianhe bao (United Daily News), 2 September 1995. 
772 Hughes, Christopher 2011: 15 
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In 1998, in supporting the waishengren KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou as Taipei 
mayor, Lee’s explicit articulation of a New Taiwanese, or xin taiwanren, civic 
identity gave huadu more national substance: 
Today, all of us who have grown up and lived together on this island are Taiwanese… 
[H]ow to transform our love of Taiwan and our feelings towards our compatriots into
specific action… is the mission of every New Taiwanese.773
In response, Ma stated “I am a New Taiwanese who has grown up drinking Taiwan 
water and eating Taiwan rice.” 774 New Taiwanese was a KMT trope that aimed 
electorally to counter the DPP, but it drew on broader bentuhua discourses.775 By 
combining waishengren and benshengren identities into a common civic national one, 
Lee averted ethnic strife and in the process constituted a liberal-democratic ROC.  
In 1999, in an interview with the German public broadcaster, Deutsche Welle, Lee 
articulated a Two State Theory, arguing that ROC constitutional amendments had 
altered Taiwan’s sovereign status:  
The Beijing authorities ignore … that the two sides are two different jurisdictions and 
that the Chinese mainland continues to pose a military threat against us… the Chinese 
communist regime … has never ruled Taiwan … the legitimacy of the rule of the 
country comes from the mandate of the Taiwan people and has nothing to do with the 
people on the mainland … the 1992 constitutional amendments determine that the 
reconfigured national agencies represent only the people of the Taiwan Area.…the 1991 
constitutional amendments have designated cross-strait relations as a state-to-state 
relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal 
relationship. Thus, the Beijing authorities' characterization of Taiwan as a "renegade 
province" is historically and legally untrue.776  
773 Lee Teng-hui, quoted in Harrison, Mark. 2006: 197. 
774 Ma, Ying-jeou.  quoted in Corcuff, Stephane. 2002. Memories of the Future: National Identity 
Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe: 128. 
775 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. 1971. Statement on our National Fate, 29 December 1971. [online] 
Available at: http://english.pct.org.tw/enArticle_public_main.htm [Accessed 15 March 2015]. 
776 Taiwan Documents Project. n.d. Interview of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui with Deutsche 
Welle radio, 9 July 1999. [online] Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9926.htm [Accessed 7 
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In linguistic terms, it is not so much Lee’s phrases “state-to-state” and “special state-
to-state relationship” that legitimate huadu, even though that is what is most picked 
up on in the literature and, indeed, what Beijing pointed to in perceiving the 
statement as a threat - although this did not prevent Beijing linguistically relaxing the 
One China principle (q.v. 7.5.). These terms are Lee’s parsing of the facts and the 
Chinese term “special” (teshu) is a common euphemism meaning “different” or that 
means the speaker does not want to specify its meaning in detail. Rather, it is the idea 
of Taiwan as a sovereign state entailed in the terms “Taiwan Area” and “the country” 
juxtaposed co-textually with “the Taiwan people” in opposition to “the people on the 
mainland” that causes the presupposition that Taiwan is not China to pass up to the 
discourse.  Furthermore, although he does not mention it and the term had not yet 
been coined as such, it is reasonable to assume that Lee has in mind the wording of 
what was to become the 1992 Consensus (the actual term was coined and applied 
retroactively by Su Chi in 2000). In this sense, Lee’s micro-discourse takes on a 
broader macro-discourse without explicitly referencing it (q.v. 5.2.1.). 
In terms of the ROC’s state identity, Lee did not discard unification. However: 
the Republic of China has been a sovereign state since it was founded in 1912. 
Moreover, [because of] the special state-to-state relationship…there is no need to 
declare independence. The resolution of cross-strait issues hinges on …different 
systems. We cannot look at issues … simply from the perspective of unification or 
independence…. the ROC has become the first democracy in the Chinese community 
(zhonghua).777 
This statement legitimates huadu in terms of the “special” nature of cross-Strait 
relations. He locates huadu in Taiwan’s “different system”, thus legitimating the 
ROC’s democratic identity and delegitimating tongyi and taidu. Lee went on to lay 
down the policy line in “We want to maintain the status quo, and maintain peace 
777 Ibid. 
268 
with Beijing on this foundation”.778 The deictic “we” in relation to the status quo and 
Beijing powerfully implies Taiwan’s sovereign status and separateness from China, 
regardless of Lee’s implicative use of the verb “want” with “maintain”. Lee’s “Two 
States Theory” may be read semantically as thin huadu located in the ROC. However, 
there is clearly ample scope for discursive slippage to a thick huadu. It is the latter 
that justifies any suggestion that Beijing may have read it pragmatically as implying 
the threat of taidu (q.v. 7.5.). 
7.5 Huadu in Democratic Politics 
7.5.1  The DPP’s Sanction of huadu  
The DPP began openly promoting taidu in 1991, before the ROC’s scrapping of the 
sedition laws in 1992. Yet, subsequently, it implicitly legitimated the KMT’s thin 
huadu by supporting its constitutional reforms. This led to cooperation as the KMT 
Taiwanised under Lee Teng-hui. As huadu nucleated around the status quo, the DPP 
and KMT converged on the status quo, despite elite policy statements that were 
perceived as supporting taidu or tongyi. For instance, while pan-Green DIGs 
prevented Taipei restarting cross-Strait dialogue under the one-China Principle, in 
December 1996, the former DPP chairman and Meilidao political prisoner, Shih 
Ming-teh, joined with KMT and New Party delegates in a multi-party National 
Development Conference. Shih argued, “it is unnecessary to declare Taiwan 
Independence” because Taiwan is already an independent state.  This constituted 
implicit sanction of a broad huadu position by a known taidu-supporting elite and 
former Meilidao dissident. Granted, DIG preferences were a factor; the DPP had 
performed poorly in 1994’s provincial and municipal elections on a slogan of “build 
an independent nation” (duli jianguo) and switched to “renovate and protect Taiwan” 
778 Ibid. 
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(gexin baotai). Shih’s articulation proposed that Taiwan “need only preserve the 
existing international situation in order to maintain its sovereignty and 
independence”. 779  Even the staunchly taidu DPP New Tide faction changed its 
position in line with Shih. Its leader, Lin Cho-shui, responded with his own slogan, 
“in sovereignty, we already are independent, but we have yet to build a nation”. Such 
instrumental discursive changes transformed the DPP from a taidu party to a huadu 
party by 1996. Yet, it is clear that huadu meant different things to different actors. 
Neither Beijing nor the DPP’s deep-Green constituency acknowledged this at that 
point. In May 1999, the DPP passed a Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, which 
asserted that Taiwan was “a sovereign and independent country” formally called the 
ROC and was not part of the PRC. At its 9th National Congress in 2001, the party 
amended the Resolution to allow “room for the party to re-interpret the so-called (sic) 
“Taiwan Independence clause” to give “flexibility in reacting to mainstream policy 
changes” and that "the latter resolution's effect supersedes the previous one".780 In 
prioritising the 1999 Resolution over the Independence Clause, the DPP sanctioned 
huadu and the ROC. Yet, whether this is thin or thick huadu is unclear. Although the 
Resolution locates huadu in the ROC and not a cultural China, shifting from “the 
ROC is independent” to “Taiwan is independent and is currently called the ROC” 
tests the line between thin and thick huadu (q.v. 1.5.). 
The compromise nature of Taipei’s cross-Strait investment policies, which saw 
competing DIGs perceiving Chinese threat differently, served to maintain huadu. Pro 
779 Kuo Cheng-liang. 1998. The DPP’s Painful Evolution (Minjindang zhuanxing zhi tong). Taipei: 
Commonwealth Publishing Co., Ltd: 73. Quoted in Rigger, Shelly. 1999. The Evolution of the DPP 
and KMT’s Policies of the National Identity Issue. Paper prepared for the Conference on War and 
Peace in the Taiwan Strait Duke University 26-27 February 1999. [online] Available at: 
https://web.duke.edu/pass/pdf/warpeaceconf/p-rigger.pdf [Accessed 31 February 2017]. 
780 Taipei Times. 2001. DPP makes minor revisions to stance on independence. 31st October 2001. 
[online] Available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2001/10/21/108060 [Accessed  
3 March 2013].  
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and anti-convergence DIGs were not neatly divided on partisan or national lines. 
Thus, some pan-Green interests favoured economic convergence, while some 
favoured taidu.781 This facilitated alignment on the status quo, and it played out in 
DIG lobbying through intra-DPP factional struggle between the New Tide faction and 
Formosa factions. The compromise policy of Strong Base, Westward Advance 
became the DPP’s platform, combining the New Tide’s desire for a stronger 
Taiwanese business identity with the Formosa faction’s platform of greater 
economic integration with China.782 Westward Advance was predicated on the liberal 
prediction that economic links would secure Taiwan’s sovereignty by upgrading 
Taiwan’s economy and shifting low-value production to China. Rather than 
absorbing Taiwan into China, increased trade would make cross-Strait relations inter-
state. In this context, cultural links simply made the island the logical source for FDI 
in China; would socialise China into liberal international norms and align Taiwan 
with globalisation.783   
The New Tide faction called Westward Advance dangerously naïve in a neorealist 
system characterised by the BoP and a clear Chinese threat; economic integration 
would lead to political talks with China. National security would be best ensured 
through diplomacy and improvement of Taiwan’s investment environment. 
Increasing economic integration would threaten even thin huadu, blurring Taipei’s 
state identity with Beijing’s in the minds of the electorate. The DPP’s main job, 
therefore, was top-down strengthening of Taiwan’s civic identity. 784 Strong Base, 
781 Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016. 
782 Ash, Robert; Garver, John and Prime, Penelope. 2013. Taiwan’s Democracy: Economic and 
Political Challenges. Abingdon: Routledge. 
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Westward Advance represented a DPP consensus that adhered to the policies and 
principles that the KMT had developed under Lee. The logical position on the 
sovereignty spectrum for the DPP therefore became huadu and not taidu. Yet, it was 
cultural, linguistic and trade links with China that served as the most powerful 
pretext for discursive slippage into a thick huadu. Taishang interests in China could 
be framed as non-political, obviating questions of sovereignty. 
In power, the DPP initially endorsed the 1992 Consensus. On 26 June 2000, 
President Chen told William Fuller, CEO of the Asia Foundation "the new 
administration is willing to accept the consensus reached by the SEF and the ARATS 
prior to the talks, which is 'one China with respective interpretations'”. The following 
day, then MAC Minister Tsai Ing-wen stated: 
the two sides are willing to address the controversy over the 'one China' issue by 
allowing each side to make oral interpretations and statements, which has become the 
actual process of reaching the cross-Strait consensus. The so-called 'one China with 
respective interpretations' is the term used to describe this process. 785  
Later that year, Tsai addressed the LY, stating "our position is to respectively 
interpret 'one China”. 
7.5.2 Embedding huadu 2000-2008 
Lee left the Presidency after the DPP’s election victory in 2000, was expelled from 
the KMT and moved to a taidu position in the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Yet, 
his construction of huadu and cautious but constructive cross-Strait policy are clear 
785 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 1992 Consensus: The Key to cross-Strait 
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in Chen’s 2000 and 2004 inauguration speeches.786 In the 2000 speech, Chen framed 
the ROC in terms of liberal values while appropriating the title of Mao Zedong’s 
1949 speech “China Stands Up”, proclaiming “Taiwan stands up” and “the country 
belongs to its people (renmin)”. He calls for “leaders on both sides” to uphold 
“democracy and parity”, implying that Taipei seeks state-like equality with Beijing. 
His assertion that “we believe leaders on both sides posess enough wisdom and 
creativity to jointly deal with the question of a future one China” is a Gricean 
implicature that challenges Beijing to come to the negotiating table while remaining 
non-commital on the meaning of “One China”.  In this way, huadu’s meaning is left 
open, yet Beijing’s failure to respond linguistically confirmed Chen’s implication 
that Beijing’s leaders lacked cooperative statecraft, thus accruing sanction for Taipei 
internationally. 
In the speech, Chen locates the difference between China and Taiwan in separate 
post-1895 political experiences rather than culture. Most saliently, he states that as 
the “popularly elected president of the Republic of China”: 
I must abide by the Constitution, maintain the sovereignty, dignity and security of our 
country, and ensure the well-being of all citizens. Therefore, as long as the CCP regime 
has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in 
office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not 
push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution, 
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and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of 
independence or unification.787 
In downplaying cultural differences and highlighting political ones, Chen might be 
seen as articulating a thick huadu. Yet, his securing of ROC institutions averts taidu 
and actually signals a thin huadu, potentially reassuring Beijing. By not declaring 
Taiwan’s independence from the ROC and referring to “our country” and “all 
citizens”, the ROC remains the semantic locus of One China. Yet, the discursive 
context affirms that the mainland is not included in the scope of “our country” and 
“all citizens” in a pragmatic sense. It suggests Taiwan cannot declare independence 
from the PRC, because the PRC has never governed it and it does not need to declare 
independence from the ROC because it is the ROC. The ROC’s identity change 
legitimates its sovereign status. In the 2000 speech, Chen mentions the ROC nine 
times and Taiwan 50 times. China is mentioned twice – once as a nation, but in 
categorical opposition to Taiwan, and implicated as a colonial aggressor when Chen 
says “over the past one hundred plus years, China has suffered imperialist aggression, 
which left indelible wounds. Taiwan has had an even sadder fate, tormented by brute 
force and colonial rule”. Chen’s use of the cultural Chinese terms huaren and 
zhonghua instead of the political ones zhongguoren and zhongguode invoke a thicker 
huadu (q.v. 1.5.). When addressing China, Chen uses the exclusive “we”; when 
addressing Taiwan’s electorate, he uses the inclusive “we” (q.v. 5.4.6.). Both uses 
invoke solidarity with Taiwan against China. Variations of the word “democracy” 
are used co-textually with Taiwan 30 times and “freedom” eight times, making 
salient representations of ROC state identity in terms of huadu. Chen’s 
representations test the line between thin and thick huadu. 
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Chen also uses the same argumentation schemes seen in Ma Ying-jeou’s speech after 
2008 when he states:  
Chinese people emphasize the difference between statesmanship and hegemony, 
believing in the philosophy that a government which employs benevolence ‘will please 
those near and appeal to those from afar,’ and ‘when those from afar will not submit, 
then one must practice kindness and virtue to attract them.’ Such Chinese wisdom will 
remain a universal value.788 
He mentions “the mainland”, “people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait” and 
“governments and people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait”, but cautiously 
refers to Chinese leaders as “Mr” to avoid ascribing legitimacy, given that he is 
President of the ROC.789 All of this constructs huadu in the context of Chinese threat. 
In a December 2000 address in Taiwan, “Bridging the New Century”, Chen appears 
to revert to a thicker huadu by referring to a cultural China, stating: 
the people of Taiwan and China share the same blood, culture and historical 
background...China’s leaders should take cross-strait economic, trade, and cultural 
integration as a starting point for gradually building mutual trust...then jointly seek a 
new framework for permanent peace and political integration between the two sides.790 
Pro-taidu interest groups in Taiwan took “political integration” to mean Chen aimed 
at a variant of One-Country-Two-States (OCTS) in return for peace and prosperity. 
791 They also claimed Chen’s “wishy-washy statements”, poor practice of democracy, 
deep-Blue elite refusal to accept the DPP as “the legitimate, democratically-elected 
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government” and residual bureaucratic KMT corporatism meant Taiwan’s 
democracy and taidu might come to nothing.792  
It is Chen’s statement in an August 2002 telecast in Hoklo to the annual conference 
of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations stating that “with Taiwan and 
China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country” (yi bian, yi guo) that 
provoked Beijing’s anger again and pleased taidu constituencies. 793  This was a 
departure from his 2000 promise of “Four Noes and One Without” and threatened to 
elide straight from huadu to taidu. 
Yet, in January 2003, at a US think-tank Q&A, Chen switched back to thin huadu, 
but equated the ROC with Taiwan and not China in seeking the endorsement of the 
international community:  
The Republic of China is a sovereign state.... The ROC effectively exercises jurisdiction 
over the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu -- a fact no one can 
deny…Taiwan is not a part of, a local government of, or a province of any 
country…We want to emphasize to the international community that, as a sovereign 
state, the ROC cannot be downgraded, treated as a local government, or marginalized 
by anyone’.794 
By his 2004 inauguration speech, Chen is back to a thick huadu that tests the 
boundary with taidu by appealing to Taiwan nativism. Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty 
is the enactment of democracy by the Taiwanese themselves in the context of local 
culture. Chinese culture is welcome but is not part of Taiwan’s native culture: “allow 
the establishment of Taiwan’s native culture to naturally connect with the culture of 
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the Chinese people (huaren) and world culture”.795 On October 10, 2004, Chen stated: 
“the sovereignty of the Republic of China belongs to the 23 million Taiwanese 
people, the Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. This 
is a fact that no one can deny”.796 
Despite Chen’s 2000 promises, China continued to counter bentuhua by influencing 
power politics in Taiwan, yet sanctioned huadu as it shifted from facilitating tongyi 
to preventing taidu. The CCP isolated taidu activists, but met pan-Blue elites, Lien 
Chan and James Soong, and wooed the DPP’s core taidu constituency and rural pan-
Green interests with economic concessions. In response, in 2006, Chen further 
Taiwanised the ROC institutionally through the Name Rectification Campaign, 
abolishing the ROC’s National Unification Council (NUC) and its unification 
guidelines (NUGs). 797  On the pretext of a PLA missile build-up, he made the 
announcement at a commemoration of the 2-28 Incident in an emotional address to  a 
taidu-leaning constituency during which he intentionally addressed a watching 
Beijing by asking the Taiwanese crowd in Mandarin, using the diminutive form of 
his name to create solidarity: “is A-bian wrong? Is A-bian wrong in returning the 
right to choose their future to the 23 million people of Taiwan?” The rest of his 
speech was in Hoklo – a direct snub that excluded Beijing, as well as tongyi 
constituencies in Taiwan, from the conversation. Chen claimed the NUC and NUGs, 
as “products of absurdity rendered in an absurd era … products created in a police 
state” did not align with Taiwan’s democratic normative representations and sought 
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the sanction of Taiwan’s electorate in stating “I believe most Taiwanese people do 
not want to continue to accept such an historical absurdity.798  
It is clear that both the KMT and Beijing perceived Chen’s articulation of huadu as 
tantamount to taidu. The KMT sought to impeach Chen. Beijing responded by 
criticising him for "leading the nation towards disaster … endangering regional 
peace" in the "first step toward his goal of achieving de jure independence for 
Taiwan." The TAO stated: "we will never permit Taiwan Independence and splittist 
forces under any name or under any form to separate Taiwan from the motherland," 
So, while Beijing provisionally sanctioned a thin huadu, it had become clear that this 
sanction could apply to the thick form as long as de jure independence was not 
declared (q.v. 1.5.). Indeed, Taipei responded by reassuring Beijing:  
We believe …any change in the status quo must be approved by the people of Taiwan 
through democratic means such as a referendum…our president has said that Taiwan [is] 
a sovereign country and there is no need to declare so-called "independence”.799  
Interviewed in the Financial Times, Chen accused Beijing and the KMT of seeking 
to change the status quo:  
Taiwan is already a sovereign independent country and does absolutely not belong to 
the People’s Republic of China, is not a part of them, and is not a province of the PRC 
either. We have a government. We have jurisdiction. We have sovereignty. But they 
intend to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait…But Taiwan, the 23m Taiwanese, 
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we still want to continue to walk down our own path of democracy, of freedom, of 
human rights and of peace.800 
Yet, Chen explicitly rejected changing the cross-Strait status quo: “Ma’s proposed 
peace treaty in exchange for no independence and removal of China’s threat would 
be a surrender treaty because it would change the status quo”.801 
Chen’s maintenance of huadu in the face of pressure from taidu and tongyi 
constituencies legitimated Lee’s inclusive version of identity and the DPP’s Grand 
Compromise discourse. Taidu and tongyi were delegitimated in the process because 
of their recourse to ethnic identity politics.  Lee’s and Lien Chan’s benshengren 
factions on the one side and the James Soong’s waishengren faction on the other had 
split the main KMT and spawned pro-China parties like the People First Party (PFP) 
that appealed to alienated waishengren.802  
On the pan-Green side, Lee’s supporters founded the TSU to “persist in sovereignty 
and establish a sovereign, independent Taiwan,” to “normalize the Taiwanese state 
and cross-Strait relations.” 803  The TSU still defined bentuhua inclusively as 
“identifying with Taiwan, contribution to Taiwan, and being willing to work for 
Taiwan’s future”.804 Yet, it also maintained that China and Taiwan were separated by 
politics rather than language and culture.805 At the same time, however, because the 
TSU threatened Beijing and tongyi, it appealed to a more nativist taidu 
800 Financial Times. 2006. Interview Transcript: Chen Shui-bian. 2 November 2006. [online] 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/b8af3b80-6a53-11db-8ae5-0000779e2340 [Accessed 2 July 
2018]. 
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Program).[Online] Available at: http://www.tsu.org.tw/policy.html [Accessed 25 April 2018]. 
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constituency.806 Having been elected with only 39% of the vote, Chen was in danger 
of being outflanked by the TSU on Taiwanisation of the ROC.  
During the 2000s, the DPP and the KMT struggled to discard ethnic elements in SIPs 
in order to promote civic norms. Pan-Blue elites, James Soong and Lien Chan, 
worked to prove their loyalty to Taiwan in 2004 after the DPP focused on their 
mainland connections. Chen admitted in his 2004 inauguration speech that the DPP 
needed to shift away from ethnic SIPs and towards increased taishang investment in 
China while strengthening the ROC’s civic identity. This study does not seek to 
discuss party positioning in local elections.However, SIPs continued in local 
elections when Chen portrayed the December 2006 Kaohsiung mayoral election as a 
struggle between Taiwan and China. Yet, by 2008, the KMT had still not fully shed 
its Chinese nationalist identity, which had become stronger with Chinese support and 
because of Chen’s perceived shift to taidu. Ethnic politics came to a head within the 
KMT when the waishengren Ma Ying-jeou competed with the benshengren Wang 
Jin-pyng for the KMT party chairmanship and the KMT candidature for the 2008 
presidential election. Wang stated in campaigning that many people thought it was 
not right for an ethnic minority (Chinese) to rule over the majority in Taiwan.807 So, 
huadu still contained scope for waishengren-benshengren ethnic struggle, despite its 
legitimacy resting on civic norms.  
The resilience of huadu suggests that bottom-up lobbying did not determine Taipei’s 
cross-strait policy with regard to its bottom line of retaining de facto independence 
through the status quo between 1992 and 2008.  Most saliently, partisan ideological 
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division was most clearly not replicated in the ROC’s cross-Strait policy. The DPP in 
power did not deploy cross-Strait policies that satisfied pro-taidu constituencies 
while the KMT in power failed to enact policies that fully reflected the desires of 
tongyi constituencies. 808 This suggests four things. First, the DPP and KMT were 
constrained by cross-Strait factors – China will not permit taidu. Second, state-
enacted bentuhua constituted a state identity that eschews taidu and tongyi and 
embraces huadu. Third, this state identity takes a civic form. However, the ROC 
deployed SIPs that enacted ethnic forms for instrumental reasons and DIGs sought to 
influence Taipei’s cross-Strait policy by appealing to ethnicity. Fourth, policy elites, 
constrained as they were, responded to DIG demands through cautious cross-Strait 
policies that reflected vote-maximising behaviour to retain power and legitimate 
huadu. The PRC offered to discuss Taiwan’s international space, so long as One 
China under the 1992 Consensus was accepted.809 By oscillating between thin and 
thick versions of huadu, Taipei was able to adhere to the 1992 Consensus even if the 
DPP formally rejected it as a legitimate encoding of Taiwan’s political status. 
7.5.3 The KMT’s 2008 Election Campaign 
By 1992, huadu had nucleated semantically. Between then and 2008, its pragmatic 
meaning, or its communicative effect, oscillated between thin and thick forms. Its 
constitutive influence in Taiwan’s domestic politics can be seen in cross-party 
consensus on “New Taiwanese” identity and the Taiwanised KMT’s conscious 
articulation of bentuhua during the 2008 presidential election. Yet, as Kaeding (2009) 
points out, the KMT went further and deployed more Taiwanese ethno-cultural SIPs 
that year. This suggests an an appeal to thick huadu for instrumental electoral 
reasons. Kaeding ascribes this to two factors: first, he argues, the KMT sought to 
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counter pan-Green perceptions of the KMT as seeking tongyi that had been 
exacerbated by the party’s informal negotiations with the CCP while out of power. 
Second, the KMT perceived DPP discourse as covert taidu. The KMT sought to 
counter both by appealing to a social constituency that it suspected may be 
susceptible to taidu.810 While this might suggest an aspiring foreign policy executive 
heading off possible domestic constraints by allaying fears, this study’s realist-
constructivist framework suggests both pan-Blue and pan-Green camps identified 
threats from Beijing based on misperception, not material fact. That is, if the KMT 
had simply stuck to New Taiwanese normative representations they would still have 
won, since huadu would have carried the day. After all, the perceived threat to 
Taiwan from China prompted by the DPP’s perceived covert taidu discourse 
legitimated the KMT as more competent to secure Taiwan’s sovereignty anyway. 
Indeed, Kaeding himself points out the discursive importance of the New Taiwanese 
to the KMT’s understanding of ROC state identity in a pamphlet, co-authored by Ma 
Ying-jeou and Yang Tu in June 2007.811 This sought to counter Taiwanese ethnic 
nationalism by explicitly invoking civic, bentuhua-inspired normative 
representations that encompassed certain Free China “idealis” ones. Specifically, it 
indexed China’s role in Taiwan’s development and challenged the pro-taidu 
narrative of a privileged ethnic Hoklo identity. 812  Ma’s pamphlet accused Hoklo 
elites, descended from Fujianese migrants, of crude nativism.  Stressing the 
waishengren role in the dangwai, Ma reiterated, ”bentuhua is inclusiveness, it is the 
integration of immigrant culture, it is a process of constant addition, constant 
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rejection and constant renewal”.813 Thus, Ma used bentuhua to legitimate huadu but 
one that rejected taidu-leaning bentuhua in that it emphasised that democratisation 
had to involve China. In this regard, the pendulum swang back to a thin huadu that 
approached a ROC-centred (huatong) version of tongyi. 
The 2008 presidential election was held two months after the KMT had secured a 
75% majority in the legislature. The results reflected dissatisfaction with the DPP, 
the economy, corruption surrounding President Chen and concerns over cross-Strait 
relations. Yet, the ethnic undertone of bentuhua under the second Chen 
administration alongside Ma’s waishengren identity presented KMT strategists with 
a challenge that prompted them to oscillate between civic and ethnic identity in order 
to delegitimate taidu and tongyi.  To gain the presidency, Ma needed to legitimate 
himself and his party.  
Ma was the favourite against the DPP’s former Kaohsiung Mayor and Premier, Hsieh 
Chang-ting. As KMT Justice Minister and Mayor of Taipei, Ma had cultivated 
support among the deep-Blue KMT, taishang and Beijing. However, his personal 
identity remained ambivalent. Born in Hong Kong to Mainlander parents, he had 
held important positions during the authoritarian era, issues raised by the DPP to 
challenge his loyalty to Taiwan.814 To respond to domestic demands, Ma needed to 
portray himself and the KMT as authentically Taiwanese, defending Taiwan’s 
sovereignty. He therefore aimed to align the KMT’s Chinese and Taiwanese 
identities with the Taiwanese identity of its social constituency. However, his 
platform included policies that pan-Green taidu constituencies perceived as 
threatening. He identified China as key to Taiwan’s economic recovery, assuring 
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voters of his commitment to Taiwan, with the Three Noes of “No Independence; No 
Unification; No War”.815  
In separating bentuhua from de-sinification, Ma responded to domestic demands for 
security by presenting the KMT as the party that could boost Taiwan’s flagging 
economy through formal commercial engagement with China, even though the DPP 
had driven massive Taiwanese FDI on the Mainland and also sought engagement 
with China.816  He proposed a wide-ranging FTA and follow-on agreements - in effect 
a cross-Strait common market. Ma lauded Taiwan as a model Chinese (huaren) 
democracy with a democratic deficit caused by the DPP. 817  Promising ethical 
governance, he portrayed the KMT as the authentic guarantors of a free, democratic, 
multi-ethnic Taiwan.818 Such ambivalence between thin and thick versions of huadu 
belies any claim that the KMT’s understanding of One China aligned to that of 
Beijing.   
By 2008, the DPP’s Taiwanisation policies had not led to taidu, yet relations with 
China were poor, taishang were alienated and domestic inequality had deepened. The 
KMT promised economic liberalisation through a series of FTAs to secure Taiwan’s 
interests, adding the 2008 global financial crisis as a post-facto justification. Despite 
being portrayed as a pro-tongyi waishengren by the DPP, Ma won 58% of the 
popular vote. In his inaugural address, he linguistically indexed huadu, referring to a 
“Taiwan Renaissance” based on democracy, ethnic harmony, deeper cross-Strait 
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relations and a liberal economy. 819 This would strengthen Taiwan’s economy and 
make Beijing more amenable to Taiwan’s signing FTAs with other countries, 
allowing fuller integration into the global economy.820 The implication was that this 
would secure Taiwan’s sovereignty. Rather than securing huadu, pro-divergence 
DIGs perceived closer cross-Strait relations and a liberal economy as a threat to 
huadu as well as to their interests. 
7.6 Beijing’s Sanction of huadu 
Just as Taipei’s statements have constructed huadu (q.v. 1.5.), Beijing’s official 
statements on Taiwan’s status have created a discursive gap for huadu to occupy. 
That cross-Strait relations themselves are inter-state constitutes an endorsement of 
huadu by Beijing as Taipei’s principal non-subject social constituency and only 
existential threat. This might seem a bold claim, given Beijing’s steadfast position on 
unification and the stridency of its public rhetoric against Taiwan Independence. It 
must be remembered, however, that Beijing seeks to avert Taiwan’s de jure 
independence in taidu, not its de facto independence in huadu. For instance, the 
PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law permitted “non-peaceful means” to avert taidu, not 
huadu.  
Dean Chen (2014) claims that changing interpretations of One China constructed 
cross-Strait peace.821 Li Yitan (2014) argues that post-2008 Rapprochement turned 
peaceful cross-Strait economic integration into a new norm.822  For Chen, strategic 
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calculations cannot account for Beijing tacitly accepting the ROC during 
Rapprochement; rather, huadu has permitted fundamental change in cross-Strait 
norms, rendering the unification-independence framework obsolete. Yet, as this study 
shows, the 1992 Consensus had already rendered it obsolete because the concept of 
OCRI contained within it enabled subsequent discursive shift.  
In November 1992, Beijing asserted that One China was the PRC and that Taiwan 
was part of it. However, it acknowledged Taipei’s position that One China was the 
ROC, that both Taiwan and the Mainland were part of it and, crucially, that the 
ROC’s governing authority was restricted to the Taiwan Area. By the late 1990s, 
however, Beijing had endorsed a looser one-China principle that more clearly 
foregrounded Taiwan and the mainland being equal parts of China. Not stating which 
China that was made Chinese state identity ambiguous, easing cross-Strait relations 
and permitting Beijing’s implicit recognition of the ROC. Shared revolutionary ties 
meant the CCP recognised the KMT’s contribution to China. This tacit recognition 
gave the CCP legitimacy through Republican China.823 It also legitimated the ROC in 
the process and averted taidu. Discursive change in Taiwanese political speech had 
changed Beijing’s perceptions of Taiwan and prompted its linguistic reconstitution of 
One China. Beijing relaxed its One China principle because it perceived that huadu 
as encoded in ROC speech was not taidu. Thus, huadu allowed Beijing to grant 
Taipei Westphalian and domestic, but not international, sovereignty.824 In so doing, 
huadu compelled Beijing’s sanction. 
Beijing had been firm on One China after 1949. However, its rhetoric of “the Chiang 
Kai-shek clique” became “peaceful reunification” after 1971 once Beijing had been 
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recognised by the UN. Even as Taipei claimed to be Free China, in a New Year’s 
Day Message to Taiwan Compatriots in 1979, Beijing promised to:  
take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the 
motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks 
of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of 
reuniﬁcation so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses.825  
However, all of this meant One China was the PRC and unification meant 
zhongtong. 826  A shift came after Taipei’s November 1992 One China statement; 
Beijing stated that it:   
fully respects and accepts your Foundation’s suggestion and both sides of the strait 
uphold the principle of one China, and actively seek national uniﬁcation, but the 
political interpretation of the one China will not be referred to in the cross-strait 
negotiations on functional issues.827 
 
Jiang Zemin’s 1995 Eight Point Proposal relaxed the 1992 articulation and offered 
“phased” negotiations leading to tongyi. If Taipei accepted One China, then Beijing 
would renounce force, recognise Taiwan as an equal and grant it international 
space.828 ARATS’ Chairman, Chen Yunlin followed this in 1997 with “cross-strait 
negotiations are equal talks based on the principle of one China, not in the name of 
talks between the central government and a local government”. 829 In 1997, Jiang 
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Zemin’s “new security concept” aimed to “rise above one-sided security and seek 
common security through mutually beneﬁcial cooperation”.830 
In October 1998, the second Koo-Wang SEF-ARATS talks in Shanghai provided a 
platform for Beijing’s policy shift. Beijing had been adamant that “our consistent 
stand before the two sides across the strait are reunified [is that] there is only one 
China across the strait, Taiwan is part of China, and Chinese sovereignty and 
territorial integrity are indivisible”. Yet, this wording in itself implied a linguistic 
shift from the 1992 assertion that Taiwan was part of the PRC. ARATS’ Chairman 
Wang Daohan stated “one China” does not refer to “either the ROC or the PRC. 
[This] indicates a uniﬁed China that will be created by the Chinese people of the two 
sides in the future”.831 At the subsequent press conference, ARATS VC, Tang Shubei, 
cited the 16 November 1992 ARATS fax that constituted the 1992 Consensus: “Both 
sides of the strait stick to the ‘one China’ principle and will strive to pursue national 
unification. However, negotiations on routine matters across the strait do not involve 
the political meaning of one China”.832 Tang went on to say “anything can be put on 
the table under the one China principle [and] the two sides should still negotiate on 
equal footing under the principle that there is one China. The issue of whether the 
talks are between central or local authorities can be left aside”.833 
Granted, Beijing’s 2000 White Paper on Taiwan asserted that the advent of the PRC 
meant that the ROC was illegitimate in terms of China’s sovereignty and that it was 
simply “a local authority in Chinese territory”.834 Yet, PRC elites were stating “both 
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the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China”, but “China does not necessarily 
mean the PRC”. In July 2000, Beijing signalled conciliation to the incoming DPP in 
Taipei. Qian Qichen articulated a more flexible One China: 
With regard to cross-strait relations, the one China principle we stand for is that there is 
only one China in the world; the mainland and Taiwan all belong to one China; and 
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are indivisible.835 
By saying that Taiwan and the mainland were both part of One China rather than that 
Taiwan was part of the PRC or of China, Beijing implied pragmatically that Taiwan 
and China were equal polities since it removed Taiwan’s adjunctive quality. In an 
interview with the Washington Post in January 2001, Qian Qichen said: 
In the past, Chinese officials said “one China” meant Communist China, that Taiwan 
was a breakaway province and the Beijing government was the only legal government. 
When Taiwan’s leaders thought of one China, they were trapped. In order to ease their 
doubts, we said “one China” not only includes the mainland, but also Taiwan. We think 
of this China as an integral whole which can’t be separated in sovereignty or territory. 
This is the true meaning of “one China.” And, they had another doubt ...They think that 
Taiwan being part of Chinese territory means Taiwan and China are not equal ...To ease 
this doubt, we said the mainland and Taiwan belong to the same one China. At least, it 
shows some kind of equality. I think it can help ease their doubt … Once we said we 
would liberate Taiwan, then we said Taiwan was just a province of China, now we are 
saying Taiwan can be our equal ...For the mainland to make these kinds of adjustments 
in policy is not an easy thing.836 
In 2002, perceiving greater taidu sentiment in Taiwan, Beijing asked Taipei to renew 
negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. Chen Shui-bian refused and cross-
Strait relations became confrontational as Taipei diverged politically from a Chinese 
state identity. In 2004, PRC Vice-Premier Qian Qichen stated:  
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/ t20110316_1789217.htm. [Accessed 23 
October 2018]. 
835 Kan, Shirley. 2002: 65 
836 Qian Qichen quoted in John Pomfret, John. 2001.  Beijing Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan: 
Comments Appear Aimed at Bush, Washington Post. 5 January 2001, p. A01. 
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both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. Despite the absence of reuniﬁcation 
at present, the two sides should work hard to create conditions for it by reducing 
contentions, improving cross-strait relations and breaking the political deadlock ...The 
importance of the ‘1992 consensus’ lies in the fact that, under the prerequisite of 
adhering to the ‘one-China’ principle, both sides seek common ground while reserving 
differences in a ﬂexible way and take the interests of both sides into consideration with 
a view to building mutual trust, negotiating matters in a practical manner and always 
looking towards the future.837 
Hu Jintao’s “peaceful development” and “harmonious world” discourses granted 
further space for huadu to fill. In 2004, Hu asserted China would not seek global 
domination, would “transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, 
development, and cooperation with all countries of the world”.838 In 2007 at the 17th 
CCP Party Congress, he reprised Lee Teng-hui’s notion of Gemeinschaft, suggesting 
a “community of common destiny [in which] one China does not mean the PRC’s 
China, but [simply] a common homeland for both sides”.839 
Huadu is socially constructed and Beijing’s sanction stems from Beijing’s and 
Taipei’s respective interpretations of One China permitted by OCRI.840 Rationalist 
arguments cannot fully explain this because tongyi has been its formal policy since 
1992. Beijing’s power gives it leverage, but OCRI is a socially constructed discourse 
with competing interpretations.  “One China” attempts to prescribe the definitional 
limits of state identity. Yet huadu pushes them, both semantically and pragmatically 
using OCRI’s “respective interpretations”. So, a realist-constructivist account sees 
huadu as being as much Beijing’s construction as Taipei’s. Wendt’s Constructivism 
                                                 
837  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2002. Speech by Vice Premier 
Qian Qichen at the Forum to Commemorate the Seventh Anniversary of Jiang Zemin’s Speech 
Entitled ‘Continuing to Endeavor for the Accomplishment of the Grand Cause of 
ReuniﬁcationoftheMotherland,’, 24 January, 2002. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng//wjdt/zyjh/t25047.shtml. [Accessed 30 November 2018]. 
838 Hu Jintao. 2004. Cited in Chen, Dean. 2014. 
839 Qiang Xin, 2010. Beyond Power Politics. Journal of Contemporary China, 19(65): 529. 
840 Chen, Dean. 2014: 22. 
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would see huadu as less threatening to Beijing than taidu.841 For Beijing, Cross-Strait 
socialisation has led it to endorse huadu because it is not taidu. In this regard, Taipei 
has compelled Beijing’s sanction of huadu. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how Taiwan used the discursive power of huadu to 
legitimate its de facto independence in the status quo. Between 1987 and 2008, 
huadu oscillated in thin and thick forms, pragmatically understood in different ways 
by different constituencies. Huadu’s semantic meaning, however, had nucleated in 
the 1992 Consensus. First, huadu was co-constituted in the dismantling of the ROC’s 
Free China identity through bentuhua and democratisation and resolved the 
authoritarian ROC’s second crisis of legitimacy. Second, it secured the ROC, thus 
stalemating the PRC’s irredentist threat. Third, it directed policy towards the status 
quo and in oscillating within that status quo, ensured that China remained unable to 
subdue Taiwan, Fourth, huadu legitimated the ROC as the Taiwanese state, 
delegitimated tongyi and taidu and compelled Taiwan’s mainstream parties and 
Beijing to sanction it. Huadu arose from the delegitimation of authoritarian 
sinification, Free China “realis” and “idealis”, bentuhua, globalisation, 
acknowledgement of Chinese cultural roots and democratisation. It developed co-
constitutively in cross-Strait and domestic politics, drawing both pan-Green and pan-
Blue DIGs and parties towards a preference for de facto independence in the status 
quo.  
Huadu has its origins in bentuhua. In power, both the KMT under Lee and the DPP 
under Chen oversaw the Taiwanisation of the ROC. However, state-led bentuhua 
841 Li, Yitan: 31. See also: Wendt, Alexander. 1987. The Agent-Structure Problem in International 
Relations Theory. International Organization, 41(3): 335–370; Wendt, Alexander. 1992: 398; 
Katzenstein, Peter. ed. 1996: 55.  
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alone does not account for huadu’s power to maintain the status quo. It required 
cross-Strait and nation-state socialization. Strategically enacted by the KMT and the 
DPP, bentuhua constituted both parties’ identities, legitimating huadu in their social 
constituencies. Between 2000 and 2008, despite high tension and Chinese and KMT 
perceptions of a move towards taidu, however, the DPP enacted policies that 
reflected a popular preference for the status quo. These policies had a strong 
bentuhua ideational component that responded to Beijing’s anti-taidu policy signals. 
Huadu was legitimated in SIPs, where ethnic politics were tempered by huadu to 
legitimate civic democratic normative representations. In this sense, this study’s 
findings suggest that, contrary to mainstream narratives on heightened political 
divergence over the period, the discursive changes in ROC state identity did not 
constitute a material change in Taiwan’s political status from 1992.  
In sum, by 2008, huadu had Taiwanised the ROC and secured its de facto 
independence. The 2008-16 period would be a litmus test for huadu; could it 
withstand Rapprochement with China under the 1992 Consensus and maintain the 
ROC’s Taiwanised identity in the status quo or would it elide into tongyi as PRC-
centred zhongtong? The next chapter accounts for how huadu was tested and 
survived in Rapprochement to crystalise in a form that reconciled thick and thin 
understandings. 
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Chapter 8: The Crystalisation of huadu under the KMT 2008-16 
Today I wish to put forth five points for maintaining the status quo of peace and 
prosperity in the Taiwan Straits. *
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a puzzle: a turn to China by a more China-identifying KMT 
administration was accompanied by a crystalisation of huadu and 
Taiwan’s maintenance of the status quo. The chapter argues that, while domestic 
preferences certainly constrained Taipei’s micro-level policies, Taiwan’s national 
interest and prevailing interest group preferences converged in huadu. This 
finding refutes the claim that Rapprochement represented underbalancing, that 
the KMT sought to violate the status quo and that prevailing domestic 
preferences stopped them. The puzzle of misperception may be explained 
pragmatically in the discursive gap between the illocutionary force of KMT 
statements and their perlocutionary effect on pan-Green constituencies. That is, actor 
A’s statements are filtered through actor B’s threat perception which, in turn, is 
contextually constituted by B’s preferences. This meant that, while pan-Green 
interest groups perceived Rapprochement as a threat to the status quo and to 
huadu, pan-Blue groups saw it as securing them. Moreover, Beijing perceived 
Rapprochement as inhibiting taidu and therefore sanctioned it. 
This chapter focuses on a series of overlapping cases. First, it outlines a broad divide 
between pro-convergence (with China) and pro-divergence (from China) interest 
groups in Taiwan and explains how Taipei formulated cross-Strait policy. Second, it 
explicates the cross-Strait environment (q.v. 8.3.), tracing how Taipei pursued 
Rapprochement on the basis of the 1992 Consensus and sold the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and the Cross-Strait Service Trade 
*Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan) (2015) Full text of ROC President Ma Ying-
jeou’s remarks in meeting with Mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping, November 7, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=113323&ctNode=6337&mp=3. [Accessed 20 November 2015]. 
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Agreement (CSSTA) to the taishang. Third, it explicates the domestic environment 
(q.v. 8.4.), showing how ECFA and the CSSTA drove two cases– the Ma-Wang 
conflict and the Sunflower Occupation. Fourth, it shows how huadu played out 
discursively in Ma Ying-jeou’s policy statements at the Ma-Xi Summit in 
Singapore in November 2015, fixing the status quo (q.v. 8.5.). Finally, it 
reiterates Beijing’s role and interest in legitimating huadu.  
In sum, the chapter concludes that Rapprochement was huadu’s litmus test and 
the ROC came out as Taiwanese. First, huadu prevailed, filtered through domestic 
power politics in the form of SIPs; second, huadu legitimates the ROC’s sovereign 
status as Taiwan, delegitimates taidu and tongyi and compels Beijing’s sanction; 
third, huadu explains China’s inability to force unification on Taiwan and accounts 
for the latter’s maintenance of its de facto independence.842 Huadu, while it remains 
unarticulated as such and is therefore a genuine discourse, is a secure position for 
Taiwan. 
8.2. The cross-Strait Environment 
This section locates tense cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s economic predicament 
at the end of the 2000-2008 DPP administration as the context for Rapprochement 
and the 1992 Consensus as its discursive vehicle. It argues that, while the DPP and 
pan-Green DIGs perceived it as a threat to Taiwan’s security, Rapprochement 
actually legitimated huadu. Indeed, prevailing pan-Green micro-
discourses legitimated huadu. This finding challenges the claim that the KMT was 
constrained by pan-Green DIG opinion.843 
842 See: Siew, Vincent. 2008. Cross-Strait Economic and Political Relations and the Next American 
Administration. The Brookings Institution Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. Keynote 
Address.  3 December 2008. [online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/1203_cross_strait_relations_keynote2.pdf [Accessed 30 July 2018].  
Siew,Vincent. 2010. Vice President Siew's remarks at the Symposium. Taiwan in the 21st Century: 
Politics, Economy and Society. Office of the President. [online] Available at: 
http://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/3344 [Accessed 30 July 2018]. 
843 Chen, Dean. 2017; Lindemann, Bjorn. 2014; Sterling-Folker, 2009. 
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8.2.1. Convergers and Divergers 
Huadu operates in Taiwan’s domestic power politics to constitute broadly 
convergent or divergent preferences. These preferences cross-cut with thin and thick 
forms of huadu tangential to the Blue-Green national spectrum. Only a tiny minority 
support taidu or tongyi in the short-term. The status quo is the preferred position of 
Taiwan’s most powerful elites and interest groups. Taiwan’s 2008-16 internal 
spectrum therefore differed simply on whether Rapprochement threatened the status 
quo. While not a strict binary distinction, the divergence camp aligned to the pan-
Green grouping and the convergence camp aligned to the pan-Blue grouping. 
However, as this study shows, both pan-Blues and pan-Greens sought an outcome 
that secured the status quo. Pan-Blues saw economic liberalisation with China as the 
best way to secure the status quo while pan-Greens saw economic liberalisation vis-
à-vis China as a threat to the status quo. By 2016, liberal democracy had been 
legitimated, while economic liberalisation with China had been delegitimated as a 
threat to Taiwan’s democracy and, by extension, Taipei’s huadu identity. 
8.2.2. How cross-Strait policy was formulated 
At the beginning of the 2008-16 KMT administration, Taiwan’s executive, the 
Executive Yuan (EY), formulated and implemented general cross-Strait policy, with 
the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) responsible for coordinating different agencies. 
Once the EY reached a policy decision, implementation was left to respective 
ministries. The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) provided governmental services 
to taishang and negotiated with ARATS, the Chinese agency that came under the 
Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). 844  However, Rapprochement shows how power 
844 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2011. Overall Structure of Mainland 
Policy Formulation. Important Documents on the Government’s Mainland Policy: 74. [online] 
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politics combined with DIG threat perception to co-constitute huadu in cross-Strait 
policy. In 2008, Ma appointed Lai Shin-yuan, a long-time advocate of Taiwan’s 
sovereignty, as MAC chairperson.845 This appointment and later evidence from MAC 
policy statements suggest that Ma’s position on sovereignty was not as fragile as 
pan-Greens perceived. In 2010, Lai defined cross-Strait policy as:  
1. Upholding the ROC’s democratic constitution while building peaceful, stable cross-
strait relations;
2. Creating external conditions for peace and prosperity, to make Taiwan a force for
stability;
3. ‘Mutual non-denial’ in cross-strait institutionalized negotiations to build mutual trust;
4. Taiwan’s way of life and democratic values as a benchmark for reforms on the
Mainland;
5. Working with regional allies to protect the security of the Taiwan Strait’846
8.2.3. Rapprochement and Resistance under Ma 
The KMT’s move towards Rapprochement had begun in September 2005 when Lien 
Chan visited China for KMT-CCP talks and Ma Ying-jeou as Mayor of Taipei asked, 
“What is wrong with promoting this policy if Taiwan is put first and the benefits are 
well taken care of?”847 In March 2007, it became a proactive policy on cross-Strait 
relations under the principle of “putting Taiwan first” to “maintain the status quo 
Available at: http://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/OldFile/public/MMO/RPIR/book522.pdf [Accessed 
20 March 2015]. 
845Office of the President. Republic of China (Taiwan) . 2008. Transcript of May 21, 2008 Presidential 
Press Conference with President Ma Ying-jeou and Vice President Vincent Siew. 21 May 2008. 
[online] Available at: https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/2941 [Accessed 20 March 2015].  
846 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2011. Lai Shin-Yuan, Minister of the 
Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan. Defending the Core Interests of Taiwan’s People while 
Advancing Cross-Strait Relations. 6 December 2010. [online] Available at: 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=A921DFB2651FF92F&sms=37838322A6DA5E7
9&s=0185CA0EE06DECE3 [Accessed 20 March 2015]. 
847 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2011. The Core Interests of the People of 
Taiwan Form an Important Foundation for the Development of Cross-Strait Relations. Remarks by 
Minister Lai at the Symposium on Continuity and Change: Cross-Strait Relations from 2008 to 2010, 
National Taipei University. 2 October 2010. Available at: 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=A921DFB2651FF92F&sms=37838322A6DA5E7
9&s=6E674415D0A31B3D [Accessed 20 March 2015]. 
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under the condition of benefiting the people” while “minimizing the threats and 
maximizing the opportunities”. The KMT promised to “firmly guard and staunchly 
protect Taiwan’s interests and stand with the people of Taiwan”. Rapprochement will 
be “conducive to our national survival”, will “work for and defend Taiwan’s interests” 
through “economic issues first and political issues later, easy issues first and difficult 
issues later, and urgent issues first and less pressing issues later”.848  
In strategically shelving sovereignty, Ma invoked huadu’s liberal normative 
representations, yet acted prudently in adopting a realist morality. In his inaugural 
address in May 2008, he stated “resolution of cross-strait issues does not lie in 
sovereignty disputes but in core values and way of life”. Minister Lai later parsed 
this as “democracy” being Taiwan’s “most important core interest”; that Taiwan’s 
security is guaranteed “under the ROC government elected by the citizenry” of 
Taiwan whose sovereignty under the ROC constitution guarantees their right to 
“freely choose the future of cross-strait relations and participate in international 
relations”.849  The core interest of Taiwan, therefore, is its right to sovereignty and it 
is the ROC that ensures that. On May 26, 2008 the SEF proposed resumption of 
institutionalised negotiations with Beijing under the 1992 Consensus. 
848 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2011. The Core Interests of the People of 
Taiwan Form an Important Foundation for the Development of Cross-Strait Relations. Speech by Lai 
Shin-yuan. Important Documents on Cross-Strait Policy. 2 October 2010. Symposium on “Continuity 
and Change: Cross-Strait Relations from 2008 to 2010. NTU. [online] Available at: 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=A921DFB2651FF92F&sms=37838322A6DA5E7
9&s=6E674415D0A31B3D [Accessed 20 March 2015]. 
849 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2011. The Core Interests of the People of 
Taiwan Form an Important Foundation for the Development of Cross-Strait Relations. Speech by Lai 
Shin-yuan. Important Documents on Cross-Strait Policy. 2 October 2010. Symposium on “Continuity 
and Change: Cross-Strait Relations from 2008 to 2010. NTU. [online] Available at: 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=A921DFB2651FF92F&sms=37838322A6DA5E7
9&s=6E674415D0A31B3D [Accessed 20 March 2015]. 
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8.2.4. Rapprochement under the 1992 Consensus as huadu 
The assumption that powerful interest groups are instrumental in foreign policy is 
understandable. Certainly, KMT policy frames taishang as a crucial cross-Strait 
interest group to be actively courted. 850  In September 2013, Lin Join-sane 
encapsulated taishang influence on policy in an address to business and political 
elites, saying KMT elites Lien Chan, Vincent Siew and Hau Pei-tsun had told him 
always to listen to the taishang: “every time we heard the opinions and responses of 
Taiwan businesspeople, we would transform them into the government’s major 
policies”.851 The political role of taishang predates cross-Strait relations, though. As 
early as 1985, under Free China, the KMT elite, Vincent Siew, had linked “Build 
Taiwan” to illicit cross-Strait trade as unavoidable and “beneficial to Taiwan's 
survival and development”.852 In January 2001, he suggested the EU model would 
lead to ‘win-win’, and the “sharing of sovereignty”. 853 By then, however, huadu had 
changed Taiwan’s preferences. 
850 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2008. SEF Holds the 2008 Dragon Boat 
Festival Gathering of Taiwanese Businessmen. 10th June 2008. [online] Available at: 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx%3Fn%3DA25A31DE8D66F1C6%26sms%3D7D28
EA87CFA26186%26s%3DAD1A78430DA2F483+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk [Accessed 20 
March 2017]. 
851 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2013. The speech delivered by Chairman Lin Join-sane of the Straits 
Exchange Foundation (SEF) at the 2013 Mid-autumn Festival dinner party for Taiwan businesspeople 
on the mainland. 18 September 2013. [online] Available at: 
http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=906432&ctNode=4632&mp=300 [Accessed 21 March 2017]. 
852 Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation. 2003. Why Do I Advocate a Cross-Straits Common 
Market? [online] Available at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130901031240/http://crossstrait.org/version3/index.html [Accessed 21 
March 2017]. 
853 Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation. 2003. Vincent C. Siew Toward the Creation of a Cross-
Strait Common Market. [online] Available at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130901031240/http://crossstrait.org/version3/index.html [Accessed 21 
March 2017]. 
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The data in this study refute Schubert’s (2016) claim that taishang do not constitute a 
cohesive interest group. 854  Several trade bodies that represent taishang interests in 
China and in Taiwan and constitute an influential interest group. The Association of 
Taiwan Invested Enterprises on the Mainland (ATIEM), for instance, aims to 
safeguard “the legitimate rights and interests of the taishang, promoting laws and 
regulations … and solving members’ problems”. 855  Indeed, a conference call 
convened by ATIEM President Kuo Shan-hui on 11th June 2010 sets the tone for 
KMT-CCP-taishang cooperation and a statement dated 15th October 2013, ATIEM 
fully endorsed the CSSTA as reflecting taishang interests and repeated the same five 
benefits put forward by Taipei.856 857 
The ECFA was the major cross-Strait policy proposal of Ma’s first term and the 
follow-on agreements were those of his second term. The ECFA itself was intended 
as a preferential trade agreement that would include a framework agreement (ECFA) 
to cover trade in goods (CSMTA); trade in services (CSSTA); investment protection, 
a dispute settlement mechanism and an early harvest list allowing China to remove 
tariffs on 530 Taiwanese products and open 11 service sectors including banking and 
investment to Taiwan. In return, Taiwan would reduce tariffs on 267 Chinese 
                                                 
854 Schubert, Gunter. 2016. 
855 Association of Taiwan Invested Enterprises on the Mainland. 2010. jianding xinxin gongke shijian, 
gongcu fazhan – zhitai qilian huiyuande changyishu (Strengthening confidence, weathering the storm, 
promoting development – a proposal to ATIEM members]. 29 June 2010. [online] Available at: 
http://www.qgtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201007/t20100702_1438432.htm [Accessed 25 April 2017]. 
856 Association of Taiwan Invested Enterprises in the Mainland. 2013. Guanyu zhichi haixia liang’an 
fuwu maoyi xieyi de shengming [Statement in support of the CSSTA]. 15 October 2013. [online] 
Available at: http://www.qgtql.com/tzgg/gglb/index_1.htm [Accessed 25 April 2015]. 
857 Association of Taiwan Invested Enterprises on the Mainland. 2010.  Quanguo taiqi lian di er jie di 
yi ci fu hui zhang dianhua huiyi jilu 
 [ATIEM first vice president conference call minutes]. 2 July 2010. [online] Available at: 
http://www.qgtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201007/t20100702_1438432.htm [Accessed 25 April 2015]. 
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products and open nine sectors, including banking. 858  The agreements benefited 
Taiwan since they implemented WTO processes while bypassing the WTO itself, 
thus obviating China’s refusal to deal with Taiwan there because of sovereignty 
implications. Taiwan’s preferential treatment around investment in China would 
benefit taishang, who had an interest in access to finance.859 The ECFA would also 
allow Taiwan greater access to the international political economy through FTAs that 
China had previously blocked. Ma hoped that, even if China did not formally 
recognise Taiwan’s sovereignty, it would relent on FTAs if Taiwan showed willing 
by liberalising. In this way, deployment of huadu would legitimate Taiwan in the 
international political economy, securing its sovereignty through rules and norms. 
Despite its instrumental shelving of sovereignty in its courting of taishang interests, 
therefore, Taipei clearly signalled huadu from the start. At his June 2008 meeting 
with Hu Jintao in Beijing, SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung reiterated “peace and 
prosperity” under the 1992 Consensus. However, while sticking to standard 
diplomatic frames, he also pressed Hu on Taiwanese identity and sovereignty, 
implying that China’s reluctance to acknowledge this was a threat to Rapprochement:  
the people of Taiwan place great importance on their ability to participate in the 
international community with dignity. If they suffer repeated setbacks in the 
international community, it will have an impact on cross-strait relations. It is therefore 
hoped that in future, the two sides can mutually assist each other in the international 
arena. The people on both sides share a common Chinese (zhonghua) heritage.860  
                                                 
858 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). n.d. Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement.  [online] Available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/data/051116322071.pdf [Accessed 
27 April 2017]. 
859 Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016: 176. 
860 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2008. SEF Chairman Chiang's June 13 
Meeting with PRC President Hu Jintao. 13th June 2008. [online] Available at: 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx%3Fn%3DA25A31DE8D66F1C6%26sms%3D7D28
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The presupposition of Taiwan’s sovereignty and legitimating of huadu through “the 
people of Taiwan” implies that Taipei considers itself sovereign  
The claim that powerful interest groups affect foreign policy is also visible on the 
pro-divergence side.  There was relentless opposition to ECFA from its proposal in 
December 2008 to its signing in 2010 and afterwards. Pan-Green DIGs and the DPP 
opposed it, questioning Ma’s identity and motives. Despite favourable opinion polls, 
most pro-divergence groups opposed ECFA on economic costs and perceived 
security threat.  In late 2008, ARATS VC Zhang Minqing visited Taipei and Chiang 
Pin-kung met with Chen Yunlin, the ARATS Chairman, at the Second Chen-Chiang 
Summit, the highest level KMT-CCP meeting in six decades. SEF had brought pro-
convergence academics on board to prepare for Chen’s visit, 861  and promised to 
continue negotiations on the basis of “peace, reason and dignity”.862 In response, pro-
divergence DIGs galvanised to protest Chen’s visit. The police response to the 
protests was robust and the Wild Strawberry movement emerged as a reaction. SEF 
accused the DPP of orchestrating the demonstrations and said they had “harmed 
Taiwan's international image”, 863 suggesting the KMT saw its policies as a delicate 
balancing act designed to secure huadu.   
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In May 2009, the DPP leader, Tsai Ing-wen, attacked the KMT for lack of 
consultation, stating “Taiwan’s democracy is actually becoming more vulnerable to 
Chinese influence”.864 At the same time, MAC Minister Lai admitted “a significant 
number of Taiwanese feared that the government might undermine Taiwan’s 
sovereignty by being too accommodating to China”, but that the Chinese market was 
so important that the KMT had no choice, 865  implying that building mutual trust with 
China would create political space for Taiwan. Thus, MAC aimed to “build a 
foundation of consensus within our domestic society” and there was no time for 
“highly political issues”.866  The EY rejected a DPP request for a referendum on 
ECFA and the KMT organised a series of forums to promote it, framing it in terms of 
shared cultural Chinese identity, pragmatism and critical opportunity. In April 2009, 
on a visit to Nanjing, Chiang Pin-kung stated:  
On March 30, 2005, I walked up to the mausoleum of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and prayed 
before Dr. Sun for cross-strait peace and the people's wellbeing. Last year, the KMT 
resumed the reins of government and launched cross-strait negotiations rooted in the 
principles of pragmatism, reciprocity, and dignity…we turned back from a looming 
crisis at just the last moment, creating a historic opportunity for the two sides.867  
Negotiations were supposed to be limited to economic matters; sovereignty would 
not be explicitly mentioned and Taiwan’s economy would be protected.868 However, 
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pro-divergence DIGs pointed out that ECFA would have to involve mutual 
recognition of sovereignty.869 Indeed, Taipei’s insistence on institutional parity and 
dignity presupposed Taiwan’s sovereignty. In February 2009, the DPP liaised with 
pro-divergence academics to frame Ma’s rush to push ECFA through in terms of a 
threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty, demanding domestic consensus-building measures 
from the KMT. 870  In sum, for the KMT and pro-convergence interest groups, 
Rapprochement secured huadu, while for the DPP and pro-divergence DIGs, 
Rapprochement threatened huadu. 
In a series of speeches leading up to and beyond the signing of ECFA in June 2010, 
KMT elites and Taiwan business groups relentlessly pushed its economic benefits; 
ECFA would ensure Taiwan’s economic and political survival and secure 
sovereignty. Couched in terms of liberal internationalism, SEF statements reference 
Taiwan’s sovereignty as the ROC, a state that claims equal international status with 
the PRC. While for pro-divergence groups, the KMT’s framing of “the two sides” 
and “mainland China” implies that Taiwan does not enjoy sovereignty, these terms 
may be read as diplomatic frames. In April 2010, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen 
engaged in a televised debate on ECFA and although both tried to stick to economic 
costs and benefits, Ma effectively legitimated the KMT’s understanding of huadu 
and delegitimated the DPP’s through pragmatic manipulation of pronominal and 
address forms, asserting his authority and perceived economic competence over 
Tsai.871 The result was that public support for ECFA and Ma’s ratings went up.872 
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However, pro-divergence groups continued to oppose ECFA, with public protests 
demanding “oppose a one-China market”. 873 The ECFA was signed on 29th June 
2010 to take effect on 1st January 2011. After the signing, pro-divergence attention 
shifted to ECFA’s content rather than the concept.   
The crystalisation of huadu became salient in the ECFA ratification process, which 
exposed an identity paradox. The KMT insisted on treating the ECFA as an 
international treaty requiring no legislative debate, while the DPP wanted it treated as 
a domestic law that required a line-by-line review to allow for amendments.874 While 
these positions were taken for instrumental reasons to do with legislative power, the 
discursive effect was to legitimate huadu. Despite the KMT having a majority, the 
benshengren KMT Speaker Wang Jin-pyng called a legislative review, implying a 
perceived threat to huadu in ECFA. The ECFA was passed after a brawl and a Cross-
Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC) was created to negotiate details. 
However, the negotiation process simply prompted further opposition that 
culminated in March 2014 during the passage of the CSSTA.   
8.2.5. Ma’s huadu Discourse 
Christopher Hughes (2013) claims that Ma’s deployment of Chinese (national) 
identity went far beyond what was necessary to maintain the status quo.875 Indeed, 
pro-divergence DIGs clearly perceived a threat in his discourse: on several occasions 
he says: “the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese (huaren)” and 
makes regular rhetorical reference to “the emperors Yan and Huang”. Ma’s 2011 
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New Year’s Day message, titled “Building Up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese 
Heritage”, claimed that “as a result” of the ROC’s Taiwan-born heroes, Sun Yat-
sen’s Three Principles, Chinese nation building, the  KMT’s Northern Expedition 
and the anti-Japanese War, “Taiwan was returned to the fold of the Republic of 
China” and the Nanjing Government joined the UN; melding “the essence of Chinese 
culture with the core features of Western democracy… we rebuilt the nation in 
Taiwan and dispelled the myth that democracy is unsuitable for a Chinese (zhonghua) 
society”.876   
This suggests that huadu’s realm and social constituency encompasses China. Ma’s 
reference to “we” and “the nation” create a locutionary gap that invites listeners to 
include themselves in its scope. “We” may be the KMT, but may also be the 
Taiwanese people. Equally, the nation may be China or Taiwan. Since his listeners 
know from the historical context, however, that the ROC is Taiwan it may be 
understood that he is inviting them to recognise “we” and “the nation” as Taiwanese. 
Moreover, contra pro-divergence DIG perceptions, it is this indexing, and therefore 
legitimation, of ROC state identity that Chinese netizens perceived as Taiwanese and 
not Chinese when they attacked Chou Tzu-yu in January 2016 (q.v. 1.2.3.). Ma’s 
reference to zhonghua and not zhongguo for China simply reinforces the categorical 
separation from the PRC. In other words, for China, ROC symbols are not Chinese 
but Taiwanese. 
Ma cannot avoid legitimating huadu and delegitimating tongyi and taidu in 
referencing Taiwan’s normative representations. Yet, he straddles thin and thick 
huadu. Extoling Taiwan’s liberal democratic values, deploying the we of power to 
                                                 
876 Office of the President. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2011. Ma Ying-jeou. NationalDay Address, 
2011. 10t October 2011.  [online] Available at: https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/4259 
[Accessed 20 May 2018]. 
305 
rebuke pan-Green DIGs for their accusations of disloyalty in a May 2011 speech, he 
states “no group or political party holds a patent on love for Taiwan…what we must 
not do is…accuse others of selling Taiwan out.” 877  In October 2011, Ma states 
“democracy and freedom … define the spirit of Taiwan” making it “a benchmark for 
Chinese communities around the world”. Then, he asserts “the Republic of China is a 
sovereign and independent nation, and Taiwan is our home” and acknowledges 
that ”mainland China” has “threatened and hemmed in” Taiwan, but that ‘in issues 
that touch upon national sovereignty and Taiwan’s dignity…the people of Taiwan do 
not back down!Long live the Republic of China! Long live Taiwan’s democracy!”878 
Certainly, in his 2010 National Day address, Ma articulated huadu, but one that pan-
Greens DIGs might perceive as oscillating towards China. The pronoun “we” may 
reference China or Taiwan.  In presaging the 100th anniversary of the ROC, Ma 
frames “the bond between the ROC and Taiwan” as resisting “Communist China’s” 
threat so that: 
today, we continue to grow and develop on this land. We share a collective destiny and 
embrace a common dream. We cherish Taiwan and identify with the Republic of China. 
We wish the best for Taiwan and want the ROC to flourish. Next year will mark the 
Republic’s centennial. Let us celebrate the birth of our nation together and create for it a 
more resplendent second century.879 
 “Parity, dignity and reciprocity” ensure that the KMT “puts Taiwan first for the 
benefit of its people” and “staunchly defends the sovereignty and dignity of Taiwan”. 
For Ma, “the ROC is a country with independent sovereignty. We conduct relations 
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with mainland China under the framework of the ROC Constitution and on the basis 
of the 1992 Consensus”. Through the use of the presuppositional trigger, “although, 
at this stage…nevertheless”, Ma implies that Taiwan’s lack of de jure recognition is 
merely provisional, and by extension that cross-Strait relations are state-to-state:  
“although at this stage the two sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot accord de jure 
recognition to each other, we nevertheless should be able to pragmatically adopt a 
policy of de facto mutual non-denial.”880 
Despite the KMT’s assertion that ECFA would secure Taiwan, it failed to solve 
Taiwan’s economic problems.881 Pro-divergence DIGs sought to delegitimate it on 
the grounds of Ma’s competence, perceived kowtowing to Beijing and rhetoric of 
Chinese identity. Polls indicated that Taiwanese national identity and support for the 
status quo had become consolidated. Support for cross-Strait policies was ambivalent, 
despite support for liberal policies in principle. 882  Pro-divergence DIGs who 
perceived a security and identity threat and marginalised KMT-supporting 
constituencies who perceived an economic threat expressed stronger support for 
protectionism. In a situation of public ambivalence, the mobilising role of DIGs 
accounts for continuing opposition to the follow-on agreements and subsequent shifts 
in that policy. Given that Ma’s KMT legitimated huadu, it seems reasonable to 
assume that identity-driven misperception of the KMT’s preferences influenced pro-
divergence DIG opposition. In sum, competing DIGs agreed the need to strengthen 
Taiwan’s sovereignty and its identity, but were divided on how to do it.  
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8.2.6. DPP Position on Rapprochement 
On October 8, 2011, Tsai Ing-wen stated the ROC existed only in Taiwan after 1949, 
so "Taiwan is the Republic of China, the Republic of China is Taiwan" and "the 
Republic of China is no longer a foreign government, but a Taiwanese 
government."883  The KMT called this “covert taidu”. In 2013, the DPP proposed 
"Republic of China Resolutions", which stated that "Taiwan is the Republic of China; 
the Republic of China is Taiwan".884 From 2008, the DPP turned pro-divergence DIG 
threat perception into policy. Yet, DPP cross-Strait policy was not substantially 
different from that of the KMT and this can be seen in the spill-over from huadu in 
DPP statements. DPP policy was not driven by anti-liberalism per se: “the idea of 
liberalisation is a bit more complicated when it comes to China because … there are 
other political and security considerations”.885 Rather, the DPP perceived ECFA as a 
threat in the context of defence, economic and social issues and presented the KMT 
as complicit.  Hsiao Bi-khim, the DPP’s spokesperson, articulated DPP policy in 
2012. The DPP has: 
a policy of gradually normalizing our economic relationship with China but risks need 
to be managed and focus should be on distribution of benefits…people are sick of 
winner-takes-all, animosity, divisions and socio-economic injustice of the KMT 
administration .886   
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The DPP does not seek to challenge cross-Strait economic relations in principle; 
rather it seeks to delegitimate the KMT in terms of its capacity to secure the 
normative representations of huadu through cross-Strait policy, a discourse that the 
Sunflowers would return to in 2014. Despite Rapprochement, Hsiao claims the 
heightened Chinese missile threat means “we will continue to budget for US defence 
purchases”. 887  In relation to the 1992 Consensus, the DPP proposed a Taiwan 
Consensus:  
What happened in ninety-two it was a spirit of 1992 - a spirit to agree to disagree and 
that enabled the two sides to engage in dialogue and interaction across the Strait over 
the past nearly two decades … And our view is …internal Taiwan Consensus … would 
be much more stable consistent and predictable in the long term and a more solid 
foundation for interacting across the strait in the long run.888 
In terms of a definition of huadu, the DPP was splitting hairs. While acknowledging 
that “ethnic differences” have evolved and that Taiwanese identity is “whether or not 
one identifies with Taiwan as their homeland,” Hsiao alleges that Lee Teng-hui 
originally coined the phrase “New Taiwanese” “to help Ma Ying-jeou get elected as 
mayor of Taipei and to help him integrate into native Taiwan society”. 889  The 
pragmatic implication is that Ma was not a “native” Taiwanese, does not naturally 
identify with Taiwan and that “New Taiwanese” is simply an instrumental construct. 
However, the DPP also acknowledged that, despite political differences and security 
considerations, China’s “peaceful development” is “an acceptable phrase”.  
We will engage proactively with the Chinese and they should understand that in a 
normal democracy … political parties … come and go…peaceful development is a 
common language and a common interest…a recognition of existing differences but a 
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willingness to work on common interests continues to be the spirit of our China 
policy.890 
On the idea of One China, Hsiao deploys the power of the exclusive “we” to invoke 
DPP solidarity with Taiwan. Hsiao implicitly threatens Beijing; “the Chinese” are 
“they” and “should understand” that Taiwan’s state identity is different to that of the 
PRC. Taiwan is “normal” and the PRC is not, by implication. Later on, Hsiao uses 
“Taiwan” instead of the “ROC” to index huadu as legitimate and in doing so, implies 
that the KMT has not deployed huadu’s normative representations in cross-Strait 
policy: 
the people of Taiwan wish … a democratic system; we seek to protect and defend our 
democracy. We seek to pursue greater international space in a dignified way. We want 
pragmatic relations with China. Our people want to be able to travel do business .... 
They're happy to welcome Chinese visitors to Taiwan as well, but at the same time we 
seek to preserve Taiwan's sovereignty, our dignity and our international space. 891   
This position on huadu means it has to respond to “that sentiment of the people of 
Taiwan”, implying that the KMT’s huadu does not do this. In 2012, the DPP’s cross-
Strait policy was still inarticulate. The Taiwan Consensus was vague and the 
electorate gave Ma the benefit of the doubt. By 2014, however, the economic 
situation had worsened, Ma was more unpopular and this combined with the 
perceived threat of the CSSTA. Pro-divergence DIGs galvanised around the 
Sunflower Movement which, despite its distancing from the DPP, bestowed 
legitimacy on it. By 2016, alleged KMT illegitimacy rested on its failure to align to 
the perceived normative representations of huadu. Rather, the KMT was seen by pro-
divergence DIGs as reverting to the its authoritarian past domestically by operating a 
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“black box” and compounding that reversion in cross-Strait relations by colluding in 
corrupt, United Front work with the CCP and taishang. Together, this was perceived 
by pro-divergence DIGs as proof positive that the KMT sought to sell Taiwan out.  
In this regard, by 2016 the DPP policy platform chimed with domestic concerns.892  
In January 2016, DPP elite, Joseph Wu reiterated that the DPP sought to maintain the 
status quo, even using the KMT’s preferred term “the Mainland”. 
The DPP’s 1991 policy platform called for a Republic of Taiwan, but a 1999 resolution 
recognized the status quo. The DPP has never denied … that the cross-Strait dialogues 
took place in 1992, and indeed acknowledges the shared desire of the two sides at that 
time to advance … mutual understanding. As for the specific phraseology of the 1992 
Consensus, created by the KMT in the year 2000, [Tsai Ing-wen] advocates a return to 
the original spirit of setting aside differences to seek common grounds that formed the 
basis of the 1992 cross-Strait meetings…our objective in … relations between Taiwan 
and the Mainland is to safeguard peace and stability between the two sides, and in order 
to for us to safeguard peace and stability between the two sides, the guiding principle, 
always, is to maintain the status quo… that Taiwan is already independent with the 
national title, the Republic of China, and I'm sure the Chinese know that. And the 
resolution position was reiterated by the DPP again in the 2014 China Policy Review, 
and the review was adopted by the Central Standing Committee, and therefore our 
newest position is not the Taiwan independence platform, and I'm sure the Chinese side 
knows it.893 
The DPP had accepted the substance of the 1992 Consensus, which presupposed 
OCRI and entailed huadu. 
8.3. Selling ECFA to the taishang 
Taipei’s campaign to sell ECFA to the taishang began in 2008, overlapped with and 
was ultimately halted by the Sunflower Movement in 2014 (q.v. 8.4.2.). This section 
argues that, although the taishang had always been supportive of economic 
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convergence for commercial reasons, Taipei sought actively to persuade them to 
support its guiding role through ECFA and the CSSTA by stressing huadu normative 
representations. This led to a tension between political and commercial interests.  
The data amassed for this study show that, in promoting ECFA, the ROC legitimated 
huadu, delegitimated tongyi and taidu and compelled first taishang and then Beijing 
to sanction huadu.   
Certainly, high-profile tycoons such as Tsai Eng-meng and Terry Gou overtly pushed 
for political unification. Yet, most taishang were simply interested in how Taipei 
could assist their operations in practical terms and supported Rapprochement for 
commercial reasons. 894  
Schubert suggests up to three-quarters of taishang voted KMT in 2004 and 2008, 
while the overwhelming majority voted KMT in 2012 because they saw the party as 
aligned to their business interests.895 Taipei’s message was that Taipei and taishang 
shared preferences and that Taipei would protect taishang by liaising with their 
counterparts in China. Business organisations mobilised the taishang vote to help the 
KMT.896 At an ATIEM meeting in Shenyang before the November 2010 mid-term 
elections, the chairman stated:  
ATIEM supports the peaceful development of cross-strait relations…the ECFA is 
related to our vital interests [and] it is particularly important to actively mobilize our 
families to return and support the most favorable political parties in Taiwan and to 
invite the TAO to assist with tickets and pricing.897  
                                                 
894 Schubert, Gunter. 2013. Assessing political agency across the Taiwan Strait: The case of 
the taishang. China Information, 27(1): 51-79 at 54. 
895 Ibid: 59-60. 
896 Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016. 
897 Association of Taiwan Invested Enterprises on the Mainland (ATIEM). 2010. taiwan yao geng hao 
ninde yipiao buneng shao. (For Taiwan to Be Better, Your Votes Cannot Be Fewer). [online] 
Available at: http://www.qgtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201011/t20101110_1596822.htm [Accessed 20 June 
2017]. 
312 
At the same meeting, ATIEM president Kuo Shan-hui explicitly lobbied taishang to 
vote KMT:  
Taiwanese businessmen are the direct beneficiaries of the policy of liberalization and 
peaceful development of cross-strait relations … ATIEM has got a number of airlines 
to … allow taishang to quickly return [to] abide by the purpose of your membership … 
the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, for the sake of peace between the two 
sides, for the sake of people's well-being, for the cause of development … the cause of 
Taiwan business needs your vote; peace on both sides requires your vote; the future of 
Taiwan needs your single vote.898 
Large Taiwanese trade associations linked to KMT patronage ambivalently 
championed Rapprochement’s utilitarian commercial benefits. On 7th June 2010 
the Chairman of ATIEM, Kuo Shan-hui, and 108 taishang leaders advertised in 
Taiwan newspapers, calling on “the Taiwan government to sign ECFA as soon as 
possible for Taiwan's economic development”.899 Yet, in April 2012, before Taiwan’s 
elections, Taiwan’s Chinese National Federation of Industries (CNFI) accused the 
KMT of politicising cross-Strait trade through unreasonable minimum-wage 
demands rather than helping with business operations.900 The Taiwan Petrochemical 
Association sent an urgent letter to the government to push ECFA quicker: “our 
requirements are quite simple…we need equal treatment. If Taiwan keeps the status 
quo on this, about half of our products will be unsellable soon”.901  
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Why did Taipei not just take taishang at their word, create the economic conditions 
for them and let them get on with it? Business aside, Taipei felt it needed to sell 
ECFA to a cross-Strait constituency whose identity was ambivalent, whose loyalty to 
Taiwan was questioned domestically and who would be enacting KMT policy on the 
ground in China. Taishang constituted a social constituency that operated in a non-
subject realm of political action in which huadu was highly contested.902 In other 
words, Taipei sought to consolidate the taishang as a social constituency that would 
sanction huadu.  
In October 2008, SEF started a continuous cycle of support visits to Taiwan Business 
Associations (TBAs) in China to “upgrade, transform and smoothly weather this 
financial crisis”.903 These developed into KMT elite visits to canvas opinion and to 
promote Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy organised under the auspices of SEF, MAC and 
ATIEM with close involvement from TAO and ARATS, as well as numerous 
meetings, trade fairs and procurement visits. This study’s data show intimate 
networks of TBA chapters, “Taiwan business circles, related government agencies” 
and political elites on both sides. Every year, Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office held a 
Taiwan Business Seminar, while Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council held an annual 
Lunar New Year Gathering, Dragon Boat Festival and Mid-Autumn Gathering of 
taishang, TBAs, Taiwan business organisations and civil servants. 904 Themes like 
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“Peace, Prosperity, and a Century of Well Being” and “peace and prosperity, 
happiness for 100 years” predominated.905  
SEF data give a good empirical picture of taishang thinking on Taipei’s cross-Strait 
policy and Taipei’s attempts to influence that thinking. At the first SEF Board 
Meeting in May 2008, Chiang Pin-kung suggested Rapprochement was about 
Taiwan’s national interest: 
jointly face up to realities, shelve controversies, and plan the future [through] new 
thinking, great wisdom and true sincerity…to resume negotiations on the basis of the 
1992 Consensus [for a] win-win outcome for cross-strait relations [and] long-term 
peaceful and stable interactions across the Strait…Ma's policy guideline of "Taiwan 
first, for the good of the people" will make SEF and ARATS a platform for 
implementation of government authority.906  
Taipei sought taishang sanction through SEF missions and events framed as “caring 
for” and “listening to” their concerns. The ECFA and its follow-on agreements were 
framed as crucial to Taiwan’s economic and political survival.907 A June 2010 SEF 
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symposium illustrates how the KMT and the TBAs used taishang to drive a liberal 
discourse of economic convergence. Here, SEF Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian 
explained that the symposium aimed to hear taishang opinions, “so as to provide a 
reference for the drafting of government policy”.908 In response, ten TBA regional 
presidents  
loudly appealed for the government to promptly sign the ECFA so that Taiwan can have 
more contact with ASEAN countries…increase Taiwan’s international 
competitiveness…get closer to the Chinese market…reduce tariffs to protect jobs in 
Taiwan [and that] Taiwan's survival is linked to the signing of the ECFA [which will] 
help Taiwan to step out and compete in the world.909  
In response, the Dongguan TBA President, Yeh Chun-jung, said that Taipei would 
institute policies “to help vulnerable industries” and that “Taiwan will only have a 
chance to sign FTAs with other countries if the cross-strait ECFA is signed”. He 
urged liberalisation of financial services to “truly help Taiwan businesses in 
industrial upgrading”. At the same time, the regional TBA presidents wanted Taipei 
to help them compete “fairly” in China, proposing that Taipei introduce protectionist 
measures.910  
While these taishang concerns are framed in terms of operational issues, it is 
important to note two linguistic presuppositions in the record of the symposium. First, 
Taiwan is a state separate to China, since it is to Taipei’s representatives that the 
taishang appeal and who in return present themselves as the legitimate 
representatives of the taishang. Second, taishang perceive a Chinese threat to their 
                                                                                                                                          
Available at: http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=917842&ctNode=4632&mp=300 [Accessed 20 
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commercial interests and see the solution resting in FTA processes, something that 
implies an economic agreement between two sovereign states. The pragmatic 
implication throughout the text is that Taiwan is categorically different to China and 
that relations are effectively inter-state.  
A series of policy statements and speeches throughout 2010 and 2011 and reveal a 
discourse conscious of Taiwanese identity that sought to legitimate huadu in liberal 
terms. In March 2010, MAC Minister Lai stated, “if Taiwan does not sign the ECFA, 
the country risks being marginalized”, that “ECFA has nothing to do with deepening 
Taiwan’s economic reliance on mainland China” but will act as a springboard to 
global markets.911  SEF Chairman, Chiang Ping-kun, implied that Chinese pressure 
compelled Taiwan to accept ECFA. Framing ECFA’s importance to a sovereign 
Taiwan in terms of security fears, he countered that it was “an immutable iron law” 
that “the earlier an economy opens up and internationalizes, the more competitive it 
is”. 912  In June 2010, The Office of the President stated ECFA sought to “strengthen, 
revive, save, stabilize, secure and protect the country to create the foundation for a 
golden decade”. “Protecting the country by promoting peace,” means liberal-
economic-reform-led promotion of “the nation’s” and “Taiwan’s competitiveness” so 
that “Taiwan can promote a peaceful external environment”. It acknowledged pro-
divergence concerns in Taiwan: this policy  
will not damage the ROC’s sovereignty or dignity in any way…The improvement of 
relations with mainland China has caused some people to grow concerned about 
whether the ROC’s sovereignty might suffer and whether Taiwan’s dignity be harmed, 
but each agreement has put ‘Taiwan first for the benefit of the people [so] we needn’t 
                                                 
911 Ho Chia-yi. 2010. ECFA talk with MAC Minister Lai Shin-yuan. Taiwan Today. 12th March 2010. 
[online] Available at: http://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=10,23,45,10&post=16432 [Accessed  6 
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website since 2016]. [Accessed 8 February 2016]. 
317 
sacrifice our sovereignty or suffer indignities in order to achieve cross-strait peace and 
prosperity.913   
In September 2010, Taipei reprised Taiwan’s sovereignty in the context of cross-
Strait peace and prosperity. This time, however, ECFA was explicitly framed as a 
means of promoting Taiwan’s democracy. Minister Lai told an EU audience that 
“democracy is Taiwan’s asset and our most precious soft power. Hence, Taiwan does 
not fear to deal with mainland China”.914 The appeal to the international community 
is clear. A week later, the Office of the President stated:  
Taiwan is a democratic society and [that] Taiwan’s future shall be decided by its 23 
million people. At the present stage, the government, based on the framework of the 
ROC Constitution, will continue to maintain the status quo of “no unification, no 
independence, and no use of force”. In addition, based on the 1992 Consensus, the 
government will operate on the principle of putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the 
people, and it will also promote the development of mutual benefit and shared 
prosperity between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.915  
These stances presuppose, index and imply huadu while respecting OCRI’s 
diplomatic frames: 
We are also a nation with lots of outstanding and enterprising people …an open society 
that emphasizes the values of democracy and freedom ... ECFA … will enable our 
economy to take off [and] ‘sign free trade agreements with other nations… Our vision 
is to welcome the world to Taiwan and to send Taiwan out into the world. We expect to 
                                                 
913 Office of the President. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2010. Protecting the Country by Promoting 
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[Accessed 20 March 2015]. 
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change Taiwan’s economic role in the Asia-Pacific region through signing of the 
ECFA.916 
In December 2013, in a speech to the SEF Board, Lin Join-sane stressed Taiwan’s 
democratic identity, suggesting that China had endorsed it since, when ARATS 
Chairman, Chen Deming, visited Taiwan he saw:  
Taiwan’s strong business and management skills [how] well-educated and polite the 
people of Taiwan are…different opinions in our plural society…I told him this is only 
normal in a free, democratic and multicultural society, where the government is able to 
lay down right policies after listening to different opinions about public 
administration.917  
In an attempt to force ECFA through the legistlature, Ma deployed the same fallacy 
of urgency and economic constraint seen in pro-divergence DIG discourses, issuing 
an implied threat in urging the legislature to pass it by presupposing that it is the only 
rational choice. His language created a perception among pro-divergence interest 
groups that he was acting contrary to huadu’s normative representations: 
we need to move quickly’ [so] I would like to urge the Legislative Yuan to speedily 
screen and pass the ECFA, firstly because [it] requires the amendment of various laws, 
and … needs to be reviewed by the legislature, which represents the will of the people. 
We plan for Premier Wu to go to the Legislative Yuan to report on the ECFA and 
clearly explain to everyone how we plan to proceed and what the benefits will be for us. 
We hope that this arrangement will enable our parliamentarians to fully understand that 
the moves we are making to integrate into the global economy are beneficial to Taiwan, 
and that this is the correct decision at this critical point in time. 918  
                                                 
916 Ibid. Italics are this author’s. 
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Lin Join-sane and Chen Deming signed the CSSTA in Shanghai on 21st June 2013 
“in the hope of creating a favorable environment for cross-strait investment, trade, 
and market development”. 919  Taipei then went on a domestic campaign, courting 
academic support for the CSSTA as crucial to Taiwan's liberalisation, regional 
economic integration and security and sovereignty. Minister Wang stated “We 
cannot turn our backs on this market, which has a vital bearing on Taiwan’s future 
survival”.920 
As CSSTA negotiations progressed, huadu became explicit. February 2014 saw an 
explicit diplomatic move towards “normalization of official interactions and 
exchanges across the Taiwan Strait” when MAC Minister Wang and TAO Director 
Zhang Zijun held the first of a series of meetings in Nanjing.   They agreed to 
negotiate under the 1992 Consensus. Wang talked about the Three Principles of the 
People and claimed relations were not state-to-state. Yet, these meetings endorsed 
Taiwan’s sovereignty. At APEC in October 2013, Wang and Zhang had addressed 
each other using their official titles, openly flouting Beijing’s previous diplomatic 
frames, and the PRC media repeated this.921 The DPP called the meeting as a sell-out. 
Yet, in linguistic terms, huadu achieved the PRC’s direct semantic sanction.  
What pro-divergence groups perceived as violation of huadu’s normative 
representations is salient in official ROC text around the passing of the pact and the 
constitutional crisis it provoked.  Ma performed a cabinet reshuffle “for the benefit of 
                                                 
919 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2013.  Remarks by Lin Join-sane, Chairman of the Straits Exchange 
Foundation, at the Ninth Round of Cross-Strait High-Level Talks. 21st June 2013. [online] Available 
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the people”; that is, in the national interest.922 The CSSTA was passed in the LY and 
the LY building was immediately occupied by the Sunflower student protestors (q.v. 
8.4.2.). However, SEF attempted to delegitimate the Sunflowers from the start by 
ignoring them. Instead of the occupation and chaos on the streets of Taipei, the SEF 
website records a SEF mission to taishang that listened to the “investment and 
operational problems encountered by Taiwan companies,” explained the “benefits of 
the cross-strait agreements signed to date” and “promoted the government's major 
mainland policies”.923 Even on 20th March 2014, well into the Sunflower Occupation, 
SEF were reporting Taiwan’s export orders, an increase in mobile phone demand and 
“advanced wafer processing”.924 
Finally, on 3rd April 2014, SEF acknowledged that the CSSTA was a national 
security issue, noting the EY’s processing of a draft Cross-strait Agreement 
Supervisory Act in response to “high level of public concern over cross-strait 
agreement supervision and the impact of the agreements on national security, as well 
as demands for a more open and transparent process”.925 On 8th April, a day after the 
official end of the Occupation, the 13th Boao Forum deployed an economic 
liberalism discourse of structural reforms. However Vincent Siew, representing 
Taiwan, implicitly acknowledged the Sunflowers’ concerns by urging “mainland 
                                                 
922 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2014. Cabinet reshuffled to further advance the wellbeing of the 
people. 3rd August 2014. [Removed from SEF and MAC websites since 2016]. 
923 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2014. SEF Vice Chairman Ma Shao-chang visits Taiwan 
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Premier” Li Keqiang “to defuse concerns over the marginalization of Taiwan's 
economy”.926  Economic and cultural missions by both sides continued in May 2014 
ignoring the Sunflowers to highlight positive growth and trade figures, historical and 
cultural links. The KMT and CCP’s sense of alarm is palpable and clumsy attempts 
were made to stress cross-Strait historical ties. Anhui CCP secretary Zhang Baoshun 
noted “Taiwan's first governor, Liu Ming-chuan, was an Anhui (mainland province) 
native and that this visit to Taiwan comes with an especially strong sense of 
closeness”. 927 Yet, Lin Join-sane’s May 2014 SEF mission to Chongqing 
acknowledged CSSTA’s threat to Taiwanese businesses and asked for the CCP’s 
understanding.928  
That June, the 10th High-level SEF-ARATS talks were held in Taipei.929 There, TAO 
Minister Zhang was met with relentless protests by the Taiwan Solidarity Union and 
Black Island National Youth Front, shouting “One Country Each Side”. When he 
met the DPP mayor of Kaohsiung, Chen Chu, one of the 1979 Kaohsiung Eight, he 
relayed Beijing’s acknowledgement of Taiwan’s “social and cultural” identity. Lin 
Join-sane acknowledged domestic opposition to the CSSTA based on national 
security, pointing out to TBA heads that the government was consulting with the 
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Sunflowers. 930   However, he assured them that the CSSTA would be passed and 
implemented, “hoping to help prevent, reduce and avoid disasters for the benefit of 
people's livelihood across the Taiwan Strait,” despite the Sunflowers having 
effectively destroyed the pact.931  
In sum, Taipei’s promotion of ECFA and CSSTA in its missions to taishang formed 
an integral part of its cross-Strait policy between 2008 and 2016. This promotion 
framed Taiwan as the legitimate representative of taishang interests in China. The 
purpose was to legitimate huadu in a social constituency that was perceived as likely 
to tend towards tongyi and be susceptible to Beijing’s United Front. In doing this, 
Taipei aimed to achieve taishang sanction of huadu. The next section shows how 
huadu was also deployed in domestic power politics and cross-cut with cross-Strait 
power politics. 
8.4. The Domestic Environment 
Two overlapping domestic events during Ma Ying-jeou’s second term constrained 
the KMT’s cross-Strait policy around the CSSTA and legitimated huadu. Both were 
driven by threat perception among pro-divergence domestic groups, constituted by 
huadu. Both involved the deployment of SIPs and sought to legitimate different 
conceptions of huadu. First, in 2013, a cleavage between the Chinese Nationalist and 
the Taiwanised wings of the KMT opened in what became known as the September 
Strife, or the Ma-Wang Conflict.  Second, the March 2014 Sunflower Movement 
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prevented the passage of the CSSTA, effectively endingthe cross-Strait economic 
agreement process. These are relevant to the legitimation of huadu in that, first, they 
reflect a struggle between misperceived tongyi and taidu discourses. Pro-divergence 
observers of the Ma-Wang conflict misperceived Ma as representing the threat of 
tongyi, when in fact he sought to legitimate huadu. Moreover, pro-convergence 
constituencies misperceived Wang as attempting to delegitimate Rapprochement 
when in fact he represented a different conception of huadu. Similarly, pro-
convergence constituencies misperceived the Sunflowers as representing taidu when 
in fact they sought to legitimate huadu and delegitimate the KMT’s version of huadu. 
These misperceptions intensified as Wang was co-opted as an ally of the Sunflowers. 
8.4.1. The 2013 September Strife: Ma-Wang Conflict 
The Taiwanese KMT elite, Wang Jin-pyng, had overseen the 1990s ROC 
constitutional reforms that had instituted huadu. As KMT vice-chairman between 
2000 and 2005 and LY President after that, he was also trusted by the DPP. Part of 
the KMT’s localised (bentupai) faction, he helped legitimate waishengren elites.  
Wang had run against Ma for the KMT chairmanship and presidential nomination in 
2005 and 2008. Both runs were bitter and he was accused of using identity politics 
against Ma.932 As early as 2005, the PRC had opposed his nomination as Taiwan’s 
APEC representative.  In the 2008 election, Wang threatened to run as an 
independent and rejected Ma’s offer of the Vice-Presidential candidature. Instead, he 
nailed his Taiwanese colours to the mast by broadly supporting economic 
convergence, while perceiving in it an implicit Chinese threat. In this, he presaged 
the Sunflowers’ 2014 demands to warn that Taipei’s cross-Strait policy must 
consider three points: 
                                                 
932 Copper, John. 2012. Taiwan's Democracy on Trial: Political Change during the Chen Shui-bian Era 
and beyond. Lanham: University Press of America: 20f.  
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one is guaranteeing national sovereignty, two is safeguarding national security, three is 
the rights of the 23 million people must be protected…Especially for the first point, all 
development of cross-strait consultations and negotiations will inevitably involve 
sovereignty, and both sides of the issue are so complex, so subtle, that negotiators are 
often unaware of the sacrifice of sovereignty, and don't realize that it has occurred.933 
During the September Strife, Ma accused Wang of influence peddling by illegally 
lobbying for the DPP Chief Whip.  Wang was expelled from the KMT and his 
legislative posts. However, the evidence against Wang had been gained accidentally 
through a KMT wiretap of another politician, in collusion with Taipei’s security 
services. The incident highlighted the fragility of the KMT’s democratic credentials 
and exposed Ma, who had sworn in his inauguration speech in May 2008 that such 
monitoring would cease.934 
Wang appealed against his expulsion and was reinstated - fortuitously for pro -
divergence DIGs, since the March 2014 Sunflower Occupation and Wang’s final 
appeal hearing converged, pitting both Wang and the Sunflowers against Ma Ying-
jeou. Wang’s KMT membership and LY speakership were reinstated on 19th March 
2014, the second day of the Sunflowers’ occupation of the legislature. This ensured 
that Wang remained Speaker and thus he – rather than Ma - could decide on police 
action, providing him with a bargaining chip and potential allies in the Sunflower 
Movement. With his position strengthened, he distanced himself from Ma’s KMT 
grouping. Thus, the KMT split entered the strategic context of the Sunflower 
Movement. The KMT retained Wang as LY speaker because of his strong Taiwanese 
base within the KMT. But Wang ran the LY in ways that protected minority parties 
                                                 
933 Zou Jingwen. 2008. Xingqi zhuanfang [Interview of the Week]. Ziyou shibao [Liberty Times]. 30th 
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[online] Available at: 
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and coalitions, thus frustrating KMT policies. Wang’s prevalence over Ma damaged 
the latter’s personal credibility, but also delegitimated the KMT’s ability to defend 
Taiwan’s sovereignty in huadu. This was not so much because of Rapprochement per 
se, but because of what pro-divergence DIGs perceived and were able effectively to 
frame as an authoritarian tendency in KMT domestic governance that violated 
huadu’s core normative representations.  
8.4.2. The 2014 Sunflower Occupation 
The Sunflower Occupation was sparked by the KMT’s clumsy attempt to force the 
CSSTA through Taiwan’s legislature. It was the most serious domestic political 
crisis of Taiwan’s democratic period. Despite evidence that ECFA’s benefits were 
unevenly spread in Taiwan, in June 2013 Ma had used his executive powers to get 
SEF to sign the CSSTA without public consultation.935 As the content became clear, 
domestic opposition from threatened business DIGs to pro-divergence civic groups 
rose. Yet, the government decided to push ahead, opening Taiwan’s service sector to 
Chinese investment and allowing Chinese professionals to work in Taiwan, 
sharpening threat perception and opposition to liberalisation from pro-divergence 
DIGs.  
Crisis point came in March 2014 during the passage of the CSSTA through the 
legislature.  The KMT’s Wang Jin-pyng and the DPP called for a public review of 
the CSSTA, but the KMT rushed it through, declaring it considered without 
amendment. The DPP blocked it, but on 17th March 2014, the KMT passed it in 30 
seconds in a furtive reading by one legislator into a microphone outside a toilet in a 
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corridor. At 4am on March 19th, 2014, 400 students from the Black Island National 
Youth Front occupied the legislature. They quickly metamorphosed into the 
Sunflower Movement, a loose coalition of diverse domestic interests. Joined by 
thousands of volunteers, the students demanded the withdrawal of the CSSTA, a 
line-by-line review and legislative procedures to govern future cross-Strait 
agreements. However, the KMT repeated its defence of ECFA and the CSSTA 
benefiting Taiwan more than China. During an international press conference, Ma 
reiterated that the CSSTA would “stimulate Taiwan's service sector, ensure Taiwan's 
economic vitality and create conditions conducive to Taiwan participating in the 
process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.”936  
The Ma-Wang conflict deepened on 20th March when Wang announced that he was 
responding to the students’ concerns. From then on, the Sunflowers concentrated on 
widening the split, rejecting Ma’s proposals and engaging with Wang’s. “Talking to 
Wang would strengthen him against Ma. It would be an insult for Ma if we 
negotiated with Wang”.937 On 22nd March the KMT VP, Jiang Yi-huah, met student 
leaders, but on 23rd March Ma peremptorily told them to go home. Students 
responded by occupying the EY and on 30th March a half-million-strong 
demonstration of civic groups supported the students, repeating the refrain of 
“Taiwan’s democracy”. 938  The “anti-black-box protests”, as they became known, 
claimed the CSSTA threatened national security, posed major risks to Taiwan’s 
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economy and exposed the KMT’s authoritarian lack of transparency and 
responsiveness “to the people’s concerns”.939 The Sunflowers continued to exploit the 
Ma-Wang split. On 6th April, Wang accepted the Sunflowers’ demand for an 
oversight bill. He then persuaded the students to leave, allowing them to save face 
and capitalise on public support. Students reported that if they had not seized the 
opportunity with Wang and support had declined, then the movement might have 
collapsed.940 The relationship between Ma and Wang was common knowledge, so the 
students sought legitimacy through Wang. 941 On 6th April, Wang’s promise of a 
legislative review of all future cross-Strait agreements including the CSSTA sparked 
KMT infighting.942 
Two student leaders, Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting, became the movement’s 
spokesmen. Eschewing the DPP, but advised by pan-Green legal academics, they 
created a coherent policy position from the disparate groupings. On 7th April, the 
Sunflower Movement issued a press release that presented its thinking on Taiwan’s 
status. Taiwan was sovereign; sovereignty rested with its people; Taiwanese 
democratic identity involved breaking with the authoritarian KMT past; there was a 
threat to Taiwan through “closed-door” and “black-box” collusion between the KMT 
and China to “sell Taiwan out” in the context of a constitutional crisis and 
democratic deficit in KMT governance: 
[The Occupation] has made Taiwanese citizens realize that it is our choice not to let the 
rules and authority of the past generation to confine us, and that the constitutional 
                                                 
939 Democracy at 4a.m. 2014. Timeline. [online] Available at: http://4am.tw/ [Accessed 30 March 
2014]. 
940 Anonymous respondent in Beckershoff, Andre. 2015: 128. 
941 Anonymous respondent in Beckershoff, Andre. 2015: 127. 
942 Democracy at 4am. 2014. Available at: http://4am.tw/ 
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principle that “sovereignty shall reside in the whole body of citizens” is a living 
experience that belongs to every Taiwanese citizen of our generation.943  
The Sunflowers’ policy stance presents a puzzle. On the one hand, their discourse is 
clearly driven by Taiwanese nationalism and bentuhua; this was a generation that 
identified only as Taiwanese and had no memory of Free China.  However, their 
focus on the KMT’s lack of adherence to the ROC constitutional and legal 
framework pulled them towards huadu located in the ROC. The Sunflowers’ 
epistemic community consisted of pan-Green academics and activists. In particular 
legal scholars, Huang Kuo-chang and Lai Chung-chiang, argued that since the 1991 
ROC Constitutional amendments treated the “Mainland Area” and “Taiwan Area” as 
separate jurisdictions within one China, there was no legal procedure for review of a 
treaty-type agreement like the CSSTA. In the absence of a ROT constitution, a 
supervisory mechanism was needed to provide “public oversight” of cross-strait 
agreements.944 This move located Taiwan’s national interest in huadu, not taidu, and 
legitimated the Sunflowers as its guardians while delegitimating the KMT as 
threatening it. 
Claiming that the Sunflowers had redefined the relationship between Taiwan and 
China, Lin Fei-fan deployed SIPs to brand the KMT undemocratic and therefore un-
Taiwanese: “we showed the government that Taiwan’s future belongs to its 23 
million people. We should be the ones to decide our future.”945 In this regard, Lin 
Fei-fan articulated a huadu position that upheld the ROC Constitution, created 
                                                 
943 Sunflower Movement. 2014. Press Release. Timeline. Facebook. 7th April 2014. Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/sunflowermovement/posts/322737267851435 Italics are this author’s. 
944 Rowen, Ian. 2015. Inside Taiwan's Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days in a Student-
Occupied Parliament, and the Future of the Region.  Journal of Asian Studies, 74(1): 5-21 at 11. 
945  Lin, Rebecca and Kai-yuan Teng. 2014.  A Chance to Deepen Taiwan's Democracy. 
Commonwealth. 3 April 2014. [online] Available at: 
https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=422 [Accessed 5 April 2014]. 
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internal Taiwanese solidarity and excluded China. Yet, in aluding to “other different 
opinions” it it implicitly refused to sanction taidu:  
we occupied the parliament because it was not functioning properly…we seek a more 
institutionalized solution that complies with the rule of law. Actually what we are doing 
is quite simple, we are not attempting to represent all these other different opinions.946  
Democratisation is Taiwanisation.947 But Taiwan is the ROC, the ROC is not China 
and the rule of law is constituted in the ROC. So it is the Sunflowers who redefined 
huadu in 2014. This position locates Taiwan’s state identity in the ROC and aligns to 
huadu normative representations as defined by the KMT in Taiwanese political 
speech after 2008. The paradox is that the Sunflowers perceived the KMT as not 
adhering to these norms. So the Sunflower huadu is tangential to the thin and thick 
versions (q.v. 1.5.) 
The Sunflower position was neither non-rational nor illiberal per se.  
We definitely aren’t against more trade... But …we have to see what the specific details 
are, what sectors are opened and what you are giving up. Are the gains worth the costs, 
and are the gains shared by the people, or by certain business interests? Also, signing a 
trade pact with China has very high [political] costs for Taiwan.948  
This contrasts with Chen Wei-ting’s more Marxist position that frames the 
Sunflowers’ defence of Taiwanese democratic identity as anti-globalisation and 
China’s use of economic liberalism to control Taiwan as the Hegelian peace in 
reverse:  
                                                 
946 Lin Fei-fan. 2014. Transcript of Press Conference with Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting. Letters 
from Taiwan. 26th March 2014. [online] Available at: 
http://lettersfromtaiwan.tw/post/80742952634/transcript-of-press-conference-with-lin-fei-fan 
[Accessed 30 March 2014]. 
947 Lan, Yiping. 1983:11-12. 
948 Hsu, Jenny and Eva Do. 2014. Taiwan Student Leader Can’t Let Go of This Spot. New York Times. 
1st April 2014. [online] Available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/04/01/taiwan-student-
leader-we-cant-let-go-of-this-spot/ [Accessed 30 May 2014]. Italics are this author’s. 
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while Taiwan is facing this world of globalized capitalism, it is even more dangerous 
facing the rise of China… because China claims sovereignty over us… the past 6 years 
we have seen how China has steadily taken over our economy. We are against this trend 
of globalized free trade, because it benefits capitalists and hurts the disadvantaged 
people, and we are especially against China’s role in riding the wave of free trade to 
monopolize Taiwan’s economy and politics.949  
Despite sanctioning huadu, Chen Wei-ting accused the DPP of reneging on its social-
democratic pro-taidu platform and shifting to the right on free trade: “Even when the 
DPP is giving up on this principle, we want to protect it, and economically we need 
to be more on the left to balance them.”950   
Although the catalyst was the KMT’s undemocratic domestic actions in forcing 
through the CSSTA, protests articulated grievances around the domestic economy 
and social movements and the KMT’s authoritarian response in the context of a 
perceived Chinese threat. The Sunflower leaders capitalised on these grievances, but 
they did not propose taidu.  
It is tempting to read the Ma-Wang Conflict and the Sunflower Occupation as DIG 
constraint on foreign policy, as a response to state underbalancing in the context of 
perceived threat and as DIGs “pulling and hauling” the FPE back to the status quo.951 
What is striking, though, is that huadu was operative in the political speech of both 
the student leaders and the administration throughout the Occupation. Both groups 
sought to legitimate different interpretations of huadu – one economically liberal and 
soft-authoritarian, the other protectionist and civic-democratic. Neither of these can 
be said to align strictly to the thin or thick versions (q.v. 1.5.). While the Sunflower 
                                                 
949 Chen Wei-ting. 2014. In The Ketagalan Project. Sunflower’s Protests to Politics (KP23). [online] 
Available at: http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2014/08/29/sunflowers-protests-politics-kp23/ 
[Accessed 30 September 2015].  Italics are this author’s. 
950 Ibid. 
951 See: Juneau, Thomas. 2015. Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign 
Policy. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 49. 
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version legitimates the ROC, it avoids One China altogether. The Sunflowers 
perceived the CSSTA and the KMT’s cross-Strait policy in general as incompatible 
with huadu, as a threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty and illegitimate. The KMT and 
Beijing perceived the Sunflowers as pro-taidu. However, rather than seeking a de 
jure ROT, the Sunflowers sought to defend huadu, protecting the symbols of Chinese 
nationalism such as Sun Yat-sen’s portrait and the legislative seal, and demanding 
that ROC institutions operate constitutionally. The Sunflower Occupation suggests 
that constraint on Taipei’s cross-Strait policy was not simply a bottom-up process, 
but a top-down one as well. The identities and interests of the Sunflowers, as 
Taiwan’s most powerful domestic interest group, were themselves constituted by 
huadu. 
8.5. The Ma-Xi Summit 
Despite pro-divergence interest group perceptions in Taiwan, the KMT’s framing of 
Taiwan’s core interests around democracy, sovereignty and security and the primacy 
they assign to democracy presuppose and imply that the ROC’s identity is Taiwanese 
and not Chinese and that sovereignty means huadu. At the Xi-Ma summit in 
November 2015, Ma Ying-jeou presented a policy platform and discourse that 
recognised Sunflower articulations of huadu norms while reasserting the 1992 
Consensus of OCRI as its basis.  
At the summit, Ma’s speech rested on a number of presuppositions around ROC 
constitutional changes in 1991 and 1993, a series of rhetorical tropes and a number of 
lexico-grammatical signals. In his opening statements, during the closed-door 
meeting, at the press conference and on board the flight to Taipei, Ma repeatedly 
mentioned the 1992 Consensus and OCRI. Ma combined a strong defence of the 
ROC as the locus of huadu with a cultural One China, thus appearing to combine 
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thin and thick huadu (q.v. 1.5.). This is surprising because, first, he knew that China 
had progressively moved away from “respective interpretations” and, second, he was 
perceived by taidu constituencies as identifying as sympathetic to tongyi.  However, 
as this study’s Realist Constructivism argues, as President of the ROC he had to 
present a policy position that reflected Taiwan’s and not China’s national interest. 
The fact that Ma asserted this form of huadu at the summit confirms Beijing’s 
sanction; the wording would have been agreed beforehand. 
First, the two sides separately identified the One-China Principle as the core of the 
1992 Consensus; Xi said “the significance of the 1992 Consensus lies with the one-
China principle it embodies”.952 
Ma stated in his opening speech: 
On Aug. 1, 1992, our National Unification Council passed a resolution on the meaning 
of “one China,” which said that both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on the “one China” 
principle, but they differ as to what that means. The consensus reached between the two 
sides in November 1992 is that both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on the “one China” 
principle, and each side can express its interpretation verbally; this is the 1992 
Consensus of “one China, respective interpretations.” For our part, we stated that the 
interpretation does not involve “two Chinas,” “one China and one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan 
independence,” as the Republic of China Constitution does not allow it. This position is 
very clear, and is accepted by the majority of the people of Taiwan.953  
Second, according to their respective constitutions, One China can mean either the 
People’s Republic of China or the Republic of China. However, since One China was 
coined, both sides have had different interpretations of who represents the one China. 
                                                 
952 Huang, Jiashu. 2015. A Cross-Strait Meeting of the Minds. China US Focus. 16 November 2015. 
[online] Available at: https://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/a-cross-straits-
meeting-of-the-minds [Accessed 15 July 2018]. 
953 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2015. Full text of ROC President Ma 
Ying-jeou’s remarks in meeting with mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping. 9 November 2015. [online] 
Available at:  
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60C4AFBAF
90&s=4F225A4BA95218E4 [Accessed 20 November 2015]. 
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Ma knew that China knew that.  In the meeting, diplomatic protocol determined that 
neither explicitly expressed his own full interpretation. However, Ma’s respective 
interpretation can be pragmatically inferred from the broader macro-discourse and 
historical context (q.v. 5.2.1.). OCRI is not treaty-bound, but is articulated 
pragmatically and is therefore discursive.   
Third, the two sides did not explicitly state what One China meant. China has never 
acknowledged the “different interpretations” since it could discursively mean that 
Taiwan is not part of the same One China as the PRC. Given this concern, Ma told 
Xi from a prepared text, “the interpretations of the Taiwan side do not include ‘two 
Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwan independence’ because those are not 
allowed by the Republic of China’s Constitution”.954 This makes the ROC the locus 
of One China and its identity as huadu. The ROC constitution does not permit 
Taiwan’s independence from the ROC, yet there is no point in independence from a 
de facto Taiwanese state. The ROC and Taiwan are one and the same. The problem 
of what the PRC is is dealt with by ROC constitutional change to the Taiwan Area 
and abolition of the NUC and NUGs. Thus, Ma’s statement is a policy position that 
maintains the status quo.  
After this, Xi stated “[the 1992 Consensus] makes it clear that the mainland and 
Taiwan belong to the same one China and the relationship across the Strait is not a 
state-to-state one or between one China and one Taiwan”. 955 Although there is a 
semantic difference, the two statements may be interpreted by pro-tongyi 
                                                 
954 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2015. Full text of ROC President Ma 
Ying-jeou’s remarks in meeting with mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping. 9 November 2015. [online] 
Available at:  
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60C4AFBAF
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955 Huang, Jiashu. 2015.  
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constituencies as having the same meaning; that is, both sides belong to one country, 
but are effectively under separate administrations. In this sense, the two sides have a 
semantic consensus on what the 1992 Consensus does not mean, but they do not have 
a pragmatic one. It is what One China does not mean, therefore, that constitutes the 
illocutionary-perlocutionary gap that huadu fills.  
This leaves discursive space for the claim that the ROC is merely a constitutional 
artefact, territorially bounded by the Taiwan Area.  However, what China opposes is 
not “respective interpretations” but interpretations deviating from the legal principle 
of one China – in other words taidu. So long as this principle is not explicitly 
violated, the ROC is legitimate and China sanctions huadu. Trying to pin huadu 
down semantically is a dead end. It can only be interpreted pragmatically in context.   
8.6. Beijing’s Sanction of huadu in Rapprochement 
After 2008, both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping implicitly acknowledged the ROC, thus 
sanctioning huadu.  In March 2008, in a call to the US President, George W Bush, 
Hu suggested Beijing and Taipei should “restore consultation and talks on the basis 
of the ‘1992 consensus,’ which sees both sides recognise there is only one China, but 
agree to differ on its deﬁnition”.956 In December 2008, he stated “both the mainland 
and Taiwan belong to one China” and urged both sides to “make pragmatic 
explorations in their political relations under the special circumstances where the 
country has not yet been reuniﬁed”. 957  Hu’s 2009 Six Points imply linguistically 
Beijing’s recognition of Taiwan’s de facto status.958 
                                                 
956Xinhua News Agency. 2008. Chinese,U.S. Presidents Hold Telephone Talks on Taiwan,Tibet. 27 
March 2008. [Online] Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
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ECFA constitutes Beijing’s endorsement of Taiwan since a FTA cannot be 
concluded between a state and a local authority. In signing the ECFA, Beijing 
sanctioned Taiwan and presupposed two central governments under a facilitating 
“one China” framework. 
In March 2012, Hu Jintao said to KMT Chairman, Wu Po-hsiung, “the CCP should 
view cross-strait situations “objectively,” that is, the “fact that [both] the mainland 
and Taiwan belong to one China [is] in line with the current cross-strait rules and 
regulations and should be observed by both sides”.959 
Ma Ying-jeou asserted huadu forcefully in May 2012. 
When we speak of “one China,” naturally it is the Republic of China. According to our 
Constitution, the sovereign territory of the Republic of China includes Taiwan and the 
mainland. At present, the ROC government has authority to govern only in Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. In other words, over the past two decades [since 1992], 
the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been deﬁned as “one Republic of China, two 
areas.” This status has remained unchanged throughout the administrations of the [past] 
three presidents ...[One ROC, two areas] is an eminently rational and pragmatic 
deﬁnition, and constitutes the basis for assuring the ROC’s long-term development and 
safeguarding Taiwan’s security. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait ought to squarely face 
up to this reality, seek common ground while respecting differences, and establish a 
consensus regarding “mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual non-denial of 
authority to govern.” Only in this way can the two sides move forward with 
conﬁdence.960 
                                                                                                                                          
Taiwan,” December31, 2008. [Online] Availableat:  http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Hu/201103/ 
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Beijing did not challenge Ma’s articulation because it aligned semantically to the 
1992 Consensus. Beijing stated that “the mainland was not surprised to hear Ma’s 
statement, as it was consistent with his previous policies … We consider any 
statements, ideas or policies that adhere to this fact [that there is one China] to be 
positive and conducive to the peaceful development of cross-strait relations”.961 Yet, 
Ma’s words “both sides of the Taiwan Strait ought to squarely face up to this reality” 
imply a rebuke to Beijing and a pragmatic claim that Taiwan is a sovereign state 
separate to China.  
In January 2013, Xi Jinping reasserted the semantic meaning of Beijing’s original 
claim in the 1992 Consensus: 
China will pursue its development by seeking a peaceful international environment [and] 
safeguarding and promoting world peace, but will never give up [its] legitimate rights 
and will never sacriﬁce [its] national core interests962 
In February 2013, he reiterated to Lien Chan that nothing could “change the fact that 
both sides on the Taiwan Strait belong to one China.”  Beijing sought “peaceful 
development of cross-strait ties … to maintain consistencies in policies toward 
Taiwan by unswervingly upholding the one-China principle and continuing to 
promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation”. Yet, Xi also voiced the flexible 
post-1995 One China. “Both Taipei and Beijing”, he stated, “base their legal and 
government systems on the one-China principle, under which Taiwan is a part of 
China, as is the Chinese mainland”. This articulation presupposed that the ROC was 
a state in its acknowledgement of “legal and government systems” in relation to 
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Strait. May 30, 2012. [Online] Available at: http://english.cntv.cn/20120530/113651.shtml. [Accessed: 
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“Taipei”. The aim is clearly tongyi, but  as a concession he added, “of course, we 
also are soberly aware that historical problems remain in cross-strait relations, and 
that there will be issues in the future that will require time, patience, and joint effort 
to resolve”. 963  
Projecting flexibility, the TAO Director, Zhang Zhijun, implied that cross-Strait 
relations were political, saying “political issues should never be artiﬁcially 
categorized as a restricted area”.964 At the Boao Forum in April 2013, Xi Jinping 
reiterated “the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should jointly push cross-strait 
economic cooperation to a new level by strengthening cross-strait high level dialogue 
and coordination”. 965  “High-level” may pragmatically be read as “government-to-
government”, effectively sanctioning huadu. 
In June 2013, Wu Po-hsiung told Xi Jinping that One China meant the ROC. Xi 
Jinping responded that “seeking common ground and shelving differences requires 
both sides to rally political wisdom, pool and expand consensus on promoting 
development of cross-strait ties and manage differences appropriately”.966 Granted, 
963  Xinhua News Agency. 2013.  Xi Meets KMT’s Lien, Stresses Cross-Strait Ties.  February 25, 
2013. [Online] Available at:  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/25/c_132191064.htm. 
[Accessed 25 November 2018]. See also:  
Focus Taiwan News Channel. 2013. Talk of the Day: KMT Honorary Chairman Meets Top Chinese 
Communist.  February 26, 2013. [Online] Available at: 
http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail. aspx?ID=201302260039&Type=aTOD. 
[Accessed 26 November 2018]. 
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the non-committal nature of the words suggests instrumental diplomacy. Yet, it is the 
lack of semantic precision itself that creates discursive space for huadu to occupy. 
During 2013, Beijing and Taipei discussed effective diplomatic relations involving 
diplomatic immunity for SEF-ARATS officials, representative offices, passport and 
consular services.967 Beijing acknowledged MAC Minister Wang Yu-chi as a visiting 
government official.968 CCP officials gradually accepted Ma’s interpretation of OCRI 
as the ROC and echoed Ma’s “mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual 
non-denial of governing authority”. 969  The DPP’s Frank Hsieh referred to this 
agreement as a “Constitutional consensus”.970 
It is both sides’ willingness to pursue Rapprochement under the rubric of the 1992 
Consensus, which provides for different interpretations of One China that allowed 
Taipei to deploy huadu and compel Beijing’s sanction. Once OCRI had been 
encoded, respective interpretations meant it became a discourse that took on a life of 
its own and developed into a war of words over legitimacy. Simply by engaging with 
Taipei and articulating interpretations of One China, Beijing sanctioned huadu. 
Granted, Beijing has a strategic interest in sanctioning a thin huadu that averts taidu. 
However, by being unable to challenge Taipei’s huadu discourse linguistically, 
967 The China Post. 2013. SEF May Establish up to Five Representative Ofﬁces in China. April 16, 
2013. [Online] Available at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/print/376180.htm. 120. [Accessed 25 
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Beijing was compelled to cede discursive space for Taipei to do with huadu what it 
wanted.  
8.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has related how huadu was tested and crystalised during the 2008-16 
KMT administration. In undergoing the litmus test of Rapprochement, huadu was re-
legitimated as a Taiwanese state identity and tongyi and taidu finally delegitimated 
as alternative state identities because both entail state death and only huadu secures 
the ROC. Huadu as civic form of liberal democracy, threatened by a perceived KMT 
authoritarian turn in alliance with Chinese interests, was secured by the DPP’s 
presidential election win in 2016.  
The KMT’s attempt to enact Rapprochement through ECFA and its follow-on 
agreements failed because, as huadu crystalised, these were perceived by powerful 
domestic groups as threatening Taiwan’s sovereignty even though an overarching 
huadu discourse constituted both KMT and DIG preferences. The crystalisation of 
huadu in fact empowered Taiwan as a legitimate actor in Rapprochement in three 
ways, all related to Beijing’s voluntary compliance. First, Taipei drew on the active 
support of Beijing, who did more than simply comply with huadu, actively investing 
resources in Rapprochement. Second, Taipei drew on Beijing’s simple compliance; 
Beijing behaved in accordance with huadu-driven rules, decisions and commands. 
Finally, Taipei benefited from low levels of opposition from Beijing, which reduced 
the costs of coercion and bribery.971 This process co-constituted and embedded huadu, 
securing Taiwan’s de facto independence and compelling Beijing’s sanction. 
The Sunflower Movement damaged the KMT’s hold on power and reversed 
Rapprochement. The KMT was wiped out in the November 2014 mid-term elections, 
971 Reus-Smit. Christian. 2007:163-4. 
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the legislature blocked all follow-on agreements with China. At the domestic level, 
Taiwan’s social movements were revitalised; The Sunflowers mobilised support and 
spawned “Third Force” parties, such as the NPP and the SDP, who pressure the DPP 
from the left, but aligned to huadu, not taidu.972 The Sunflowers supported the anti-
nuclear movement immediately following the LY occupation in 2014 and backed 
former DPP elite and Kaohsiung defendant Lin Yi-hsiung’s hunger strike in support 
of it.  The KMT lost the 2016 election; domestic economic issues and the KMT’s 
administrative competence were factors, but so was the perception that the KMT had 
violated huadu norms. This was perceived by powerful groups in Taiwan as 
threatening the status quo and by extension Taiwan’s de facto independence.  
Taiwan’s business organisations switched to lobbying the DPP to institute “business-
friendly” labour reforms in Taiwan, confirming the DPP as the party of Taiwanese 
business. The NPP and the SDP supported Taiwan’s trade unions against these 
labour reforms. The DPP’s refusal formally to accept the 1992 Consensus as the 
basis of cross-Strait talks led Beijing to isolate Taipei internationally. Taipei adopted 
liberal economic policies while switching away from China to a “Southbound 
Policy”. Yet, at the same time, the new DPP administration, supported by the pan-
Blue KMT and PFP caucuses, enacted a Referendum Act prohibiting any 
constitutional change to the ROC’s official title and territory through referendums, 
confirming that, despite Taipei’s semantic rejection of the 1992 Consensus, huadu is 
Taiwan’s state identity, national interest and political status. 
972 Beckershoff, Andre. 2015. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
9.1. Introduction 
On 2nd January 2019, Xi Jinping reiterated Beijing’s January 1979 offer of “One 
Country, Two Systems” (OCTS) to Taipei. While stressing “peaceful reunification” 
and respect for “the legitimate rights” of the Taiwanese, he reasserted “China must 
and will be reunified” and retained Beijing’s option of force as a last resort against 
“Taiwan independence separatists”.973 
International media focused on an existential threat to Taiwan.974 Yet, Tsai Ing-wen 
recognised Xi’s mention of taidu as a straw man and immediately occupied the 
discursive gap that he had helpfully directed her to, tweeting: 
As President of the Republic of China, I must solemnly emphasize that we have never 
accepted the “1992 Consensus”. The fundamental reason is that the Beijing authorities’ 
definition of the “1992 Consensus” is “one China” and “one country, two systems”. So 
again, I am calling on China to accept the reality of the Republic of China (Taiwan); it 
must respect the commitment of the 23 million people of Taiwan to freedom and 
democracy; it must handle cross-strait differences peacefully, on the basis of equality, 
and it must be governments or government-authorized agencies that engage in 
negotiations.975  
973 China Daily. 2019. Highlights of Xi's speech at Taiwan message anniversary event. 2nd January 
2019. [online] Available at:  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/02/WS5c2c1ad2a310d91214052069.html [Accessed 10 
January 2019]. 
974 See: New York Times. 2019.  Xi Jinping Warns Taiwan That Unification Is the Goal and Force Is 
an Option. 1st January 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/world/asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-
china.html; The Guardian. 2019. All necessary means': Xi Jinping reserves right to use force against 
Taiwan. 2nd January 2019. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/all-
necessary-means-xi-jinping-reserves-right-to-use-force-against-taiwan [Accessed 10th January 2019]. 
975 Tsai Ing-wen. 2019. Twitter. 2 January 2019. Available at: 
https://twitter.com/iingwen/status/1080424117583540225/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp
%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1080424117583540225&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.telegraph
.co.uk%2Fnews%2F2019%2F01%2F02%2Fchinas-xi-jinping-threatens-resort-force-unify-taiwan%2F 
[Accessed 16 January 2019]. 
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Tsai’s formal rejection of the 1992 Consensus appears puzzling alongside her 
defence of the ROC and the fact that her four substantive demands reiterate those of 
Ma Ying-jeou (and reflect 2008-16 Rapprochement): Beijing must recognise that the 
ROC is a sovereign state; Taiwan is a liberal democracy; cross-Strait relations are 
peaceful and state-to-state and relations must be functionally diplomatic ones. In fact, 
Tsai justifies rejecting the 1992 Consensus because Beijing’s interpretation (OCTS) 
would make Taiwan a Special Administrative Region of the PRC and, as such, entail 
ROC state death. Granted, Tsai’s interpretation of ROC sovereignty diverges from 
Taipei’s contribution to the 1992 Consensus (q.v. 7.2.) and Ma Ying-jeou’s 2015 
interpretation (q.v. 8.5). However, it certainly aligns to the DPP’s position expressed 
by Joseph Wu in January 2016 (q.v. 8.2.6.). So, Tsai’s rejection of OCTS keeps the 
ROC in play and, to achieve this, she keeps on the table a pragmatic interpretation of 
what Taipei said in 1992, modified by intervening policy statements (q.v. 7.3; 8.2.6; 
9.4.1.). In so doing, Tsai legitimates the ROC, maintains the status quo, secures 
Taiwan’s de facto independence and adheres to huadu. Beijing sanctions this. The 
1992 Consensus is not essential to the status quo or to huadu; it was simply a means 
to to those ends.  
In her 2019 New Year speech, Tsai reiterated “what the two sides of the strait really 
need is a pragmatic understanding of the fundamental differences in the values we 
espouse, our lifestyles, and our political systems”.976 Indeed, Xi also acknowledged 
976 Executive Yuan. Republic of China (Taiwan). 2019. Full text of President Tsai Ing-wen’s New 
Year’s Day Speech. 2nd January 2019. [online] Available at: 
https://english.ey.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=3FA02B129BCA256C&sms=925E4E62B451AB83
&s=73623FC95A215B22 [Accessed 10th January 2019]. 
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that different normative representations were the sticking point and reiterated that 
OCTS would respect Taiwan’s democracy.977 
In this regard, then, the 2019 New Year exchange confirms this study’s realist-
constructivist and discourse-analytic arguments around the logic of huadu. Taipei’s 
deployment of huadu’s normative representations in cross-Strait power politics is 
ameliorated by prudence and morality. Huadu crystalised in Rapprochement; Beijing 
and Taipei endorse huadu and huadu encodes Taiwan’s normative representations in 
the ROC, securing the status quo and Taiwan’s de facto independence. Taidu is a 
straw man and, while PRC-centred tongyi may be Beijing’s goal, it remains simply 
an aspiration as long as it endorses huadu. 
This chapter seeks not simply to relate the study’s key findings. The study’s unique 
theoretical framework, data set and methodology require and invite a much broader 
and more involved response. To do so, it does the following: first, it summarises the 
findings of the thesis (q.v. 9.2.). Second, it expands on how these findings relate to 
state identity change (q.v. 9.3.). Third, it shows how this study’s realist-constructivist 
framework and discourse-analytic methodology support the findings (q.v. 9.3.). 
Fourth, it discusses the logic of huadu (q.v. 9.4.). Fifth, it outlines the academic and 
policy implications of the findings (q.v. 9.5.). Finally, the chapter offers a number of 
concluding remarks for consideration. In doing so, this study offers a plausible 
explanation of the Taiwan Problem and a useful and innovative approach to a 
number of IR issues. In particular, it suggests that in pursuing huadu Taipei seeks not 
just security but peace.  
977 China Daily. 2019. Highlights of Xi's speech at Taiwan message anniversary event. 2nd January 
2019. [online] Available at:  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/02/WS5c2c1ad2a310d91214052069.html [Accessed 10 
January 2019]. 
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9.2. Main Findings 
This thesis concludes with the following findings: 
First, the concept of Taiwan Independence is misconceived; Taiwan has been 
independent in the ROC since at least 1950. In this regard, huadu is a state-centred 
identity that exists on a pan-Blue-pan-Green spectrum that runs from unification 
(tongyi) to de jure independence (taidu) and oscillates within the cross-Strait status 
quo of de facto Taiwan independence. Violating huadu would spell the end of the 
ROC.  
Second, this study accounts for huadu analytically as a state identity; Fell and 
Schubert do not – they treat Taiwan’s de facto independence as a national-identity-
driven function of domestic party politics.  The data in this study show that huadu 
was constituted in authoritarian KMT sinification as well as in Taiwanisation 
(bentuhua), democratisation and cross-Strait relations from the earliest days of Free 
China. Huadu norms are visible in Free China “idealis”, while Free China “realis” 
embedded the ROC’s political isolation in Taiwan. Huadu was catalysed by the 
ROC’s crises of legitimacy, oscillated within the status quo after 1992 and had 
nucleated by 2008. After 2008, huadu underwent a domestic and cross-Strait test of 
its Taiwanese-ness that led it to crystalise as transparent, civic and liberal democratic. 
These representations bestow legitimacy.  
Third, huadu’s normative representations reflect a domestic struggle between ethnic 
and civic nationalisms, deployed strategically in SIPs. KMT and DPP rhetorical 
appeals to Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms belied a strong defence of huadu and 
when ethnic identity threatened huadu (and the existence of the ROC), elites 
restrained it. Rather, liberal democracy became a key huadu norm through a civic-
nationalist appeal to the “New Taiwanese”. Taiwan’s presidential-parliamentary 
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system facilitated elite (presidential) entrepreneurship and agency in constituting 
huadu in the first place. Yet, it also permitted authoritarian “black-box” practices that 
potentially threatened huadu norms. Such practices in turn prompted the Sunflowers’ 
defence of huadu norms, determining who got to legitimate huadu.  
Fourth, Beijing pragmatically sanctions huadu because it provisionally averts taidu. 
Yet, that sanction in itself threatens Beijing’s ontological security. As this study has 
argued, huadu contains the pragmatic threat of taidu (q.v. 4.6.3.). For this reason, 
Beijing must relentlessly delegitimate taidu and blur the meaning of Taiwan 
Independence.  China’s Great Power identity sees the recovery of Taiwan as an 
imperative.978 Yet, Beijing has relaxed its original One China definition, sanctioning 
the ROC’s Westphalian and domestic sovereignty, but not international recognition. 
It resists the Washington Consensus, adopting Peaceful Development as its cross-
Strait policy agenda.979 Huadu forces Beijing to accept international liberal norms to 
a degree. While Taipei perceives a threat in Beijing’s semantic support for tongyi and 
opposition to taidu Beijing lives in fear that huadu will violate its boundary with 
taidu. The formal loss of Taiwan would delegitimate the CCP, empowering Chinese 
liberal and nationalist dissidents as well as the separatist movement in Xinjiang. 
Taiwan perceives an immanent threat in Beijing’s power. But it is this rise combined 
with its state identity that is perceived as a threat.  
Fifth, the crystalisation of huadu in Rapprochement refutes any claim that the KMT 
sought to sell Taiwan out or that Taiwan-leaning elites sought to pull the KMT 
administration back to an optimum policy position, or indeed that elites even know 
what that position is. Huadu, rather than leaders’ motivations and ideologies, 
978 Gries, Peter Hayes. 2004.; Callaghan, William A.  2010; Zhao, Suisheng. 2004. A Nation-State by 
Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
979 Gries, Peter Hayes. 2004.  
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constitutes cross-Strait policy and the preferences of powerful domestic groups.  But 
domestic groups may misinterpret leaders’ intentions based on threat perception and 
national identity. This phenomenon is apparent in the 2014 Sunflower occupation 
and the 2015 Ma-Xi summit. 
Sixth, the Sunflowers aligned to huadu norms, thus delegitimating the KMT as 
defenders of those norms. In this regard, the Sunflowers did not seek taidu. Rather, 
like Taiwan’s other powerful DIGs, they sanctioned the ROC and formed part of its 
legitimacy nexus. The discursive power of the huadu discourse accounts for this. 
Seventh, Taipei actively sought to draw the taishang, who were perceived as China-
leaning by Taiwan-leaning interest groups, into huadu’s legitimacy nexus. It did this 
discursively through engagement with Taiwanese Businessmen’s Associations that 
framed Taipei as the authority that represented and secured taishang interests 
diplomatically on the mainland. In this regard, the data in this study refute Schubert’s 
claim that the taishang do not constitute a coherent interest group. 
Eighth, the 1992 Consensus permits huadu, while ROC constitutional change 
permitted the 1992 Consensus, allowing de facto international relations. That the 
term 1992 Consensus was not created until 2000 is irrelevant; the discourse clearly 
exists in the data. Similarly, the DPP’s semantic refusal of the 1992 Consensus does 
not mean that it does not recognise it pragmatically or that the DPP’s own discourse 
is not constituted by it. 
Ninth, this study’s Taiwanese Political Speech data facilitates a linguistics-driven 
discourse analysis that reveals the findings above and accounts for them in a way that 
previous studies do not. In particular, it reveals how a huadu discourse developed 
and that huadu’s discursive power to secure Taiwan’s de facto independence should 
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be understood pragmatically rather than semantically. That is, huadu is presupposed 
and implied over the long term in Taiwanese political speech through a discourse that 
takes Taiwan’s de facto independence for granted. 
9.3. State Identity Change and Taiwan’s Maintenance of its de facto 
Independence 
This section relates the above findings to Taiwan’s state identity change and its 
maintenance of de facto independence in the face of superior Chinese power. The 
argument has been that, despite its relative material power advantage, Beijing is 
unable to realise its irredentist claim to Taiwan because of the discursive power of 
huadu. Huadu is primarily a state identity, but it is also a discourse and a political 
status that speaks to a social constituency to legitimate a sovereign ROC as Taiwan. 
In this way, Taipei delegitimates Beijing’s Great Power (daguo) irredentist claim by 
averting two forms of unification, or tongyi - Beijing’s preferred PRC-centred 
zhongtong (under OCTS) and ROC-centred huatong, which Beijing acknowledges 
but opposes. It also averts Beijing’s worst-case scenario of taidu. For Taipei, such 
outcomes are not only normatively inimical to its state identity, but materially 
impossible, since both would result in state death.980  
As a rational reponse to and discursive resolution of perceived PRC threat and the 
ROC’s loss of legitimacy as Free China, huadu has transformed the ROC from 
authoritarian and Chinese to democratic and Taiwanese in power politics. Taipei 
appeals to this identity to exercise discursive power more effectively than Beijing. 
Taipei’s discourse represents Taiwan as a legitimate sovereign state in the ROC and 
a more legitimate member of the international community than Beijing. While the 
980 The Qing was an empire, the 1895 ROT was territorially restricted and did not enjoy legitimacy 
and Taiwan’s status under Japan was that of a colony. The 1991 ROC constitutional changes made the 
ROC a Taiwanese state.  
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PRC has existed since 1949, the ROC has existed since 1912. Yet, its post-1996 
liberal-democratic political system and free-market economy appeal to powerful 
liberal internationalist discourses and gain it widespread sanction as Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s powerful interest groups and constituencies – including taishang, 
Sunflowers, policy elites, mainstream political parties and the electorate - seek to 
maintain the status quo. The international community supports Taiwan. Forced 
unification by the PRC is not deemed acceptable.  
That huadu receives the sanction of the US and the international community is not a 
novel claim. The US also sanctioned Free China and the international community 
sanctioned the Asian Tiger. The power of huadu is that it has a legitimacy that Free 
China and the Asian Tiger never achieved. That is, it also compels Beijing’s implicit 
sanction by nullifying the latter’s principal red line – a formal declaration of taidu. 
The PRC’s legitimacy could not survive a successful taidu. Beijing’s concerns over 
the negative ramifications to its international reputation and legitimacy as a 
permanent member of the UNSC and a responsible global citizen deter it from 
attempting forced unification. Huadu would render such a move an invasion of a 
well-functioning liberal-democratic state rather than the settling of an irredentist 
claim. The fact that Beijing has engaged in de facto state-to-state relations with 
Taipei at least since 1992 and that this is encoded in political text means that Beijing 
sanctions huadu. Whether that sanction is instrumental and provisional or not, it 
passes up to the discourse, thus reinforcing Taipei’s legitimacy, and to break it would 
delegitimate Beijing. In this regard, huadu represents Taipei’s more effective 
discursive power to legitimate its de facto independence. 
By side-stepping the tongyi-taidu binary choice through huadu, Taipei also exposes 
taidu as misconceived in relation to China’s irredentist claim in two ways. First, 
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since taidu represents Taiwan’s aspiration to independence from the ROC and the 
ROC has been constituted as Taiwan since 1991, Taiwan is already independent as 
the ROC.  Second, Taiwan’s two-host puzzle explains Beijing’s claim to Taiwan as 
part-and-parcel of its successor-state claim as China to an ROC that also claimed to 
be China. Since the ROC has reconstituted itself, its claim to be China has dissolved 
into huadu, thus delegitimating Beijing’s claim. Beijing cannot legitimately pursue 
its claim through force as long as Taiwan remains the ROC. The expansion of 
legitimacy from domestic and transnational non-state constituencies to other states, 
including enemies, constitutes a powerful legitimacy nexus. For huadu to stand, 
Beijing counts more than the US, domestic and transnational constituencies or the 
international community of states. 981  Yet, in sanctioning huadu, Beijing’s own 
ontological security is threatened. 
Security and sovereignty through the legitimation of its state identity define Taiwan’s 
national interest and cross-Strait policy between 1945 and 2016. Exogenous shocks 
like international crises of legitimacy change elite views and lead to foreign policy 
change if the state wishes to survive. As this thesis has shown, foreign policy cannot 
operate independently of state identity, since both seek to promote the national 
interest. In this regard huadu, as a reconstituted state identity, was bound to lead to 
divergence from China as Taiwan’s national interest diverged. Taiwan has sought to 
resolve this through cross-Strait economic and social convergence alongside political 
divergence on the one hand and intense domestic political struggle on the other.  
It may seem that if huadu continues to define Taipei, China will be unable to compel 
Taiwan to unify and still retain legitimacy and Taiwan will be unable to achieve de 
jure status as the Republic of Taiwan. This raises certain questions: is there a way out 
981 Yeh, Chieh-ting. 2016. 
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of this quandary for Taiwan? Can huadu sustain Taiwan’s security in the long term? 
What traction does huadu have beyond maintaining the cross-Strait status quo? Does 
huadu have a political purpose beyond security? This thesis provides tentative 
answers and points to some areas in which the post-2016 DPP leadership has 
reconstituted huadu. The DPP’s management of cross-Strait relations permits 
tentative verification of the main arguments in this thesis.  
Huadu is ideationally driven, but it is realist and rational. For Realist Constructivism, 
the intersubjective nature of power politics and contingency of state identity provides 
insight. Cross-Strait relations and domestic politics are power politics and a struggle 
for power.982 However, power politics are contextual and contingent. The discursive 
power of huadu to legitimate Taipei’s normative representations must balance the 
morality of political action with its likelihood of success. Carr, Morgenthau and 
Wendt see the fundamental puzzle of IR as moral. If the moral imperative of huadu 
is cohesive, peaceful cross-Strait relations that secure Taiwan’s de facto 
independence, then economic power combined with political will might constitute 
systemic structural change; Taiwan may have the latter, but it does not have the 
former. Rapprochement, and indeed cross-Strait relations in general, attempted this. 
Yet, for Realist Constructivism, conflict is just as likely as cooperation in IR. 
Reading huadu through Carr, it might be seen as purposeful appeasement of Beijing 
to produce temporary cross-Strait harmony. For Morgenthau, prudence may allow 
huadu to produce some providencial outcome favourable to Taipei – and to Beijing 
for that matter.983  Prudence and morality, not ideology, guide huadu norms as cross-
Strait policy. In Rapprochement, Taipei sought to avoid ideological confrontation 
and to acknowledge Beijing’s interests while protecting and promoting its own. As a 
982 Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. Politics among Nations: 25. 
983 Molloy. 2006: 65. 
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state in limbo, the ROC must legitimate itself. This carries threats. Therefore, policy 
elites constantly seek sanction for huadu through normative representations as well 
as de facto ability to function. Paradoxically, legal non-recognition has facilitated  
state-building. Loss of international standing forced Taipei to engage directly with 
powerful international norms, institutionalising legitimate government. The ROC did 
not face an explicit international demand to reform, since this would have entailed 
formal recognition. However, Taipei knows that internationally-held standards of 
governance provide security.   
9.4. A Realist-Constructivist huadu 
This study has argued that neither Realism nor Constructivism alone can adequately 
account for the power of huadu. However, a realist-constructivist synthesis can for 
the following reasons. First, it fits theory to problem rather than vice-versa, obviating 
paradigmatic overstretch. Second, it presents huadu as both rational and ideational; 
this opposition is dialectic, not exclusionary. 984  Third, it conceptualises Taiwan’s 
discursive power as the productive power of huadu to legitimate the ROC as Taiwan 
(q.v. 3.2.4.) and it conceptualises huadu itself as Taiwan’s state identity (q.v. 4.4.2.). 
Thus, it applies Realism’s core concept of power and Constructivism’s core concept 
of intersubjectivity to show how huadu draws on and bestows discursive power – 
that is, legitimacy constructed in power politics – on Taiwan. Fourth, it invites a 
discourse-analytic approach that melds positivism and interpretivism to locate 
empirical textual warrant for the semantic meaning of huadu and for its pragmatic 
communicative effect (q.v. 5.2.). Fifth, a realist-constructivist synthesis brings a 
classical-realist focus on huadu’s role in power politics and cross-Strait policy and 
constructivist methodology for co-constitution of structures (huadu; ROC state; 
984 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 2-3. 
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cross-Strait relations) and agents (elites, constituencies, interest groups, states) in 
cross-Strait policy to account for Taipei’s refusal of Beijing’s power. Sixth, it 
combines bottom-up domestic construction of a unitary state foreign policy response 
with top-down, systemic construction of unitary state preferences, permitting a two-
level, three-stage analysis of cross-Strait policy construction (q.v. 3.3.). Finally, it 
provides constructivist epistemological and ontological support for classical-realist 
morality and prudence and avoids the contradictions of the scientific turn in Waltz’s 
neorealism.985  
To justify the study’s innovativeness and analytical appropriateness, the primary 
argument is that a single conception of power and identity cannot explain Taiwan’s 
maintenance of its de facto independence because, first, all factors affecting state 
behaviour are interrelated.986 Second, a neorealist focus on material forces provides 
useful core concepts of balance of power and balance of threat. Neoliberalism 
provides core concepts of economic interdependence and liberal institutionalism. 
These partially explain policy choices and how the cross-Strait sub-system constrains 
Taipei’s options. Yet, they cannot provide a comprehensive theoretical account of 
Taiwan’s maintenance of de facto independence because they do not satisfactorily 
align ideational factors like state identity, legitimation and norms with foreign policy. 
Wendt’s constructivist approach provides a broad understanding of state identity 
construction in socialisation with other states, with each state identifying Self and 
Other as Hobbesian enemy, Lockean rival or Kantian friend and formulating 
preferences in relation to Others. That is, it provides a Highway Code for state 
behaviour in the system.  
985 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 7-8. 
986 Kenneth Waltz, 1988. The Origins of Wars in Neorealist Theory, The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 18(4): 615 
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Yet, Wendt’s approach alone is problematic in Taiwan’s case. First, his systemic 
theory merely brackets the domestic, meaning that Wendt’s corporate state identities 
require further exploration. Second, Wendt downplays the role of power politics in 
state identity formation. 987  This requires opening up the domestic to unearth the 
agency of Taiwan’s political elites and DIGs to construct state identity and cross-
State policy, a step permitted by Realist Constructivism. Yet, as this study observes, 
Taiwan’s elites resort to context and selectively deploy SIPs to legitimate huadu. 
Thus, they make context crucial to state identity and foreign policy. 
Between 1947 and 1987 the KMT retained power by deploying sinification and 
bentuhua to construct huadu through Free China. From 1987 to 2016, the ROC 
enacted huadu to shift from being Chinese to Taiwanese. The democratic presidential 
elections in 1996, 2000, 2008 and 2016 indicate oscillation between pan-Blue and 
pan-Green, but other domestic watersheds that signal power shifts are first, 2-28 in 
1947; second the Zhongli Incident in 1977; third, the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979; 
fourth, the end of Martial Law in 1987; fifth, the ROC Constitutional changes of 
1991 and, sixth, the 2014 Sunflower Occupation. These gamechangers 
institutionalised state identity and gave agency to powerful interest groups and elites 
to change norms and make them stick.  They also allowed huadu to speak to and 
construct a legitimacy nexus by expanding its realm of action. 
9.4.1. Huadu as Realist-Constructivist Discursive Power 
This thesis has argued that the discursive power of huadu can be conceived of thus: 
first, it is constituted in power politics; second, it is material and ideational; third, it 
follows a logic of the social; fourth, it is the national interest; fifth, it is prudence and 
987 Wendt states only “contemporary states have been interacting for dozens, even hundreds of years, 
during which they have accumulated considerable knowledge - [namely historical experiences] - about 
each other’s interests.” 
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morality; sixth, it is agentive change; seventh, it is prescriptive; eighth, it is 
constitutive and understood through a dialectic logic; ninth, it is understood 
pragmatically in context. In this regard, it conforms to Morgenthau’s six principles 
and to realist-constructivist core concepts (q.v. 3.2.2.). 
First, huadu entails the ROC’s rational interest in survival; this, along with 
intersubjectivity permits a realist-constructivist synthesis in power politics.988 Realist-
constructivist power politics are relative, relational, contingent and social. Thus, 
huadu responds to constraints in the cross-Strait context.  
Second, Huadu’s material and ideational nature invokes intersubjectivity as a 
discursive process of material construction that is mind-independent. The social 
reality of cross-Strait relations out there confirms huadu is the status quo and that its 
internal logic is intersubjectively accepted by a legitimacy nexus. However, that 
logic – like the ROC – is contingent because if Beijing decides not to buy in, it will 
change.  
Third, huadu follows a logic of the social in that it is a preference, socially and 
rationally constructed by knowledgeable state and domestic actors.989 It is rational 
since it seeks legitimacy through reason, even when its agents may not act optimally 
in power politics. 990 Huadu defines how its social constituency interacts and self-
identifies. As such, it generates political interaction with tongyi and taidu 
constituencies and with Beijing that enables its deployment in cross-Strait policy.991 
This study’s RC admits the logic of the social; “we” as a Taiwanese constituency are 
constituted before “we” and “them” as a cross-Strait constituency. Morgenthau 
988 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 25 
989 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 50-1 
990 Morgenthau, Hans. 1946 [1967]:10; Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 54  
991 Barkin, Samuel. 2010:  58 
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locates the state as “we”.992 Carr claims there is no political man in isolation from the 
state.993 Thus, the first “we” must be Taiwan as the ROC, constituted in huadu.  
Fourth, to legitimate itself as Taiwan’s national interest, huadu compels sanction 
from its subject (Taiwan) and non-subject (Beijing) social constituencies. Neither 
taidu nor tongyi have the legitimacy to do this.994 Neither represents Taipei or cross-
Strait relations as they are and so constitute wishful thinking. Elites who deploy 
huadu therefore co-opt a constituency that (explicitly or implicitly) sanctions 
Taiwan’s national interest in huadu.995 In this way, power politics constitute Taiwan’s 
interest in huadu. It is the ROC’s legitimacy that invokes Taiwan’s national interest 
in maintenance of its de facto independence.996  
Fifth, huadu has a social purpose beyond security and “its content and manner are 
determined by the political and cultural environment”.997 This suggests huadu is a 
prudent, moral compromise between tongyi and taidu that recognises Taiwan’s 
national capabilities, its discursive power and the appeal of its norms to Beijing. As 
such, huadu as political change cannot be understood absent “the compromise 
between power and morality”.998 Huadu eschews overconfidence and insures against 
unpredictability. 
Sixth, as agents, huadu’s social constituency consists of “purposeful actors whose 
actions help transform” Taiwanese politics and cross-Strait relations.999 Free China 
could not have become huadu without entrepreneurship. Elite agency has been 
992 Morgenthau. Hans. [1946] 1967: 97-105. 
993 Carr, Edward Hallett. 1939 [1964, 2001]: 95, 
994 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 68. 
995 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 69-70. 
996 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 73. 
997 Morgenthau, Hans. [1946] 1967: 9. 
998 Carr, Edward Hallett. [1939] 1964: 210. 
999 Wendt, Alexander. 1987:338. 
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crucial in Taiwan in avoiding a bloodbath by creating an intermediate state in 
huadu. 
Seventh, the logic of the social reveals Taiwan’s dilemma as unpredictable.1000 Huadu 
may reflect a political attempt to inject predictability into cross-Strait 
relations. However, although Realist Constructivism may infer from huadu to make 
contingent policy predictions, it cannot epistemologically predict outcomes. To 
account for huadu, it must avoid scientific prediction and have a normative 
context. 1001  Conversely, a prescriptive power approach sees cross-Strait relations as 
both foreign policy and elite and domestic-group agency, but it effaces the 
constitutive nature of huadu and agency. Viewing huadu’s legitimating power in 
power politics permits recognition of its constitutive power. 1002 Unpredictability 
may account for ROC presidents having enforced change in the absence of a full 
knowledge of their social constituency. Eighth, for this study’s Realist 
Constructivism, huadu represents both interactional and constitutive power; it is 
generated in SIPs (actions) and constitutes these as power politics (social 
relations).1003 Thus, a pre-constituted ROC and PRC engage in foreign policy 
through cross-Strait relations. At the same time, power operates in cross-Strait 
relations that analytically precede the ROC’s and PRC’s state identities. Chapter 4 
argues that huadu co-constitutes productive and structural power in cross-Strait and 
domestic power politics. 1004 Yet, since the ROC is a corporate actor, it is able to 
deploy huadu as structural power to a social purpose in cross-Strait 
1000 Morgenthau, Hans. 1967: 19) Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 118. 
1001 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 119. 
1002 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 132. 
1003 Barnett and Duvall. 2005: 45-6. 
1004 Barnett and Duvall. 2005; 52-3. 
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relations and domestic politics; that social purpose is to legitimate the ROC. Huadu 
is agency and structure.1005 
Ninth, huadu is understood pragmatically not semantically by its social 
constituencies (q.v. 5.2.6.). In other words huadu legitimates the ROC discursively 
and its constituencies recognise it not in explicit policy statements but in implicit 
political language that presupposes and indexes Taiwan’s sovereign status over time. 
Political actors exploit the discursive gap between illocution and perlocution to 
legitimate huadu and that gap in itself accounts for competing actors misperceiving 
threats. 
Realist logic explains huadu best in its recognition of power politics, cross-Strait 
policy, morality and agency. Constructivist logic amends prediction; it provides a 
framework to link agency to cross-Strait relations and methods to do this by 
exploring discourses, identity and power.1006 Yet Realist Constructivism has limits. 
9.4.2. Limits of RC in Explaining huadu 
This study has critiqued the Wendtian suggestion that huadu is only a systemic 
identity, or culture of anarchy, generated in inter-state relations. In this regard, it has 
made salient its operation in 2008-16 Rapprochement to challenge Wendt’s liberal 
analytical contention that if states get institutions right, international relations will 
become cooperative and the KMT’s normative appropriation of that claim for cross-
Strait relations. 1007  Rapprochement shows that institutional sociability is not 
perfectibility.1008 The KMT (unconsciously) attempted to recreate a Wendtian cross-
Strait system beyond competing ROC-PRC state identities and to fill it with “a more 
1005 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 19; Dahl, Robert. 1957. 
1006 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 137. 
1007 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 109. 
1008 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 110. 
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rational discourse based on collective problems as they exist ‘out there’ rather than as 
they exist ‘in here’ where our identities originate”. 1009 In deploying huadu to do this, 
however, they were bound to fail since huadu self-evidently starts as the corporate 
“in here” of Taiwan. Since sociability entails group affinity and relative power, 
cross-Strait relations cannot be reduced to inter-state functional needs. Thus, huadu 
cannot perfect institutions; it must prolong tension. Yet, as agency represents the 
unexpected, it may change huadu as structure. A prudent cross-Strait policy 
recognises and allows for the unexpected effects of agency.1010  
A Wendtian conception of huadu as normative liberalism lacks explanatory power. 
Rapprochement adopted this stance ideologically then disproved it analytically. So, 
in analysing huadu’s power as legitimacy, Realist Constructivism seeks not to 
privilege liberal norms in China-Taiwan relations or to assume the normative 
primacy of Taiwan’s liberal democracy. Realist Constructivism simply assumes that 
normative structures are socially constructed and de-constructed.  
9.5. The Logic of Huadu 
This thesis has argued that huadu’s logic is rational but not rational-choice. Thomas 
Schelling (1960) argues that “it may be perfectly rational [...] to wish for the power 
to suspend certain rational capabilities in particular situations”. 1011 So, huadu is 
rational in that it offers certain advantages; Taipei may suspend rationality to use 
huadu as a strategic tool to shape Beijing’s expectations. It may do this by blurring 
the boundary between huadu and taidu, and among thin, thick and other conceptions 
of taidu, thus convincing China that Taiwan is not rational on certain issues, 
1009 Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. 2000. Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and 
Neoliberal Institutionalism. International Studies Quarterly, 44(1)97-119 at 114, 
1010 (116) 
1011 Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 
18.
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enhancing the credibility of Taipei’s commitments and threats. Such situations 
include, for example, Taiwan trying to deter (or compel) China by implicitly 
threatening taidu. 1012 Similarly, Taipeimay resist Chinese threats and make a self-
binding commitment to a particular bargaining position, such as in Ma’s statement to 
Xi in the 2015 summit (q.v. 8.5.). Granted, Beijing may anticipate Taiwan’s actions 
by structuring cross-Strait relations to its advantage.1013  
Such an instrumental huadu is rational. Yet to effectively resist Beijing’s power, 
huadu also needs to transcend the ROC’s control. Huadu’s strength is that it 
represents liberal democratic norms that reject explicit state control over state 
identity, since once such control becomes obvious to Beijing, it can more easily 
delegitimate the “controlled” identity, as Taiwan was able to do with Free China and 
is able to do with  Great Power. This is the disadvantage the PRC and tongyi face in 
confronting huadu’s liberal norms. At the same time, in the hands of powerful 
interest groups within its subject realm and constituency, huadu becomes a potential 
constraint on Taipei’s policy options since it may metamorphose into taidu. 
China prevails over Taiwan in terms of material power. Yet to assume that Taiwan’s 
maintenance of its autonomy is puzzling in this regard is to ignore the power of 
huadu. China’s military capabilities do not by definition produce desired 
outcomes.1014 Great Power lacks the legitimacy of huadu. Absent domestic support, 
Beijing might be unable or unwilling to subdue Taiwan. Yet at the same time, a 
militarily unchallenged taidu would represent the end of the CCP’s legitimacy, since 
Beijing’s own deployment of Great Power has made Taiwan the sine qua non of 
1012 Schelling, Thomas. 1960, 19. 
1013 Schelling, Thomas. 1960: 28. 
1014 Tsang, Steve.ed. 2006. If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
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Great Power. Thus, Beijing must buy into huadu at all costs. In the context of huadu, 
China has no hope of subduing Taiwan materially; it also has no hope of making 
tongyi prevail. It must, therefore, sanction huadu while continuing to delegitimate 
taidu forces, thus further legitimating huadu. This is Beijing’s quandary and the 
threat implicit in huadu’s provisional security guarantee (q.v. 4.6.3). 
This study has argued that sinification, Free China, bentuhua and a New Taiwanese 
collective identity constructed huadu to legitimate ROC power itself. This reciprocal 
relationship between power and state identity means that ROC power legitimates 
Taiwanese identity and Taiwanese identity seeks to secure itself by legitimating the 
ROC state. The two phenomena cooperate through domestic and cross-Strait 
competition so that separating them becomes nearly impossible.  
State identity legitimation demands a credible sovereign claim. The authoritarian 
ROC did not have this. The legitimacy of Free China “was undermined by the 
intrinsic mismatch between the de jure state structure and its actual practice of a 
sovereign state on Taiwan over four decades”.1015 Lee Teng-hui fixed this in 1991 
through huadu. Huadu’s legitimacy arose in the ROC’s social interaction with and 
co-option of the Taiwanese population. Power politics legitimated the norm of self-
determination.1016 Chiang Ching-kuo’s acceptance of the DPP’s unlawful formation 
in 1986 and his decision three weeks later to announce the lifting of Martial Law 
pushed ROC identity change “beyond the point of no return”. 1017  Lee Teng-hui 
cannily exploited discursive gaps between Chinese and Taiwanese state identity, 
1015 Chu, Yun-han and Jih-wen Lin. 2001. Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-
Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity. The China Quarterly, 
165: 102-129 at 119. 
1016 Cheng, Tun-jen. 1989: 499 
1017 Chu, Yun-han and Jih-wen Lin, 2001: 121 
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ambivalently framing Taiwan as China under the ROC while discursively 
legitimating it as Taiwan through huadu.  
Huadu commands legitimacy because its power is recognised as rightful by a 
legitimacy nexus. Huadu’s legitimacy secures Taiwan’s sovereignty because with 
social recognition comes domestic, transnational and other-states’, including 
Beijing’s, compliance. With compliance comes a stable status quo and Taiwan’s 
maintenance of its sovereignty. Legitimacy is crucial to Taipei’s power to resist 
Beijing and to maintain stability in cross-Strait relations. The ROC’s crises of 
legitimacy were potential sources of international instability and disorder. Their 
resolution therefore is of some importance to the maintenance of international peace 
and stability.1018 
9.5.1. The 1992 Consensus: huadu’s encoding 
This study has argued that the 1992 Consensus legitimated huadu by encoding it in 
the form of a prudent compromise. In doing so, it sought to ensure both sides’ 
ontological security by making cross-Strait relations predictable. Yet, its effect was 
to threaten Beijing’s ontological security. 
The 1992 Consensus provided both sides with a way out of the state identity 
dilemma by allowing Taipei to be Taiwan in the form of huadu, thus inhibiting taidu. 
Yet, the corporate domestic “we” of huadu had already been constructed in the 1991 
constitutional changes, compelling taidu and tongyi constituencies’ domestic 
sanction.  The 1992 Consensus represents Beijing’s sanction of huadu and also inter-
state sanction. That is, in the 1992 Consensus, huadu expanded its realm of political 
action to the cross-Strait level and compelled Beijing’s sanction as a non-subject 
social constituency. Nevertheless, China continues rhetorically and diplomatically to 
1018 Reus-Smit. Christian. 2007:170. 
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warn against taidu in public statements. 1019  Yet, Beijing knows that the 1992 
Consensus rhetorically and discursively inhibits taidu by permitting huadu and that 
the ROC cannot violate it even if it does not explicitly acknowledge it. Thus, for 
Beijing the 1992 Consensus semantically encodes huadu and guarantees China’s 
ontological security. Yet, read pragmatically, huadu prompts ontological insecurity 
for Beijing precisely because it represents Taiwan’s de facto independence (q.v. 
4.6.3.). 
9.5.2. Rapprochement: huadu’s litmus test 
This study acknowledges the appeal of seeing 2008-2016 Rapprochement as an 
attempt to move from a Hobbesian through a Lockean to a Kantian culture in which 
allies “do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security 
threats”.1020 In this view, Beijing and Taipei attempted to internalise liberal norms 
that they perceived as legitimate, fully accepting their claims by adopting a 
corresponding identity.1021 They did this by agreeing to respect the 1992 Consensus. 
Yet, Beijing formally maintained the threat of war if taidu were declared (q.v. 1.2.1.) 
and Taipei, in fact, deployed huadu in a way that maintained its political divergence 
from China (as ROC and PRC). Indeed, Taipei’s rhetorical buy-in to the 1992 
Consensus meant Beijing bought into Taipei’s discursive deployment of huadu.  
From the 1990s, cross-Strait economic relations attracted liberal scholars and 
journalists, who proclaimed the Liberal Peace in the Taiwan Straits. However, the 
puzzle of a continuing security dilemma and political divergence during the 2000s 
made salient the contested nature of Taiwan’s state identity. Rapprochement was 
1019 Taipei Times. 2018.Taiwan grateful to US for defense act. 15th August 2018. [online] Available at: 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/08/15/2003698543/2 [Accessed 30 August 
2018]. 
1020 Wendt, Alexander. 1999: 258. 
1021 Wendt, Alexander. 1999: 272-3. 
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intended to resolve the security dilemma through deepening economic integration. 
Crucial to this was the ECFA and its follow-on agreements. Yet, despite being 
launched in September 2008 and signed in June 2010, ECFA had not been completed 
by the time the KMT left power in May 2016. This was due to the collapse of the 
CSSTA in the face of the Sunflower Movement. It ought not to have happened in 
rationalist terms, given deep economic interdependence; the projected economic 
benefits outweighing potential costs for Taiwan; geographic proximity; elite agency 
on both sides and promised diplomatic cooperation that would have enhanced 
Taiwan’s international space. So the Kantian Peace was elusive. 
In this regard, Chapter 8 explains Taiwan’s ditching of the CSSTA and 
Rapprochement in terms of the crystalisation of huadu. While there were strong cost-
benefit arguments against the CSSTA, Taiwan’s response to it resists rational-choice, 
cost-benefit accounts alone. According to rational choice explanations, Taiwan 
rejected the CSSTA because of the perceived threat to weaker sectors in Taiwan; 
China’s economic power constituted a threat that activated Taiwan’s traditional 
protectionism. 
Such explanations, however, cannot fully explain Taiwan’s threat perception around 
China’s economic ascent. This study’s Realist Constructivism finds the source of 
Taiwan’s resistance in the crystalisation of huadu. That is, CSSTA was perceived by 
Taiwan’s (ROC) core social constituency that included powerful DIGs as facilitating 
a more powerful China’s entry into Taiwan’s (ROC) realm of political action and 
violation of huadu’s boundary with tongyi. In resisting the CSSTA, Taiwan’s pro-
divergence DIGs sanctioned huadu, but huadu itself had already passed the litmus 
test of Rapprochement with China. This was evident during the Lee and Chen 
administrations, but under Ma deeper negotiations with Beijing crystalised huadu as 
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they touched on political issues. Indeed, prudence demanded that Taipei consider the 
CSSTA’s political implications and avoid provoking China. Huadu resolved this 
quandary. 
This case has demonstrated how huadu maximised Taiwan’s core national interest in 
maintaining its sovereignty. It has argued that pro-divergence threat perception 
related to China’s and the KMT’s intentions were constituted by huadu, certainly 
filtered through domestic interests, but overarching and constitutive of policy elite 
preferences as well.  Huadu effectively guided Taipei’s cross-Strait policy to start 
with. Thus huadu, while facilitating Rapprochement, became the primary 
impediment to its full realisation. As such, Rapprochement was huadu’s litmus test 
and the ROC came out as Taiwan. 
9.5.3. The Status Quo: huadu’s legitimation 
The status quo is taken for granted in Taiwanese political speech. Ma Ying-jeou’s 
Three Noes slogan “no unification, no independence, no war” is devastatingly simple 
in this regard. In deploying a traditional Chinese three-step rhetorical device Ma 
implicitly equates “war” with unification and independence. Rather than making 
“war” a third and equal option to independence and unification, Ma craftily lodges it 
next to unification and independence in the collective mind of the legitimacy nexus, 
invoking huadu to fill the illocutionary-perlocutionary gap. If power is A’s ability to 
get B to do what B would otherwise not do, then a hearer who has not yet considered 
huadu is invited to do so and pragmatically to associate it with peace. If it is a 
knowledgeable actor’s ability to exploit discursive gaps to remake his identity, then 
Ma as President has deployed the identity of the Taiwanese state and compelled 
Beijing to sanction it. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 have provided a theoretical framework for huadu as state identity 
and discursive power. Chapter 5 has operationalised it. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 have 
provided a plausible answer to the research question. That is, change in state identity 
and interests in Taiwan in a crisis of legitimacy constituted huadu in opposition, first, 
to Free China and then in opposition to taidu and tongyi. In so doing, it rejected 
China’s Great Power state identity that supported tongyi, but also compelled 
Beijing’s sanctioning of huadu by inhibiting taidu.  Chapter 6 showed how Free 
China was constructed and dismantled in successive crises of legitimacy, sowing the 
seeds of huadu in sinification and bentuhua. Chapter 7 showed how huadu nucleated 
in domestic politics and cross-Strait relations. Chapter 8 showed how it crystalised 
under the test of Rapprochement. These chapters showed the co-constitutive nature 
of huadu as state identity and the discursive power to legitimate the ROC as a 
sovereign Taiwan.   
Against this backdrop, Rapprochement may be seen as dramatic state identity change 
by Taipei. Lee and Chen’s Taiwanisation of the ROC, military vulnerability and 
diplomatic exclusion may have caused the conflict that Rapprochement sought to 
resolve. Yet, Taiwan’s perceived economic dependence on China in Rapprochement 
may have resulted in economic, then political, subordination to China and tongyi by 
force, thus killing huadu and the ROC. Given China’s rapid military modernisation, 
these factors help explain why pro-divergence elites and DIGs perceived a Chinese 
threat in the KMT’s policy. As has been argued, however, material factors alone 
cannot provide a complete account. Rather, they operate as functions of state identity. 
Therefore, pan-Green threat perception arises not just from China’s economic rise 
but from the threat to Taiwan’s huadu state identity, since Great Power status 
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demands tongyi. In this context, this study finds that huadu has legitimated Taiwan’s 
sovereignty as the ROC, but that it is not completely secure.  
Rapprochement did not result in enhanced diplomatic recognition for Taipei.  Rather, 
Taiwan lost existing diplomatic recognition soon after 2016. In this context, 2014 
was decisive in powerful Taiwanese interest groups galvanising perceptions of 
Chinese threat. In addition to the perceived threat of ECFA and the CSSTA 
themselves, continued revelations of United Front work in Taiwan, accusations of 
treason among ministers and military elites and the Ma administration’s cooperation 
with Beijing in the Diaoyutai (Senkkaku Islands) dispute with Japan coupled with 
Ma’s diplomatic rhetoric of pan-Chinese-ness. Ma himself proposed and then 
rejected a peace treaty with China to formally end the Civil War. Yet, such a treaty 
would have violated huadu since it would of necessity have been between the KMT 
and the CCP. Technically, it would also have violated Beijing’s state identity as the 
PRC. 
9.6. Implications of the Thesis 
This thesis has shown that huadu legitimates Taiwan’s sovereignty in the ROC and 
that, as such, it balances Beijing’s threat in the form of the latter’s material power 
and its Great Power state identity. It also delegitimates tongyi, threatening Beijing 
and taidu, provisionally reassuring Beijing.  It has argued that state identity has 
determined Taipei’s cross-Strait policy because it is constitutive of prevailing elite 
and DIG preferences vis-à-vis China. Conclusions derived from this thesis, therefore, 
have important academic and policy implications.  
9.6.1. Academic Implications 
First, the issues discussed in the thesis account for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de 
facto independence in the face of superior Chinese power regardless of systemic 
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factors. That is, the role of the US has been abstracted out. Second, the thesis 
provides a snapshot of cross-Strait relations over the last thirty years as a template 
for policy practice.  After the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait relations oscillated 
between convergence and divergence, yet they adhered to a status quo that kept the 
peace. As the thesis indicates, however, cross-Strait relations have not been smooth. 
Specifically, this study serves as a useful basis for the study of realist-constructivist 
approaches in general, the status quo and Taiwan’s political status, party-political 
convergence, legitimacy, conflict resolution and contested state identities. For 
instance, in terms of conflict resolution, Taiwan’s status may be conceived of as 
resolved rather than settled. That is, huadu in the status quo represents a provisional, 
uncoerced accommodation that represents the most powerful social constituencies 
and compels the sanction of a broad legitimacy nexus. A resolution is not definititve, 
yet it does require trust and is not immediately vulnerable to repudiation in a 
reversion to the status quo ante.1022 The Good Friday Agreement and the Northern 
Ireland peace process may be seen in this context - as might relations between the 
UK and the EU. Such relations are not simply economic and rational-choice. They 
rest on on contested state identities, sovereignty and legitimacy. With regard to the 
EU, SIPs in London and Brussels may trump shared liberal democratic values, an 
inter-connected neoliberal economic structure and joint external ties to other 
economies. There are clear parallels between Taiwan’s threat perception around 
ECFA post-Financial-Crash and pro-Brexit threat perception around the negative 
costs of economic integration with the EU in the context of Austerity. The link to 
Britain’s state identity as an offshore balancer in the context of potential EU collapse 
1022 See: de Reuck, Anthony. 1984. The Logic of Conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution. In 
M. Banks. ed. Conflict in World Society. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books: 96–111 at 98; Reus-Smit,
Christian. 2007: 170; Hoffman, Aaron. M. 2002. A Conceptualization of Trust in International
Relations, European Journal of International Relations 8(3): 375-401 at 376.
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is a logical extension. Amelia Hadfield’s historical-cultural NCR study certainly 
provides fascinating insights into the link between national identity and UK foreign 
policy in this regard.1023 Indeed, Hadfield-Amkhan’s loosening of NCR’s positivist 
variables invites a realist-constructivist analysis of power politics, state identity and 
legitimacy in UK-EU relations. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union may also be seen in the 
context of crises of legitimacy, nationalism and shifting state identities and 
normative representations. States may not voluntarily die, but exogenous shocks may 
compel this. A realist-constructivist approach may help explicate the Ukraine’s 
relations with Russia in the context of state identity and threat perception. There are 
also clear implications for Taiwan’s oscillating relations with its former colonial 
master, Japan. In this regard, huadu widens understandings of Taiwan-Japan 
relations. It may explain Taiwan’s “Japan Fever”, or hari, and China’s negative 
response to this.  Taiwan did not suffer under Japan as China did.  
Further academic insights are that, first, this research contributes to the IR literature 
on state identity, legitimacy and foreign policy more specifically. The RC framework 
has clear applications to cases in which the material and the ideational converge. In 
terms of Taiwan Studies, this study contributes to and expands on the debate on 
polarisation and convergence in Taiwan’s domestic politics. For instance, it confirms 
Fell’s thesis around pure and diluted independence in Party Politics in Taiwan, 
Schubert’s overarching consensus and the natural independence of the Sunflower 
Movement. However, in identifying huadu as a state identity, it provides greater 
analytical depth in terms of foreign policy; nations require a state to enact foreign 
1023 Hadfield-Amkhan, Amelia. 2010. British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Neoclassical 
Realism. London: Rowman & Littlefield. 
369 
policy. Furthermore, this study also challenges Schubert’s claim that the taishang do 
not represent a coherent interest group. Crucially, the data suggest that both the 
Sunflowers and Ma Ying-jeou’s KMT administration sanctioned huadu and sought 
to defend the ROC. 
There are further factors that are unique to Taiwan: For instance, this research has 
shown how an unrecognised state that represents one partner in a two-host claim over 
a nation that seeks independence has an identity that actually corresponds to that 
nation, but is itself subject to an irredentist claim by the other partner in the two-host 
phenomenon. It shows how state identity change in a crisis of legitimacy ensures 
state survival and also the de facto survival of the putative independent entity 
assesses the growth of a large neighbour with an irredentist claim by suggesting a 
realist-constructivist framework based on legitimacy and state identity. Taiwanese 
threat perception around China is influenced by material factors such as military 
upgrading and economic convergence. These are crucial but not sufficient 
explanations. We still need state identity in order to clarify and anticipate future 
implications for cross-Strait relations. The rationale behind Taiwan’s elite and 
domestic perceptions provide for action at a government level.  
9.6.2. Policy Implications 
Zhou Enlai’s maxim of “seeking common ground while shelving differences” is 
ubiquitous in Chinese diplomacy and invokes classical-realist morality and 
prudence.1024 It is crucial to the 1992 Consensus and is reflected in Rapprochement in 
1024 This trope is deployed frequently: See PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2012.  Stay Committed to Peaceful Development 
and Win-Win Cooperation, Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun at the Eighth Lanting 
Forum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 28, 2012. [online] Available at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/lantingluntan_665724/t1001499.shtml  [Accessed 
30 August 2018]. 
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Ma Ying-jeou’s “easy first; hard later; economics first; politics later”. As such, it 
typifies the pragmatism and prudence of huadu.  Such common sense might be said 
to reflect the faltering course of cross-Strait relations from 1992 to 2016.  There were 
two honeymoons: 1987 to 1993 and 2008 to 2014, with confrontation and wary 
engagement in the meantime. Rapprochement proved too much and tested the hard 
issue of state identity, confirming Carr’s contention that politics trump economics.1025 
While business embraced Rapprochement, state identity resisted. The 1992 
Consensus was invoked to resolve matters.  
If Taipei and Beijing clash over the DPP’s acceptance of the 1992 Consensus, does 
that mean it is essential to huadu? The 1992 Consensus encodes and permits huadu, 
but the DPP’s non-recognition does not stop Beijing sanctioning huadu. Huadu is 
Taipei’s state identity under the KMT and the DPP. This suggests that a state identity 
(operating system) can be upgraded or changed, while huadu (software) can be 
swapped. Cross-Strait relations (the network) and the ROC state (the computer) 
cannot. A ROT would involve swapping a computer for one that might not be 
compatible with the network and the computer of the PRC. In this regard, the 1992 
Consensus operates as a firewall – an anti-virus that stops huadu becoming infected 
by taidu or tongyi and thus secures an “aquamarine” status quo. Despite the status 
quo, cross-Strait relations are historically progressive. They are not teleological, yet 
they move. 
9.7. Conclusion  
This chapter has summarised this study’s argument regarding Taiwan’s state identity 
to conclude that huadu accounts for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto 
1025 Carr, Edward Hallett. 2001 [1981, 1964, 1946]. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919 – 1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
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independence and resistance to Beijing’s power. For policymakers and scholars, 
Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence presents a puzzle.   Clearly, to 
understand all the drivers of cross-Strait policy is an impossible task.1026 If cross-
Strait relations continue to be constrained by the failure of Rapprochement and the 
DPP’s refusal semantically to endorse the 1992 Consensus, it does not mean that 
there will be no huadu. Nor does it mean that Beijing will not sanction huadu. After 
all, the absence of a written code of ethics does not entail unethical behaviour.  
At the same time, however, the DPP’s adherence to the status quo coupled with its 
shift to the Right in domestic economic policy endangers the huadu-taidu boundary. 
That is, social movements that grew from the Sunflower Movement identify the DPP 
as the party of the Taiwanese bourgeoisie, which aligns it to taishang and “cross-
Strait capitalist” interests. Given that the DPP defends huadu, if these movements – 
led by the NPP and SDP – do not accept the ROC Constitution, a tendency to 
identify workers’ interests with taidu may prove too hard for huadu to resist.  
Morgenthau argues that, beyond security, states have an interest in peace and that 
power politics, ameliorated by prudence and diplomacy, have the normative purpose 
of achieving peace. “Peace” is a recurring theme in cross-Strait political speech. Two 
recurring phrases in ths study’s data that draw on broader historical Chinese 
discourses are the “peaceful development of cross-Strait relations”, or liang’an 
guanxi heping fazhan and “peace and prosperity”, or heping yu fanrong. Both terms 
are invariably accompanied by the term “for the benefit of the people”, or weile 
renmin de liyi. This can be read as the national interest, since “benefit” and “interest” 
are both liyi. What is remarkable about huadu is that it has secured cross-Strait peace 
1026 Jensen, Lloyd. 1982. Explaining Foreign Policy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall: 267 – 268. 
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so far. Considering that current cross-Strait relations are at a historic low, an explicit 
recognition of huadu’s peace-securing quality and value cannot but help.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Indicative master dictionary 
Category Pattern 
Sovereignty One China; One-China-Respective-Interpretations; Republic of China; ROC; 100 years; ROC constitution; international status; 
national sovereignty; sovereign; independent; international participation; national borders; nation; country; state; 1992 
Consensus; community; peaceful unification; status quo; constitution; Taiwan; Taiwan’s; Taiwanese; Mainland China; cross-
Strait policy; Taiwan Area; Mainland Area; jurisdiction; government; legal; Beijing; Taipei; territory; legislation; political; 
domestic; power; The ROC government; Cross-Strait; cross-Strait relations; side; leaders; officials; the two sides; the other side; 
representatives; competent authorities; agencies; organs; personnel; peaceful development; status quo;   
State 
Identity 
Democratization; democratic; democracy; rule of law; freedom; human rights; freedom of speech; citizen; freedom; public 
opinion; pluralistic; personal liberty; safety; civic society; civil society; human rights; Taiwanese democracy; Taiwan’s 
democracy; democratic values 
Economy Trade; agreements; business; businesspeople; reforms; liberalization; protectionism; investment protection; shared prosperity; 
ECFA; trade in services; Three Links; investment environment; economic development; FTA; financial crisis; manufacturing; 
services; enterprise; economic development; Taiwanese businessmen; TBA; companies; free-trade; FTA; FDI; international 
competitiveness; goods; early harvest; media; jobs; provide assistance; measures; mainland tourists; tourism; telecoms; 
regulations; remittances; output; diversify; dependency; restructuring; trademark; internationalization; individually owned; 
property; competitiveness; intellectual property; TPP; FEPZ; Free Economic Pilot Zone; Trade in Goods; early harvest package; 
zero tariff; mutual recognition agreement; offshore banking units; original design manufacturing; original equipment 
manufacturing; RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) 
Security Threat; Chinese threat; missiles; point; target; defence; national defence; PLA; PLAN; confrontational; peaceful; mutually 
cooperative; problem-solving; ROCAF; ROC forces. 
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Appendix 2: Deonymic and Geonymic Co-text of the Words “Taiwan”, “Taiwanese” and “Taiwan’s” 
Deonym/ge
onym 
adjectival modifiers Adjectival 
predicates 
noun modifiers predicates verbs with name as 
subject 
verbs with name as 
object 
Taiwan democratic; prosperous;  first;  willing; 
[ordinal number]; 
able; grateful; 
small; unable; more; 
proud; competitive; 
ready; interested. 
Strait(s); 
businesspeople; 
business; Relations Act; 
side; people; 
association; company;  
Office; independence; 
enterprise; government; 
Area; society; 
democracy. 
country; be; have; become; 
rank; make; hope; 
sign;  face; do; need; 
provide; receive;  
visit; say; help; enable; 
rank; put; support; make; 
include; allow; give; 
transform  
Taiwanese overseas; fellow; as; young; 
many; courageous; 
chamber; businesspeople 
(men); people; business; 
 fisherman; 
 company; 
enterprise; boat;  
industries; firm; 
investment; community;  
society;   
living on the same land and connected 
to; our fate is; busy all the time; peace-
loving and friendly people;  developing 
their own unique experience; concerned 
with how to invest in China; 
concentrated on one function; a 
passionate people who love to help 
others; open to good diplomatic and 
economic relations with China; creating 
their own society; 
Consider; Identify; 
Organize; Allow; Be; 
Taiwan’s participation; economy; 
development; partner; 
democracy;  industry;  
people; bid; effort; 
competitiveness;  
security; relations; 
sovereignty; society; 
identity; freedom 
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Appendix 3: Word Sketch: Indicative Taiwan sovereignty and identity terms 
Sovereignty-and-State-
Identity-indexing (SSII) 
Term 
Modifying Adjective Verb (subj) Verb (Obj) 
Businessmen/people Taiwan; Taiwanese; Taiwan’s; mainland-based; China-based; local; many;  operate; be; work; make; have; face; 
invest; go; attend; contribute 
visit; participate; encourage; be; care; invite; help; 
attend; include; provide 
Business*; company; 
enterprise; firm;  
Taiwan; Taiwanese; medium-sized; individually-owned; mainland-based; 
domestic; own; Taiwanese-invested; Taiwan-invested; manufacturing; many. 
have; be; face; make; encourage;  invest; 
operate; support; establish; lead; 
do; encourage; help; visit; assist; develop; be; run; 
conduct; support;  
People Young; many; Taiwan; Taiwanese; Chinese; indigenous; more; business; 
local; other;  
be; have; make; do; believe; support; live; 
share; think; share; want. 
help; enable; benefit; allow; encourage; say; give; let; 
urge; serve 
society International; (ethnic) Chinese; civil; Taiwan; democratic; pluralistic; open; 
just; Taiwanese; harmonious; modern. 
Be; have; need; provide; become; do; 
regard; continue; recognize; regard; 
respect. 
Be; build; establish; create; age; become; make; have; 
base; characterize; serve. 
experience Taiwanese; Taiwan’s; successful; developmental; valuable; abundant; 
practical; past; own; share;. 
Be; have; show; leave; make; gain; prove; 
provide 
Share; have; exchange; be; accumulate; use; learn; gain; 
provide; offer 
identity National; Taiwan’s; Taiwan; Taiwanese; own; common; cultural; great-China; be Strengthen; confirm; have; verify; base; regard; 
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system; separate; ethnic. establish; be. 
culture Chinese; Taiwan’s; traditional; Hakka; diverse; high-quality; ethnic; 
indigenous; rich; unique; local; different 
Be; have; make;  Promote; be; create; preserve; develop; experience; 
admire; appreciate; enrich; share; have 
democracy Taiwan’s; freedom; constitutional; young, mature; new; true; human rights; 
sovereignty; political; full-fledged; liberal 
Be; have; do; become; take; face; win; 
play; grow; show 
Promote; deepen; consolidate; emerge; uphold; pursue; 
become; strengthen; establish; safeguard 
investment Foreign; mainland; trade; total; Taiwan’s; private; more; two-way; Taiwanese; 
bilateral 
Be; have; total; reach; increase; create; fall Attract; make; increase; promote; expand; encourage; 
allow; protect; welcome; facilitate 
community International; Taiwan business; world; global; ethnic Chinese; overseas 
Chinese; academic;  Taiwanese; Taiwan’s; local; pacific; democratic 
Be; have; recognize; applaud; understand; 
praise; take; see; ignore; pay; 
Urge; enable; show; help; join; hope; pay; benefit; 
serve; be;  
citizen Fellow; ROC; senior; Taiwan; Taiwanese; Taiwan’s; ordinary; local; private; 
global; Chinese; world 
Be; have; work; reside; live; make; think; 
want; enjoy; approve; support 
Allow; encourage; give; grant; urge; benefit; welcome; 
protect; provide; become; empower; wish; honor; entitle 
participation Taiwan’s; meaningful; international; active; enthusiastic; great; political; 
public; full; ROC; equal;  
Be; have Support; expand; seek; have; advocate; increase; 
include; pursue; promote; encourage 
economy Taiwan’s; Global; world; large; knowledge-based; second; domestic; market; 
robust; China’s; nation’s; Asian; efficiency-driven; innovation-driven; 
country’s; 
Be; have; recover; begin; grow; continue; 
face; become; move; improve 
Develop; revitalize; stimulate; boost; help; emerge; 
improve; revive; reinvigorate; strengthen 
development Economic; Taiwan’s; peaceful; sustainable; national; democratic; future; 
industrial; stable; positive; further; social; nation’s country’s ROC’s. 
Be; have; show; please; indicate; 
demonstrate; point; need; give; make. 
Promote; support; pursue; see; foster; ensure; boost; 
maintain; spur; boost; achieve 
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security National; Taiwan’s; regional; important; economic; public; food; banking; 
social; nation’s. 
Be; have Ensure; be; safeguard; maintain; defend; threaten; 
protect; strengthen; enhance; concern 
sovereignty National; Taiwan’s; popular; nation’s;  ROC’s; territorial; ROC; China’s; 
country’s; independent 
Be; have; belong; lie; claim; do; rest; 
remain 
Defend; safeguard; have; regard; maintain; claim; 
exercise; uphold; involve; vest; preserve 
Interests National; Taiwan’s; common; mutual; good; great; public; overall; own; keen; 
business; country’s. 
be Protect; have; safeguard; express; serve; share; 
represent; pursue; show; ensure 
freedom Democracy; press; religious; personal; peace; Taiwan’s; complete; speech; 
human rights; great; economic; political 
Be; have Enjoy; protect; defend; uphold; have; pursue; promote; 
safeguard; ensure; embrace; seek 
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Appendix 4: Word Sketch of Discourses in Taiwanese Political Speech. 
Discourses adjectives Verbs (subj)  Verbs (obj) 
Status quo Peaceful; of peace and prosperity; current; present; of peace and stability; of no 
unification, no independence and no use of force; of Taiwan(‘s) being;  independent; 
stable;  
Be; do exhibit; continue; Maintain; change; define; defend; undermine; 
sustain; threaten; safeguard; create; be; 
One-China Principle; policy; dispute; respective interpretations; resolution; different 
interpretations 
Be;  Adhere to; accept 
consensus 1992; Taiwan; cross-Strait; national; broad; basic; social; initial; public; internal; 
concrete; joint 
Be; have; regard; serve; reach; exist; follow; 
provide; do 
Reach; be; forge; build; form; accept; have; seek; 
achieve; consolidate 
ECFA Negotiation; agreement; Early-harvest list; early-harvest program; work; certificate; 
implementation; item; talk; phase; plan; people; issue 
Be; have; take; cover; do; constitute; come; 
bring; damage; relate; focus; require; include 
Sign; support; promote; conclude; negotiate; 
review; regard; have; pass; approve; implement; 
make 
independence Taiwan; de jure; energy; judicial; economic; formal; unification; national;  Be;  Declare; gain; promote; seek; pursue; oppose; 
achieve; ensure; support; advocate. 
threat Military; China’s; Beijing’s; serious; missile; great; external; potential; big; major; 
security; nuclear. 
be Pose; be; face; reduce; renounce; increase; deter; 
constitute; minimize; address;  
Military threat China’s; Beijing’s; constant; perennial; persistent; constant; perennial; strategy—
posing; ever-mounting; unconventional; unrelenting; two-pronged; view; massive; prc  
Increase; face; pose; reduce; be; grow; 
overlook; mount;  
Be; intimidate; characterize; exist 
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Appendix 5: Concordance Lines: Taiwan’s Predications 
. 
380 
Appendix 6: Pan-Chinese Diplomatic Rhetoric (Argumentation Schemes and Rhetorical Patterns) 
Text Structure and themes Argumentation: Claims and topoi -(false) warrants and 
appeals 
Opening remarks Argument: This historical meeting must agree to pursue the 
cross-Strait status quo based on the 1992 Consensus because it 
is that which has brought peace and prosperity and which is in 
the interests of the people on both sides. 
Today Mr. Xi and I, as leaders of mainland China and Taiwan, respectively, have moved on from the past 66 years, 
reaching out to share this handshake, to hold the past, embrace the future, and uphold the aspirations for prosperity of 
the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This carries historic significance.  
T: Making history  
T: (common) interest of 
prosperity 
Claim 1: This meeting is historic and interest-reflecting. 
Topos of improved history and interests 
Topos of teleology linked to interests 
Twenty-two years ago, in April 1993, Mr. Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫), chairman of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation, 
and Mr. Wang Daohan (汪道涵), chairman of mainland China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, 
met in Singapore. Four agreements were signed, laying the groundwork for institutionalized cross-strait consultations. 
Twelve years ago, in October 2003, I met with the founding Prime Minister and Senior Advisor of Singapore Lee Kuan 
Yew at the East Asia Economic Summit. We both believed then that cross-strait developments must be based on the 
interests of the people.  
T: Historical lead-up 
T: (common) interests of 
the people 
Topos of teleology and appeal to common interests and 
identities 
Topos of ‘it’s now or never’ 
At this moment, Mr. Xi and I are sitting across from each other, gathered together in one room. Behind us is the 
historical backdrop of six decades of separate governance on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Before us lie the 
accomplishments that the two sides have achieved in the past few years through our commitment to replacing 
antagonism with dialogue and confrontation with rapprochement. We hold in our hands the future objective of 
sustainable peace and prosperity. At this time, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are proclaiming loudly and clearly to 
the rest of the world our determination to consolidate peace in the Taiwan Strait and the message that we will promote 
peace in the region.  
T: Linking the past, present 
and future 
T: Visible 
accomplishments through 
dialogue 
T: (common) interest of 
Claim 2: Peace has allowed cooperation 
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peace 
Over the past 66 years, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have developed under different systems. That we have been 
able to shift from military confrontation to cooperative exchanges is certainly not an overnight achievement. Over the 
past seven-plus years, the two sides have concluded 23 agreements, and have created over 40,000 student exchanges, 8 
million annual cross-strait visits, and US$170 billion in two-way trade. The foundation for these momentous changes is 
peace. 
T: From confrontation to 
cooperation through peace 
Topos of teleology 
Appeal to authority 
Appeal to common interests and identities 
History has bequeathed the two sides of the Taiwan Strait an epochal and convoluted issue that, as Shang Shu (The 
Book of Documents, 尚書) says, is easy to understand but difficult to resolve. Sensitive issues on which each side 
maintains a firm position must be faced squarely and pragmatically, and handled with wisdom, patience, and good will 
by both sides. In the meantime, we can devote continued effort, through institutionalized consultations that we have 
facilitated over recent years, to building rapprochement and cooperation, and to promoting sustainable peace and 
prosperity. This is a common aspiration of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as well as the international community. 
T: Resolution of historical 
difficulties through détente  
T: interest of peace and 
prosperity 
Topos of history and culture 
Today I wish to put forth five points for maintaining the status quo of peace and prosperity in the Taiwan Strait. T: maintenance of the 
status quo of peace and 
prosperity 
Claim 3: We should continue with the status quo 
Topos of peace and prosperity 
Claim 4: the 1992 Consensus led to peace and prosperity  
Topos of peaceful development 
First, consolidation of the 1992 Consensus and the maintenance of peace. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
arrived at the 1992 Consensus of “one China, respective interpretations” in November 1992. This consensus provides the 
common political basis for the two sides to promote peaceful development. It is because the two sides share a common 
T: 1992 Consensus is basis 
of détente and peaceful 
development 
Claim 4: We should continue with détente 
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respect for this consensus that, over the past seven and a half years, we have reaped many rewards and ensured peace 
and prosperity—which includes the conclusion of 23 agreements—leading to the most peaceful and stable cross-strait 
relations in 66 years. I will elaborate on this point later in our meeting. 
Second, reduction of hostility and peaceful handling of disputes. The two sides are no longer in a state of 
confrontation. Both sides should continue to reduce hostility and resolve disputes in a peaceful manner. 
T: Peaceful development 
Third, expansion of cross-strait exchanges and mutual benefits. Efforts should be stepped up to resolve issues such 
as a trade-in-goods agreement, reciprocal establishment of representative offices, and flight transfers in Taiwan for 
mainland Chinese travelers, so as to create a win-win situation for both sides. 
T: increased exchanges 
create common benefits 
Claim 5: We should increase economic convergence 
Topos of win-win 
Fourth, establishment of a cross-strait hotline to handle important or urgent matters. A liaison mechanism is 
already in place between the heads of the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations across the 
Taiwan Straits, as well as between the deputy heads of the Mainland Affairs Council and the Taiwan Affairs Office. A 
hotline between the heads of the MAC and the TAO should be set up to deal with important or urgent issues. 
T: High-level cross-strait 
hotline 
Claim 6: We should have direct ministerial contact 
Appeal to urgency 
Fifth, joint cooperation for cross-strait prosperity. The people of both sides are Chinese, descendants of the 
emperors Yan and Huang. The two sides should cooperate to promote cross-strait prosperity. 
T: Cooperation in interests 
of mutual prosperity 
T: common Chinese 
identity 
Claim 7: We should increase P2P contact. 
Topoi of historical identity and foundational myths 
Topos of common Chinese identity and culture bringing 
material benefits 
These five points are not aimed at achieving selfish goals or unilateral gains, but a better future for coming generations. 
Both sides should accord great importance to the values and way of life that our people cherish, maintain cross-strait 
peace, and ensure mutual benefits and success for both sides with the wisdom embedded in Chinese culture. 
T: Selfless purpose of 
suggestions 
T: common Chinese 
normative and cultural 
identity 
383 
Cross-strait relations are at their most peaceful and stable since 1949. In the past few years, I have often seen students 
from the two sides talking, taking part in sports, playing music, and enjoying themselves together on university 
campuses around Taiwan. This natural gathering of students is very touching. They show passion and creativity, with no 
enmity or historical burden. They are able to build friendships at an early stage of life; this will certainly cement a strong 
foundation for sustainable cross-strait peace. We must cherish and expand on this foundation. 
T: Most peaceful CSRs 
T: Young people without 
burden of history 
T: interest of peace 
Topos of beauty of youth 
As Northern Song dynasty scholar Zhang Heng-qu (張橫渠, 1020-1077) advised: Devote your heart to heaven and earth, 
devote your life to the people, uphold the wisdom of past sages, create peace for generations to come. For the people of 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait, let us work together, devote our lives to our people, create peace for generations to 
come, and open a new chapter of peace and a glorious future.  
T: future peace and glory Appeal to historical authority topos of shared Chinese identity 
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Appendix 7: Discourse of Taiwanese Identity (Linguistic Means of Realisation) 
Questions Discursive Strategies Purpose 
How are people, places and 
things related to Taiwanese 
identity referred to 
linguistically? 
Nomination strategies Discursive construction of political actors 
• personal names 
Mr Xi; Mr Koo Chen-fu; Mr Wang Daohan; Lee Kwan Yew, Yan; Huang; Zhang Heng-qu 
• titles 
chairman; leader; prime minister; senior adviser; emperors; deputy heads; scholar; sages; heads;  
• national toponyms 
Singapore; the two sides (of the Taiwan Strait); both sides;  mainland China; Taiwan; Taiwan’s; mainland China’s; cross-strait; Chinese;  
• sub-state names 
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF); Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait; Mainland Affairs Council (MAC); Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO); 
representative offices; East Asia Economic Summit;  
• geographic toponyms 
the region; in the Taiwan Strait; around Taiwan 
• deictic and anaphoric reference 
  I, we (both); us; our; they; your; across from 
  each other; gathered together in one room;  
  before us; this;  
• collectives, including national anthroponyms 
the people; the people of both sides; our people; travellers; coming generations; generations to come; students (from the two sides);  
Discursive construction of things 
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• material 
handshake; one room; accomplishments; message; groundwork; military confrontation; cooperative exchanges; 23 agreements; 40,000 student exchanges; 
cross-strait exchanges; 8 million annual cross-strait visits; US$170 billion in two-way trade; achievements; issue; Shang Shu, Northern Song Dynasty; 
consolidation; maintenance; rewards; meeting; disputes; expansion; liaison mechanism; representative offices; flight transfers; hotline; university campuses; 
separate governance 
• ideational 
o institutional 
Cross-strait relations; 1992 Consensus; Once China Respective Interpretations (OCRI); interests; agreements; institutionalized cross-strait consultations; 
cross-strait developments; systems; the international community; separate governance; the rest of the world; institutionalised consultations; status quo; 
common political basis; joint cooperation; trade in goods agreement; 
o mental 
peace; prosperity; historical backdrop; (common) aspirations; commitment; antagonism; dialogue; confrontation; rapprochement; objective; determination; 
achievement; difficult issues; wisdom; patience; good will; peaceful development; (common) respect; hostility; mutual benefits; win-win situation; cross-
strait prosperity; selfish goals; unilateral gains; better future; importance; success; wisdom; passion; creativity; enmity; historical burden; friendships; 
foundation; 
o normative 
values; way of life; Chinese culture;  
o temporal 
   the past 66 years; the past; the present;  the future; twenty-two years ago; April 1993; twelve years ago; six decades; the past few years; at this 
time; overnight; the past seven years plus; in the meantime; over recent years; in November 1992; over the past seven and a half years; in 66 years; 
discursive characterization/ qualification of people, places and things (more or less positively or negatively) 
• Political actors: political elites have acted wisely in the interests of the people; the people share common interests and identities 
• Things: teleological move from conflict to peace and prosperity through rapprochement 
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What characteristics and 
qualities are attributed to 
people, places and things? 
predication strategies 
persuading addressees of the truth of speaker’s claims 
• Claims of truth regarding existence of, reasons for and effects of cross-Strait peace and prosperity 
• Claims of normative rightness regarding need and desire for cross-Strait peace and prosperity 
• Claims of ‘should’ regarding future actions 
positioning the animator’s point of view (identity?) and expressing involvement or distance (solidarity or power?) 
• ideological perspectives: commercial liberalism and rapprochement bring peace; elite-driven common interests and identities constitute each
other 
• grammatical distancing: ‘Four agreements were signed’ 
modifying illocutionary force through implicature, epistemic and deontic modality 
• explicit 
maintain the status quo 
• implicature 
• All rhetorical fallacies contain implicatures and presuppositions 
• presuppositions 
Both sides share common interests and identities; peace and prosperity outweigh all other considerations;  
• epistemic 
o mitigation 
fallacy of submission: ‘Taiwan respectively’;  
topos of formulaic denial of separate sovereignty: mainland China; the two sides; cross-strait; Mr Xi;  
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What arguments are employed 
in discourses of Taiwanese 
identity? 
From what perspective are these 
nominations, attributions and 
arguments expressed? 
Are the utterances explicit, 
implicit intensified or 
mitigated? 
argumentation 
strategies 
perspectivization 
strategies 
mitigation and 
intensification 
strategies 
fallacy of ‘the people’, diminishing separate national identities – which people? 
o intensification 
fallacy of false ascription and co-option: ascribing peace and prosperity to the actions of elites who share common interests and identities with 
constituencies. Use of pronouns of solidarity (we, our); assumed warrants (through);  
Fallacy of authority: ‘as leaders of mainland China and Taiwan’; 
Fallacy of appeal to history: History as a teleology, the weight of history. 
Fallacy of appeal to authority: Lee Kuan Yew, Koo Chen-fu, Wang Daohan, shang shu, Northern Song Dynasty. 
Fallacy of ‘now or never’ 
Use of positive verb and noun forms 
False warrant regarding support for 1992 Consensus and OCRI and link between these and peace. 
Fallacy of beauty of youth and shared identity and interests linked to future peace 
Fallacy of win-win through ‘so as’ 
• Deontic 
o mitigation 
o intensification 
Use of ‘we both’; modal verb ‘must’; ‘let’s’; ‘should’; 
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